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1. The distinctive phenomenology of empathy 
 
 
 
In this opening chapter, I introduce and motivate the work as a whole by offering a preliminary 
take on one of its central thematic threads: the phenomenology of empathy. I begin by considering 
one way of thinking about empathy, classically defended by Theodor Lipps and recently 
rehabilitated by ‘simulationist’ accounts of social cognition, that construes it as a kind of 
imaginative re-enactment that projectively comprehends other minds through imitative capacities. 
Drawing upon the work of Edmund Husserl and his student and collaborator Edith Stein, I then 
outline an alternative approach to empathy, one that is more sensitive to the distinctive way in 
which others are given. As I try to show, the analyses of Husserl and Stein reveal a basic form of 
empathy that amounts to a perception-like experience of other embodied subjects, a form of 
experience that stands in contrast both to the perception of material things and to self-
consciousness. This basic kind of empathy serves as presupposition and motivational basis for a 
more active form, which re-accomplishes the other’s intentional acts and explicates their context 
in the other’s world-directed experiential life. Contrasting my reading of Husserlian empathy with 
that offered by Theunissen, I then suggest that a structural account of empathy only gets us so far, 
and that further clarification requires us to consider a set of further questions. It invites us to 
explicate the distinctive character of our perception of things and of self-awareness, as well as to 
clarify the difference between grasping another embodied subjectivity and recognising another 
person, issues with I try to address in the thesis as a whole. Finally, I outline the textual approach 
employed in the remainder of the dissertation, as well as sketching the contents of the chapters 
which follow. 
 
 
§1.1 | Empathy: a (very) brief historical overview 
 
 
The English term ‘empathy’ only dates back to the beginning of the 20th Century, when it was 
first coined by Edward Titchner in 1909 to translate the concept of Einfühlung as employed by the 
German philosopher and psychologist Theodor Lipps. While the term was already positively 
employed in the philosophical writings of J. G. Herder in the late 18th Century,1 and later used in 
19th Century German aesthetics to designate an ability to ‘feel oneself into’ (Ein-fühlen) works of 
art,2 the now ubiquitous association of empathy with interpersonal relations can be largely traced 
back to Lipps’ work. Since Lipps was both a source of inspiration and a target of opposition for 
Husserl and Stein, outlining the basic features of his account can thus be of aid in clarifying their 
own position. 
                                                           
1 See, in particular, his remarkable essay from 1774 ‘This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation 
of Humanity’ (Herder, 2004, pp. 291-2). 
2 To my knowledge, the earliest use of Einfühlung in aesthetics occurs in Vischer (1873). 
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Lipps argued that there are three distinct regions of knowledge, namely, knowledge of the 
material world, self-knowledge, and knowledge of other selves. While the first region has as its 
source sensuous perception and the second inner perception, our knowledge of other selves is 
rooted in empathy, which should accordingly be understood as a basic concept for both 
psychology and sociology.3 Consequently, for Lipps, empathy is “the name for an original and 
irreducible, yet simultaneously wondrous, state of affairs,” namely the ability to “co-grasp” foreign 
mental states “in and with” the perceptual apprehension of foreign bodies. Lipps’ claim that 
empathy is an irreducible source of knowledge of other minds partially stems from his belief that, 
rather than being rooted in analogical inference, our basic grasp of other minds is a more 
“immediate” accomplishment. As he hastens to add, however, this should not lead us to believe 
that we can “see” or “know immediately” the other’s anger itself, since the latter is something non-
perceivable which can only be directly known by the person who feels it. Rather, our awareness of 
another person’s affective state “in” her bodily expressions must be attributed, not to a direct 
experience of that state, but to what he calls the “instinct of empathy,” which itself has two 
components, the “instinct of imitation” and the “tendency of expression.”4 Lipps’ proposal, 
briefly, is that when perceptually faced with another’s body as physically contorted in a certain 
way, the empathiser feels an instinctive tendency to imitate the other’s bodily contortion. If this 
bodily contortion coincides with one she has previously performed in instinctively expressing an 
emotion, then her tendency to imitate it in its turn reproduces an experience she has earlier had of 
‘this’ emotion. This recollected affect is then “represented” or “thought into” (vorgestellt, 
hineingedacht) the other’s gesture as something which belongs to and is intimated in it.5 Furthermore, 
Lipps claims that empathy is not limited to the rather weak and preliminary ability to project one’s 
own (past) emotional states into other people’s bodily gestures; rather, in a second step, the 
empathising subject is instinctively moved to express and feel the otherwise merely recollected 
emotion in the present. Consequently, unless the natural course of empathising is interrupted by 
internal or external circumstances, empathy instinctively develops into a state of sympathy or 
emotional sharing (Sympathie, Mitfühlen), in which the empathising subject not only represents a 
mental state as belonging to the other’s gesture, but actually feels and lives through the relevant 
emotion ‘with’ the other.6  
As Zahavi and others have shown, far from being an antiquated peculiarity from the 
history of psychology, echoes of Lipps’ work reverberate through the (recently rejuvenated) 
discussion of empathy in contemporary philosophy and cognitive science, although he is less often 
referred to.7 While other phenomenologists have made valuable contributions in critically and 
comprehensively engaging with this discussion, I will consider only one philosopher influential 
within it, Stueber, whose arguments significantly intersect with those developed in the present 
work.  
One of the central claims in Stueber’s (explicitly neo-Lippsian) account is that an adequate 
theory of interpersonal understanding must recognise a distinction between two different types of 
empathy.  On the one hand, basic empathy involves an ability to quasi-perceptually recognize other 
                                                           
3 Lipps (1909, p. 222; 1907, p. 713). 
4 Lipps (1907, pp. 713-4). 
5 Lipps (1907, pp. 718-9; cf. 1909, p. 228). 
6 Lipps (1907, pp. 719-20). 
7 For seminal examples of this, see: Zahavi (2014, Part II), Zahavi & Overgaard (2012), and Ratcliffe 
(2012). 
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persons as minded beings, as well as to identify certain of their more embodied mental states, 
allowing us to apprehend, in Stueber’s words, “that another person is angry, or that he intends to 
grasp a cup.” Drawing upon the recent neuroscientific discovery of so-called ‘mirror neurons,’ 
Stueber argues that this primitive ability to recognise others’ emotions and actions involves 
“various cross-modal matching mechanisms,” each of which make use of the internal architecture 
of my own embodied emotions and actions to interpret the other’s body, hence “allowing me 
directly to map observed bodily movements onto to a motor representation or an observed facial 
expression onto mechanisms that are involved in the production of my own characteristic 
expressions of an emotion.” As such, Stueber is surely correct in characterising his theory of basic 
empathy as an empirically-informer successor to “Lipps’ conception of empathy as mechanisms 
of inner imitations.”8  
Reenactive empathy, on the other hand, involves actively imitating the other’s experiences 
through imagination, a process which aims to achieve a more complex understanding of the other 
person’s mental states by uncovering the reasons and motives which underlie her thoughts, 
emotions, and actions, and which allow them to be assessed in terms of their appropriateness with 
respect to rational norms. Crucially, Stueber claims that reenactive empathy plays a central and 
unique role in interpersonal understanding, since it is only through reproducing an experiential 
episode as if were our own that we can understand the subject of the episode as a rational agent. In 
support of this claim, he appeals to certain distinctive features which he regards as necessary 
conditions for our mental states exhibiting rationality and norm-responsiveness—namely, their 
contextuality and indexicality—arguing that understanding mental states in terms of these features 
necessarily requires situating them within a first-personal perspective. Once this is established, it 
follows that understanding others’ mental states as enactments of rational agents requires 
reenactive empathy, since it necessarily requires us to put ourselves “in the other person’s shoes” 
and seek to understand her mental states as if they were our own, thus providing them with the 
first-personal framework necessary for their rationality to be comprehended and assessed.9 Briefly 
put, Stueber’s thought here is that to construe a person’s thoughts, emotions, and actions as 
context-appropriate and as motivationally related to other thoughts, emotions, and actions had by 
the same person—and thus as participating in rational agency—it is necessary to imaginatively 
reconstruct the other person’s own first personal perspective (reenactive empathy), and not merely 
to quasi-perceptually identify the other person’s discrete mental states (basic empathy). 
As in Stueber’s work, a major concern of this study will be to offer an account connecting 
the basic recognition of foreign mindedness and the higher-order understanding of others as 
rational agents—or, in my preferred (Husserlian) terminology: personal selves. Accordingly, a detailed 
assessment of reenactive empathy will have to wait until much later (§5.4). Moreover, it will only 
be by the end of this chapter that the non-imitative and non-projective take on basic empathy 
defended by Husserl and Stein will begin to become clear, and even in this regard further 
refinements will later be necessary. However, it will nevertheless be fruitful here to provisionally 
                                                           
8 Stueber (2006, pp. 21, 142, 20, 117). See Zahavi (2012) for a Husserlian assessment of the implications 
of the discovery of ‘mirror neurons.’ 
9 Stueber (2006, pp. 21, 152, 160, 164-5). Stueber often presents his arguments for re-enactive empathy as 
criticisms of the theory of mind approach adopted by, e.g., Wellman (1990) and Gopnik and Meltzoff 
(1997), as well as of some hybrid theorists such as Nichols and Stitch (2003), as these thinkers deny re-
enactive simulation an epistemically central role in social cognition (cf. 2006, pp. 165–171). 
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consider the continuities and differences relating the Husserl-Stein account of empathy to the kind 
of theory offered by Lipps and Stueber. At this stage, four issues can be distinguished:  
(I.) An influential idea in 19th and 20th century philosophy and psychology, associated 
historically with Mill,10 and more recently with ‘theory of mind’ accounts of social cognition,11 
stipulates that our knowledge of other minds is rooted in analogical inference. Unlike introspective 
knowledge of one’s own mind and perceptual knowledge of the outer world, the analogical 
inferentialist notes that we are in possession of no faculty which would make possible immediate 
knowledge of other minds. Consequently, my knowledge of the minds of others must be based 
upon an inference that concludes, on the basis of a mind-body connection in my own case, and 
the similarity of my own behaviour with that of another body, that this other body is itself 
connected to another mind. Like Lipps, Husserl and Stein decisively reject this reasoning. On the 
one hand, both Lipps and Husserl note that this so-called analogical inference lacks logical validity. 
Rather than legitimising belief in the existence of other minds, the most that can be inferred from 
the observation that an event physically resembles an expressive bodily movement of my own is the 
(somewhat paltry) conclusion that there are worldly events that are physically similar to my 
expressive movements, but which do not express my psychic life.12 On the other hand, Stein argues 
that the theory of analogical influence simply ignores the “experience of foreign consciousness,” 
and as such altogether overlooks the “phenomenon” of empathy—an option which is arguably 
inadvisable for the psychologist and flatly impossible for the phenomenologist. While 
acknowledging that analogical reasoning is occasionally made use of in interpersonal 
understanding, Stein points out that its appropriate function is not to yield the bare recognition of 
foreign bodily movements as mentally expressive. Rather, in our everyday familiarity with others, 
the analogical use of our own experiential past to understand the mind of the other only comes 
into play in the formation of probable belief regarding a bodily expression (or personal event) 
whose specific significance eludes us. As such, it both rests upon and transgresses our ordinary 
experience of other minded beings, rather than accounting for the very foundation of the latter.13 
(II.) More positively, Lipps’ core claim that empathy is a unique and irreducible experiential 
accomplishment and a basic source of knowledge of other minds was taken over and arguably 
radicalised by the early phenomenologists. Indeed, Stein is willing to claim that empathy is “a kind 
of experiential act sui generis,” defining it as “the experience of foreign consciousness in general,” 
while Husserl would later write that “the intentionality in one’s own Ego which leads into the 
foreign Ego is the so-called empathy.”14 To anticipate a claim that will be further developed in the 
next section, Husserl and Stein argue that—like our perceptual contact with material things and, 
arguably, our emotive contact with the value of such things—empathy involves a non-inferential 
                                                           
10 Mill (1872, pp. 243-4); for discussion, see Avramides (2001, pp. 167-9). 
11 See the footnote before the last. 
12 Lipps (1907, pp. 706-7). Husserl’s formulation of this criticism of the theory of analogical inference, 
which he describes as an eminent piece of sophistry [Hauptsophisma], occurs in a manuscript from 1907 or 
1908, which appears to have been written without any knowledge of Lipps’ objection (cf. Hua VIII 36-8). 
When referring to Husserl I typically provide only the pagination for the relevant Husserliana volume, 
since this is given in the margins of the English translations (where available); the exception here being 
the translations of Logical Investigations and Ideas I, for which I also include the pagination of the English 
edition. 
13 Stein (2008, pp. 40-2; 1989, pp. 26-7). In the following I will refer to Stein (2008) as ‘Stein (Einfühlung)’ 
and Stein (1989) as ‘Stein (Empathy)’. 
14 Stein (Einfühlung, p. 20; Empathy, p. 11); Hua IX 321. 
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mode of experiential access to other minded beings, one which provides a prima facie justificatory 
basis for those of our judicative beliefs which concern the mental lives of others. 
However, Husserl and Stein also offer a starkly different construal of this basic experiential 
and epistemic directedness towards others. One of the most important features of this controversy 
was their insistence that the immediacy and distinctiveness of empathy was not only a matter of 
its non-inferential character, but also of its distinction from a Lippsian process which combines 
elements of body-perception, self-experience, and ultimately projection.  
(III.) On the one hand, while acknowledging that Lipps was sensitive to the logical 
inadequacy of analogical inferentialism, Husserl and Stein both question whether his own account 
offers the measure of explanatory value he finds lacking in the inferential theory. Echoing Lipps’ 
own critique of analogical inferentialism, Stein notes that someone who perceives a physical entity, 
the movements of which instinctively evoke a tendency to express and re-live an emotional state 
of her own, does not thereby “arrive at the phenomenon of foreign lived experience, but at a lived 
experience of her own awoken by the seen foreign gestures.”15 One way of putting Stein’s 
objection here is that, since one must first have some grasp of what the other is going through in 
order to recognise a similarity between one’s own experiences and those of the other, it is logically 
muddled and epistemically inadequate to suggest that the most fundamental way of understanding 
the emotive state of another could be constituted by the imitative enactment of a state of our own 
that putatively approximates the other’s (otherwise indiscernible) affect. Consequently, Stein 
suggests that Lipps’ imitative theory is better equipped to account for emotional contagion or 
motor mimicry than for an epistemic grasp of other minds.16 In place of Lipps’ explanatory appeal 
to instinctive imitation, which Husserl dismisses as “a refuge of phenomenological ignorance,” the 
phenomenologist of empathy must rather reflectively attend to the distinctive kind of “experiential 
apperception” by means of which the other shows up as other, with the aim of tracing out the typical 
style of “exhibition and repudiation” implicated in the experience of empathy.17 
(IV.) An arguably more fundamental worry Stein and Husserl express regarding Lipps’ 
view is that in modelling our basic empathetic grasp of other minds on the (projection of) self-
experience, one overlooks the phenomenological fact that the givenness of the mental lives of 
others is entirely different from the givenness of one’s own mental life, having its own distinctive 
structure which phenomenological reflection can tease apart.18 To come face to face with another 
person’s sadness is, after all, quite different from feeling sad oneself or remembering a sadness one 
felt earlier.19 And if, upon encountering another’s sadness, one finds oneself sharing the other 
sadness or sympathising with it, then this shared or sympathetic sadness is not the basic empathetic 
access one has to the other’s sadness but something more complex built upon and presupposing 
it.20 In short, empathy and self-awareness (in its various forms) do not only target a different object; 
as intentional experiences they also differ fundamentally in type and composition. Thus, when 
Lipps postulates that empathetic understanding ultimately requires the empathiser to first-
personally feel the other’s emotion through instinctive re-enactment, Husserl and Stein accuse him 
                                                           
15 Stein (Einfühlung, p. 36; Empathy, p. 23). 
16 Stein (Einfühlung, pp. 36-7; Empathy, pp. 23-4). 
17 Hua XIII 23-4 
18 Stein (Einfühlung, pp. 23-4, 28; Empathy, pp. 13-14, 17). 
19 Stein (Einfühlung, p. 20; Empathy, p. 11). 
20 Stein (Einfühlung, pp. 24-5, 28-9; Empathy, pp. 14-15, 17-18). 
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of overlooking a central feature of empathetic acquaintance: namely, its contrast with self-
experience—an objection which one could also put to Stueber’s later account.21 
(V.) Finally, both Husserl and Stein attack Lipps’ underlying presupposition that all that 
can be directly experienced of another person are the merely physical features of her body, arguing 
that such a postulated gap between foreign mindedness and the directly given is completely at odds 
with our lived acquaintance with others. As Husserl puts it, a basic form of empathy is rather “an 
immediate experience of others,” in that our perception of another person is not merely instinctively 
accompanied by, but rather includes a certain “experience [of] the other’s lived experiences,” this 
being “accomplished as one with the originary experience of the [other’s] living body.”22 As will 
become clear in the next section, rather than beginning with the presupposition that other minds 
are (invisible) entities accessible only through the projection of one’s own mental states into 
otherwise inanimate bodies (Lipps), the Husserl-Stein account of empathy begins by attempting 
to articulate the sense and manner in which others are directly visible as minded beings. 
 
 
§1.2 | Empathy in Husserl and Stein 
 
 
It is possible to say ‘I read timidity in his face’ but at all events the timidity does not seem to be merely 
associated, outwardly connected, with the face; but fear is there, alive, in the features. 
L. Wittgenstein23 
 
For Husserl and Stein, then, empathy is both our basic mode of access to other minded beings, 
and an irreducible form of intentional experience with a unique structure. As we shall see in this 
section, this unique mode of intentionality is nevertheless multi-layered, incorporating different 
modes of accomplishment. Moreover, while the claim that empathy has sui generis intentional 
structure stipulates that empathetic acts are not composed of or identical to other intentional acts, 
this does not prevent it from exhibiting some of the characteristic features of other modes of 
intentionality. While the most primitive form of empathy can be described as a perception-like 
experience, a more active form of empathy is more akin to imagination. 
 
§1.2.1 | Empathy as perceptual (or perception-like) experience 
 
One of the more intriguing traits of the Husserl-Stein account of empathy is their claim that a 
basic form of empathy shares important characteristics with the perceptual experience of non-
minded entities, without nevertheless being strictly identical to the latter. To illustrate this thought, 
consider a perceptual episode which might be expressed by the following description: 
(1) “On turning the street corner, I saw a blue car heading straight towards me.” 
                                                           
21 Ibid.; cf. Hua XIII 24, 38-41. 
22 Hua IV-2/V-2 649, 307 (Hua IV 385, 208) [1917, 1917/18]. Husserl elsewhere appeals to the 
perceptual character of empathy as a refutation of Lipps’ theory (Hua XIII 40-1), while Stein counters 
what she regards as Lipps’ fixation on the ‘symbolic’ function of bodily movements by emphasising 
perceptual modes of empathy (Einfühlung, pp. 101-2).  
23 Wittgenstein (1968, §537). 
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(1) expresses a certain kind of perceptual episode, and by reflecting upon it one may identify certain 
general features of perceptual experience, of which I will emphasise just three. (i) In perceiving an 
object, such as ‘a blue car’, or state of affairs, such as ‘a blue car moving towards me’, what we are 
directly and immediately acquainted with is just the perceived object or state of affairs itself. In 
such cases, we take the object which appears to us to be the spatiotemporal object that is really there 
before us. This differs markedly from the way we experience an object in, say, imagination: in 
imagining ‘a blue car moving towards me,’ we do not typically take the imaginary object to be 
identical with an actual clunky entity heading in our direction. We can call this feature of perception 
its directness. (ii) A further general feature of perceptual experience is its epistemic role, namely that 
it can provide a prima facie justificatory basis for our (perceptual) judgements. Compare a person 
who thinks she was almost run over this morning, and does so because she earlier had a perceptual 
experience as of a car speeding towards her, with a person who holds the same belief but without 
having had any such experience. The former person surely has a justification for her belief than 
the latter lacks, even if her belief may ultimately be false. Call this the justificatory import of 
perception. (iii) A final feature of perception is what we will call its perspectival character. The 
perceptual experience expressed in (1) is an experience of a spatiotemporal object in motion, but 
it is one in which the moving object appears under a certain aspect or perspective, or more 
accurately, an aspectual series that unfolds as the blue car moves closer to the perceiver. 
Throughout this series, the perceiver does not experience each new aspect as a new object, but 
rather precisely sees the car as appearing under ever-new aspects, in that with each aspectual shift 
certain visible features of an identical object come (more clearly) into view, while others cease to 
be visible. In short, even in a momentary perceptual appearance one can distinguish 
phenomenologically between the presence of the object and that of its visible aspect, where the 
former is irreducible to, and only partially revealed by, the latter.24 
We can now consider to what extent empathetic experience might embody these general 
features. Consider an experience expressed by the following description: 
(2) “On turning the street corner, I saw someone glare at me angrily.” 
There is something inadequate in the suggestion that, were one to turn a corner and face such a 
person, what one would be experientially acquainted with is simply an inanimate entity. One might 
conclude from this that an empathetic grasp of the other’s angry glare must then be rooted in an 
additional capacity which projects mental states into the directly given. However, it would also be 
phenomenologically inaccurate to claim that what appears directly in (2) is essentially the same as in 
(1), and that the subject turning the corner only thinks that someone is glaring at her angrily 
because the (wholly physical) entity she perceives is of such a kind as to set in motion a process of 
inference or simulation. Rather, a more accurate description of this experience would simply claim 
that what directly appears is just a person staring angrily, and that this is so irrespective of any process 
of imagining or thinking the subject may perform. In episodes like this, what is immediately there 
before us experientially is surely not merely a material body, but a person, one whose facial 
expression displays an emotion. It therefore seems that a compelling description accords to this 
experience perceptual feature (i), in that here the intentional object of our experience (namely the 
person glaring at us angrily) directly appears to us, is visibly there. This claim gains further weight 
                                                           
24 This brief sketch of the phenomenology of perception is indebted to the Husserlian account of 
perception developed by Hopp (2011). I return to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception in §2.5.  
 11 
when we note that such cases also exhibit feature (ii). The person undergoing experience (2) would 
surely gain a prima facie justification to believe that ‘a person is glaring at me angrily,’ not that ‘an 
‘angry-looking’ lump of flesh stands before me’—indeed, were she to believe the latter and claim 
to be perceptually justified in so doing, one might suspect her of suffering a pathology (or perhaps 
of being a particularly obstinate philosopher). It seems plausible, then, to claim that it is not only 
beliefs about the others’ body, but also at least some which concern the other person as a whole 
(notably, a belief that she is currently angry), that gain a perceptual-like warrant in such cases. 
Finally, an encounter with another’s angry glare exhibits feature (iii), in that we can distinguish 
between the object directly given and the aspect through which it perspectivally appears. While 
what we see is a person glaring at us angrily, the angrily glaring person is always given under a 
certain aspect; after all, in any moment of the perceptual episode only certain features of the others’ 
body are directly visible. 
One might think, however, that this last point actually counts against the claim that a basic 
form of empathy shares the directness characteristic of perception. If it is conceded that only 
certain features of the other’s body can ever be directly visible, then it may seem to follow that a 
grasp of the other as a minded being could never be accomplished by any direct experience of her 
alone. The account of empathy developed by Husserl and Stein avoids this objection by insisting 
that, at least when it comes to the way others directly appear to us, the relationship between body 
and mind is not taken as a causal link between two separate entities, but as an expressive relation. 
We do not merely perceive the other person’s directly visible countenances and gestures as 
unrelated physical events, just as we do not see written words merely as meaningless and unrelated 
squiggles.25 Rather, to have such expressive movements directly in view just is to grasp their sense, 
that is, to see something of the other’s emotive and practical condition. As Husserl puts it in Ideen 
II: 
Empathy into persons is nothing else than precisely that apprehension which understands the sense, i.e., which 
grasps the body in its sense and in the unity of the sense it has to bear. To perform an act of empathy means 
to grasp mind as an object, to see a human being, to see a crowd of people, etc. Here we do not have an 
apprehension of the body as bearer of something psychic in the sense that the body is posited (experienced) 
as a physical object and then something else is added on to it, as if it was apprehended just as something in 
relation to, or conjunction with, something else […] the body appears, but what we perform are the acts of 
                                                           
25 By drawing an analogy between the expressivity of the written word and that of other persons, Husserl 
means to emphasise two features of bodily expressivity. First, in both cases we directly experience an 
“expressive” unity in which something sensuously perceivable is immediately given, not as a merely 
physical thematic object, but as embodying mental or socio-cultural (geistig) meaning or sense (Sinn). 
Second, just as the meaning of a word is dependent upon its textual and extra-textual context, another 
person’s directly given emotive or practical condition is something “articulated” through complexes of 
temporally and spatially diffuse bodily movements, and these are primarily meaningful in relation to one 
another and to the circumstances in which they appear (Hua IV 320, 244, 238, 241; cf. Hua IV-2/V-2 
260, 732 [1913, 1916/17], and §3.4.1 below). However, Husserl emphasises that there are limits to this 
analogy. On the one hand, while what is expressed in the other person’s bodily movements is nothing 
other than his or her embedded and embodied mental life, grasping the “irreal” unity of a written word 
and its meaning does not typically involve a direct acquaintance with foreign mindedness (Hua IV 244-5 
(Hua IV-2/V-2 261) [1913]). On the other, while understanding words as meaningful is a highly mediated 
achievement, requiring the possession of complex linguistic abilities, the “Einheit von Leib und Geist” is a 
primitive and immediately given form of expressivity, one which more mediated forms presuppose and 
refer back to (Hua IV 320, 166 (Hua IV-2/V-2 260, 453) [1913, 1922/23]). 
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comprehension, and what we grasp are the persons and the personal conditions “expressed” in the 
appearing content of the body.26 
For the most part, we experience the other’s bodily gestures and movements as intrinsically 
embodying mindedness, as movements lived through by someone; we see them as movements 
which the other purposively achieves or involuntarily suffers, which bring her perceptual world 
into ever-new orientations, or as the manifestations of her affects.27 Similarly, we see the other’s 
limbs and skin as loci for fields of sensation, such that when an object comes into contact with the 
others’ body we immediately grasp this contact as tactually lived, and sometimes as painful or 
pleasurable.28 To quote again Husserl, the “body is not only in general a thing but it is indeed 
expression of the mind and is at once organ of the mind.”29 The conclusion that other people’s mental 
states are entirely shielded from perception only follows from the (valid) observation that their 
bodily features alone are directly visible if we picture the body as a meaningless physical entity. But 
once we appreciate that foreign bodies are directly visible as fields of expression, such reasoning 
loses much of its force.  
While there are similarities between thing-perception and empathetic perception, there are 
also important differences. It was stressed earlier that perceptual experience is perspectival, and 
that one can consequently draw a phenomenological distinction between the perceptual object and 
its aspectual appearance. In the case of perceptual (or perception-like) empathy, then, the aspectual 
appearance corresponds to certain directly visible aspects of the others’ expressive body, while the 
(empathetic-)perceptual object is just the person who we see before us. Just as our perceptual 
experience of non-expressive objects is not limited to the directly visible but aims at a three-
dimensional object (such that we do not see a free-floating car bonnet, but exactly an actual car 
from the front), our perception-like experience of another person aims, not at whatever of her 
(expressive) body is directly visible, but at the other person as a whole. Put this way, it becomes 
evident that in both thing-perception and empathetic perception, something more complex is 
operative than the mere having of visual appearances, in that the object intended is grasped as 
having ‘more to it’ than that of it which strictly appears. Importantly, Husserl argues that an 
adequate account of this complexity as an internal structure of perceptual experience can only be 
given if we do not appeal to extra-perceptual capacities. He consequently rules out any suggestion 
that we are able to perceptually grasp objects ‘through’ their limited profiles due to a tacit set of 
beliefs about, or images of, the aspects of an object which are not currently visible. While tempting, 
such a proposal would ultimately conflict with our pre-theoretical intuition that what we see in 
perceptual experience is the object itself, not merely its apparent aspects supplemented by thought 
or imagination. Briefly, Husserl’s alternative proposal is that our ordinary perceptual grasp of (non-
expressive) objects essentially includes both a sensuously rich givenness of its directly visible 
aspects, and an “inner horizon” of perceptual “co-intentions” which “co-present” its non-visible 
aspects. While such co-intentions do not sensuously present anything of the object, they 
                                                           
26 Hua IV 244, translation modified; cf. Hua IV-2/V-2 260-1 [1913], which includes elements of this 
passage.  
27 Stein (Einfühlung, pp. 79, 85, 93-103; Empathy, pp. 61-2, 67-8, 75-84); Hua IV 322-3, 389-90 (Hua IV-
2/V-2 611 [1910-12]). 
28 Stein (Einfühlung, pp. 75, 78; Empathy, pp. 57-8, 61). 
29 Hua IV 96 (Hua IV-2/V-2 382 [1915]), translation modified. 
 13 
nevertheless contribute to its overall perceptual sense, and they can function as anticipations, 
which may be satisfied or frustrated, in the ongoing course of perceptual experience.30 
When it comes to our perception-like empathetic experience of other persons, on the other 
hand, the experiential structure is subtly different. As we have seen, the other’s body is not only 
co-intended as materially more than what meets the eye, but is also seen as an expressive body that 
displays elements of the other’s experiential life. Consequently, in seeing the other person we are 
not only acquainted with her body in its materiality through the structures of sensuous presence 
and co-presence; in understanding the expressivity of her body, Husserl claims, we also achieve a 
certain ‘presentification’ (Vergegenwärtigung) of the other’s experiential life, which is ‘made present’ 
to us in a certain way. It is crucial not to misunderstand this claim. On the one hand, Husserl is 
not suddenly conceding that our basic empathetic contact with others is dependent upon 
imaginative capacities; rather, he emphasises that the presentification he has in mind is simply a 
moment in our perception of the other as an expressive, embodied whole, a moment which has 
essentially the same role as that played by co-intentions in the perception of material objects.31 The 
presentification in question is, therefore, more of an ambiguous sense that the other is undergoing 
an experience of a certain type, namely that one which is seen as alive before me ‘in’ the others’ 
facial expressions and bodily movements. On the other hand, Husserl should not be understood 
as claiming that, while the others’ physical states and features are directly presented, her mental 
states and features are only co-presented or envisaged.32 Such a claim cannot be correct, not only 
because of the ubiquitous role already played by appresentation in the perception of material 
features, but also because much of what we directly encounter in other persons doesn’t fall onto 
only one side of the mind-body distinction, being rather (perceived as) immediately embodied and 
conscious. Indeed, there is a sense in which every movement of the other’s body is directly visible 
as, as it were, “full of soul”; consider how we see a person’s “standing and sitting,” or her “way of 
walking, dancing, and speaking.”33 The phenomenological claim that a moment of envisaging 
functions in perceptual empathy, then, simply affirms that our perceptual experience of persons 
as expressive unities necessarily involves a certain inarticulate awareness that the other’s embodied 
enactments have an experiential dimension, that they are not only perceptually evident to the 
empathising subject but also lived through by the other. 
For Husserl, then, any account of empathy that begins with the thought that we first 
experience another’s body as a sheerly material entity, and must then accomplish an additional 
empathetic act in order to ‘feel our way into’ the other’s mind, overlooks that the primary datum 
                                                           
30 Hua XI 3-7. I develop this analysis in §2.5. 
31 Hua IV 198, 162-6 (Hua IV-2/V-2 307, 450-55 [1917/18, 1922/23]); cf. Hua I 143-4, 150-1. See also 
Stein (Einfühlung, pp. 14-5, 19, 31, 75, 69; Empathy, pp. 6-7, 10, 61). 
32 This reading of the role of co-presence in empathy forms the basis of Smith’s recent Husserl-inspired 
account of other-perception (2010, pp. 739-41), and it has, I think, been persuasively criticised by 
Overgaard, who advocates a more Merleau-Pontian position (2013). While I share Overgaard’s doubts 
regarding any account of other-perception which operates with a distinction between directly visible 
physical properties and merely co-presented mental properties, I nevertheless regard it as improbable that 
an adequate account can be given of empathetic perception that doesn’t allocate a constitutive role to a 
unique kind of co-presentation or presentification. 
33 Hua IV 240. The original manuscript for this passage cannot be found, so it is impossible to verify 
whether it was written by Husserl, or by Stein or Landgrebe (see §1.3.2). However, I take that the texts 
cited in the next two footnotes, which are known to have derived from Husserl’s original manuscripts, 
confirm that the essential thought expressed here was one he fully endorsed. 
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in our experience of others is neither a material thing nor a disembodied stream of consciousness, 
but the person we see before us in the social world.34 Indeed, the thought of body and soul as 
epistemically and ontologically separate layers of the human being whose occurrences are related 
to one another only extrinsically comes after the experience of the other person as an expressive 
unity, and derives from a specific kind of thematic attitude which modifies the other’s intuitive 
(i.e., empathetic-perceptual) sense.35 Nevertheless, it should always be kept in view that the 
empathetic form of contact we have with another’s mind differs in important and essential ways 
from the form of (self-)awareness we have of our own conscious life. To paraphrase Husserl, while 
it is true that others show themselves to me perceptually as beings both bodily and minded, they 
do so as embodied experiences with whom I co-exist, and whose lived experiences can never truly 
become mine but will always remain ineluctably other.36 This statement should not be primarily 
understood as a plea for the necessity of recognising the unique challenge set for interpersonal 
understanding by ‘personal differences’—although I will argue at the very end of this study that 
Husserl’s work on empathy is exemplary in understanding and taking seriously just this challenge 
(§5.4). Rather, his basic point is that, while one’s own conscious life is lived immediately and 
originarily in the mode of self-awareness—and is so even prior to the thematising gaze of 
reflection, an issue which I will also return to later (§4.3)—the experiential lives of other persons 
present themselves as ‘foreign’ primarily because they are not lived by me in such a fashion.  
In other words, an invariant structural feature of all empathetic experience is that the 
experiencing life which the other’s body displays is not lived through [erlebt] by the empathising 
subject; indeed, empathised experiences are rather given as lived through originally by the other, and 
by her alone.37 As such, they lack the “selfness” inherent in one’s own lived experiencing, 
manifesting not only a different personal character but a foreign “pure Ego.”38 Consequently, 
Husserl and Stein both admit that even the basic mode of empathy discussed above, which 
participates in the originary self-giving of perceptual experience, involves intrinsically non-
originary elements, such that the invariant character of our familiarity with the experiential lives of 
others is exactly its contrast with self-acquaintance.39 Or as Husserl famously puts the point in 
Cartesianische Meditationen, the verifiable accessibility of others, and with this their existential 
character for me, consists exactly in their original inaccessibility.40 
 
§1.2.2 | Empathy as explication of foreign intentionality. 
 
One misunderstanding which can arise from describing empathetic experience in perceptual terms 
is that it can lead one to think of the other embodied mind as a self-enclosed sphere given and 
contained ‘in’ the other’s body. This thought is not only philosophically disastrous as a general 
conception of the mind. Crucially for our purposes, is also fails to capture how others show up 
for us in pre-theoretical experience. For as Stein notes, the empathized other doesn’t merely face 
us as an object in our visual field; rather, other people are also given as embodied centres of 
                                                           
34 Hua IV 259, 190, 191, 320, 244-5 (Hua IV-2/V-2 234-6, 257-8, 260-1 [1913]). 
35 Hua IV 245 (Hua IV-2/V-2 262 [1913]. 
36 Hua IV 198, 418-9 (Hua IV-2/V-2 307, 661-2 [1916/17]). 
37 Ibid.; Hua IV 322-3 (Hua IV-2/V-2 266-8 [1913]); Stein (Einfühlung, p. 28; Empathy, p. 17). 
38 Stein (Einfühlung, p. 54; Empathy, p. 38); Hua IV 110 (Hua IV-2/V-2 399-400 [1915]). 
39 Hua IV 198 (Hua IV-2/V-2 307 [1916/17]); Stein (Einfühlung, p. 20). 
40 Hua I 144. 
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orientation for their own visual fields, and as intentional subjects whose self-transcending 
experiences are directed towards worldly objects. Moreover, her analyses ultimately show this is 
the case already at the previously discussed level of empathetic perception. We do not only “see” 
other people’s bodily members as bearers of sensations of various types—such as, in Stein’s 
examples, the perceived foreign hand which “‘presses’ against the table more or less strongly,” and 
“lies there limpid and stretched,” or the person who is seen to be feeling cold “by his ‘goose flesh’ 
or his blue nose.”41 We also directly perceive others as engaging the style of kinaesthetic self-
movement and attentive immersion characteristic of perceptual experience.42 As such, we 
simultaneously grasp the other’s living body as a centre of orientation for her perceptual acts. As 
Stein emphasizes, this is not to be confused with an act of imagination (Phantasie), in which I 
attempt to bring to mind how things would look were I to adopt the other’s posture and position, 
and nor does it require a detailed understanding of the other’s perceptual field.43 Rather, this 
empathetic grasp is more accurately described as a perceiving of the other’s bodily movements as 
intimating a “perceiving consciousness in general,” that is, a certain generic structure.44 Although 
Stein doesn’t explicitly make this point, we might add that it is also often perceptually evident 
which specific objects another person is attending to, or at least in which general direction her 
visual gaze is turned. Consequently, while we can only directly encounter another perceptual life 
as displayed in bodily expressivity, this life is not given in empathetic perception as contained 
within an inner realm but as reaching into the common perceptual world. 
Moreover, the experiential possibilities of empathy are not exhausted by our immediate 
perceptual contact with the other. The lived perception of the other as an embodied subject always 
implies tendencies towards further empathetic enactments, in which the other’s initial empathetic 
sense can be explicated, further determined, and potentially superseded. Some of these motivated 
enactments remain within the realm of empathetic perception. As Stein notes, when “I empathise 
the pain of the injured in looking at a wound, I tend to look to his face to have my experience 
confirmed in the expression of suffering.”45 As with our perceptual experience of material objects, 
empathetic perception contains its own immanent standards of correctness, in such a way that our 
initial grasp of the other’s subjective life can be confirmed or disconfirmed through the ongoing 
course of empathetic perception—an observation which also suggests that complex structures of 
typification and anticipation are already operative in that initial grasp. In other cases, however, the 
empathetic enactments motivated by our initial perceptual contact with the other, and that serve 
to explicate its sense, are of an entirely different level of accomplishment (Vollzugsstufe). When the 
other’s sadness faces us as directly given in her facial expressions, we frequently “feel ourselves led 
by it”, in that the theme of our empathetic interest becomes not merely that the other is sad, 
but what she is sad about and why this state of affairs elicits sadness in her.46 In such cases, the 
other’s experiential life “is no longer an object in the proper sense. Rather, it has pulled me into it, 
and I am now no longer turned to the experience but to its object, I am in the position of its 
subject.”47 Here, we are not merely directed towards the other in her embodied presence, but we 
                                                           
41 Stein (Einfühlung, pp. 75, 78; Empathy, pp. 58, 61). 
42 Stein (Einfühlung, p. 85; Empathy, pp. 67-8). 
43 Stein (Einfühlung, p. 79; Empathy, pp. 61-2). 
44 Stein (Einfühlung, p. 80; Empathy, p. 62). 
45 Stein (Einfühlung, p. 103; Empathy, p. 84). 
46 Stein (Einfühlung, p. 31; Empathy, p. 19). 
47 Stein (Einfühlung, p. 19; Empathy, p. 10). 
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enact a more active presentification of the other’s world-directed experiential life, bringing it to 
mind ‘as if’ we were its subject, in a manner more similar to memory, expectation, or imagination, 
than to perception. Importantly, Stein emphasises that this modality of empathy, which she 
characterises as a form of self-displacement or re-accomplishment (Hineinversetzen, Mitvollzug, 
Nachvollzug), is derivative to and explicates the perceptual empathy discussed above.48 Moreover, 
just as the latter is not strictly identical to our perceptual experience of inanimate objects, this 
active presentification or re-accomplishment should be distinguished from imagination, in that it 
targets a different domain of experiences (namely, those of the other, not an imaginary 
modification of oneself), and has a different type of epistemic import and motivation.49 Here too, 
then, empathy retains its irreducible and sui generis character. 
Similar thoughts can be found in Husserl, who emphasises that, from the outset, our 
empathetic experience recognizes the other as “the centre of a surrounding world, appearing to 
him, presentified to him in memory, thought about, etc.,” such that the other’s living body is not 
given as the container of an inner realm but as a passageway [Durchgang] which displays the 
other’s subjectively accomplished and world-engaged activity. As he puts it, what the other’s 
body expresses is first and foremost “the “he:” he moves his hand, he reaches for this or that, he 
strikes, he considers, he is motivated by this or that.”50 Despite the radical differences between 
self-awareness and empathy, then, in both cases we are primarily acquainted with subjectivity in 
its very directedness towards and responsiveness to worldly objects and situations.51 Admittedly, 
our initial perceptual comprehension of the other’s perceptual, intellective, affective, and 
practical enactments are often rather limited, the other’s bodily movements betraying little more 
than a general ‘type’ of subjective response, and drawing with it a “horizon of indeterminateness 
and unknownness.”52 However, this horizon is one that, if one’s practical interests allow it, the 
ongoing course of empathetic perception can begin to disclose, particularly when embedded 
within communicative engagement or informed by a familiarity with the other’s personality and 
personal history. And in this context it is occasionally possible for us to accomplish a quasi-
imaginative form of empathy in which we understand the situatedness of the other’s enactments 
within her own personal life, a comprehension which Husserl regards as enabling, at least in an 
ideal case, a most complete and perfect form of interpersonal understanding (see §5.4). 
 
 
§1.3 | Motivating this study 
 
 
In concluding this introductory chapter and motivating those to come, I will first contrast my 
interpretation of Husserl’s conception of empathy with another way of reading him on this issue. 
This comparison will be made not only for exegetical purposes, but also to bring into view a series 
of issues which I hope to address in later chapters. I will then be in a position to outline the textual 
approach and general argument taken in later chapters. 
                                                           
48 Stein (Einfühlung, p. 18-20, 32-3; Empathy, p. 10-12, 20). See here Zahavi (2014, pp. 137-8), Jardine 
(2015a, pp. 281-4), Shum (2012, pp. 185-95) and Dullstein (2013, pp. 343-6). 
49 Stein (Einfühlung, pp. 10-1). 
50 Hua IV 347 (Hua IV-2/V-2 659-6 [1916/17]). 
51 Hua IV 321-2 (Hua IV-2/V-2 264-5 [1913]). 
52 Hua IV 342 (Hua IV-2/V-2 680) [1916/17]). 
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§1.3.1 | Theunissen on empathy 
 
If one were to single out a single book from the secondary literature that has most influenced the 
received view of Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity, few would dispute the choice of Michael 
Theunissen’s Der Andere. This seminal work critically discusses the various attempts of 
phenomenologists and dialogical philosophers at developing a ‘social ontology,’ with Theunissen 
effectively arguing that Husserl’s writings contain the most strictly and radically worked out 
attempt at a transcendental theory of ‘the Other’ and of sociality, with the Fifth Cartesian 
Meditation in particular perfectly encapsulating both the positive value and the inherent limits of 
the transcendental approach.53 While others have made important contributions in both 
responding to Theunissen’s critique and offering a more sympathetic and wide-ranging 
interpretation of Husserl’s work on intersubjectivity and sociality, my aim here will be more 
modest.54 I will first spell out how Theunissen understands Husserl’s conception of Einfühlung, 
before illuminating the contrasting reading which I develop here and in later chapters. 
On Theunissen’s reading, Husserl employs the term ‘empathy’ in a rather narrow fashion. 
Rather than designating the perceptual recognition of another’s bodily subjectivity, or the 
immediate acquaintance with another person in the face-to-face encounter, empathy refers to a 
quite specific kind of accomplishment in which I ‘feel my way into’ the sheer interiority of the 
other’s mind. Theunissen notes that this form of experience can be understood either from a 
‘natural’ point of view, as a specific way in which others minds are represented and understood, 
or in a ‘transcendental’ register, as the positing by one transcendental ego of another, where this 
serves as a necessary precondition for the constitution of an intersubjectively common, and hence 
‘objective,’ world.55 To focus on the former construal, Theunissen argues that empathetic 
experience amounts to a rather mediate way of comprehending the style of the other’s bodily 
movement, one that proceeds by recalling past episodes in my life where similar bodily movements 
were displayed, before taking my recollected inner state as representing, and similar to, the other’s 
current inner state. On Theunissen’s reading, then, Husserl conceives of empathy in essentially the 
same way as Lipps, and he suggests in a footnote that the same applies to the account offered by 
Stein.56 Moreover, Theunissen rejects the thought that Husserl, in his descriptions of the 
immediate comprehension of other persons from Ideen II, outlines a conception of empathy that 
goes beyond Lipps. Rather, Theunissen contends that, precisely because Husserl grounded the 
immediate experience of other persons in Einfühlung, he ultimately took such immediacy to be only 
acceptable at the level of pre-philosophical naivety. While our everyday encounters with others in 
                                                           
53 Theunissen (1984, pp. 3, 7-8). Here, as elsewhere in this work, I refer only to the English translations of 
secondary literature (where available), unless there are specific reasons for the original texts to be 
preferred. 
54 See in this regard Yamaguchi (1982), Steinbock (1995), and Zahavi (2001), as well as the criticism of 
Theunissen’s take on the question which the 5th Meditation seeks to address offered by Staehler (2008, 
pp. 102-4). I return briefly to Theunissen in a later chapter (§3.4.1), where I contrast my reading of 
Husserl’s thesis that empathy is motivated by the recognition of bodily similarity with his. 
55 Theunissen (1983, pp. 71, 121). 
56 Theunissen (1983, pp. 70, 389-90). Steinbock (1995, p. 70) has a similar reading to Theunissen on this 
issue, in that he also understands Einfühlung in a projective fashion and even pointedly translates it as 
‘intropathy.’ A similar portrayal of empathy, which may have been a tacit critique of Husserl’s theory, can 
be found already in Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (1962 [1967] §26). 
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the social world may seem to involve a direct understanding of them as persons—particularly 
when compared to other, more obviously egocentric, forms of social cognition—for Theunissen’s 
Husserl such an understanding must, once properly clarified, be understood as a projective and 
mediate act. On the last analysis, Husserl is therefore committed to the view that the extraction of 
mental significance from the other’s bodily expressions is an accomplishment forged with the 
(Lippsian) tools of imitation and self-displacement.57 
Theunissen’s reading of Husserl’s conception of empathy is primarily grounded upon the 
very brief sketch of it Husserl offers in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, an interpretative move that 
certainly can be challenged.58 For in that text, Husserl is less concerned with explicating the 
character of our empathetic acquaintance with other persons than with a rather different task—
briefly, that of explicating how, and the degree to which, the sense of foreign subjectivity can be 
originally instituted in the intentionalities of a subject who is (abstractively) thought of as not yet 
recognising this sense.59 Consequently, Husserl’s portrayal of Einfühlung there necessarily proceeds 
under a radical abstraction, since, in accordance with his self-imposed methodological limitations, 
he is only able to describe a form of empathy that draws solely upon the past experiences of the 
empathising subject in order to understand the empathised other. But as Husserl notes elsewhere, 
this is not at all the normal case of empathetic understanding. Rather than merely projecting one’s 
own psychological history, our typical empathetic comprehension of others’ living bodies as 
expressively displaying foreign mentality “develops, as a system of ordered indications, only by 
means of continuous experience of other people, who are already empathetically given.”60  In 
empathetically recognising shame ‘in’ another’s blushing cheeks, for instance, we can be informed 
just as much by our past acquaintance with ashamed others than with prior episodes of our own 
shame. To anticipate an issue discussed much later, Husserl even maintains that one’s own 
emotional dispositions are partially formed through one’s empathetic contact with and appropriation 
of the emotive characters of other people, something which remains unintelligible as long as we 
assume that foreign emotions could only be comprehended through the analogical transfer of 
one’s own emotive past (§5.2.2). Consequently, when untied from the specific problematic pursued 
in Cartesianische Meditationen, Husserl’s conception of empathy needn’t be understood as the 
staunchly egological accomplishment portrayed by Theunissen. 
                                                           
57 Theunissen (1984, pp. 123-7). 
58 Beyond the brief passage on empathy from 5CM (Hua I 149), Theunissen (1984, pp. 71-2, 200) also 
refers to two passages from Ideen II to substantiate his interpretation of Husserl’s Einfühlung. The first 
passage (Hua IV 274-5) involves Husserl describing empathy as an act of placing myself in the other 
subject, and appears to support Theunissen’s reading. However, in consulting the new edition of Ideen II 
we find that no original manuscript from this passage can be found, although there is a much larger 
manuscript which Husserl’s assistants appears to have summarised in this passage (Hua IV-2/V-2 575-83 
[1916/17]). I argue in §5.4 that this text, which describes a specific form of interpersonal empathy, 
actually emphasises the necessity of recognising personal difference for interpersonal understanding. The 
second passage Theunissen refers to (Hua IV 200) arose from a manuscript from 1917 or 1918 (Hua IV-
2/V-2 309), where Husserl does indeed write that, in contrast to our own lived-experiences, the other’s 
lived experiences are given to me “mediately, in empathy.” However, I understand Husserl here to be 
merely emphasising that while another’s experiences are only given when perceptually encountered in her 
living body—a point he emphasises in the same short manuscript (Hua IV-2/V-2 307 (Hua IV 198))—
my own lived experiences are lived through first-personally, a thought which needn’t be understood in 
projective terms. 
59 Cf. Hua I §§42-4. In Chapter 3, I discuss Husserl’s attempt to address a similar question in Ideen II. 
60 Hua IV-2/V-2 452 (Hua IV 165) [1922/23]. I return to this point later (§3.4.1). 
 19 
But what of Theunissen’s claim that Husserl distinguishes between a form of experience 
which recognises another living body as such, and the empathetic comprehension of ‘higher’ forms 
of mentality, such as the other’s emotions and practical intentions? Theunissen is certainly right 
that a distinction of this kind was endorsed by Husserl, but it seems to me that his way of 
understanding the difference it invokes is distorted by his misreading of the Husserlian conception 
of empathy. On the one hand, and as we saw in the previous section, in our empathetic contact 
with others in the social world we have a perceptual (or perception-like) experience of other 
persons, such that the other’s body typically appears as expressing or displaying certain world-
directed emotions and agential intentions. In Ideen II, Husserl gives us no reason to conceive of 
this direct recognition of another’s attitudes—which I will thematise in Chapter 5 under the 
heading of ‘interpersonal empathy’—as a projective transferal of the past lived experience of my 
attitudes, and I take it that in characterising such empathy as an intuitive and quasi-perceptual 
experience, Husserl means to underline that it does not come about through the recollection and 
projection of self-experience.  
On the other hand, both Husserl and Stein do indeed distinguish from interpersonal 
empathy a more basic form of intersubjective experience, in which the other’s body is recognised 
as sensitive and mobile, and as a sphere of localisation and orientation for her sensuous-perceptual 
experience. However, they often characterise such experience as a primitive form of empathy, and 
unlike Theunissen I will attempt to take this thought seriously.61 One way of understanding this 
idea, which I pursue in depth in Chapter 3, is that there are not only important differences between 
our empathetic experience of other persons and that of (at least some) non-human animals, but 
there is also a core of similarity. In both cases, we experience another living body as expressive of 
a subject who co-perceives, albeit often in a radically different way, the world we have in common. 
As we shall later see, Husserl claims that this kind of experience—which I term ‘animate 
empathy’—has important transcendental consequences, in that it enables perceptual experience to 
come into contact with a common world of material things. However, contra Theunissen I will try 
to show that this thought does not condemn Husserl to an impoverished understanding of such 
empathy, but rather enables him to analyse it in a rich and multi-dimensional manner.62  
Moreover, once we recognise that the constitution of a common perceptual world is 
already enabled by animate empathy—without an analysis of the latter being exhausted by our 
pointing out this function—this allows us to render thematic the specific forms of foreign 
subjectivity and interpersonal reality that are opened up by interpersonal empathy, which involves 
but goes far beyond animate empathy. Accordingly, the relevant distinction here is not that 
between a reifying perception of a foreign living body and empathetic projection (Theunissen), 
but between two modes of empathy, both of which involve a perception-like experience of 
expressive and embodied foreign subjectivity, but which differ in the dimension of subjectivity 
they recognise, as well as in the ways they draw in, and affect the sense of, the common experiential 
world. 
 
 
 
                                                           
61 See, e.g., Hua V 109, 9-10 (Hua IV-2/V-2 21-2, 83-4) [1912]; Stein (Einfühlung, pp. 74-80, 83-85; 
Empathy, pp. 57-62, 66-79). 
62 Cf. Staehler (2008, pp. 102-3). 
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§1.3.2 | Methodology and an overview. 
 
In this chapter, I have mainly been concerned with outlining the conception of empathy found in 
the work of Husserl and Stein. However, empathy is far from being the sole theme of this study. 
Rather, in the following chapters I will just as much delve into Husserl’s writings on selfhood, self-
consciousness, and even thing-perception. I have chosen to begin with a discussion of empathy 
because the unifying issue which this work seeks to clarify is, in a sense, the distinction between 
animate and interpersonal empathy outlined in the previous paragraph. But getting a hold on this 
distinction requires us to attend to a number of pressing questions. In what sense do we take the 
world whose validity we naively accept in perceptual experience to be one ‘shared’ with, or 
‘common’ to, other embodied perceivers?  And what exactly is at stake in our recognising another’s 
attitudes and responses as enactments of a person, rather than merely as the perceptual experience 
or instinctive conduct of an animal or living body? Finally, how are we to understand the 
relationship between the other’s alterity as a foreign subject of experience, and as a personal subject 
with a different character or style from my own; and how does this relate to a similar distinction 
with regard to my ipseity? In beginning to reflect on such questions, one soon realises that they 
cannot be fully captured by a single-minded focus on empathy. Rather, they invite us to consider 
the way in which empathy, thing-perception, self-awareness, and the generic character of personal 
subjectivity are interwoven. 
The questions which I raise in this work have arisen from closely studying a particular 
collection of Husserl’s writings, and the answers I propose here are grounded in the analyses found 
in the same texts, although I occasionally appeal to other parts of Husserl’s oeuvre or intervene 
with my own attempts at resolution. The collection I am referring to here is a volume which 
reconstructs and brings together the original manuscripts written by Husserl for the project of 
Ideen II and III, a now-finished editorial project which had been carefully pursued for several years 
by Dirk Fonfara at the Husserl-Archiv in Köln.63 The appearance of this volume will constitute an 
important event for both Husserl scholarship and phenomenological theory more generally, in 
that it exhibits with greater clarity the inner depth and complexity of one of the central texts in the 
history of the phenomenological movement. While the version of Ideen II posthumously published 
in 1952 (Hua IV) could aptly be described as a messy masterpiece—in which we find Husserl 
penetratingly exploring a whole host of different directions for phenomenological inquiry with an 
evidently productive if sometimes confusing disregard for systematicity, while at the same time 
anticipating and sometimes going beyond the more radical ideas of his phenomenological 
                                                           
63 At the time of writing these texts are still unpublished, though they are due to appear soon as 
(Husserliana) volume ‘Hua IV-2/V-2’, since they include the raw materials of the texts already published 
as Ideen II (Hua IV) and Ideen III (Hua V). In citing these texts, I give the page number in the latest 
version of ‘Hua IV-2/V-2’—which is likely to have the same pagination as the published version—as well 
as, when possible, references to the corresponding text in Hua IV (or, occasionally, Hua V), and the year 
in which the editors know or estimate the text to have been written. Where there is a significant 
discrepancy with the text of Hua IV, or when a passage of Husserl’s was not included in the latter, I have 
included the text from Hua IV-2/V-2 in the Appendix, this being indicated in the citation by the letter 
‘A.’ I would like express my gratitude to Dirk Fonfara and Dieter Lohmar for permitting me to cite this 
text. 
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successors64—this description applies all the more for the new edition.65 While Mohanty has 
correctly observed that the importance of Ideen II demands a greater degree of scholarly attention 
than the text has yet received, this may begin to change with the emergence of the new edition.66 
Not only do these freshly excavated texts frequently shed further light on and significantly 
complicate many of the lines of thought familiar from Hua IV; they also present Husserl’s writings 
free from all editorial elaboration, allowing scholars to engage with his texts without any anxieties 
regarding their origins, and thereby quashing a worry that has often deterred serious studies of 
Hua IV—a text well-known to shaped by the editorial work of Husserl’s ‘student assistants,’ Edith 
Stein and Ludwig Landgrebe.67 Most important for my purposes here, the new edition offers a 
richer picture of Husserl’s thoughts on empathy, perception, and in particular, personal selfhood, 
than could be extracted from Hua IV. 
Let me now outline the themes which will be addressed in the remainder of this work. 
Chapter 2 lays the groundwork for my later discussion of animate empathy, by explicating 
Husserl’s conception of nature as a domain of perceptible materiality. I first show that Husserl 
locates nature in the most primordial sense in the things of perception—understood as a layer of 
the experienced world that underlies and is articulated by emotive, practical, and judicative acts—
before considering more closely the distinctive character of such perceived materiality and the 
embodied subject for whom it is there.  
In Chapter 3, I then develop Husserl’s thought that not only one’s own but also other 
perceiving bodies are implicated in the perception of material nature. I first attempt to clarify 
Husserl’s claim that perceptual experience contains an implicit reference to animate others. 
Building upon this, I then spell out the sense in which such animate others are perceptually given 
as beings who are both causally immersed in the perceptual world and fellow subjects of it. I then 
suggest that what these strands of thought lead us towards is a conception of animate empathy 
that comprises our perceptually-based understanding of animals, whether human or non-human, 
as bodily beings perceptually sensitive to a common world, before fleshing out this thought, by 
considering the roles of bodily self-awareness, the distinction between normality and abnormality, 
and mutual recognition, in our experience of animate others and of the nature they co-perceive. 
Chapter 4 breaks thematically with the previous chapter, in that it temporarily puts 
empathy aside and focusses instead on the issue of self-consciousness. I begin by considering 
Husserl’s phenomenological account of agential subjectivity, tracing out the forms of self-
awareness that he finds implicated in voluntary movement and action. I then show the continuity 
between this form of self-awareness and the phenomenological account Husserl develops of 
                                                           
64 Notably, both Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger had studied fragments of Husserl’s Ideen II manuscripts, 
or at least edited drafts thereof, prior to writing their most famous works. While I occasionally highlight 
the similarities and differences of Husserl’s writings with these authors, I do not attempt here a systematic 
comparison. 
65 That said, I believe that on certain issues we find a clearer line of argument in Husserl’s original 
manuscripts than we do in Hua IV. In particular, this applies for Husserl’s discussion of the habitual 
endurance of attitudes and their connection to self-awareness and the self (see §4.3), and his 
phenomenology of the material thing (see §§2.3-2.5). 
66 Mohanty (2011, p. 60). This is not to say that there has been no good scholarly work on Ideen II. In 
addition to the excellent study of this text in the just-quoted work by Mohanty, see in particular the essays 
collected in Nenon & Embree (1996). 
67 For the history of Ideen II, see Biemel’s ‘Einleitung des Herausgerbers’ (Hua IV xiii-xx), and the 
‘Translators’ Introduction’ and ‘Foreword’ of the English translation. 
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personal selfhood, contrasting Husserl’s take on this matter with Korsgaard and Frankfurt.  Finally, 
I consider the form of self-awareness that Husserl locates in the formation and habitual acceptance 
of attitudes, arguing that Husserl anticipates the recent efforts of Moran and Finkelstein to untie 
our conception of personal self-acquaintance from the dual misconceptions of ‘detectivism’ and 
‘constitutivism’. In short, I argue that Husserl doesn’t rigidly separate pre-reflective and personal 
self-consciousness; and, moreover, that his account of the traces of the latter in the former allow 
us to see how the personal self can ‘live’ or ‘exist’ in its emotions, beliefs, and actions. 
Whereas Chapter 4 was concerned with offering a solely first-personal account of personal 
selfhood, Chapter 5 considers together interpersonal empathy and the deeply intersubjective being 
of the person. I begin by developing Husserl’s remarks regarding personal self-understanding, 
distinguishing between a variety of different levels and forms this can take, before explicating 
Husserl’s claim that the person necessarily exists in a nexus of other persons, spelling out the roles 
of mutual recognition and the appropriation of others’ attitudes in both pre-reflective personal 
agency and reflective, narrative-embedded, personal self-understanding. I then address the sense 
in which, as persons, we are empathetically acquainted with other personal selves, arguing that 
such interpersonal empathy both rests upon and transgresses the animate empathy discussed in 
Chapter 3. In this regard, I first suggest that a minimal form of interpersonal empathy can be 
equated with what Honneth has recently called ‘elementary recognition,’ where this designates a 
perception-like recognition of another (embodied) personal self, and which grounds and is 
explicated by emotive and practical forms of interpersonal recognition.68 I then argue that 
interpersonal empathy can go beyond such recognition, and aim at a deeper understanding of the 
‘who’ of the other’s actions, emotions, and beliefs—of the personal self who ‘lives’ in them—an 
accomplishment which requires a sensitivity to the embeddedness of the person’s acts in her 
personal history. Accordingly, I suggest that the distinction between perception-like and 
imagination-like empathy introduced in Chapter 1 requires complementation by the different 
shades found in animate empathy, interpersonal recognition, and interpersonal understanding. 
 
 
 
                                                           
68 I have had the occasion to publish much of this section elsewhere (Jardine, 2015b). However, while the 
latter article focussed only on the relationship between Stein and Honneth, in §5.3 below I develop 
Husserl’s contribution too. 
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2. “Nature” and perception 
 
 
 
Constituted together are the physical thing as nature, the lived body as aesthesiological unity, and the psyche 
as a founded reality, thus a non-selfsufficient one, with the lived body as its subsoil (the lived body always 
thought constitutively only as an aesthesiological unity). 
E. Husserl69 
 
In this chapter, I attempt to shed light on Husserl’s thought that “nature” is already disclosed in 
the things of perception. While this turn might strike the reader as a diversion from the general 
direction outlined in the previous chapter, I hope it will become increasingly clear that taking this 
route is necessary if we are to spell out the mode of givenness of animate others. The primary 
reason for this, nicely encapsulated by the quotation above, is that the character of bodily 
subjectivity cannot be elucidated in separation from the perceptual world with which it is 
correlated, a rule that, I will argue in the next Chapter, applies just as much for other living bodies 
as it does for one’s own. 
My discussion begins by bringing into view Husserl’s general project of a transcendental 
phenomenology of nature (§2.1), before locating material and animate nature with regard to his 
distinction between the naturalistic and the personalistic attitudes (§2.2). I then explicate three 
generic senses or ‘layers’ of nature distinguished by Husserl and offer a preliminary characterisation 
of their relation to intersubjectivity (§2.3), turning next to Husserl’s claim that ‘perceptual nature’ 
functions as a basic layer of the world of experience, to which affective and practical acts are 
motivationally responsive (§2.4). Finally, I sketch some of the discoveries which emerge from 
Husserl’s detailed phenomenological analyses of such perceptual nature and the embodied subject 
to which it is given (§2.5), before critically examining the degree to which animate others conform 
to this conception of perceptual nature (§2.6).  
 
 
§2.1 | Regional ontology and constitutive analysis 
 
 
By regional or material ontologies, Husserl means a set of studies which respectively concern 
themselves with the regions of being.70 He characterizes his usage of the term ‘region’ in two ways. 
On the one hand, Husserl famously holds that, by means of eidetic variation, one can specify the 
essential features which an individual object instantiates, and which make it up as the determinate 
thing which it is, through imaginatively bringing to light the generic character which it shares with 
other objects.71 In doing so one will ultimately be led to one of the “highest essential universalities”, 
                                                           
69 Hua IV-2/V-2 322 (Hua IV 310, translation modified) [1913]. I return to this passage in §4.1. 
70 Hua III/1 23 [Ideas I 20]. For a classical discussion of Husserl’s conception of regions and regional 
ontologies, see Landgrebe (1981, pp. 149-75). 
71 Hua III/1 [Ideas I] §§3-4. 
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an essential composition which characterizes that object as belonging to a “supreme material 
genus”.72 Thus if we want to exactly describe, for instance, the essential features of a red brick, we 
will not only have to take note of that which makes it a ceramic object with a chestnut hue, a heavy 
cuboid, and so forth. We will also have to consider those features which it has just by virtue of 
being a material thing, thus clarifying the essence ‘material thing in general’ [ materielles Ding 
überhaupt ].73 This most generic essence Husserl calls a region, and the task of the regional 
ontologies is to respectively demarcate the regional essences, that is, to specify the essential features 
pertaining to each of the most basic types of object, in spite of all factual and qualitative difference 
amongst beings of this region. But Husserl also links the regions (and their ontologies) to the 
empirical sciences. While each empirical science has a domain of objects [Gegenstandsgebiet] as the 
sphere which it factually investigates, regional ontology alone allows us to specify the a priori 
norms, what Husserl calls the “regional axioms”, that an empirical concern presupposes.74 So, for 
example, the essential characteristics of ‘the physical’ constitute a norm which the physicist tacitly 
appeals to in his scientific studies, and which distinguishes the sphere of reality with which he is 
concerned from that of the biologist or the sociologist. 
Crucially, Husserl insists that regional ontology only becomes truly realizable when the 
regional a priori is exhibited within the context of transcendental phenomenology. Husserl was 
convinced that the essence of a region cannot be fully or directly uncovered merely through 
conceptual analysis—if by this one means a study of the generic meanings articulated in the 
linguistic employment of the concepts of, for example, ‘thing,’ ‘mind,’ or ‘animal’—since, he 
claimed, such conceptual meanings are not the sole or the primary domain in which the regional 
essences reside. Rather, a truly self-critical and clarificatory account of thinghood, mindedness, 
and animaticity, must at some point be informed by things, minds, or animals as we experience 
them in their bodily presence [leibhaftig].75 On Husserl’s view, direct experience of this sort presents 
meaningful realities whose objective senses point, already before the articulation of conceptual 
thought, to regional distinctions; and, indeed, higher-level conceptual meanings only arise as 
modifications of the senses which pertain to the objects of intuitive experience.76  
To understand why Husserl regards regional-ontological analysis as ultimately being a 
transcendental-phenomenological project, we must note a further point, namely that for him the 
meaningful objects of direct experience are neither (to take two extreme positions) simply received 
by consciousness in an unaltered and pre-packaged form, nor are they the products of the 
conceptual capacities of a purely cognitive subject. For instance, in perceiving a red brick as there 
before us within a broader worldly context, temporally extended manifolds of appearance are 
‘synthesised,’ such that what directly appears to us is a unitary thing with certain features as given 
from a certain perspective and within certain surroundings. The nexus of syntheses accomplished 
here are not intellective or conceptual in nature, in that they require no active intervention from 
thought, rather being brought about in the passivity of perceptual functioning itself. Nevertheless, 
Husserl claims, what such (passive) syntheses reveal is that the perceptual apprehension is itself 
governed by certain imminent laws and rules, and that our perceptual grasp of an object as such is 
                                                           
72 Hua III/1 13, 23 [Ideas I 10, 20]. 
73 Hua III/1 13 [Ideas I 10]. 
74 Hua III/1 10, 37-8 [Ideas I 9, 31-2]. 
75 Hua III/1 15, 45 [Ideas I 13, 38]. 
76 Hua IV-2/V-2 376-8 (Hua IV 91) [1912]; cf. Hua IV-2/V-2 354 A [1915]. 
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responsive to certain norms or ideas [Ideen].77 Since this normatively responsive experience is 
necessarily involved in the exhibition of objects which are perceptually meaningful and, as it were, 
ontologically rich, the task of a regional ontology can be seen as leading into, and being more fully 
accomplished through, a more radical philosophical project—one which reflectively interrogates 
the space of correlation which encompasses both experienced objects and the law-governed 
experience in which they are made manifest or ‘constituted’. In short, regional ontology opens 
onto a constitutive or transcendental phenomenology.78 
If the (generic) ‘sense of the relevant class of regional objectivities’ is to grasped in a manner 
which is not one-sided and abstract, therefore, it must be analysed as the correlate of a certain kind 
of law-governed “ruling “apperception””.79 As we shall see in the following, in Husserl’s analyses 
the class of apperceptions which are constitutive of generic regional senses reveal themselves as 
genetically developing, essentially embodied, and intersubjectively mediated, and as involving 
varying degrees of activity and passivity. One consequence of this is that he regards the regional 
essences themselves as multi-layered, in as much as they are correlated with various levels of 
subjective and intersubjective accomplishment.80 Seen in this light, Husserl’s analyses can be 
shown to provide an account of the differences and the continuities between, for example, the 
material thing as originarily given in perception, and the material thing as the “physicalistic thing” 
of natural science, with its idealized and mathematically disclosed determinations—both of which 
constitute divergent layers of the same regional essence, ‘the material thing in general’.81 A more 
general consequence is that regional ontology provides one motivation for a constitutive 
phenomenology, a philosophical explication of the various modes in which such meaningful 
objects are present for us in experiential life. 
 
 
§2.2 | The naturalistic and personalistic attitudes 
 
 
At this stage, we must consider an important Husserlian distinction, one which aligns the different 
ontological regions with the issue of different modes of empathy: namely, the distinction between 
the naturalistic and the personalistic attitude. The naturalistic attitude, which is the orientation 
towards the world adopted by the natural scientist in his or her research activities, is guided by the 
ideal goal of fully determining the real, subject-independent, properties of the totality of physical 
(and, perhaps, psychophysical) entities. But this task requires the natural scientist to accomplish a 
certain abstraction, in which the axiological, practical, and aesthetic features of worldly objects as 
ordinarily experienced are disregarded, or as Husserl also puts it, in which certain intentionalities 
belonging to the personal sphere are temporarily ‘neutralized’, so that the ‘real’ properties of things 
can be determined ‘objectively.’82 Such an abstraction is necessary within its own domain, since 
such predicates clearly do not belong to the reality which natural science takes as its sphere of 
inquiry. To describe a galaxy or organism as ‘beautiful’, the Higgs Boson as ‘gaining a Scotsman 
                                                           
77 Hua III/1 [Ideas I] §150. 
78 Hua IV-2/V-2 175 (Hua V 79) [1912]. 
79 Hua IV-2/V-2 751 (Hua IV 2) [1913]. 
80 Hua III/1 [Ideas I] §151. 
81 Hua IV-2/V-2 556-564, 466 (Hua IV 76-77, 84-88) [1916/1917, 1915/1916]. 
82 Hua IV-2/V-2 753-756, 347-348, 232-235 (Hua IV 8-10, 27, 186-8) [1913, 1915, 1913]. 
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the Nobel Prize in Physics’, or to ‘despair’ about the changing climates, is not to contribute to, nor 
to dispute anything of, our scientific understanding of nature. Rather, nature in this sense is a self-
contained totality of entities bearing real or objective-substantial properties alone. Thus the 
constitutive correlate of the naturalistic attitude is, as Husserl at one point puts it, “the whole of 
nature as the total domain of the natural sciences”, and the essence, ‘nature as such’, comprises 
the “pure sense” of this attitude, the norm obscurely operative in all naturalistic thinking and 
practice.83 
The personalistic attitude, on the other hand, is just the prior attitude of everyday life that 
the naturalistic attitude transgresses, in which subjects do not adopt an abstractive orientation 
towards the objects of their surrounding world [Umwelt], but rather respond to them in their life-
worldly concreteness, a concreteness whose sense is to varying degrees articulated in terms of 
practical interests and culturally formed evaluations.84 Husserl thus maintains that “the naturalistic 
attitude is subordinated to the personalistic”, and that the natural scientist may only take his or her 
theoretical activity to bear an exhaustive, absolute and unconditioned cognitive relation to the 
world by means of “a kind of self-forgetfulness [Selbstvergessenheit] of the personal Ego.”85 He also 
insists that it is for subjects of the personalistic as opposed to the naturalistic attitude that sociality 
operates, and in which culture and society can blossom, since it is in this attitude that others are 
encountered as persons and engaged with communicatively.86 
For our purposes, one complication concerning the naturalistic attitude must be noted. 
The domain of nature, understood as the correlate of the naturalistic attitude, is in fact comprised 
of two broad sub-domains, each of which are marked by their own regional essences: the domains 
of material and animate nature.87 That these are two separate domains is manifest in the division 
of labour within the sciences of nature; the natural scientist investigates either physical reality, 
which is to say material things and the laws governing them, or biological reality, that is the 
physiological structure, behaviour, and psychological states and dispositions of animate organisms 
(including, of course, human beings). These two domains, moreover, are not wholly independent 
of one another, nor can one be reduced to or exhaustively accounted for by the other. Rather, and 
as I will explain in more detail later, according to Husserl animate nature contains a substratum of 
material nature with a psychic substratum unidirectionally founded upon it. Briefly put, something 
cannot be an animate natural being without also being a materially natural being, whereas not all 
material beings are animate. What is distinctively ‘alive’ about animate natural beings as opposed 
to sheer inanimate matter—namely that they are “experienced as psychically living things,”88—
nevertheless only objectively pertains to a natural being insofar as the psychic states of the animal 
are embodied within a material substratum, by means of which those states acquire a localization 
within nature. And this material substratum, while comprising only an abstract layer within the 
double-sided unity of the animate natural being, is thinkable as a self-sufficient entity, one not 
                                                           
83 Hua IV-2/V-2 214-216 (Hua IV 174) [1913]. 
84 Hua IV-2/V-2 231-242, 307-309 (Hua IV 185-200) [1913]. Admittedly, this dense formulation conceals 
shades of great complexity, some of which be explored in Chapters 4 and 5. 
85 Hua IV-2/V-2 228-229 [Hua IV 183-184] (1913). 
86 Hua IV-2/V-2 235-242, 280-281, 301-303, 303-305, 307-309 [1913, 1913, 1915-1917, 1913, 
1917/1918]; elements of these texts are found in Hua IV 190-200. 
87 Hua IV-2/V-2 105, 108, 117 (Hua V 25-26, 29, 36) [1912]. 
88 Hua IX 103 (emphasis mine). 
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interwoven with a psychic stratum.89 In fact, we are intuitively presented with something 
resembling such an entity when an organism dies—an event, Husserl darkly states in 1925, which 
is already delineated as a foreseeable possibility in every apperception of animate life.90 
 
 
§2.3 | Nature as a perceptual, theoretical, and scientific theme 
 
 
We have seen Husserl claiming that a constitutive correlation holds between, on the one hand, the 
naturalistic attitude, and on the other, nature as a sphere of reality manifesting a generic regional 
essence (or, rather, a set of generic regional essences which pertain to material and animate nature 
and are foundationally related), and that a pre-eminent task of transcendental phenomenology 
consists in investigating this correlation, as well as the manner in which it develops through our 
individual experiential histories and intersubjective contact. While some of Husserl’s discoveries 
in this field will be discussed later (§2.5), my aim now will be to show how his own analyses 
ultimately lead him away from the idea of an exhaustive correlation between the naturalistic attitude 
and nature, and towards the insight, of crucial importance to my argument here, that ‘naturalistic’ 
nature arises as a modification of a nature more primitively given. 
This line of thought can be stated, in somewhat misleadingly brief terms, as follows. The 
naturalistic attitude is evidently a theoretical attitude.91 But natural beings are not first constituted 
or made manifest as such through theorisation, rather, as we have already seen, Husserl insists that 
regional-essential distinctions can already emerge when we explicate and compare the pre-
predicative sense of the objects given directly in experience.92 Consequently, regional object-types, 
such as ‘material thing’ and ‘animal,’ are not first breached through our adopting a theoretical 
attitude, being rather originally located in directly given worldly objects, considered just in their 
direct givenness.93 To put the point in more Heideggerian terms, inasmuch as naturalistic thinking 
takes itself to have sole access to the being of material and animate nature, or at least as having the 
only means to ‘potentially’ gain such access (that is, in a possible future when natural-scientific 
investigation has been fully worked out), it forgets that natural being first shows itself as 
(generically) natural in pre-theoretical experience. 
At this stage, some readers, and particularly those familiar with Heidegger’s work, may well 
suspect Husserl of uncritically grafting the structure of the ‘scientific object’ onto the things and 
creatures encountered in everyday experience—and thus of violating his own methodological 
commitment of being guided, in philosophical thinking, solely by die Sachen selbst in their relevant 
modes of acquaintance.94 It seems all too easy, perhaps, to give a (quasi-foundational) account of 
natural-scientific objectivity by stipulating that its basic categories are already delineated in the pre-
theoretical realm, just as it seems inadequate to assume that a phenomenology of everyday world-
                                                           
89 Hua IV-2/V-2 219 (Hua IV 177) [1913]. 
90 Hua IX 106; cf. Hua IV-2/V-2 380, 679 (Hua IV 94, 341) [1915, 1916/1917]). 
91 Hua IV-2/V-5 752 [1913]; cf. Hua IV 2. 
92 Hua IV/2-V-2 210 (Hua V 91) [1912]. 
93 Hua IV-2/V-2 219 (Hua IV 177) [1913]. 
94 For statements of this methodological commitment, see Hua XIX/1 10 [LI 1 168]; Hua III/1 [Ideas I] 
§24; Heidegger (1967, pp. 27-29 [1962, pp. 49-51]). 
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openness can uncritically appropriate the basic categories of natural science.95 While developing a 
comprehensive response to this worry would lead us too far afield, it is worth noting, not only that 
Husserl is keenly aware of this danger, but that he is always attentive to the need to examine the 
different ‘levels of nature’ in their own terms, and in strict correlation with the modes of perceptual 
or attitudinal comportment in which they are originally ‘constituted’ (that is, made manifest as 
such).96 Moreover, he repeatedly concerns himself with assessing whether, and in what way, such 
accomplishments (with their correlative regional layers) are to be found in the everyday 
personalistic attitude with its familiar world, in which axiological and practical senses are 
immediately interwoven with ‘factual’ ones, and others are straightforwardly experienced as 
animals or persons rather than unities of causal properties.97 In fact, as several commentators have 
noted, in so doing he uncovers phenomenological insights—concerning, in particular, the 
structure of embodied, encultured, affective, and practically immersed world-disclosure and its 
primacy over ‘detached,’ theoretical cognition—more often associated with the existential analytic 
of Sein und Zeit.98 
In beginning to see more clearly what Husserl has in mind here, an explication of his claim 
that the naturalistic attitude is a theoretical attitude will be of aid. Husserl distinguishes what he calls 
the theoretical, cognitive, or judgemental attitude from the valuing, emotive, or axiological attitude 
and the practical attitude.99 He helpfully illustrates these three different attitudes by means of the 
example of a subject who is perceptually confronted with a blue sky. If the subject makes the blue 
sky the primary theme of her attention and immerses herself responsively ‘in’ it, we can distinguish 
(at least) three different ways in which this can occur. The subject can, first, be ‘swept away’ by the 
beauty of the blue sky and “live in the rapture of it”, in which case the dominant egoic 
comportment is not practical or intellective but emotive. Here, the subject is an (affectively) 
‘valuing subject,’ living in a ‘valuing attitude.’100 Alternatively, the subject can, when confronted 
with the blue sky, be primarily and thematically concerned with orienting herself practically in the 
situation in which she now finds herself, perhaps considering whether she should give in to a desire 
to take the afternoon off work and enjoy the sun, or rather remain steadfast in her commitment 
to make progress in her writing, this deliberative process allowing her to form a decision and 
ultimately act upon it. When orienting ourselves in this way, we “live in wilful self-resolve or else 
in the activity of actually carrying out that resolve,” and are consequently in the ‘practical 
attitude.’101 Finally, the subject might adopt a theoretical attitude towards the blue sky, in which it 
“becomes a theoretical object.” Here, the subject actively performs the judgement, ‘the sky is now 
blue,’ thereby making the blue sky an object “of an actively performed positing of being in which 
the Ego lives, grasps what is objective, seizes it and posits it as a being.”102 Theoretical objectivities 
in this sense are no longer simply given perceptually, but are now constituted as “categorical 
                                                           
95 For delineations of such a criticism, see Heidegger (1979, pp. 171-2 [1985, p. 124]; 1967 [1962], §§19-
21), Dreyfus (1991, Chapter 6), Crowell (1996, pp. 86-89), and Overgaard (2010); and for some recent 
Husserlian responses, Theodorou (2005) and Staiti (2010). 
96 See, e.g.: Hua III/1 [Ideas I] §40, §52. 
97 See, e.g.: Hua IV-2/V-2 34-8, 227-31, 232-5, 246-51, 259, 260-4 (Hua IV 139-43, 182-5, 186-9, 207-11, 
234-5, 244-247) [1912, 1913, 1913, 1913, 1913, 1913]. 
98 See, e.g., Smith (2003, p. 14), Mohanty (2011, p. 462), and Bernet (2015). 
99 Hua IV-2/V-2 752, 753, 337 (Hua IV 2, 8, 11) [1913, 1913, 1915). 
100 Hua IV-2/V-2 753-754 (Hua IV 8-9) [1913]. 
101 Hua IV-2/V-2 755 (Hua IV 10) [1913]. 
102 Hua IV-2/V-2 759 A; cf. Hua IV 11. 
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objectivities (in a quite definitive sense: objectivities of thought)”, that is, as intentional objects 
actively posited as beings and syntactically articulated in acts of thinking. Thus, the blue sky is here 
constituted—through “theoretical acts,” actively performed by the Ego, of “subjectivating, 
attributing, collecting, relativizing,” etc.—as a categorically structured state of affairs, a subject 
(‘the sky’) to which a predicate (‘blue’) pertains.103 
Husserl emphasises that being in a certain attitude is not simply a matter of spontaneously 
performing acts of the relevant class, since one can spontaneously perform acts of a certain kind 
while living in a different kind of attitude. As he notes, a physicist might observe the blue sky in a 
strictly theoretical attitude while simultaneously feeling its beauty. Or, to take a slightly different 
case, an art critic may well continue to be touched by the beauty of an art work, despite her 
attitudinal stance being theoretical, in that her dominant comportment consists in judging the 
aesthetic value of the work.104 Similarly, when being in a joyful attitude with regard to an imparted 
“tiding,” the acts of thinking in which the tiding is constituted as a categorical objectivity serve 
“only as a foundation for the emotive act in which, by preference, we are living.”105 To be in a 
certain attitude, then, is not merely a matter of performing a certain kind of act, since such acts 
can be performed while serving as the underlying basis, or unthematic background, of our 
attitudinal comportment. Rather, being in an attitude involves living in the relevant act “in a 
privileged sense” and performing it with a greater “phenomenological dignity,” such that it is a 
“dominant spontaneity” upon which no other current spontaneous performances are based. The 
performance of an act functions as comprising our current attitude only when it embodies our 
current overarching “interest,” and this is only one, as it were, the ‘highest,’ way in which an act 
can be operative in our overall doxic, affective, and practical world-relatedness.106 
We can now directly address the relationship between the theoretical attitude and ‘nature.’ 
Consider again the examples of the physicist theoretically attending to a cloud while simultaneously 
feeling delight in its beauty, and that of the art-critic who continues to feel a painting’s beauty 
despite her dominant concern being with judicatively assessing its aesthetic value. These two cases 
illustrate nicely that adopting a theoretical attitude is a matter of selectively attending to and 
categorically articulating certain senses which are already constituted pre-theoretically. In the case 
of the physicist, what acquires theoretical articulation is that of the pre-given object which remains 
when its aesthetic values are, from the perspective of the theoretical subject as such, abstracted 
away. In the case of the art-critic, on the other hand, no such theoretical abstraction from the 
object’s aesthetic value is required, the visceral ‘feel’ of the painting rather being included in the 
domain of sense which her acts of thinking articulate categorically. Consequently, adopting a 
theoretical attitude towards nature, as exemplified in the former but not the latter case, involves 
abstracting from the aesthetic and practical senses which experientially coalesce upon perceived 
things and situations and categorically articulating the domain of sense which remains after this 
abstraction. Or, correlatively, it involves the “theoretical regard” going “through only those lived-
experiences which are sense-giving or sense-determining for the theoretically grasped object as 
such,” while theoretically ‘disregarding’ the affective and practical lived experiences, which 
nevertheless continue, on the pre-theoretical level, to be both “lived through” and constitutive of 
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105 Hua IV-2/V-2 337 (Hua IV 12) [1915]. 
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“new objective strata for the object in question, but ones in relation to which the subject is not in 
the theoretical attitude”.107 Indeed, Husserl notes that, rather than being an occasional nuisance, a 
relegation of ever-functioning emotive and practical modes of comportment to the “background” 
of one’s thematic field occurs in all theoretical research.108 
But here the following question arises: what are the ‘objective strata’ that a natural-
theoretical attitude takes as pregiven and categorically articulates, or, put in experiential terms, 
what is the domain of pre-theoretical intentionality which it ‘goes through’ in so doing? We have 
seen that such strata be cannot a matter of axiological or practical significance, as correlated with 
the emotive and voluntary spheres, these being disregarded by the subject in her theoretical 
concern with nature. It is here the Husserl introduces the crucial claim that, in the theoretical 
attitude, the subject relates to an “Object that is given and delimited by a constitutive sense (e.g. a 
nature-object [Naturobjekt]),” in theoretical acts which themselves “exercise a constituting 
function.”109 That is, the domain of pre-theoretical objective sense which remains after all 
axiological and purposive senses have been abstractively disregarded, and which the natural-
theoretical attitude articulates theoretically, is, already prior to this theoretical constitution, an 
object which exhibits the regional essence, ‘nature.’ 
Such nature-objects are passively constituted beings, and they reside in a field of perceptual 
experience which precedes and grounds all thinking about nature. Husserl makes this point clearly 
in a passage from 1912: 
Nature, as the nature given immediately in sensuous appearance and appearing with sensuous qualities, is 
to be distinguished from the nature of mathematical physics. […] Mathematical nature is, therefore, not the 
nature which is immediately perceived, not the intersubjectively concordant, immediately experienced and 
immediately experienceable nature, but rather a nature constituted in experiential thinking, a “thought” 
nature.110 
Rather than a category projected by the theoretical attitude, nature is first and foremost a generic 
sense which exhaustively permeates, as a basic stratum, the world of pre-theoretical experience. 
And a theoretical attitude is only natural-theoretical—rather than involving a theoretical concern 
with, say, values, actions, or cultural facts—in as much as the stratum of the pre-theoretical world 
which it targets is that which is already delimited by this generic sense. As I understand it, this line 
of thought comprises the basic axiom of Husserl’s thinking regarding nature.111  
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108 Hua IV-2/V-2 337 (Hua IV 13) [1915]. 
109 Hua IV-2/V-2 330 (Hua IV 5, translation modified) [1915]. 
110 Hua IV-2/V-2 323 A, 325 A [1912]. See also: Hua IV-2/V-2 749 [1913]. 
111 In Husserliana IV, there are two passages in particular that seems to clearly state that Husserl solely 
equates nature, as the theme of his constitutive analyses, with the direct object of the natural sciences, 
namely §1 and §11—for a reading along these lines and anchored in these passages, see Crowell (1996, 
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Chapter, writing on the draft of Ideen II prepared by Landgrebe: “Dieses Kapitel muβ völlig neu ausgearbeitet 
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While this point may appear relatively simple, complications soon emerge. And here we 
should note a point at which the results of Husserl’s analyses arguably outmanoeuvre his own 
conceptual arsenal; namely, in that they complicate the straightforward equation of the natural-
theoretical attitude and the natural-scientific one. To see this, consider how the claim that our 
perceptual contact with the world is already a form of contact with nature immediately leads to 
the question of how such nature relates to the natural sciences and their domain of inquiry. That 
is, while we must distinguish between the “essence of the nature-Object” as “the correlate of the 
idea of natural science” and “nature as the sphere of transcending perception,”112 and interrogate 
each on its own terms, a crucial task of the phenomenology of nature is to uncover the intelligible 
motivations which lead to the positing of natural-scientific nature as a higher-order modification 
of its perceptual equivalent, as well as understanding the transformed sense and epistemic function 
acquired by perceptual nature when seen through natural-scientific eyes. 
To complicate matters further, this clarificatory task ultimately requires the 
phenomenologist to take account of an ever-perplexing constitutive ingredient, in that she must 
consider the role played by intersubjectivity. Thus, in his analysis of the personalistic attitude from 
1913, Husserl distinguishes nature “as the nature appearing sensuously, in relation to the individual 
subject” from nature “as the imperfectly Objective nature relating apperceptively to an open nexus 
of “normally” appearing subjects,” and claims that both of these senses of ‘nature’ should not be 
confused with “nature in the sense of natural science, the ultimately and perfectly Objective 
nature.”113 That is, the relation between ‘nature’ as perceptually manifest to a solipsistic subject 
(though of as an ideal possibility; see Chapter 3), and nature as a publically accessible domain 
accepted by a communicative community, and the relation between intuitive and natural-scientific 
nature, are distinct issues which should not be squarely equated. Rather than being the law-
governed realities of natural science, the “things of our socially common surrounding world, the 
things of the world of our dialogue and praxis, have precisely those qualities we actually see them as having.”114 
For the time being, the important detail in this regard is as follows. From the perspective 
of the natural-scientific attitude, Husserl claims, nature understood as a communicatively 
describable and socially accepted domain of perceivable reality itself has the status of a mere 
                                                           
werden” (403). This dissatisfaction becomes further intelligible when we note that the main text Husserl 
prepared in 1915 offers, at least with regard to his account of material nature, a clearer, if less detailed, 
argument than the text carefully prepared by Stein and Landgrebe, one which can be sketched as follows.  
Husserl begins by describing the natural-scientific conception of nature (Hua IV/2-V-2 328-9), before 
revealing that the theoretical attitude in which such nature is constituted is only one form of egoic 
responsiveness amongst the practical and emotive attitudes, and examining its contrast and Verflechtung 
with the latter (329-8). He then shows how all egoic attitudes rest upon and presuppose a form of 
perceptual contact with natural beings as such (338-7). After offering some preliminary regional-
ontological reflections concerning the interrelation and difference between material and animate nature 
(347-7), Husserl begins his constitutive-phenomenological analysis of materiality. In accordance with 
what has earlier been shown, his analysis pursues, not the correlates of a natural-scientific attitude, but the 
perceptual things of pre-theoretical experience (354-368). He then considers more closely the 
complications involved with embodiment and intersubjectivity, describing how these function in both the 
constitution of perceptual nature and, finally, in motivating the positing of ‘physicalistic’ nature (368-375).  
112 See Hua IV-2/V-2 750 [1913] where Husserl addends the following note to his discussion of “das 
Korrelate der Idee der Naturwissenschaft”: “Nicht erörtert ist Natur als Sphäre der transzendenten 
Wahrnehmung.” 
113 Hua IV-2/V-2 272 (Hua IV 325) [1913]; cf. Hua III/1 [Ideen I] § 151. 
114 Hua IV-2/V-2 258 (Hua IV 234) [1913]. 
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appearance, and the reality which stands ‘behind’ these appearances is the non-perceivable 
“physicalistic thing-Objectivity” of “intersubjective research into nature,” whose determinations 
are ideal laws are solely constituted in thought. In the same manuscript on the personalistic attitude, 
this claim is expressed with clarity: 
The Objectivity which is intuitively constituted for individual subjects and which comes to expression in 
their descriptive statements, as well as the Objectivity constituted as correlate of a community of persons 
who mutually assess each other as normal, itself now has the status of a mere “appearance” of a “true” 
Objectivity. And this common nature given in intuitive experience has the status of a mere “appearance” 
of a nature in itself, unintuitable by essence, of a nature that can indeed be determined intersubjectively but 
cannot be experienced directly. Hence this nature is not, strictly speaking, describable, and no concepts of 
immediate experience can go to determine it.115 
The central point that we should take from this is that the natural-scientific attitude cannot simply 
be identified with what we have earlier called the natural-theoretical attitude, with any judicative-
cognitive attitude that one takes up towards natural beings as such. To illustrate this, we only need 
to consider that a subject whose dominant activity consists in forming the judgement, “the sky is 
now blue,” is concerned with categorically articulating a different layer of nature than someone who 
is swept away in mathematical-physicalistic thinking. While the noematic correlate of the former 
subject’s dominant attitude is not exactly intuitive, perceptual nature, but a categorically articulated 
objectivity which draws upon it, her attitudinal activity nevertheless describes intuitive nature. In 
such a case, that is, the following phenomenological description is apt: “Living in the lowest level 
of mere sense intuition, and performing it theoretically, we have theoretically grasped a mere thing 
in the most straightforward manner.”116 Such a theoretical claim retains a descriptive-perceptual 
character even when it finds acceptance and agreement from others, that is, when the judgement 
exhibits validity as a description of intersubjectively accessible nature. But the dominant interest 
of ‘physicalistic’ thinking, on the other hand, consists rather in the formation and application of 
rigorous and universal laws, such that intersubjectively valid descriptions of perceptual objects 
have for the natural-scientific subject a ‘merely phenomenological’ significance, the results of such 
descriptions serving, at best, as ‘evidence’ upon which inferentially formed judgements, targeting 
a nexus visible to nobody, can be tentatively based.  
In summary, we have seen that Husserl’s phenomenological reflections regarding the 
essential character of ‘nature’ leads to a distinction between three different ways in which nature 
can be objectively present. Nature first announces itself as a rich domain with which we are 
acquainted in perceptual experience (although we are yet to explicate how this ‘we’ can be invoked 
in the perceptual experience of an ‘I,’ a matter which will have to wait until the next chapter), and 
it can then become a theme either of a ‘descriptive’ theoretical attitude, or of properly natural-
scientific thinking. The latter mode of thinking, moreover, can only be regarded as giving an 
account of the world in as much as it bears the promise of more exactly determining the (already 
descriptively rich) domain of perceptual nature. As Husserl puts the point in Ideen I, for the 
physicist in his or her theorising “[t]he thing appearing to the senses has its sensory shapes, colours, 
properties of smell and taste, and hence it is anything but a sign of something else; instead it is in a 
certain way a sign of itself.”117 In order to avoid equivocation, I will refrain in the following from 
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using the somewhat ambiguous term, ‘the naturalistic attitude,’ and rather refer to the ‘natural-
theoretical attitude,’ as pertaining to the subject in its description of perceptual nature, and the 
‘natural-scientific attitude,’ as exemplified by the attitude in which a subject unearths or appeals to 
the invisible laws governing natural reality.118 
 
 
§2.4 | Nature as motivating for affect and praxis: objectivating and non-objectivating acts 
 
 
It is further clear that valuation, however evanescent, is necessarily consequent on some character or 
specification which is capable of being distinguished from the value we find in an object, and which is what 
we value an object for, our reason for finding it precious, etc., such a character or specification being in 
principle such as could be elsewhere and otherwise exemplified. Even when individuals are valued for being 
the individuals they are, there is an obscure reference to specifications they fulfil, and occasions on which 
these specifications are manifest, or at least to occasions on which they can be repeatedly contemplated and 
assessed. 
J. N. Findlay119 
 
The worker can create nothing without nature, without the sensible external world. It is the stuff [Stoff] in which 
his labour realises itself, in which it is active and from which and by means of which it produces. 
K. Marx120 
 
Before considering Husserl’s phenomenology of perceptual nature, we should first consider a 
further controversial Husserlian claim: namely, that such nature does not only serve as a pregiven 
basis for the natural-theoretical attitude (and, ultimately, the natural-scientific one too), since it is 
also presupposed for the emotive and practical attitudes.  
Husserl’s line of argument here rests upon a distinction between ‘non-objectivating acts,’ 
which comprise emotive and practical acts, and ‘objectivating acts,’ which include perception and 
judgement and, in modified forms, memory and imagination. Objectivating acts necessarily involve 
an element of doxa or belief, such that their noematic correlates are ‘doxically posited’ as ‘beings.’121 
In the case of perceptual experience, this positing occurs in relative passivity, requiring of the 
experiencing subject nothing more than a ‘receptive’ “apprehension” (which, Husserl claims, 
nevertheless requires a highly minimal, and typically habitualised, form of spontaneity).122As we 
shall see below, this occurs whenever something presents itself directly as a unitary something with 
visible, tactile, or audible features and an open horizon of as yet undetermined ones, in as much 
as the perceiving subject ‘naively’ accepts this determinate object as really standing there before 
her in its spatiotemporal reality. Or as Husserl formulates the point in Ding und Raum (1907), in 
the normal case of perception the moment of belief is fused with the moment of presence in the 
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flesh.123 When it comes to theoretical acts, on the other hand, the element of belief resides rather 
in the existential positing of a categorically articulated state of affairs in judgement.124 What makes 
perception and judgement objectivating acts, then, is that ‘in’ them a certain objective sense is 
taken as truly holding, where this taking or positing is a predominately passive affair in perception 
and a more active accomplishment in judgement. 
When it comes to non-objectivating acts, on the other hand, any doxic element is non-
intrinsic to the constitutive accomplishments of the act itself. Consider an emotive act, say, the 
feeling of anger regarding a situation of interpersonal betrayal. When feeling angry towards a 
disloyal friend, the basic intentionality of my anger does not consist in my forming an evaluative 
judgement in which my friend’s offending act is articulated as bearing a certain predicate, as being, 
for example, “treacherous” or “reproachable.” While I might indeed form such a judgement while 
being angry, and while such a doxic activity may arguably be classed as a constituent part of my 
total state of anger, it would be phenomenologically unmotivated to stipulate that it comprises its 
basic element, or that I can only feel anger inasmuch as such an evaluative judgement is operative. 
After all, it seems quite possible to live through an episode of anger without actively entertaining 
an evaluative judgement. Similarly, even if I have directly witnessed my friend’s reproachable act, 
the reproachableness itself has not exactly been doxic-perceptually given, has not stood there before 
me in the flesh as just one perceivable feature of the witnessed event amongst others. In feeling 
angry about the betrayal, I rather ‘take,’ ‘behold’ or ‘feel’ the other’s action to have a certain 
(dis)value (Wertnehmen, Werterschauung, Wertfühlen)—in that the event affects me, in this case, as 
having a certain ‘reproachableness’—without my necessarily forming a (judicative or perceptual) 
doxic thesis with regard to that value.125 
We can say something analogous in the case of practical intentionality. In intending to 
accomplish a certain action, I commit myself practically to its performance, in that the intended 
action is set up as a norm or standard which is to be regulative for my bodily comportment. But 
this needn’t require the formation of a doxic judgement in which I predict that a certain factual state 
of affairs, namely the event of my intended action, will occur in the future (nor, of course, could 
it involve a perception of my as yet unaccomplished deed). In support of this claim, we can note 
that it would not be logically incoherent to fully intend to accomplish a certain action, while at the 
same time remaining in a doxic state of uncertainty with regard to whether the action will factually 
transpire. A person who was wholly committed to a futural action while doxically accepting that 
mitigating circumstances could intervene and prevent its occurrence would not thereby hold two 
logically conflicting beliefs. It would be, as it were, practically incoherent to intend to accomplish a 
certain action while also intending to accomplish an incompatible action at the same point in 
time—such as if one were to intend both to enjoy an afternoon in the sun and to fulfil an 
afternoon’s work duties. However, this incoherence does not involve a conflict of mutually 
exclusive doxic judgements regarding what will factually occur, being rather a matter of two 
practical commitments whose posited actions are, when understood just as norms regulative for 
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one’s futural bodily engagement, irreconcilable. In short, such incompatibility is originally lived as 
a volitional rather than a doxic disjunction, being a categorical formation arising from the sphere 
of the will, rather than one primarily ascertained by the intellect.126 
For subjects of the emotive and practical attitude, then, the noematic correlates of their 
dominant mode of intentionality (the ‘reproachableness’ of the other’s behaviour, or the 
normativity of a futural practical possibility) only become posited doxically as a factual being 
through a change of (dominant) attitude, in which the non-objectivated axiological or practical 
senses are taken up, in higher-order acts of judgement, by a theoretical stance.127 While in the cases 
we have been considering, such an attitudinal shift retains the world-directedness of the non-
objectivating act on which it is based, it is also possible for the subject to enter into a wholly 
different type of theoretical attitude, namely that of reflection—an issue which will be considered in 
some detail in later chapters. The latter involves making one’s own pleasure or volition, and not 
the object one finds pleasing or desirable, into a theme of judgement, something which minimally 
occurs whenever someone earnestly declares: “I take pleasure in this.”128 
A second essential feature of non-objectivating acts is that they are founded (gegründet) 
upon objectivating acts. This foundedness has two characteristics. On the one hand, Husserl 
claims, in order for an emotive act to be intentionally related to a particular object, that object must 
first be posited as a being in one way or another. This positing could occur by means of perceptual 
doxa, such as when a person feels fear upon seeing a stranger lurking on a dark street corner, or it 
could be one originally accomplished through judgement, as in Husserl’s own example of feeling 
joy upon judicatively accepting a good piece of news. Here, the perceptual or judicative act 
provides a foundation for the emotive act in that the latter ‘borrows’ the intentional object and 
doxic component of the former, adding a new layer of evaluative sense to its noematic correlate.129 
On the other hand, this foundedness comprises a normative or motivational element. Our emotive 
and valuing acts do not just blindly ‘latch on’ to arbitrary objects, being rather ‘appropriate’ or 
‘inappropriate’ responses to the determinate features of such objects. Such responsiveness is 
analogous to the manner in which the claims of perceptual judgements are answerable to the 
perceptual world. Husserl expresses this point as follows: 
[T]he acts of emotive valuing and praxis, performed in these attitudes, exactly require their own 
pregivennesses, in regard to which they take a position and perform new constitutive accomplishments 
with their own phenomenological forms. The objects of the pregiving intentional experiences exercise 
certain allures upon the subject, irrespective of whether it is subject of the theoretical, practical, or 
axiological attitude. Such attitudes respond to the “allure” with the relevant logical, axiological, and practical 
acts.130 
Consider again the example of a fear felt when passing a stranger on a street corner. Husserl’s 
claim here is simply that this fear is not unmotivated by the concrete perceptual sense which the 
passing stranger has for us; rather, our fear is elicited ‘in light of’ certain of his perceptually evident 
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features, say, his aggressive posture or angry mutterings.131 Similarly, the felt beauty of a cloud is 
surely not unrelated to its very visible presence, the way its white billowing expansion stands in 
contrast to the blue sky lying ‘behind’ it. Emotive acts, moreover, are obviously not solely 
responsive to the sensuously given features of perceptual objects. The contents and structure of a 
philosophical account, or the prose and plot of a literary work, can also affectively strike us as, say, 
‘exasperating’ or ‘elegant.’132 
Willing and acting are also founded upon pregiven objects in these two ways. On the one 
hand, to construe a possible bodily event as a possible action, whether as a goal in and of itself or 
as a means by which certain ends could be achieved, presupposes not only the perceptual presence 
of the world (and perhaps certain judicative beliefs) but also an imaginative envisaging of the 
context and nature of the possible future doing, upon which is founded a minimally practical 
consciousness of that action as something ‘I can do.’133 On the other hand, when deciding which 
practical possibility to pursue in action (e.g. whether to frolic in the sun or labour in the office), 
my decision will typically take as its justifying motives certain evaluative judgements or emotive 
stances, whether as explicitly appealed to in thought, or as sedimented in my outlook and thus 
tacitly operative in my habitual way of deciding. Consequently, willing and acting always 
presuppose “certain representing acts, perhaps thinking acts of various levels, and valuing acts.” 
If such founding acts are actively ‘run through’ in thought, they are “not ones performed in the 
eminent sense of the word, they do not have the mode of theoretical acts, the mode of “life” which 
would be “performed” in such acts.” Rather, here “the true and proper performance lies in the willing 
and the doing.”134 Nevertheless, a background of doxic (and, in some cases, emotive) theses serve 
as the intentional groundwork and motivational context for my willing and acting, and partially 
comprise its inner intelligibility. 
Now, we have seen that what serves as founding for the non-objectivating acts of emotion 
and the will is not always a matter of perceptual nature. While certain modes of affective and practical 
comportment may gain their motivating grounds solely from the worldly features that are directly 
manifest in perceptual experience, in other cases the underlying doxic component also 
incorporates imaginative and memorial elements, as well as drawing upon the subject’s nexus of 
judicative beliefs (a nexus which will be considered in depth in Chapter 3). However, and to leave 
aside the complexities of memory and imagination for now, we saw in the previous section that 
such judicative stances cannot be understood as wholly divorced from perceptual experience and 
its correlates, for the origins of our thinking about nature may ultimately be traced back to our 
actual and possible perceptual experience of it. Even when the doxic component underlying, say, 
an emotive act consists in a judicative acceptance of a particular state of affairs with which we are 
perceptually unfamiliar—as in Husserl’s example of our feeling joy regarding an imparted piece of 
news—our doxically positing the relevant event, our taking it as a real occurrence, involves 
                                                           
131 A complication regarding this particular example is that such perceptual features are given in an 
empathetic grasp of the other as a person, and as such are not ‘merely natural’, despite being perceptually 
presented in a broader sense. See §5.3. 
132 As Husserl repeatedly emphasises, higher-order objects constituted in theoretical, affective, and 
practical attitudes can themselves function as pregivennesses for new (theoretical, affective, and practical) 
attitudes (Hua IV-2/V-2 331, 235 [1915, 1913]; cf. Hua IV 5-6, 188). 
133 Hua IV-2/V-2 742 A (1915-1917); cf. Hua IV 204-205.  
134 Hua IV-2/V-2 755-6 A [1913]; cf. Hua IV 10. Further discussion of practical intentionality can be 
found in Chapter 4, and see here Melle (1997). 
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situating it within the “open horizon” of the perceptual world with which we are constantly in a 
certain perspectival (i.e., egocentric, embodied, and limited) contact.135 Ultimately, then, the 
intentionality and intelligibility of our affective and practical acts can only be fully explicated with 
reference to our perceptual familiarity with nature.  
In that perceptual nature comprises the basic doxic layer of the experienced world upon 
which all senses that arises from non-objectivating acts are directly or indirectly founded, it follows 
that such nature, when regarded simply as a founding noematic layer, cannot yet involve any 
element of axiological or practical sense. That is, just like the sphere of reality investigated by 
natural science, it has a certain independence from ‘subjective’ valuations and the interests of 
praxis. However, two qualifications must immediately be added to this statement. First, as we have 
already emphasised and will see more clearly in the next section, the essential features and modes 
of acquaintance pertaining to perceptual nature are markedly different from those of its natural-
scientific counterpart. Correlatively, these two levels of nature are ‘impermeable’ to affect and the 
will in quite different ways. Second, it is important to recognise that Husserl’s claim is not that 
perceptual nature is the sole constituent of the world as we directly experience it, but an abstract 
and partial layer. In our ‘natural,’ everyday comportment, things are directly and immediately 
encountered not simply as unities of perceptible causal features, but as things which ‘affect’ us and 
with which we ‘have to do’: that is, as irritating and beautiful, as pencils and goalposts.136 Indeed, 
our very sense of what differentiates everyday things is deeply caught up with our enduring emotive 
style and the social practices in which we are immersed—a point of which Husserl was just as 
keenly aware as Heidegger.137 For Husserl, however, the layers of significance at play in such world-
disclosure only fully reveal their intelligibility when seen as ultimately responsive to a founding 
layer of strictly perceptual sense.138 
 
 
§2.5 | Perception and the material thing 
 
 
As we have seen, Husserl locates an originary form of nature in the perceptual object just as 
perceived, where this comprises a domain of sense that precedes all articulation through judicative, 
affective, and practical acts. In a sense, this thought is only a point of departure for a transcendental 
phenomenology of material nature, and indeed Husserl proceeds to actively thematise the things 
of perceptual nature in their mode of givenness, offering an expansive assembly of analyses that 
excavate this theme from a variety of different perspectives. In the following, I will limit myself to 
                                                           
135 Hua IV-2/V-2 3, 398, 237 [1912, 1915, 1913] (cf. Hua IV 109, 194-5). 
136 Hua III/1 58, 77 [Ideas I 50, 65-66]; Hua IV-2/V-2 233-5, 296-7, 297-8, 298-99 [1913, 1923/24, 
1923/24, mid-20s] (cf. Hua IV 186-189). 
137 Hua IV-2/V-2 593, 627-628, 696-697, 733-745, 298, 627-30 [1910-1912, 1916/1917, 1916/17, 1917, 
1923/24, 1916/17] (cf. Hua IV 378, 347, 268, 188). I return to this point in §5.2.2. 
138 Drummond (2013a) has argued, to my mind persuasively, that once we understand Husserl’s claim to 
be that emotive and practical sense is motivated by perceptual or judicative sense, such that there is a single 
act which includes both the underlying perceptual/judicative grasp and the stratum of emotive/practical 
sense—rather than it being that emotive and practical acts are built upon objectivating acts—then we can 
also explicate the immediacy and directness of emotive and practical intentionality (which Husserl himself 
emphasises). The analyses of this last section, which I build upon in §5.3.3, are indebted to Drummond’s 
seminal work on the intentionality of the emotions. 
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sketching several discoveries that emerge from these analyses which are of relevance for our 
concerns here, in that they will later help us to render thematic the specific character of animate 
others. 
(1) If perceptual nature comprises a ubiquitous and motivationally basic stratum of the 
experienced world, then in seeking to render it thematic we must ask what remains of the latter 
once all senses accruing to judicative, affective, and volitional acts are stripped away. Husserl’s 
preliminary answer to this question is that we are then left with a sphere of “sense-objects,” these 
being a domain of “primal objects” which serve as the ultimate motivational basis for all other acts. 
As he immediately notes, however, the “concept of the sense-object is not univocal, just as, correlatively, 
the concept of presentation [Vorstellung] in the pregnant sense is not—I mean sensuous presentation 
(sensuous perception, sensuous remembering, etc.).”139 On the one hand, this is because the things as they 
present themselves prior to judicative articulation have a style or character which shows up by 
means of a plurality of sensuous modalities. Thus, for instance, the spatial form or shape [Gestalt] 
of a thing—which is here not an exact and idealised geometrical determination, but simply a 
corporeal style over which its colours and tactile qualities spread—is something which can be both 
seen and touched.140 Or to take a slightly more complex case, the weight of a perceived object, again 
not as an exact measurement but as a rough way of being ‘bulky,’ can present itself either tactually, 
through my picking the thing up or catching it in mid-air, or visually, by my seeing it crush another 
object beneath it.141 Moreover, there are evidently sensuous qualities which only appear through 
vision or touch, and yet the perceived thing presents itself as a unitary whole to which all such 
qualities belong. Here we come across the working of primitive passive syntheses which connect 
different spheres of sensibility, such that the perceived (normally) coheres into a concordant 
whole.142 
 (2) Husserl outlines a second respect in which the things of perception lack equivocity, 
one which involves their intrinsically relational character. To illustrate this, consider that a patch 
of the white wall in front of me is illuminated by an adjacent window, and that this illumination 
dampens and reappears as clouds pass overhead. In attempting to describe what we ‘see’ in such 
a case, we can easily get in quite a muddle. On the one hand, we are inclined to say that the colour 
of the wall ‘changes’ with the flickering lights. One would suspect someone who was blind to the 
yellowish tinge that radiates so delightfully over the wall to be blind to colour itself. On the other 
hand, we are perfectly aware that the wall has not actually ‘changed colour,’ and that what we see 
is simply a white wall illuminated in varying degrees. For Husserl, this ambiguity is not simply a 
product of conceptual confusion but reveals the multi-layered character of things as we perceive 
them. It also illustrates that our perceptual grasp of stable “material features” already recognises 
‘real,’ or (for lack of a better word) ‘causal’ relations in which things are immersed. As such a stable 
feature, the colour of the wall shows itself perceptually through the spectrum of ‘shades’ which 
spread across its spatial form being (perceptually) taken as ‘caused’ by the lighting conditions and 
the shadowy presence of occluding objects. Here Husserl upholds what both Hume and Kant 
famously deemed impossible, namely that certain kinds of causal relation already infuse the objects 
                                                           
139 Hua IV-2/V-2 338-9 (Hua IV §8) [1915]. 
140 Hua IV-2/V-2 537 A, 51 (Hua IV 153) [1912]. 
141 Hua XVI 344. 
142 Hua IV-2/V-2 342 (Hua IV 20) [1915]. 
 39 
of sensibility.143 In this way, the stable perceptual character of a thing shows up in the regular styles 
of dependency which its changing qualitative states [Zustände] exhibit in relation to its causal 
circumstances [Umstände].144 With regard to the perceptual exhibition of a material thing, absence 
of change is not the sole possibility but exactly the limit-case [Grenzfall] of change.145 
However, Husserl was not content with spelling out this three-strung model of ‘features,’ 
‘states,’ and ‘circumstances,’ but regarded it as an enigma in need of clarification. As he puts it, the 
situation we now have before us is that “an alteration of a thing is only an alteration of a thing if 
it is dependent upon other alterations of things, which are themselves always alterations of things 
in such dependencies, and so on. This seems to lead us in a circle.”146 Husserl’s worry here is that 
the insight that materiality and causality are constituted together in perceptual experience appears to 
leaves us unable to account for how perception recognises causal relations between the things which 
perceptually appear. In addressing this issue, one cannot simply appeal to the relations evinced 
between ‘states’ and ‘circumstances’—such as the dependence of the yellowish tinge upon the 
flickering lights—for such elements of the perceptual world only emerge with the causally-real 
things themselves, and as already related to one another—as the yellowish tinge of the white wall 
which is caused by the flickering lights. Accordingly, Husserl maintains that there is an underlying 
layer [Unterschicht] of the perceptual world which motivates the perception of material things as 
causally immersed, and which consists in a plurality of mere ‘phantoms’ or ‘schemata.’147 Defined 
most rigorously, the phantom of a thing incorporates its total perceptual sense minus those stable 
features which accrue to it by virtue of its causal relations.148 As such, it is a “sensuously filled 
corporeal form in space,” a definite and mobile spatial spread filled up with a cacophony of 
sensuous qualities that are not yet taken as causally dependent.149 The passive-synthetic 
accomplishment of thing-perception then consists in recognising the ‘functional dependencies’ 
between the schemata, these relations motivating the apprehension of a (material) thing whose 
features are exhibited in the causally-dependent alterations of its states.150 
(3) We saw in the previous chapter (§1.2.2) that Husserl emphasises the perspectival 
character of perception. As he puts it in Ideen II, the mode of givenness of perceived things is 
always such that, at any point in time, “strictly, only very little “of it” is presented in “actual,” 
“proper,” perception.”151 When I look down at the book on my desk, “[w]hat is properly given, 
with respect to the form, for example, is only the front-side with its square boundary, and with 
respect to the colour, only the grey of this part of its surface.”152 But if it is only ever a certain 
aspect of the object which shows itself sensuously, in what sense can we say that what we see is the 
                                                           
143 Hua IV-2/V-2 361-362 (Hua IV 44) [1915]. See here also Husserl’s more critical reflections regarding 
the perceptibility of causal powers or capacities from Ding und Raum (Hua XVI 344-5). 
144 Hua IV-2/V-2 361, 555-6 A (Hua IV 42-3) [1915]. 
145 Hua IV-2/V-2 416-7 A [1915]; cf. Hua IV 42-3. 
146 Hua IV-2/V-2 468-9 A [1915/16]. 
147 Hua IV-2/V-2 472 (Hua IV 65), 513 A [1915/16, 1912]; cf. Merleau-Ponty (2012, p. 228; 1945, p. 
254). In many passages, Husserl explicitly identifies ‘phantom’ and ‘schema’ or ‘complete schema’ 
[Vollschema] (see, e.g., Hua IV-2/V-2 14 A, 110-11, 175, 203 [1912, 1912] (Hua V 30-31, 79, 103). 
148 Hua IV-2/V-2 343-4, 357 (Hua IV 22, 36) [1915].  
149 Hua IV-2/V-2 14 A [1912]. See also: Hua IV-2/V-2 357-8 (Hua IV 37-8) [1915]. For particularly good 
discussions of Husserl’s concept of the phantom, see Sokolowski (1974, pp. 86-9, 95-7), and Mattens 
(2006). 
150 Hua IV-2/V-2 464 A, 416-7 A [1915/16, 1915]; cf. Hua IV 42-3. 
151 Hua IV-2/V-2 217 (Hua IV 176) [1913]. 
152 Hua IV-2/V-2 355 A [1915]; cf. Hua IV 35. 
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thing itself? It is here that Husserl appeals to the thought that we can distinguish two kinds of 
perceptual presence, which he terms “primal presence” [Urpräsenz] and “appresence” or “co-
presence” [Appräsenz, Mitpräsenz, Kopräsenz]. At any point in time, only those aspects of the thing 
which directly appear to the senses are primally present, whereas a partially determinate set of the 
thing’s other aspects are merely co-present, in that they “co-meant,” “co-intended,” or “co-
grasped” in the total perceptual act.153 In this way, perceptual givenness is always characterised by 
a sensuously or primally presented aspect and a horizon of appresented aspects, where these two 
components are integrated within one’s perception of the object.154 
Crucially, Husserl correlates this description of the perspectival character of perception 
with an account of its embodied and dynamic nature. Accordingly, he suggests that the horizonal 
structure of perceptual givenness is rooted in the capacity for bodily self-movement. We can see 
this by noting that getting to know a thing perceptually is not accomplished through a frozen gaze, 
but my moving closer to and around the object and thereby getting a proper view of more of its 
sides and material peculiarities.155 And in this (normally) smooth process of perceptual exhibition, 
the transition to the primal presence of a new aspect of the thing is generated by a certain kind of 
bodily movement, whether this be a matter of walking forward, turning one’s head, rolling one’s 
eyes, or bending down—or, as is usually the case, an integrated complex of such movements 
simultaneously transpiring. In explicating this state of affairs, Husserl suggests that “kinaesthetic 
sensations,” in which bodily movement is lived, and more exactly the actualisation of possible 
“kinaesthetic constellations” through determinate courses of bodily self-movement, function as 
the “motivating circumstances” for perceptual experience.156 Leaving aside the more complex 
situation of moving things, consider the case in which an object is perceived as resting while I 
move around it. Here, my perceptual experience ‘takes account of’ the kinaesthetic movement I 
enact, in that the changes in my appearance-systems are accepted as dependent upon the freshly 
emerging kinaesthetic constellation, to the effect that the sensuous emergence of a new aspect is 
taken as a certain kind of transition within the horizon of appresented aspects correlated with my 
earlier ‘view’ of the object.  
Accordingly, Husserl claims that “in all perception and perceptual exhibition (experience) the lived 
body is involved as freely moved sense organ, as freely moved totality of sense organs,” such that, “on this original 
foundation, all that is thingly-real in the surrounding world of the Ego has its relation to the lived 
body.”157 But in what way does kinaesthetic awareness exactly serve, not merely as perceptually 
guiding, but also as manifesting one’s own body? In addressing this question, it is important to note 
the distinction Husserl famously draws between the ‘lived body’ or ‘living body’ [Leib] and the 
body as a thing in space [Körper].158 While something like the latter construal of our own body can, 
                                                           
153 Hua IV-2/V-2 450f., 340-1. (Hua IV 162f, 19-20) [1922/23, 1915]. 
154 Hua IV-2/V-2 341, 410 (Hua IV 20, 127-8) [1915]. 
155 Hua IV-2/V-2 355 A [1915]; cf. Hua IV 35. 
156 Hua XVI 188; cf. Hua IV-2/V-2 59-60 (Hua IV 57-58) [1912]. 
157 Hua IV-2/V-2 49 (Hua IV 56) [1912]. This sketch of the role of kinaesthesia in perception only 
touches upon the depth and complexity of his analyses, particularly in his ground-breaking lectures from 
1907 published in Ding und Raum (Hua XVI). See here Drummond (1979). 
158 Given that no English term matches the German Leib, I have either translated it as ‘lived body’ or 
‘living body.’ As a general rule, I have used ‘lived body’ when referring to the body as a field of affection 
and self-movement that is first-personally ‘lived’ as a dimension of subjectivty, and ‘living body’ to refer 
to the animate body as a perceptual object. While this approach risks threatening the terminological 
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on occasion, become a (particularly opaque) perceptual object, and becomes particularly salient in 
our empathetic relations to others (see §3.3), the lived body is rather a pervasive element of the 
perceiving subject. Prior to any perceptual concern with the material reality of our body, the lived 
body manifests itself as the ‘here’ which I occupy and to which all perceptual, and even imaginary, 
objects are egocentrically related. Husserl writes: 
[T]he lived body acquires a distinction as bearer of the pole of orientation [Orientierungspole], the bearer of the here 
and now, out of which the pure Ego intuits space and the whole world of the senses. Thus each thing that 
appears has eo ipso a relation of orientation to the lived body, and this refers not only to what actually appears 
but to each thing that is supposed to be able to appear. If I am imagining a centaur I cannot help but 
imagine it as in a certain orientation and in a particular relation to my sense organs: it is “to the right” of 
me; it is “approaching” me or “moving away;” it is “revolving,” turning towards or away from “me”—from 
me, i.e., from my lived body, my eye, which is directed at it. 159 
In claiming that the lived body continually functions as the “zero-point of orientation” or 
“absolute “here,”” Husserl is evidently not suggesting that perception in some way implicitly 
represents the body as a material thing ‘out there’ in space amongst other things.160 As he notes, 
““I am here” does not mean: “I am an Object of nature.””161 We can indeed say that the salience 
of the lived body in perceptual experience is, in part, a matter of the quasi- or proto-spatial relations 
it sustains to the things of the perceptual environment. However, given that, like much of our 
body, our eyes themselves never visually appear as occupying a determinate spatial position 
(although they may, of course, be occasionally located tactually),162  it is clear that the lived relation 
between bodily here and thingly there is quite unlike the kind of spatial relations perceived things 
bear to one another. The lived body is ‘here’ in relation to all else in the perceptual world, not in 
the sense that a perceptually given object stands in an empirical spatial relation to others, but as an 
a priori and invariant ‘here’ in relation to which all possible perceptual ‘theres’ must stand. 
However, the universality of the bodily ‘here’ does not prevent it from being essentially dynamic, 
which is to say, a relation which is intelligible in its concreteness only in terms of possible and 
actual bodily movement and the perceptual consequences thereof.163 For something to show up 
perceptually as ‘to my right’ or ‘distant,’ or indeed even as ‘appearing from the front,’ certain 
possible bodily movements in which such kinds of ‘there’ can be transformed into other kinds of 
‘there,’ or even into a ‘here,’ are perceptually implied.164 And these kinaesthetic possibilities are 
both embedded in and partially constitute my present way of being oriented, which is itself lived 
as having arisen from a kinaesthetic actualisation of the retained past. 
(4) Summarising the last two points, we can say that a tacit relation to ‘circumstances’ is 
always involved in thing-perception. On the one hand, the stable features of things are given in 
the styles of change exhibited in the regular way their ‘states’ alter in relation to ‘causal 
circumstances.’ On the other hand, in seeing a thing in space an awareness of one’s currently actual 
                                                           
consistency of my argument, I hope it will help clarify the form of embodiment Husserl is invoking at 
different instances. 
159 Hua IV-2/V-2 49-50 (Hua IV 56, virtually identical, translation modified) [1912]. Cf. Hua IV-2/V-2 22 
(Hua V 109) [1912]. 
160 Hua IV-2/V-2 410 (Hua IV 127) [1915]. 
161 Hua IV-2/V-2 277 (Hua IV 203) [1913]. 
162 Hua IV-2/V-2 460, n. A [1908]. 
163 Hua IV-2/V-2 312 A [1914/15]. For a discussion of this passage, see §3.1.2. 
164 Hua IV-2/V-2 320 (Hua IV 308) [1913]. 
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kinaesthetic constellation, and the horizon of kinaesthetic possibilities which surrounds it, is always 
at play, such that things are given in relation to my mobile bodily ‘here’—and to this degree the 
thing is given in relation to my kinaesthetic-bodily circumstances.165 Husserl accords a primacy to 
the latter kind of relation, which is involved already in the constitution of the spatial phantom.166 
However, kinaesthesia are not solely of import for the perceptual disclosure of the spatiality of 
things; rather, they also enable perception to have a certain teleological character. As Husserl puts 
it, our perception of a thing as appearing from a certain side and with certain material features 
“points us towards a currently invisible backside and ahead to certain courses of perception in which 
we, in “turning the head,” “moving the eyes,” etc., would bring into view what is ever new of the 
same thing (the meant thing), of its form, it colour, etc.” In this way, Husserl suggests that our 
momentary perceptual experience of a thing as exhibiting certain features—that is, sensuous-causal 
styles—always delineates courses of movement in which those features would be better given, and 
“which we only have to give ourselves over to, as it were, in order to fashion the appropriate clarity 
and givenness.”167 In perceiving material features, the currently operative perceptual circumstances 
are always tacitly located somewhere on a spectrum of ‘optimality,’ a spectrum which peaks in 
those circumstances under which the features would appear optimally, a matter which in its turn 
depends upon which kind of material feature is in question. And while these optimal circumstances 
sometimes include a certain kind of causal situation—such that, for instance, “clear daylight” 
serves as the lighting conditions under which the thing’s ‘true colour’ directly ‘appears’—they also 
always involve an optimal relation to one’s body, in which the relevant features would be given in 
the flesh [leibhaftig].168 It is then possible for epistemically interested perception to follow up and 
more closely determine the perceptual object, through a transition to these (passively delineated) 
optimal circumstances.169 
 
 
§2.6 | Animate empathy: A preliminary take 
 
 
At this stage, we are sufficiently prepared to highlight the point at which the phenomenological 
analyses of nature and empathy intersect. As we have seen, Husserl claims that nature announces 
itself experientially in (at least) three different ways: as a layer of ‘founding’ reality constantly 
present, as an underlying and perceptible stratum, in worldly objects as experienced in the 
personalistic attitude (perceptual nature); as the generic essence pertaining to a certain class of 
categorical objectivities, namely, those constituted in acts of thinking in which perceptual nature 
is described (theoretical nature); and, finally, as a domain investigated by the natural sciences, which 
is solely accessible to a non-descriptive, indeed rigorously mathematical, style of thinking (scientific 
nature). With regard to the things of perceptual nature, we have seen their givenness integrates a 
plurality of sensory modalities, that their features are manifest in the style of alteration their states 
exhibit in relation to circumstances, and that perceptual experience recognises these styles on the 
                                                           
165 Hua IV-2/V-2 342 (Hua IV 20) [1915]. 
166 Hua IV-2/V-2 410 (Hua IV 127-128) [1915]. 
167 Hua IV-2/V-2 355 A [1915], emphasis mine; cf. Hua IV 35. 
168 Hua IV-2/V-2 504 A, 463 A, 497 A, 493-4 A [1915-1917]. 
169 Hua IV-2/V-2 510-11 (Hua IV 60) [1915-1917]. Husserl also emphasises that the perceptual givenness 
of a thing always involves a certain unknownness and openness (Hua IV-2/V-2 421 A [1915]). 
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basis of a pregiven manifold of phantoms or schemata. Finally, we have seen that our perceptual 
contact with nature has an embodied, dynamic, and teleological character. When it comes to the 
empathetic experience of other persons, on the other hand, we saw in Chapter 1 that we are directly 
acquainted with expressive unities, that is, unities whose corporeality immediately displays an 
embodied and world-directed experiential life other than one’s own. This mode of experiential 
contact with others takes place in the personalistic attitude, in that it is a pre-scientific way of 
relating to others which emerges in and to a significant degree comprises our everyday involvement 
with the social world. 
It is not immediately clear how, and indeed whether, these two pictures may be integrated. 
We have seen that a basic form of empathetic contact with others as persons can be described, 
once the notion is untied from the perception of material things, as a mode of perceptual experience 
(§1.2.1). Such an empathetic grasp of others has certain similarities with our acquaintance with 
‘perceptual nature,’ in that it involves a basic mode of doxic intentionality that is directly giving of 
a certain type of real object (namely, other persons), and which serves as founding for those of 
our (theoretical, affective, and practical) attitudes which relate to other persons as such (see §5.3.3). 
But the other person as empathetically given also differs from, and in a sense ‘exceeds,’ an object 
of perceptual nature, in that the dynamics of her bodily reality are not only visibly present but also 
immediately expressive of the person’s conscious engagement with her surrounding world (§1.2.2). 
The fact that the other person is empathetically experienced with a certain immediacy and 
directness, but also as exceeding her sensuously presentable bodily features, appears at odds with 
the claim that perceptual nature operates as a self-enclosed founding layer in all worldly experience. 
In beginning to see how we might face up to this conceptual hurdle, it is important to note 
that perceptual nature is not itself ontologically, or indeed phenomenologically, univocal. As was 
briefly mentioned earlier (§2.2), Husserl claims that the region of nature permits differentiation 
into the sub-regions of material and animate nature (see §3.1). However, Husserl’s account of the 
difference between the perceptual givenness of material and that of animate nature is more 
important for our current purposes than his (arguably somewhat rough and preliminary) 
ontological reflections. Let me now explicate one seemingly problematic way Husserl characterises 
this difference, before suggesting an alternative approach I consider in the next chapter 
According to Husserl, like the beings of material nature, animals are also first given as such 
in a direct and doxic mode of perceptual experience. He illustrates this nicely with the example of 
the perceptual experience of a cat, in a passage which is worth quoting in depth, in that it brings 
to the fore several issues which will be pertinent to my argument. 
I see a playing cat, and I regard it now as something of nature, just as is done in zoology. I see it as a sensing 
and animated living body, i.e. I see it precisely as a cat. I “see” it in the general sense ordinarily meant when 
speaking of seeing. […] In its own way, the cat is itself seen, and in the seeing, its existence as the animal, 
cat, is experienced. This experience has the kind of imperfections corresponding to the fundamental 
character of our experience of animals. But, as always, the cat is present there in the flesh—specifically, as 
a physical thing with sensing surfaces, sense organs, etc. The stratum of sensation is not there as something 
beside the physical thing; what is there is a living body, a living body which has physical and aesthesiological 
qualities as one. 170  
The first thing to note about this passage is that Husserl regards the experience of animals to 
require a broadening of the concept of perceptual nature, such that animate others can be 
                                                           
170 Hua IV-2/V-2 217-8 [1913] (a virtually identical passage is found at Hua IV 175-6). 
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incorporated within it. This is phenomenologically necessary, because, when perceptually 
confronted with a cat, what exhibits itself directly is exactly the cat itself under a certain mode of 
imperfect givenness. Or, more exactly, what we face perceptually in such cases is a unitary reality 
which includes two interwoven layers, one of bodily materiality and one of fields of sensations. 
These two layers are interwoven in that they are not experienced as externally related to one 
another, but as comprising two dimensions, isolatable only through abstraction, of the 
straightforwardly given object. In other words, the sensuous layer is simply that of the cat which, 
when compared with any object of (perceptual) material nature, remains as a surplus of perceptual 
sense. 
The second point to note regarding this passage is that, despite the claim regarding the 
distinctiveness of animals in the domain of perceptual nature, the subject seeing the cat is 
characterised as a theoretically interested one: as an ‘I’ who ‘regards the cat as something of nature, 
just as is done in zoology.’ In the section of the passage quoted above, the descriptive activity 
being performed here is largely a ‘nature-theoretical’ one, a description of the cat’s perceptually 
given living body, along with an eidetic-phenomenological recognition that this living body, as 
with all (foreign) living bodies, is concretely correlated with a certain form of perceptual 
experience. However, things become more complex in the lines which directly follow: 
Likewise, the living body is also experienced as living body of a soul, and the world “soul” indicates again 
a founded stratum of qualities, and of course one that is still higher. The soul is not there as extended over 
the living body in the manner of being localised in the proper sense; it does not offer itself as something 
like a complex of psychic fields—thought in analogy with sense fields—which would come, immediately 
or mediately, to phenomenal coincidence with the extensional components of the living body…. In spite 
of that, the psychic is, in experience, one—that is, realiter one—with the living body; to that extent it is 
something at the living body or in it, lacking only distinguishable separate location. One could employ the 
expression, misleading to be sure of introjection; it would then express precisely this state of affairs. […] As 
we can direct our analysing regard onto other properties, so we can also turn to these psychic ones; they 
then stand out as a “stratum,” as a really inseparable annex, of the physical living body, and of the thing 
which for its part would be thinkable without such strata.171 
Involved in some way with the apprehension of the cat is an experience, not merely of the 
sensitivity of its body, but also of its soul or psyche. By this Husserl appears to mean an 
apprehension of the cat’s intentional acts—say, its perceptions, affects, and desires—as ‘states’ 
which, while not directly embodied in the manner of fields of sensations and hence not directly 
visible in the same way, nevertheless belong to the total reality of the perceived cat. Now, it is easy 
to see why this apprehension operates as a necessary presupposition for (at least a certain kind of) 
natural-scientific investigation of animate life, in that it serves up the cat’s psychological life as an 
additional layer of states that inhere within its total reality as a worldly object. Indeed, this is one 
way of understanding Husserl’s claim that the apprehension of the cat as bearer of psychic states 
makes possible an ‘analysing regard’ being directed towards the psychic state as a ‘stratum.’ 
However, with regard to a phenomenology of the animate other this account is, I think, less 
informative.172 What are we to do with the claim that the nexus of the cat’s psychic states are, for 
                                                           
171 Hua IV-2/V-2 218 [1913] (virtually identical passage at Hua IV 176). 
172 Heidegger was thus partially correct when, in lectures given in Marburg in 1925, he (critically) referred 
to just this example as one which Husserl employed to depict the naturalistic attitude (1979: 168-9 [122]). 
Only partially correct, however, in that Heidegger fails to note that Husserl is, in an admittedly somewhat 
unclear and preliminary way, in fact highlighting two issues by means of this example: 1) the manner in 
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a natural-theoretical subject, ‘at the living body or in it,’ despite their not belonging to the perceived 
living body but rather being experienced only through a certain kind of ‘introjection,’ by which 
Husserl appears to mean: an accomplishment over and above perception? The most we can take 
from this seems to be that the apprehension of the psychic lives of animate beings transgresses 
their perceptual givenness, which only presents their living body as a materially embodied nexus 
of sensation-fields.173 
But the question still lingers of how a higher-order apprehension of the mental lives of 
animals as a layer of inner states is motivated. We have seen that this apprehension cannot be 
merely perceptual, and it must therefore be a categorically rich—even, in a certain sense, 
metaphorical174—way of thinking about the experiential life of a foreign animal and its relation to 
the perceptually given. It may seem to follow from this that the experiential lives of animals are 
ultimately only grasped by us through a projective movement of thought (a view apparently evoked 
by Husserl’s usage of the term ‘introjection’). As should be evident, this conclusion would be 
problematic for the broader argument of this thesis. If such a line of thought holds with regard to 
animals, then it could easily be extended to our experience of human persons. For ‘our’ experiential 
lives surely bear enough in common with our ‘fellow creatures’ that if the latter are conceived as 
invisible domains, the intersubjective accessibility of the former will also be called into question. 
Fortunately, this conclusion doesn’t follow as hastily as might be supposed. Rather, we can 
acknowledge that the intentional experiences of other animate beings are only constituted as ‘inner 
states’ through an extra-perceptual activity, while maintaining that such foreign experiences can be 
perceptually given in a different way. As I will show in Chapter 3, this becomes clear when we note 
that the perceptual naturality of animals does not only consist in their facing us as a unique type 
of perceivable nature-object (as sensitive living bodies), but also in that we encounter them as fellow 
subjects of perceptual nature, as beings who directly experience and ‘co-constitute’ the same domain of 
nature with which we are perceptually acquainted. I call the mode of experience which incorporates 
both of these elements animate empathy. This mode of empathy designates the experience of animate 
others as intentionally directed towards and responsive to a surrounding world which, as it were, 
‘overlaps’ with our own, and it has a priority to any ‘naturalistic’ thinking in which their lives are 
                                                           
which foreign animality is directly perceptible, and 2) the (mediate and complex) sense in which such 
perception serves as a kind of presupposition for natural-scientific thinking regarding animals. Lotz’s more 
sympathetic and accurate account of Husserl’s take on ‘animate others’ exhibits a similar blindspot, when 
he claims that, for Husserl, the sense, ‘animal,’ is “constituted whenever we describe consciousness with 
the prospect of and regarding its natural and causal circumstances.” (2006: 194) On the view I have been 
developing here, this alleged essential correlation of animality with a theoretical attitude overlooks 
Husserl’s sensitivity to the perceivability of animate others as such. Another reading, in stark contrast 
with Heidegger and Lotz, has recently been offered by Painter. From the (correct) claim that Husserl’s 
playing cat evinces that, for him, animals are directly perceived as sensitive and self-moving beings, she 
concludes that animals ought to be understood as fellow ‘personal subjects,’ that is, subjects of the 
‘personalistic attitude,’ who therefore demand of us moral care and concern (2007: 98-103). Interestingly, 
Husserl himself occasionally suggests that the concept of personhood be de-anthropomorphised so as to 
also cover (some) non-human animals (see, e.g., Hua IX 130, Hua I 101). However, he would also insist, 
and to my mind correctly, that while animaticity is a necessary condition for personhood, it is not yet 
sufficient (see Chapter 4). I cannot discuss the ethical implications of this here, beyond suggesting that 
univocally personalising animate others may not the best starting point for explicating the kind of moral 
claim they make upon us. 
173 In this regard, see also Hua IV-2/V-2 216 A [1913], emphasis mine; cf. Hua IV 174. 
174 Cf. Hua IV-2/V-2 51-2 A [1912]; cf. Hua IV 153. 
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construed in terms of interior states. Indeed, such thinking modifies our pretheoretical contact with 
animate beings as embodied co-subjects, ‘objectifying’ their experiential lives through construing 
them simply as an additional ‘inner’ layer of the animal-object. 
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3. Animate empathy and intercorporeal nature 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I will attempt to think through together two discrete but interrelated questions. 
First, in what way does one’s perceptual contact with material nature involve a tacit appeal to other 
subjects who co-perceive, or could co-perceive, the material things one perceives? And second, 
what is the generic character of our experience of other animate beings? Both of these matters are 
hugely complex issues which Husserl returned to repeatedly, and my discussion of them will not 
be exhaustive. Nevertheless, I hope to show that Husserl’s analyses in Ideen II move towards a 
conception of ‘animate empathy,’ understood as a form of intuitive experience of the animate 
other’s body as appresenting bodily subjectivity, and that they provide us with the resources to 
explicate both the distinctive character and transcendental implications of this mode of experience. 
Unpacking this thought will then provide the necessary groundwork for the discussion of personal 
ipseity and alterity found in the last two chapters of this work. 
 
 
§3.1 | Animals and things: Ontological Considerations 
 
 
In orienting ourselves towards the two questions mentioned above, it will helpful to first 
reconsider Husserl’s ontology of animate nature. Husserl maintains that a phenomenology of 
nature should not be restricted, in its orienting ontological reflections just as much as in its 
constitutive analyses, to the sole theme of material things. After all, when we think, in a pre-
philosophical and naïve register, about the totality of real entities that comprises the universe of 
nature [das All der “realen” Sachen, das “Weltall”, die Natur], whether in its factual composition or 
even in terms of the possible entities that could conceivably lurk within it, then there is perhaps 
no distinction that comes more readily to mind than that between ‘material nature’ and ‘living 
nature,’ that is, ‘the nature of animals’ [lebendige, animalischer Natur].175 Leaving aside the tricky cases 
of plants, amoeba, and other organisms that are not obviously minded—and consequently of great 
interest to those theorists who seek to identify a smooth continuum linking rudimentary forms of 
life and embodied and socialised human intelligence176—Husserl suggests, as a general and 
preliminary ontological classification, that animals are living bodies animated by mind or psyche 
[beseelte Leiber].177 This characterisation, which applies without being at all limited to us “human 
beings (or “rational” living creatures),” specifies that animals are unitary realities with both material 
and mental strata, each encompassing their own real features.178 Thus, animals contain, “in 
                                                           
175 Hua IV-2/V-2 347 (Hua IV 27, translation modified) [1915]. 
176 See, e.g., Jonas (2001) and Thompson (2007). 
177 Hua IV-2/V-2 352 (Hua IV 32, translation modified) [1915]. 
178 Hua IV-2/V-2 447 (Hua IV 162) [1916/17]. 
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themselves, as their lower stratum, material realities, so-called material living bodies”, but crucially 
they also have “besides their specifically material qualities, still new systems of qualities 
[Beschaffenheiten], the “psychic” ones”.179 The point here is simply that it lies within the scope of our 
truthful thinking about the real nature of animals that we ascribe to them “sensations, 
representations, feelings, and psychic acts and states of every kind,” and, conversely, that the latter 
owe their ontological status as real events within nature to their being taken as “activities or 
conditions of animals or humans and, as such, included in the spatiotemporal world.”180  
Husserl describes animate beings as ‘founded realities,’ by which he appears to mean at 
least three things.181 First, he is drawing our attention to the fact that, when thinking about or 
perceiving animals as such, body and psyche are not taken as distinct and self-contained entities—
however differently they might be thought of within the remit of certain practical and theoretical 
tasks—but as integrated layers of a “concrete totality,” the human being or animal itself, layers 
which alter their sense when perceived or thought of outside of such an integration.182 Second, he 
is emphasising that, insofar as the states and dispositions which constitute the psyche of an (human 
or non-human) animal are always saturated with and conditioned by bodily affection, the animate 
psyche possesses an intimate unity with the living body.183 Moreover, while psychic qualities do 
not belong to the animate body in just the same way as the material features which literally extend 
over it—such as the colours, tactile qualities, muscular strengths, etc., which are spatially 
distributed amongst its parts—they nevertheless have a certain “spatial integration” or localisation 
through their “foundation in the living body” (see §3.4.1). Consequently, unlike material things, 
animate beings cannot undergo “fragmentation”; insofar as their psychic qualities are bodily 
conditioned and spatially integrated but not literally extended, being more than ways in which 
space is filled with sensible or causal features, such qualities are not retained when the parts in 
which they are integrated are broken off from the whole of the organism.184 Finally, by describing 
the psychic qualities of animate beings as materially founded, Husserl is emphasising that, while 
the materiality of the animal is intertwined with mentality, one can nevertheless abstractively specify 
the merely material features of the animate body without any reference to the psyche—although 
one will not thereby do justice to them as animate. The animate psyche, on the other hand, only 
participates in the universe of nature through its bodily integration. 
However, and as with his phenomenological account of the material thing, Husserl’s 
phenomenology of animate being cannot remain content with regional-ontological considerations 
alone. Rather, to strive towards a phenomenological account of the animate, his inquiry must 
interrogate animaticity in correlation with the forms of experience in which it is first disclosed. But 
while Husserl achieved this in his constitutional analysis of material nature by focussing on the 
material thing as pre-predicatively given in perception, the experience which originally gives the 
animal as a worldly being is rather a certain form of empathy. It is, after all, only in the experience 
of foreign animate beings that we directly encounter mindedness objectively, as something embodied 
                                                           
179 Hua IV-2/V-2 352 [1915]; virtually identical passage at Hua IV 32. Cf. Hua IV-2/V-2 765 [1913]. 
180 Hua IV-2/V-2 347-8 (Hua IV 27-8, translation modified) [1915]. To this degree, we might wonder 
whether the Strawsonian thought that persons are ‘basic particulars’ (see §5.2.1) also applies to non-
human animals. 
181 Hua IV-2/V-2 352 (Hua IV 32) [1915]. 
182 Hua IV-2/V-2 766 (Hua IV 33) [1913]. 
183 Hua IV-2/V-2 17-8 (Hua IV 134-5) [1912]. 
184 Hua IV-2/V-2 766 (Hua IV 33) [1913]. 
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within a unified reality that stands there before us. However, empathy is not wholly analogous to 
perception in this regard, in that it is only a certain level of empathy, what I will call animate empathy, 
which has as its direct object foreign animate being. Moreover, as we shall see, even this level of 
empathy is not squarely correlated with the animal just as specified in Husserl’s ontological 
considerations. 
 
 
§3.2 | Intersubjective nature and living bodies 
 
 
The constitution of the sensible world is obviously to be distinguished from the constitution of the “true” 
world, the world for the scientific subject, whose activity is spontaneous “free” thinking and, in general, 
researching. That is to say: if we live passively, in the manner of animals, “in the world” and in reciprocal 
engagement [Wechselverkehr] with others who are like us, who are as “normal” as we are, then a world of 
experience is constituted common to us all. 
E. Husserl185 
 
Before directly treating animate empathy (§3.3), I will first bring it into view through a preliminary 
discussion of the intersubjectivity of the perceptual world, an issue which both makes possible and 
receives clarification through an analysis of the animate other, and which we will return to later in 
this chapter. This is not an arbitrary diversion. For as I argued briefly in the previous chapter, there 
is a risk inherent in phenomenological treatments of the animate other, one to which Husserl 
himself occasionally succumbs, but also warns against (§2.1.6): namely, that of metaphorically 
extending the quasi-spatiality of bodily sensibility to the intentional acts themselves, such that they 
are thought of as inhering within a nexus of ‘inner states’, located or localisable somewhere inside 
the animal’s head. This view is not only phenomenologically problematic because—first-personally 
speaking—we do not live our own acts of thinking as localised within our brain as we do our tactile 
sensations in our fingers.186 More importantly, it is not clear that such a view correctly captures 
our experience of animate others, whose bodily movements display a subjectivity which, rather 
than being ensconced within an inner domain, is immediately geared to a world experientially 
common to self and other. In order to carefully avoid this pitfall, the current section will gradually 
ease out the givenness of the animate other by explicating the manner in which our perceptual 
experience of worldly things permits, and is ultimately made possible by, the co-existence of 
animate others. 
 
§3.2.1 | Perception and solipsism 
 
In taking this route, we can simply follow the train of thought which Husserl himself outlines to 
motivate the transition from material to animate nature as themes of his analyses. There Husserl 
notes that what his constitutive studies of material nature have described is “the thing constituted 
in the continuous-unitary multiplicity of the intuitions of an experiencing Ego, or in the manifold 
of “sense-things” of various levels, manifolds of sensuous adumbrations, of schematic unities, of 
real states and real features [Eigenschaften] on various levels. It is the thing for the solitary subject, the 
                                                           
185 Hua IV-2/V-2 480 (Hua IV 89, translation modified) [1915-1917]. 
186 Hua IV-2/V-2 51, 693 (Hua IV 153, 218) [1912, 1916/17]; see also Hua IV 164. 
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subject thought of ideally as isolated”. The analyses touched upon earlier (§2.5) have, in other words, 
only thematised the material thing of perception in its correlation with the sensuous schemata and 
motivated apprehensions of an egoic subjectivity. Moreover, they have proceeded to do so without 
recognizing, or at least critically reflecting upon, this limitation; the subject whose isolated 
achievements they describe “in a certain sense remains forgotten to itself and equally forgotten to 
the one doing the analysis.”187As Husserl then remarks, the limits of this implicit methodological 
solipsism become evident in the face of the things themselves and their very givenness: 
Nevertheless, this self-forgetfulness is hardly appropriate for the restoration of the full givenness of a 
material thing, a givenness in which the thing exhibits its actual reality. We need only consider how a thing 
exhibits itself as such, according to its essence, in order to recognize that such an apprehension must contain 
in its sense, and at the very outset, components which refer back to the subject. Specifically, these 
components refer back to the human subject (or, conceived purely: the animal subject) in a fixed sense; 
furthermore, they refer back, in a similar way, to a multiplicity of subjects who mutually understand, and 
exchange their experiences with, one another.188 
Husserl raises at least two important points in this passage. The first is that material objects refer 
in their sense to a plurality of subjects, in that even the “thing-apprehension” lived by a subject 
presently unaccompanied by others harbours certain “unfulfilled intentions,” which are fulfilled 
only through a “harmonious exchange of experience” taking place between self and other(s).189 
The second point is that this plurality is a plurality of animal subjects, subjects whose experience is 
essentially bodily in nature. 
While both of these thoughts will be unfolded throughout this chapter, I will first offer a 
preliminary sketch of the first one. On the one hand, and as I will explore in more detail later 
(§5.2.2), in the abstraction which inaugurates Husserl’s analyses of material nature—that by means 
of which the sheer materiality of the objects of our perceptual world is taken apart from the 
axiological and practical senses which the full givenness of those objects exhibit in our ordinary 
experience of and engagement with them—the senses which are abstractively laid aside do not 
merely arise from one’s own subjectivity. Rather they also and indeed for the most part originate in 
those fellow subjects who co-constitute (and have, in the past, co-constituted) the common 
cultural surrounding world. On the other hand, something analogous applies to the sense of the 
‘merely material’ thing which remains after this abstraction. That is, a genuinely fulfilling exhibition 
of a real thing as objectively real requires “a relation to the apprehension of a multiplicity of subjects 
sharing a mutual understanding,” since it presupposes the intersubjective concordance of one’s 
own experiences with others’.190 This claim appears at first puzzling since, after all, “when we carry 
out an apprehension of a thing we do not, it seems, always co-posit and co-think a number of 
fellow men and, specifically, co-posit and co-think them as ones who are to be, as it were, appealed 
to.”191 
But that we do in fact tacitly appeal to the experiences of others in apprehending worldly 
things can be made evident by what Husserl calls a “solipsistic thought experiment”.192 Husserl 
invites us to imagine our experiential history, and the world with which it has made us familiar, as 
                                                           
187 Hua IV-2/V-2 369 [1915] (virtually identical passage found at Hua IV 55). 
188 Hua IV-2/V-2 369-70 A [1915]; cf. Hua IV 55. 
189 Hua IV-2/V-2 371-2 (Hus IV 80) [1915]. 
190 Hua IV-2/V-2 373 (Hua IV 81) [1915]. 
191 Hua IV-2/V-2 372 A (cf. Hua IV 80) [1915]. 
192 Hua IV-2/V-2 373 (Hua IV 81) [1915]. 
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changed in one crucial respect: that we have never encountered another (human or animal) living 
body. Abstracting from the obvious fact that this lack of socialisation would have profound 
implications for the way we think, feel, and act in the world—and, accordingly, that this ‘solipsistic 
world’ would lose much, perhaps even all, of its cultural and personal meaning—Husserl is 
primarily interested in the question of how, in such an imaginary world, our perceptual 
apprehension of things in their sheer materiality would be altered. Despite the complete absence 
of any intersubjective “apperceptive domain”, Husserl claims, it is conceivable that, in the 
solipsistic world, “I have the same manifolds of sensation and the same schematic manifolds,” 
and, in as much as functional relations hold between such manifolds, then it may be that “the 
“same” real things, with the same features, appear to me and, if everything is in harmony, exhibit 
themselves as “actually being””.193 And yet, if other human living bodies were to then “show up” 
and be “understood” as such, the feigned reality of our experienced ‘things’ would be called into 
question: 
Now all of a sudden and for the first time human beings are there for me, with whom I can come to an 
understanding. And I come to an understanding with them about the things which are there for us in 
common in this new segment of time. Something very remarkable now comes out: whole complexes of 
assertions about things, which I made in earlier periods of time on the ground of earlier experiences, 
experiences which were perfectly concordant throughout, are not corroborated  by my current companions, 
and this not because these experiences are simply lacking to them (after all, one does not need to have seen 
everything others have seen, and vice versa) but because they thoroughly conflict with what the others 
experience in experiences, we may suppose, that are necessarily harmonious and that go on being 
progressively confirmed. […] As I communicate to my companions my earlier lived experiences and they 
become aware of how much these conflict with their world, constituted intersubjectively and continuously 
exhibited by means of a harmonious exchange of experience, then I become for them an interesting 
pathological Object, and they call my actuality, so beautifully manifest to me, the hallucination of someone 
who up to this point in time has been mentally ill. One may imagine perfection in the exhibition of my 
solipsistic world and raise that perfection to any height, still the described state of affairs as an a priori one, 
the ideal possibility of which is beyond question, would not change at all.194 
The central point I take Husserl to be making with this thought-experiment is that the intra-
subjective concordance of the perceptual experiences of a solipsistic subject (conceived here as 
merely an ideal possibility) is a necessary, but not yet sufficient, condition for an exhibition of things 
in their objective reality. In the world of the radically isolated perceiver, any distinction between 
veridical perception and concordant hallucination—that is, the experience of a non-existent 
intentional object which continues to appear, throughout an episode of dynamic-embodied 
perception, as if it were a stable ‘thing,’ potentially even responding to changes in its real 
circumstances in the way that things do—would be unintelligible, since, for the radically isolated, 
the ‘perceptual’ object would be nothing more than a unity of my concordant, body- and 
circumstance-related, schematic adumbrations. In order for perceptual experience to even aspire 
to exhibit material things as such, then, it must ‘aim’ at a more demanding kind of objectivity than 
the ‘unity’ given to an individual subject in her concordant experiences. And for us non-solipsistic 
subjects, this appeal to a richer sense of objectivity is operative perceptually even when we are 
                                                           
193 Hua IV-2/V-2 370 A (Hua IV 79) [1915]- 
194 Hua IV-2/V-2 371-2 (Hua IV 79-80) [1915]. 
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momentarily alone—in as much as we still naively accept our perceptual grasp of reality as a grasp 
of reality.  
But what does this appeal consist in? For Husserl, perceptually apprehending a thing as 
real in the pregnant sense involves taking my own perceptual appearances to participate, not only 
in an intra-subjective temporal concordance, but in an intersubjective harmony spanning across a 
plurality of perceiving subjects. This is why he insists that, in the exposure of the imaginary solipsist 
to others, what gets called into question is not only that of her ‘world’ which is non-corroborated 
by her new companions, but her ‘actuality,’ that is, her solipsistically constituted ‘world’ as such. 
That is, even those elements of her earlier experienced world which go unchallenged by the other 
embodied beings she now encounters can acquire a totally new sense, becoming, for the first time, 
taken as genuinely worldly—whether evidently so, through intersubjective corroboration actually 
taking place, or only presumably, intersubjective harmony typically now being taken for granted. 
Perceiving a thing as such is thus, on the one hand, dependent upon the synthetic manifolds of an 
egoic and bodily experiential life, without which no object could ever be manifest as something to 
somebody, and on the other hand, a matter of that subject’s staking a claim to reality, a claim which 
already moves within a socially embedded space, and which points towards an intersubjective 
corroboration in which it would be authentically fulfilled.195 Accordingly, a transcendental 
phenomenology of material nature remains incomplete, failing to explicate the normative claim 
implicated in perceptual experience, if it construes the perceiving subject as isolated from others.   
 
§3.2.2 | Common nature and intercorporeal concordance 
 
Husserl may not have been the first to recognise intersubjectivity, the way conscious subjects relate 
to one another, as a topic which is not only of theoretical interest for the empirical sciences but of 
perennial importance for transcendental philosophy. As many have pointed out, the thought that 
intersubjective relations cannot be ignored in addressing the conditions of possibility for worldly 
intelligibility, self-consciousness, and freedom of the will, can be traced back as least as far as the 
German Idealists.196 However, it is almost certain that no other author has yet engaged in the 
degree of painstaking and multifaceted reflection regarding the relation between transcendentality 
and intersubjectivity as that which we find documented in the Nachlass of the founder of 
                                                           
195 For Husserl, this insight, that a phenomenological treatment of the constitutive relation between subject 
and world would have to address the (co-)constitutive role played by intersubjectivity, raises issues which 
cannot be addressed by a single analysis, but which rather demand a rethinking of the entire project of 
phenomenology. It is consequently unsurprising that the problem of transcendental intersubjectivity would 
continue to haunt Husserl’s research manuscripts for many years to come. The ‘solipsistic thought 
experiment’ referred to here would ultimately be understood in terms of a ‘primordial abstraction’ or a 
‘reduction to the sphere of ownness’, by means of which the respective roles played by one’s own and 
foreign subjectivity (whether in its concrete or anonymous guises) in world-(and self-)constitution could be 
delimited. For recent well-informed discussions of Husserl’s mature position on this issue, see Steinbock 
(1995, Chapter 4), Sheets-Johnstone (1999), Zahavi (2001, Chapter 2; 2011), Overgaard (2002), Smith 
(2003, Chapter 5), Staehler (2008), de Warren (2009, Chapter 7), Mohanty (2011, Chapter 16), Taipale (2014, 
Chapter 4), Franck (2014, pp. 71-135), Staiti (2014, pp. 191-206), and Luo (2016). 
196 See, in particular, the seminal works of Fichte (2000) and Hegel (1977, 1991), and recent studies by 
Williams (1992), Neuhouser (2000), Honneth (2000) and Pippin (2008). 
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phenomenology.197 To employ a Husserlian metaphor, the account given in the last section of the 
relation to others implicated in perceptual experience is therefore no more or less than an 
Abschattung, a sketch of Husserl’s reflections on the topic in question which purports to adumbrate 
more than the limited textual evidence it directly presents. I will now supplement this sketch with 
another, this time focussing on Husserl’s claim that the others implied in perceptual experience 
are essentially other embodied perceivers. I will argue that this latter claim leads us towards an account 
of animate empathy as the mode of experience which presents other living bodies as perceptually 
attuned to a common nature. 
As we shall see later (§5.2.2), the constitutive function of intersubjective relations is not 
always only an ‘inter-corporeal,’ but sometimes also an ‘inter-personal’ matter, and this applies most 
robustly for the social space of judicative, axiological and practical meanings that infuse the 
surrounding world of, and provide the motivational context for, the lives of persons. But, for 
Husserl, interpersonal intersubjectivity is essentially rooted in a more primitive bodily 
intersubjectivity, and the latter has its own constitutive consequences.198 The most primitive and 
crucial difference, in other words, between the world of ordinary perception and the hypothesized 
‘world’ of the solus ipse—even more primitive than and indeed accounting for the difference in 
ontological status or worldliness—is that in the latter there would be no “human beings and 
animals”, no “living bodies that I could apprehend as the living bodies of foreign psychic 
subjects.”199 To see why this is so, we must turn to a crucial manuscript from 1913, where Husserl 
explores in more detail the constitutive function of bodily intersubjectivity. In this text, Husserl 
emphasises that the living body of the other is the only possible perceptual object which announces 
a radical transcendence which reaches beyond my synthetic appearances, without the objectivity of 
the world being yet ‘assumed,’ that is, without intersubjectivity having been established as 
transcendental structure. He writes:  
If we bring comprehension and its constitutive accomplishments into the compass of our considerations, then the Ego 
previously thought of as solitary now grasps certain of “its” Objects as “other living bodies” and in unity with 
them, other Egos, which, however, are not yet thereby constituted as real subjects. At first new “Objective” physical 
things in the pregnant sense, i.e., intersubjective things can be constituted, and subsequently can be constituted 
living bodies as intersubjectively identifiable unities.200  
Husserl here formulates two important thoughts, both of which I will now try to unpack. The first 
thought is that a foreign living body as ‘comprehended’ announces a distinct experiential life, even 
if we envisage the sense it has for the one perceiving it as not yet claiming objective reality, that is, 
if we abstract away from its sense any implicit reference to an intersubjective concordance 
integrating its appearance-for-me and its appearance-for-others. Second, Husserl is suggesting that 
it is this apprehension of another living or lived body as minded but not yet objectively real which 
makes possible the institution of objective-intersubjective nature as a normative framework for 
perception and thought. 
                                                           
197 Cf. Zahavi (2014, p. 97). Most of Husserl’s reflections on the topic of intersubjectivity can be found, 
thanks to the impressive editorial work of Iso Kern, in Husserliana volumes 13-15. For an overview, see 
Kern’s introduction to those volumes.  
198 Hua IV-2/V-2 374, 285 (Hua IV 81, 297) [1915, 1913]. 
199 Hua IV-2/V-2 373, 370 (Hua IV 81, 79) [1915]. 
200 Hua IV-2/V-2 318 [1913]; virtually identical passage at Hua IV 307. 
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This first claim may strike some as phenomenologically ungrounded, or even 
ungroundable. After all, if one agrees with Husserl that perceptual experience is always already 
normed by intersubjective objectivity, then it might seem to follow that little could be gained from 
reflecting upon the nature of a putatively quasi-solipsistic perception of another living body. One 
way of responding to this worry would be as follows. As we saw in §2.5, phenomenological analysis 
can trace out the motivating kinaesthesia, norm-governed syntheses, and phantoms implicated in 
the perceptual exhibition of material things as such; and it can trace out such constitutive elements 
as embedded in my subjectivity alone. Admittedly, in not attending to the intersubjective elements 
of this exhibition, such an analysis fails to fully clarify the objectivity or worldliness of perceived 
things. Nevertheless, the very intelligibility of the claims made by such an analysis shows that a 
distinction of some kind can be drawn between the traces of the thing as disclosed through and 
correlated with my subjective experience alone, and the thing in its objective-intersubjective being. 
Indeed, I suggested earlier that the objects of concordant hallucinations satisfy the conditions of 
solipsistic thing-exhibition but without being open to corroboration from (at least bodily and 
mentally ‘normal’) other perceivers.  What the possibility of such hallucinations reveals is not, as 
some philosophers would have it, that an ontological gulf divorces the (‘inner’) world of perception 
and (‘outer’) reality, but simply that perceptual enactment is both typically world-presenting and a 
subjective accomplishment, one that can occasionally ‘misfire.’201 For Husserl, while perceptual 
contact with the world is only intelligible if it involves a tacit appeal to others, it nevertheless 
contains a ‘solipsistic’ core, such that we can distinguish both noetically and noematically between 
its self-accomplished stratum and those elements of it which appeal to (co-perceived or merely 
possible) other perceivers. 
Now, in the case of the other’s living body, we can also distinguish between that of it which 
appears as meaningful in and through my experiential life alone, and the bodily reality with which 
others are, or at least can be, also familiar. However, it is entirely inconceivable that a foreign living 
body be given as such, whether as disclosed through my own constitutive synthesis alone or as an 
intersubjective reality, without it appearing as a locus for another experiential life—a life which, in 
the ‘solipsistic’ case somewhat paradoxically, outstrips my own sphere of possible and actual 
experiences as another sphere of this kind. Indeed, if we try to imagine a mindless living body, the 
best we can do is to picture a corpse, or, perhaps, someone in a coma or a very deep sleep. These 
possibilities, we might say, exemplify the limits of the bodily mind, and the extent that such objects 
continue to count as living bodies for those who encounter them depends upon the degree to 
which the mindedness they ambiguously and problematically embody is perceived or thought of 
as open to being ‘awoken.’ To think that a living body could be apprehended as such without it 
                                                           
201 Drummond (2012, p. 130) argues that, once we attend to “what happens [to a hallucinatory, non-
existent object] in response to bodily movements over time, what happens with regard to verification by 
other sense-systems, and what happens at the level of intersubjective verification”, we can begin to 
contest the thesis that hallucination and perception are indistinguishable—and thereby better motivate 
the claim that veridical perception (understood as temporal, multi-modal, embodied, contextual, and 
intersubjectively responsive) is non-representational and world-involving. As should be clear, my interest 
here lies primarily in those cases, which are surely at least imaginable, where a hallucinatory object 
exhibits its non-existence—or, in Drummond’s terms, becomes phenomenologically distinguishable from 
a corresponding object of veridical perception—only through intersubjective contestation. These cases 
highlight an element of perception that only makes use of the perceiver’s kinaesthetically motivated 
appearance-systems, an element that can, on occasion, fail to deliver the intersubjectively acceptable 
objects that perception, as a whole, aims at. 
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being taken as embodying an experiential life (whether actually, or, at the obscure limits, merely 
historically or potentially), then, makes as much sense as supposing that a perceived thing could 
be replaced by a phantom without losing its very materiality. It follows from these considerations 
that even another living body thought exclusively in terms of its perceptual appearance for me—
that is, even in abstraction from the full sense it ordinarily has for me perceptually as an ‘objective’ 
living body perceivable by others—is always already comprehended as embodying another 
conscious life, or as Husserl puts it in the passage above, ‘in unity with another Ego’. 
The second important thought here is that the intersubjective concordance involved with 
the exhibition of material things in their objectivity is rooted in and sustained by precisely this 
experience, or stratum of experience—that is, the one in which the animate other is comprehended 
as a minded and bodily, but not yet ‘objectively real,’ being. Immediately after the above-quoted 
lines from 1913, Husserl spells out in detail what this claim involves: 
We assume first of all a “normal” Ego-community and living bodies of “normal,” i.e., typically “standard” 
structure. We assume them in general in such a way that for all Ego-subjects the same sense-things and 
subjective-Objective things are constituted, differing only in the way they are given—by way of an 
orientation that changes from one subject to another. Now, subjects can switch [vertauschen] their 
“positions.” If we think such switches as having taken place, then their actual appearances (the actually 
given things in the how of their modes of sensuous appearance) are exchanged also, always presupposing 
the same “adaption”—taken here in an enlarged sense that is easily understood. In this exchangeability 
[Austauschbarkeit], resting on comprehension, is founded the possibility of the identification of Objects originally relative to 
isolated subjects: we see the “same Object,” each of us from his own position, but also with the mode of 
appearance which would be ours if we were, instead of here, there in the other’s place.202 
This line of thought is densely formulated but, I believe, it rewards careful explication. Perhaps 
the most basic point here is that, in comprehending another living body, in its mobile materiality, 
as embodying alert conscious life, we necessarily take this life to be experiencing its own sense-
things. That is, comprehending the other’s living body means taking it to embody another sphere 
of lived perceptual experience, one which comes into its own kind of meaningful perceptual 
contact with material things. In the standard case, where both empathising and empathised 
subjects are bodily ‘normal’ (i.e., human beings with a degree of free mobility who do not suffer 
from blindness or other profound sensory deprivations; see §3.3), we can say that for a subject to 
empathetically grasp another’s living body she must comprehend it as a foreign bodily ‘here’ related 
to a foreign sphere of sense-things (to which foreign ‘theres’ correspond), where these are 
recognised as transcending my own bodily ‘here’ and the sense-things surrounding it. 
While this way of putting things sounds relatively simple, things become more complex 
when we try to explicate the guiding structures that are implicated in such comprehension. Husserl 
suggests that, when the materiality of the other’s body ‘over there’ coincides, in its “general type,” 
with my own lived body ‘here’ in its familiar self-presence, “then it is “seen” as a lived body, and 
the potential appearances, which I would have if I were transposed to the ‘there,’ are attributed to 
as actual; that is, an Ego is empathetically understood as the subject of the living body [ein Ich wird 
dem Leib als Subjekt einverstanden], along with those appearances and the rest of the things that pertain 
to the Ego, its lived experiences, acts, etc.” That is, alongside the perceptible similarity of my lived 
body and the other’s (a problematic issue to which we will return at the end of this chapter), this 
empathetic apprehension of a foreign sphere of sense-things also rests upon a further structural 
                                                           
202 Hua IV-2/V-2 317-8 [1913]; virtually identical passage at Hua IV 307-8. 
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feature of perceived space; namely, that each ‘there’ is necessarily recognised as a possible ‘here,’ 
a possibility whose actualisation would rest solely upon my freely executing the relevant course of 
movement. As Husserl notes, already at the level of spatiality fashioned through my own bodily 
potentialities alone, each ‘there’ delineates, “in a regulated and motivated way,” kinaesthetic courses 
through which it would become ‘here,’ and in which my orientation and appearances would be 
accordingly changed. The empathetic recognition of the other’s living body as embodying another 
experiential life with kinaesthetic possibilities, appearances, and a perceptual space of its own draws 
upon but subverts this structure. With the emergence of the other’s body in my bodily space, I am 
faced with something actually ‘there’ that resembles and associatively recalls my body ‘here’ 
without being it; and it is this incompatibility with and transgression of my corporeal spatiality that 
motivates my empathetic recognition that another (embodied) Ego—whose manifolds of 
appearance are “similar” to mine but “can never become actual in the unity of the stream of my 
lived experiences”—stands before me.203 
Several complications regarding the just-sketched account of the motivational structure of 
the comprehension of foreign living bodies will be considered throughout this chapter. But at this 
stage, we should get clear about how such empathetic comprehension of a similar but irreducibly 
other embodied-perceptual life ‘there’ makes possible intersubjective concordance and the sense 
of objectivity that comes with it. As the long passage quoted above evinces, Husserl’s view is that 
the intersubjective objectivity at issue hinges upon the possibility that, when one subject switches 
[vertauscht] his or her spatial position with another, an exchange [Austausch] of experiences will 
thereby emerge. It is crucial not to misunderstand this argument. Husserl is not suggesting that 
empathetically recognising another embodied perspective requires one to imaginatively transport 
oneself into the ‘there,’ a claim which would entail that foreign bodily subjectivity is only given as 
such through a movement of projection that ‘brings to life’ the other’s merely material body. 
Indeed, he stresses that experiential exchangeability is not a process which accounts for empathetic 
comprehension, but something which rests upon [beruht auf] and further articulates the latter.204 
Rather, his thought is that empathetically comprehending another similar bodily orientation to my 
own ‘over there’ motivates the acceptance of a certain commonality lying between and enveloping 
my own and the other’s perceptual ‘spaces.’ The commonality Husserl has in mind here is twofold. 
On the one hand, a new “sense-content” now accrues to the objects which appear to each subject, 
since the material things of perception now become “intersubjective—i.e., intersubjectively 
identifiable—unities”. With the acceptance of commonality, the very sense of a perceived thing 
can be explicated, with regard to its intersubjective potentialities, as follows: “it is the same thing 
that I see and that the other sees, it is just that we see this same thing “from out of” different 
points of space.”205 On the other hand, for Husserl, this worldly publicity finds its roots in a 
commonality which infuses the very constitutive correlation between subjectivity and world. That 
is, the intersubjective thing as perceived by me is not simply and straightforwardly correlated with 
my law-governed and kinaesthetically motivated systems of actual and possible appearances. 
Rather, in such perception, my own currently actual appearances, as well as the horizon of possible 
                                                           
203 Hua IV-2/V-2 320-1 (Hua IV 308-9) [1913]. 
204 Hua IV-2/V-2 317-8 (Hua IV 307-8) [1913]. 
205 Hua IV-2/V-2 321 (Hua IV 309) [1913]. 
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appearances motivationally related to my kinaesthetic possibilities, now function as situated within 
“the common system of possible appearances.”206  
To see what this means, we should first note that, for Husserl, the moment we first 
empathetically comprehend another lived body as such, we obtain not merely a commonality with 
this specific other but also the otherwise inconceivable possibility of a commonality that stretches 
to all possible subjects. And, as he notes in a later manuscript, it is with the acceptance of this 
commonality that perception becomes open to “nature in the first and original sense”, which is to say, 
“the totality of objects which can be primally present and that make up a domain of primal 
presence common to all communicating subjects”. Nature in the sense of the totality of things 
which are recognisable in direct perception by all, and just in the way they are so recognisable, is 
thus set up as a normative framework for even ‘solitary’ perceptual episodes, in that they too ‘claim’ 
to gain contact with the world in its publicity. In explicating this claim to perceptual publicity, 
Husserl maintains, we see that it stipulates that the perceptual object “can be given, in primal 
presence, and as identical, to each other subject who stands with them as presupposed in possible 
nexuses of empathy.” 207 In seeing a thing as a natural being, then, an implicit appeal is made not 
only to my possible and actual perceptual experience, but also to the perceptual experience of 
possible others as correlated with possible empathetic acts (or, as the case may be, to the experience 
which I now empathetically attribute to concrete others who are currently here with me). This 
delineation of a plurality of possible others and their own spheres of ‘primal presence’ within 
perceptual experience both orients such experience towards nature in its perceptual publicity, and 
opens it to possible confirmation and contestation when concrete others come into view and 
manifest a perceptual grasp which concords or discords with my own.208 Moreover, a further 
consequence of this intentional implication of an open plurality of others is that the context in 
which the perceptual object is embedded and has meaning, rather than being simply a construct 
of the appresentations that arise through the sedimentation of my own past experiences, is exactly 
the “open horizon of an unknown world of things”.209 In perceiving a thing as there for everyone 
within an indefinite worldly horizon, then, an “apperceptive relation” to “actual or possible fellow 
human beings (or fellow animals)” is necessarily operative.210 
The publicity of nature, for Husserl, is secured through a degree of common concordance 
and exchangeability holding between one’s own and the other’s perceptual appearances. This 
holds, albeit in a presumptive and fallible way, when others are tacitly appealed to in perception as 
                                                           
206 Hua IV-2/V-2 321 (Hua IV 309) [1915], emphasis mine. 
207 Hua IV-2/V-2 451 A [1922/23]; cf. Hua IV 163. Husserl repeatedly emphasises the connection 
between objectivity and an open plurality of others in the Ideen II manuscripts, including in the opening 
pages of the very first manuscript that he wrote for the project (e.g., Hua IV-2/V-2 4-5 [1912], 400-401 
[1915]). 
208 There has recently been an interesting discussion amongst Husserl scholars regarding whether the 
form of empathy discussed here, in which the other is given as a concrete foreign subjectivity who co-
constitutes the perceptual world, already presupposes a certain a priori or “open” transcendental 
intersubjectivity, a view defended by Zahavi (2001, Chapter 2) and Taipale (2014, Chapter 4), or whether, 
as de Warren (2009, Chapter 7) and  Staiti (2014, pp. 191-206) suggest, such empathy should rather be 
regarded as a primitive experience of alterity which opens up the intersubjective horizon of constitution. 
While I am unable here to assess Husserl’s final view on this issue, a task which would require detailed 
consideration of his wide-ranging reflections on intersubjectivity in the 20’s and 30’s, it should be clear 
that I take the Husserl of Ideen II to incline more towards the latter view. 
209 Hua IV-2/V-2 301 A [1915-17]; cf. Hua IV-2/V-2 238, 474, 595. 
210 Hua IV-2/V-2 398-9 (Hua IV 110) [1915]. 
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possible and anonymous companions, but it also holds for the empathetic experience of concrete 
others. When facing another normal living body, I take the other to be in perceptual contact with 
the very same concrete things and animals that I am, and in such a way that I have a vague 
empathetic comprehension of the differences of aspect, depth and the like, that are rooted in our 
contrasting spatial orientations. To this degree, the other’s and my own appearances are taken to 
participate in a common system, one which unfolds for me through the possibility of our 
reciprocally switching bodily ‘heres’ and the experiential interchange which would thereby occur. 
Importantly, however, it pertains to the sense of such exchangeability that “our series of 
appearances […] are exchanged as the similar is with the similar, not as the identical is with the 
identical; they are exchanged out of a similar system organised according to a typical content, while 
each subject yet remains ineluctably distinct from every other by means of an abyss, and no one 
can acquire identically the same appearances as those of another. Each has his stream of 
consciousness displaying a regularity that encompasses precisely all streams of consciousness, that 
is, all animal subjects.” 211 That is, the difference between my current appearances and the foreign 
ones expressed in the other’s bodily movements is not simply a difference between how things 
look from ‘here’ and how they would look from ‘there,’ such that I could literally possess the 
other’s very lived perceiving through adopting her current position. Rather, for Husserl, the other’s 
experiences are empathetically comprehended as being ‘the same’ as, or ‘exchangeable’ with, my 
own, primarily in the sense that the alterity of the other’s embodied perceiving is taken to involve 
a typical regularity that we share—a regularity which, as he intriguingly puts it, encompasses all streams 
of consciousness, that is, all animal subjects. In section §3.3, I will try to show that explicating this 
regularity allows us, on the one hand, to render thematic the animate other as the correlate of 
animate empathy, and on the other, to analyse the implications of the animate other as so 
experienced for the constitution of oneself as animate. 
 
§3.2.3 | Reciprocity and communication 
 
Before turning to this issue, however, one final point should be emphasised. Husserl frequently 
claims that the exhibition of the publicity of perceptual nature depends, not only upon a one-sided 
empathetic experience of other animate beings, but on what he calls reciprocal understanding, 
reciprocal empathy, or communication [Wechselverständigung, wechselseitige Einfühlung, 
Kommunikation].212 Moreover, he also claims that reciprocal understanding first makes possible the 
comprehension of one’s own lived body, and the mental life it embodies, as a worldly reality213, 
and that such self-objectification is necessarily tied to the constitution of things as worldly beings 
within an open spatiotemporal horizon.214 Now, this emphasis on the role of communication and 
reciprocity might lead us to suspect that the positing of a shared world and the comprehension of 
oneself as an animate being is ultimately, for Husserl, something dependent upon dialogue, and 
therefore deeply mediated by linguistic thought and speech. On this reading, my comprehension 
of reality presupposes, even at the most basic level, my communicatively appropriating from others 
certain judicative beliefs, namely those that concern my own worldly reality and the reality of what 
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appears to me perceptually. Were this in fact Husserl’s view he would then be required to offer an 
account of how we could begin to understand the other’s utterances as existential assertions 
without our having any prior grasp whatsoever of the world to which such utterances refer. 
Moreover, this way of thinking appears to depart from the thesis, so central to both everyday life 
and Husserl’s philosophy, that perceptual experience counts as a mode of pre-theoretical and, 
when all goes well, epistemically informative contact with the world. If our basic sense of the world 
originates in judgements we appropriate from others, it is unclear how perception can serve to 
directly legitimate our beliefs about the way things ‘really’ are. Finally, this reading would be in 
conflict with the emphasis Husserl elsewhere places on the constitutive implications of the 
animaticity of the other, in that it would suggest that the publicity of nature unfolds for us 
exclusively through linguistic and interpersonal engagement, with no important role being allotted 
to embodiment and empathetic perception. 
Fortunately, a more plausible interpretation becomes possible when we consider a 
manuscript likely dating from 1915 or 1917, in which Husserl distinguishes between two different 
forms of Kommunikation, both of which involve the formation of a bond between self and other 
through “doxic reciprocal understanding.” While one of these two forms involves the more 
familiar case of dialogical understanding and interpersonal influence, the other is more of a hinge 
between one-sided empathy and such socialised communicative activity. Husserl characterises this 
primitive kind of communication as follows: 
I do not only understand the other, I do not only empathetically grasp his personal and psychic being; 
rather, at one with my empathetic grasp of his being, he reciprocally grasps my being. This is, at one with 
my empathetic grasping him as a man in my environment, I also grasp him as a man that currently grasps 
me empathetically, as a man of his environment. I “lay eyes” on him, and he lays eyes on me. And we also 
see each other doing that. We see ourselves in [each other’s] eyes and souls, and that now includes this 
“empathetic seeing” itself.215 
Husserl takes the most primitive form of communication, then, to reside in a certain kind of mutual 
recognition. What this consists in is my empathetically seeing another embodied self as 
empathetically seeing me as another embodied self, and fused with this, the other exhibiting a 
recognition that I am seeing her as another embodied self.216 My proposal now is that this form of 
communication has important and irreducible implications for the constitution of self and world. 
In the event that my own and the other’s eyes meet, there is a sense in which our perceptual 
spheres mesh into a higher-order intersubjective perceptual nexus, such that we are now able to 
experience the same objects together. While my perceptual experiences are lived through originally 
by me alone and remain tied ineluctably to my bodily here, and while I recognise that the same 
holds for you, in the meeting of our gazes a shared space unfolds between us. This shared 
perceptual space is irreducible to the delimited nexus of spatial objects that previously comprised 
                                                           
215 Hua IV-2/V-2 302 A [1915/1917]; cf. Hua IV-2/V-2 649 (Hua IV 375) [1917]. 
216 To adopt the terminology later introduced by Alfred Schütz, in the meeting of our gazes we have “a 
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now experiencing directly” (p. 165), he does not address the role it plays in the constitution of the shared 
natural world. 
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my surrounding world of things, in that the objects in my perceptual surroundings now have the 
immediate sense of being possible or actual perceptual objects for both of us.  
Crucially, what occurs here goes beyond the acceptance of a common system of 
appearances as motivated by one-sided empathy. In merely perceiving another embodied 
perceiver, what emerges is only another nexus of appearances for me, whereas in reciprocal empathy 
I am immediately faced with another embodied perceiver who simultaneously recognises my 
perceptual sphere as other than hers. In this sense, the possibility of experiential exchangeability is 
not merely something which I accept, but which the other also presents herself as accepting, and 
it is this which brings about a deeper and properly intersubjective acceptance of perceptual 
publicity. As we shall see later (§3.4.2), this reciprocal recognition of one another and of a shared 
world also opens up and is articulated through a novel form of self-consciousness; and that this is 
itself not without implications for the constitution of a common nature. 
 
 
§3.3 | Animate empathy 
 
 
Still, after all the abstract intellection, there remain the facts of the frantically clanking lid, the pathetic 
clinging to the edge of the pot. Standing at the stove, it is hard to deny in any meaningful way that this is a 
living creature experiencing pain and wishing to avoid/escape the painful experience. To my lay mind, the 
lobster’s behavior in the kettle appears to be the expression of a preference…. 
D. F. Wallace217 
 
We have seen Husserl suggesting that the perceptual experience of material things as worldly 
objects in the familiar and proper sense makes appeal to a common system of appearances, a 
system in which my own appearances are taken as having a certain exchangeability with respect to 
those of actual or possible others. Furthermore, we have seen that this appeal itself hinges upon 
the empathetic recognition of other living bodies as embodying foreign spheres of perceptual 
experience with a regular structure, where this regularity simultaneously characterises the other’s 
living body and her way of perceiving. While Husserl does not spell out explicitly what this 
regularity involves, it seems plausible to think that he is referring, at least in part, to the forms of 
dependency the perceptual object exhibits upon the bodily subject who perceives it, or what he 
elsewhere calls the most primitive kinds of “psychophysical conditionality.”218 As we saw earlier 
(§2.5), Husserl refers here to the dependency of the sense of the perceived thing, in its way of 
being spatially ‘there’ for the subject in relation to its bodily ‘here,’ as well as in its presenting itself 
as ‘more’ than that of it which currently appears, upon a lived awareness of the current kinaesthetic 
constellation and the possibilities of self-movement which surround it (such possibilities having 
given birth, in the immediate past, to the current constellation itself). Empathetically 
comprehending the other’s perceptual domain as having such a conditional structure, then, is 
tantamount to taking the other’s living body to function as a mobile ‘here’ around which her 
perceptual space is centred. This characterisation hits upon the basic structure of what I call 
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animate empathy, and we are now in a position to consider more closely what this is, along with 
its constitutive presuppositions and consequences. 
 
§3.3.1 | Animate empathy and the animal of intuition 
 
As Husserl notes, both non-human and human animals are, much like material things, realities that 
are “originally given,” in that they are “constituted for us experientially, before all theoretical 
research, as unities within the unitary totality: world = nature.” However, to originally experience 
an animal is not merely to grasp a unity of material features, to merely become acquainted with 
something that stably alters its states in the causal nexus of other things. It is not merely to perceive 
an extended object in its causal dependencies, but to animately empathise. This is because animals 
are “double-unities, unities which allow two strata to be distinguished therein, unities of things and 
subjects with their subjectivities”.219 To originally encounter an animal as an animal, therefore, is 
to recognise the sensible materiality of its body as simply that of it which most visibly protrudes 
into the perceptual world. But how are we then to characterise the total givenness of foreign 
animals as embodied subjects? In a manuscript likely dating from 1916 or 1917, Husserl sketches 
an answer: 
The animal of intuition. 
1) In the sensuous-intuitive sphere of the givenness of the living body, we have the intuitive living body as 
a substance, that is, with its sensuously given features. 
2) Expressed in this, in the foreign living body (and this expression is an appresentation!), is “psychic life,” 
another subject with its lived experiences, its surrounding world, etc. 
We do not have 1) and 2) alongside one another, we do not have a living body and, separated from this, a 
representation of the subjective; rather, we have an intuition of a human being.220 
For Husserl, the intuitive experience of a foreign animal grasps an expressive unity. On the one 
hand, this means that the corporeality of the animal incorporates the invariant structures of 
perceived thinghood outlined earlier (§2.5). The most basic layer of the other’s living body, in its 
perceptual givenness for me, is a schematic unity of aspects. After all, the appearances which bring 
the different features of this body into view unfold in a kinaesthetically motivated fashion, and in 
this sense there is a foreign bodily ‘phantom’ which stands in a certain kind of ‘there’ in relation 
to my bodily ‘here.’ Moreover, our intuitive grasp of another animate body recognises in it material 
‘states’ that, in their causal relatedness to ‘circumstances,’ announce stable material features. The 
fur of the cat presents itself perceptually as tactually soft, as having a definite shade of brown 
visible in the light of day, and when it jumps onto my lap I feel the weight it exerts on my own 
living body as exhibiting a real feature of the cat itself. On the other hand, as Husserl notes in the 
same manuscript, my apperception of the foreign animal or human being is not merely a grasp of 
materiality but is also a “system of experiential indications, by means of which an Ego-life, with a 
partially determined content and a horizon of indeterminateness and unknownness, is “there,” 
given in unity with the living body and bound with it.”221 That is, my experience of the animal does 
not merely incorporate a sensuously present aspect fused with a horizon of possible schematic 
appearances with their kinaesthetic circumstances, and a recognition of certain causal 
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dependencies in which the other’s body is embedded—where this perceptual structuration already 
involves a degree of appresentation. Rather, the animal other’s bodily alterations and movements 
are also given, through a novel form of appresentation, as expressive of psychic life. The way that 
the cat’s head visibly arches upwards as the bird flies above it; its purring response to my caressing 
the back of its neck; and the sensitivity and self-movement felt in the relaxing of its neck as I run 
my fingers over it—what shows itself here cannot be adequately described through the language 
of material states, material circumstances, and material features, at least once we have a clear grip 
on the perceptual styles these concepts originally serve to express. Rather, here the material 
features are intertwined with elements announcing the experiential life of the animal, as something 
foreign and largely unknown, but certainly “there” and not entirely impenetrable. 
 We should dwell a little more closely on this animate expressivity. Husserl emphasises that 
the expressive unity of foreign living body and psychic life is not merely a matter of certain psychic 
states directly mapping onto certain visible bodily states. Rather, the relation of expression to 
expressed consists more in the way the sensuous materiality of the living body serves to articulate 
the psychic life it appresents. As he puts it, the bodily movements of an animal “manifest the ever 
more intimate intertwinement of both sides the more articulated in various ways is the expression, 
or rather the expressing, and the more sensuous parts there are that have a meaning-function.”222 
In emphasising this articulation, Husserl is drawing attention to the manner in which bodily 
occurrences typically function expressively in relation to one another, rather than as isolated 
events. For instance, the cat’s purring expresses pleasure, rather than aggression or fear, not only 
in virtue of its distinctive auditory quality—which is nearly indistinguishable from some of the 
noises it makes when distressed—but also and perhaps even primarily in conjunction with the 
posture of the animal and the way its skin trembles as I run my fingers over it. Indeed, what 
distinguishes one kind of emotion-expression from others lies more in a complex bodily gestalt 
than in a solitary symptom. To further illustrate this, consider what Darwin has to say about cats 
in the opening pages of his classical work on emotional expression: 
When the animal is threatened by a dog, it arches its back in a surprising manner, erects its hair, opens its 
mouth and spits. But we are not here concerned with this well-known attitude, expressive of terror 
combined with anger; we are only concerned with that of rage or anger. […] The animal assumes a 
crouching position, with the body extended; and the whole tail, or the tip alone, is lashed or curled from 
side to side. The hair is not in the least erect. […] Let us now look at a cat in a directly opposite frame of 
mind, whilst feeling affectionate and caressing her master; and mark how opposite is her attitude in almost 
every respect. She now stands upright with her back slightly arched, which makes the hair appear rather 
rough, but it does not bristle; her tail, instead of being extended and lashed from side, is held quite stiff and 
perpendicularly upwards; her ears are erect and pointed; her mouth is closed; and she rubs against her 
master with a purr instead of a growl.223 
Now, the expressive features which Darwin refers to here were undoubtedly identified by him 
through what we earlier called a ‘natural-theoretical’ attitude, in that his hypotheses have clearly 
been produced through repeated attempts to taxonimise the bodily events typically displayed by 
cats when emotionally aroused in various ways, and in situations assumed and perhaps even 
designed to incite such arousal. To this extent, we should be wary of assuming that all of the 
expressive features he describes, and just in the way he describes them, have an expressive 
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significance (or are even given at all) in our pre-theoretical and perceptual grasp of cats. However, 
it would surely be phenomenologically inaccurate to stipulate that—to paraphrase an already 
quoted formulation of Husserl’s—only the material body of the cat is intuitively given, while her 
emotional states themselves (or the ‘psychological’ element of them) require representation 
through a separate act. At least when the perceptual and causal conditions are ‘normal’—that is, 
when they approximate the norm according to which the spatial form and material features of the 
cat show themselves optimally, and when our perceiving unfolds through movement over time—
we do have some perceptual grasp, if indeterminate and preliminary, of the cat’s posture, facial 
expressions, hisses and purrs, and the like. (Indeed, these bodily events are not only perceptually 
discernible even to infants, but can also arouse overwhelming emotive responses in the young 
perceiver him or herself, as any child who has been too close to a snarling dog will testify—though 
it remains an open, and intriguing, question whether the fear elicited here is responsive just to the 
dog’s bodily features as such or rather to the affects and inclinations those features express.) And 
our perceptual grasp of these expressive elements of the animate other’s body is not usually 
something self-contained; rather, those different styles of integrated movement, spreading across 
the different parts of the foreign body, will typically appear to us as immediately expressive of and 
‘tinged’ with elements of foreign mentality. This is not to say, of course, that we always and from 
the outset have a detailed understanding of the mental events which are so bodily intimated. As 
Husserl frequently emphasises, foreign bodily expressivity is just as much characterised by 
indeterminateness and ambiguity as it is by transparency and insight. But this does not make it any 
less an experience of foreign embodied subjectivity, which always and necessarily presents itself to 
us with a horizon of the unknown. 
Moreover, it would be a mistake to limit the function of bodily expressivity to the domain 
of affect with which it is most often associated. For Husserl, this expressivity is operative whenever 
“the interiority of psychic acts” is appresented as belonging to and co-existing [mit-daseiend] with 
the other’s perceived living body.224 By this, Husserl does not mean that expressivity presents a 
nexus of inter-cranial states; indeed, he emphasises that the foreign psyche is not literally (given 
as) spatialised at all, although, as we shall see below, it is co-perceived as having a certain 
localisation in and boundedness to the other’s sensitive bodily organs.225  Rather, what the other’s 
living body expressively appresents is first and foremost a foreign nexus of lived experiences as 
correlated with a foreign (egocentrically structured) “surrounding world.”226 To this degree, the 
most fundamental form of expressivity consists in the animate other’s posture and style of self-
movement displaying a mode of perceptual immersion, the intentional objects of which are 
immediately taken, at least to a certain degree, to overlap and concord with my own. As Husserl 
notes, if I am looking at a cathedral and I notice another standing by me, “looking at the cathedral, 
then I understand this without any further ado. His seeing, which I acknowledge in him by 
empathy, is equally an immediate having-over-against; the Object is immediately given.”227 While 
we normally only take human others to see a cathedral as a cathedral—in that this sense is one 
generated and sustained by human experience and social praxis—Husserl’s claim that we would 
empathetically take the other to immediately see the ‘colossal black thing’ (which is a cathedral for 
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us) surely holds with regard to some non-human animate others too. Moreover, we do not only 
empathetically grasp animate others as perceptually and affectively attuned to their environment, 
but also as relating to their environing objects in a practically significant manner. In seeing a cat 
playing with a piece of string or running hungrily towards its food or, as the passage from Wallace 
which introduces this section vividly illustrates, hearing the lobster frantically trying to escape from 
the pot, we become acquainted with a creature whose environment is structured for it by desires, 
preferences, and goals—the latter elements being expressively appresented for us through the 
animate-other’s goal-oriented movements. Consequently, the following formulation seems just as 
apt with regard to non-human animals as for human beings: “Since here the manifold expression 
appresents psychic existence in living corporeality [Leiblichkeit], thus there is constituted with all 
that an objectivity which is precisely two-sided and unitary: the human being, without 
introjection.”228 
 
§3.3.2 | Animate abnormality and the commonality of nature 
 
The account sketched here of animate empathy has proceeded at the level of the concrete, worldly 
animate other as the intentional object of such experience—though, since the animate other 
typically presents itself as a self-transcending subject who consciously relates to its environment in 
perception, emotion, and action, to claim that the other animal is given in animate empathy as an 
object is somewhat inaccurate, or at least potentially misleading. However, Husserl does not only 
treat the intuitive experience of the animate other as a theme for regional phenomenological 
analysis; he also suggests that it has fundamental implications for the constitution of self and world. 
As we saw in the last section, the publicity of perceptual nature is exhibited through those 
empathetic, and ultimately reciprocal, experiences in which another living body manifests a foreign 
system of perceptual appearances that concords with my own. We also saw Husserl suggesting 
that the animate other who first functions as a co-perceiver in this way is the ‘normal’ animate 
other—which is to say, another human being whose sensibility is not radically different from my 
own. Husserl is not here simply dogmatically treating the case of bodily ‘normality’ as that of sole 
or primary philosophical interest. Rather, his insistence on the primacy of the normal other is 
motivated by his interest in tracing out what is implied in my taking a material thing as I perceive 
it—that is, with the sensible features that my perceptual experience has disclosed and the horizon 
of indeterminacy still left often—as a public reality that can be perceptually grasped as such by 
others too. That is, it is only through empathetically encountering others whose sensibility I take 
to be of the same generic structure as mine that my sense-things can acquire a preliminary validity 
(for me) as components of an intersubjective nature. Moreover, with the kind of reciprocal 
empathy discussed earlier (§3.2.3), this validity becomes not merely accepted by me but co-
accepted by the other. Accordingly, the correlation between the sensible world and embodied 
perceivers ‘like me’ becomes communalised, and it becomes possible for the material things of my 
perception, just as I perceive them in their determinate features and causal relations, to become 
accepted and henceforth habitually assumed as there ‘for us.’ 
For Husserl, it is only when such a correlation between ‘our’ embodied subjectivity and a 
common sensible world has already been established that animate others with different forms of 
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embodied sensibility can show up as abnormal.229 While he more often uses the example of human 
beings with sensory impairments such as colour blindness and congenial deafness, Husserl 
occasionally implies that non-human animals are given as abnormal perceivers too.230 In order that 
the embodied perceptual enactments of ‘abnormal’ perceivers show up for us as perceptual 
enactments, however, he insists that there must be some degree of commonality between ‘our’ and 
the abnormal other’s perceptual world. For Husserl, it is here that a legitimate distinction emerges 
between primary and secondary qualities or material features. While the secondary features 
encompass those sensible features that have a relativity to ‘our’ bodily structuration, such as 
colours, sounds, and the like, the primary features designate the bare spatial and temporal structure 
and causal powers of material things, which perceivers with importantly different living bodies to 
‘ours’ can also be cognizant.231 While we recognise an ‘alien’ sensibility and perceptual environment 
in the bumblebee that obstinately bounces off the glass window in a hopeless struggle to get 
outdoors, in the bat which gets trapped in the loft and swoops around manically, or in the blind 
person we pass in the street, what nevertheless unites all of these cases, despite the stark differences 
between them, is that we take the things as perceived by the other to involve, at the very least, a 
core of spatiality and temporality, and perhaps certain causal events and features, that unites it with 
the things as we perceive them—an empathetic acceptance which arguably becomes more richly 
motivated when we experience them responding to our own lived body as a spatiotemporal reality 
(or even, in some cases, as another living body).  
For Husserl, moreover, in taking animate others to be cognizant of the same 
spatiotemporal world as our own we necessarily recognise the other’s experiential grasp of the 
world as involving some form of sensibility, even if the latter is accepted as importantly different 
from our own (as in the case of abnormality).232 We can understand this better by noting that 
primary qualities, on the one hand, are features necessarily given sensibly, and thus as interwoven 
with secondary features of one or another kind, but on the other, that the givenness of such 
features is not limited to any specific sensuous modality.  As we saw in §2.5, the spatial form of a 
thing can just as much be given tactually as it can visually, and, likewise, its weight can either be 
visually perceived in its causal effects upon other things, or felt tactually by our attempting to pick 
it up. While I am not aware of Husserl anywhere explicitly making this point, it could be argued 
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that this coherent fusion of distinct modes of sensibility in the givenness of the normal material 
thing as perceived—the thing which is, as Husserl vividly puts it, simultaneously a unity embedded 
in causal relations and something “colourful, gleaming, sounding [farbig, glänzend, tönend]”233—
serves as a necessary precondition for the empathetic recognition of the alien perceiving of the bat 
or the bumblebee as attuned to the intersubjective nature with which I am also perceptually 
familiar. Moreover, it may be that the intersubjective recognition of the abnormal other as 
perceptually responsive to nature presupposes and radically modifies an intra-subjective distinction 
between ‘my’ normal and abnormal bodily functioning, a distinction which can also be broadened 
to include relative normalities and abnormalities within the community of normal perceivers. As 
Husserl famously notes, when my finger is blistered or I ingest santonin the tactile or visual features 
of my environing objects undergo an alteration, but this change is usually recognised as one 
dependent upon an abnormal state of my living body as opposed to evincing a real change in the 
things themselves. This recognition of the stability of reality throughout bodily-relative alterations 
in schematic qualities may indeed pave the way for the recognition of foreign abnormal experience 
as co-directed to intersubjectively accessible nature.234 
 
§3.3.3 | Animate empathy and natural-scientific thinking 
 
We can now draw together these lines of thought. In seeing a non-human animal, with sense-
organs that may be quite different to those of ‘ours,’ moving its living body in a way that exhibits 
perceptual, affective, and volitional immersion, we will immediately recognise it relating to its 
environment not merely as a causally dependent material unity but also as an embodied psychic 
life with an intentional surrounding world of its own. And the core of this grasp of the animate 
other consists in our taking its body as displaying a foreign sensibility attuned to a foreign sphere 
of abnormal sense-things, that is, sense-things which, as foreign and given empathetically, are 
present and can be originally present to this concrete animate other alone, and, as abnormal, are 
saturated with (secondary) qualities that differentiate them starkly from ‘our’ sense-things and 
which are unknown and perhaps forever unknowable to us. Nevertheless, in as much as such 
animate others exhibit an oblique sensitivity to the very things with which I am also perceptually 
aware, Husserl maintains that the identity of intersubjective nature is not collapsed or superseded 
by the experience of other animals, but sustained and broadened: “The identity of nature for all 
human beings and animals is also something originally given, and it is ever given anew precisely 
through the apperception constitutive for those beings.”235 That is, experiencing other living beings 
with abnormal sensibilities serves to cultivate in us an understanding of the world of things as “a 
concordant intersubjective Objectivity,” one that is “valid for any single subject.” This 
understanding emerges through such alien sensibilities dethroning the sensible features that qualify 
the ‘normal’ perceptual world, which now fall short of their prior status as qualities of an all-
encompassing intersubjective reality and exhibit a certain relativity to our embodied sensibility; a 
loss which is inextricable from the primary qualities, as thingly features “manifest” in the otherwise 
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discordant sensible appearances of normal and abnormal perceivers alike, acquiring a broader 
intersubjective validity, that is, becoming prominent as “Objectively identical.”236 
It is not difficult to see the connection between this latter kind of understanding and the 
natural sciences. And indeed Husserl himself repeatedly emphasises that the latter’s claim to 
validity—the self-professed legitimacy of the different natural sciences as the styles of thought and 
praxis that are able to rigorously and objectively uncover their respective strata of the natural 
world—can only be rendered intelligible once we explicate the motives that can lead us to abandon 
our everyday understanding of things as intersubjective realities disclosed through normal 
sensibility. Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that while the encounter with abnormal 
perceivers as inhabiting a common world provides an original motivation for natural-scientific 
thinking, the former doesn’t yet bring us into contact with the domain of stable and 
mathematicised laws appealed to by natural science. In working out what this difference involves, 
it will not be sufficient to simply appeal to a distinction between perception and thought. While, 
for instance, the bumblebee buzzing against the window may already directly display a peculiar mode 
of sensitivity to the objects which I see in its surroundings, my activity of singling out certain 
perceptible features as only there-for-me and others as there-for-the-bumblebee-too is surely one 
which explicates my initial animate-empathetic grasp of the bumblebee through acts of thinking 
and imagining. That is, as Husserl emphasises in a text from 1912, the constitution of an 
intersubjective nature as identical for normal and abnormal perceivers alike involves a mode of explicative 
thinking that rests upon but goes beyond mere one-sided and even reciprocal empathy.237 But this 
mode of thinking marks the outer limits of what, in §2.3, I called the natural-theoretical attitude, 
in that it involves little more than the explication of senses disclosed through my own and others’ 
perceptual experiences. Natural-scientific thinking, on the other hand, goes beyond such 
explication, in that it requires the “logification of space, of time, and of the materiality that fills 
space and time” that, for Husserl, “yields the Eidos and factum of mathematical natural science.”238 
While natural-scientific thought and praxis constantly presupposes the originary epistemic contact 
with nature found in perception and perceptual judgement, it moves beyond perceptual nature 
entirely when it construes spatial forms and causal events in terms of geometrical idealities and 
mathematical laws. Moreover, in as much as natural-scientific thinking is in principle answerable 
to logical norms, it is ultimately an accomplishment which can only be achieved by a rational thinking 
subject, that is, by a person embedded in a social world.239  
Animate empathy does not only play a role in the constitution of intersubjective material 
nature; it also comprises, perhaps less surprisingly, the basic experience of animate nature. We have 
already seen Husserl emphasising that non-human animals are typically experienced from the 
outset as two-sided beings: as both living bodies comprising material features intertwined with 
sensuous-affective fields (an issue returned to below), and embodied psychic lives who are 
perceptually, emotively, and practically responsive to a surrounding world. Furthermore, Husserl 
maintains that all legitimate theoretical investigation of animate life takes its origins in the complex 
unities presented or presentable in animate empathy. Accordingly, scientific studies of animate 
nature can either pursue the sheer materiality of the other’s living body, a colossal task 
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encompassing morphological classification, physiology, and many other fine-grained studies of 
biological phenomena; or the relations of dependence between causal events implicating the living 
body and the fields of sensation directly embodied in the latter, through a (novel) theoretical 
discipline he terms ‘somatology’; and finally, one can psychologically investigate the perceptual, 
affective, and volitional responses enacted by animals in relation to their environment.240 To focus 
on the latter field, Husserl offers a rich analysis which can be summarised, briefly, as follows: the 
scientific study of the (human and non-human) animal psyche is largely concerned with identifying 
typical regularities in the manner in which ‘psychic states’ (i.e., conscious lived experiences, 
understood here as momentary conditions of the animal as a double-sided reality) emerge in 
relation to the animal’s (past and present) bodily, intrapsychic, and intersubjective ‘circumstances’. 
Such a study, which can either take its basis in animate empathy or mundane first-personal 
reflection, seeks to locate in the relation between psychic states and their circumstances certain 
‘dispositions’ or psychic features (Eigenschaften), in which the stable nature of the animal or human 
being reside.241 (To this degree, an analogy can be drawn between material and psychic features, in 
as much as both are fundamentally relational styles holding between momentary ‘states’ and 
‘circumstances,’ although Husserl emphasises that, unlike their material analogues, psychic states 
are incapable of schematisation and perspectival givenness through adumbrations.)242  
While this model of psychic features seems to me to be of some merit, it nevertheless 
implies a somewhat self-enclosed conception of the animate mind that is at odds with our intuitive-
empathetic experience of the foreign psyche as immediately world-embedded. Husserl himself was 
certainly aware of this problem, and he occasionally suggests an alternative approach to animal 
psychology which begins with the descriptive study, carried out in the personalistic attitude, of the 
surrounding world of the animal [tierische Umwelt].243 Especially when one takes into account his 
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nuanced analyses of the intimate connection between experience, embodiment, and world, it thus 
seems plausible that Husserl would be sympathetic to, and to some degree anticipates, those 
contemporary theorists who advocate a psychology that begins with the embodied responses of 
creatures to their meaningful environment, rather than with a putative inner domain of 
representations cut off from the world. However, as we shall see later, he would also stress that 
the meaningful behaviour of persons fundamentally differs from that of the animal, exhibiting a 
novel mode of responsiveness to the surrounding world, along with a different kind of historicity, 
sociality, and enduring character. It is for this reason that animate empathy falls short of disclosing 
the other as a person, though it forms a constant underlying basis for interpersonal empathy. 
 
 
§3.4 | The animate other and the animate self 
 
 
As we have already seen, the phenomenology of animate empathy thematically includes, but is not 
limited to, a description of the concrete animate other as intuitively given. Indeed, to properly 
explicate the experiential sense of the animate other we must attend to the sense in which the latter 
presents itself to us as, not only as a distinctive kind of worldly object, but as a fellow subject of 
perceptual nature. And explicating this requires us to face the thorny issue of the discrete roles 
played by one’s own and the other’s (possible and actual) experiences in exhibiting the publicity of 
the perceptual world, a matter which cannot be addressed without attending to the ‘mediating’ 
roles played by one’s own and the other’s living bodies. In concluding this chapter, I will now 
consider more closely Husserl’s analyses of the manner in which the constitution of one’s own 
living body and that of the other are reciprocally interwoven, with the aim both of deepening the 
account of animate empathy presented in this chapter, and, ultimately, of highlighting the role of 
intercorporeity in the intersubjective constitution of persons, an issue which will only be fully 
addressed later (§5.2). I will begin by illuminating Husserl’s account of the functioning of ‘my’ 
lived body in animate empathy, before peering at the other side of this coin, considering the 
irreplaceable function of one-sided and reciprocal animate empathy in the intersubjective 
constitution of my lived body as a living body. 
 
§3.4.1 | The institutive experience of the animate other: Bodily similarity and localisation 
 
As we saw earlier (§3.2), the Husserl of Ideen II makes use of a phenomenological thought 
experiment in his attempts to interrogate the sense of the animate other and explicate the 
constitutive role played by foreign embodied subjectivity in the constitution of common nature, a 
technique which anticipates the ‘reduction to the sphere of ownness’ (in)famously employed in the 
fifth and final of his later Cartesianische Meditationen. This technique appeals to those moments of 
experience which institute the intersubjectivity of the perceptual horizon in and through the 
givenness of another living body in contrast to my own—where these experiential moments do 
not only consist in my grasp of the other’s living body as a unique phenomenon in my perceptual 
horizon, but ultimately also in the other’s (appresented) experiences of her perceptual environment 
                                                           
279-80). For an instructive and well-informed discussion of Husserl’s treatment of passive motivation and 
its relation to rational egoic activity, see Staiti (2014, pp. 217-9). 
 70 
and of my living body within it. In as much as such moments of experience make possible the 
intersubjectivity of the perceptual horizon, they are not simply identical with, but rather 
presupposed by, the experience of things, animals, and persons in their concrete worldly sense as 
intersubjectively accessible realities. For Husserl, the most basic moment of this institutive event 
must consist in the other’s corporeal body showing up as another living body, that is, as a body 
lived by another.  
Controversially, Husserl maintains that this apprehension of the other’s living body is 
motivationally structured in such a way that the other’s corporeality manifests itself as embodying 
foreign subjectivity because it exhibits a certain ‘similarity’ to my own lived body. As he puts it 
already in 1913: 
If to me, being now here, is given in the there a corporeal body [Körper] which from here looks like my lived 
body [Leib] would look (at least according to the general type, as regarded from here) then it is “seen” as a 
living body [Leib], and the potential appearances, which I would have if I were transposed to the there, are 
attributed to it as actual; i.e., an Ego as subject is empathetically apprehended with the living body, along 
with those appearances and the rest of the things that pertain to the Ego, its lived experiences, acts, etc.244 
As should by now be clear, Husserl does not evoke this motivational ‘if-then’ as an analogical 
inference that must take place in order for one subject to legitimately judge certain perceived 
bodies to conceal an inner life, and nor is he advocating a (Lippsian) account of empathy according 
to which perceived bodily similarity arouses in me an imagined or remembered mental episode of 
my own that I project onto bodies like mine. As Husserl consistently emphasises, the originary 
givenness of the other’s living body does not involve an act of body-perception accompanied by 
a separate act of mind-ascribing—irrespective of whether this ‘accompaniment’ is taken to arise 
through imagination or inference—but of a unitary act in which the other’s bodily subjectivity is 
appresented and thus already participates in the perceptual sense the other’s living body has for me.245 
Moreover, Husserl’s admittedly misleading claim in this passage that we attribute a set of our own 
potential appearances to the other’s corporeal body should not be taken at face value, since he 
immediately qualifies it by noting that the foreign perceptual systems which the other’s body 
appresents are precisely not potential or actual experiences of my own but those of the other, 
phenomenologically separated from mine “by an abyss.” Rather, the proximity of the other’s 
empathised perceptual appearances to my own merely consists in, on the one hand, the other’s 
living body expressing a perceptual ‘here’ which recalls my own without being it, and on the other, 
this foreign perceptual here intimating a correlative field of perceptual ‘theres,’ a field which I 
typically assume to be concordant with my own field of sense-things.  
But what of his assertion that the other’s body is only perceived empathetically if it looks 
like mine, that is, if it exhibits the same general type as my own lived body? One obvious way of 
understanding what Husserl means by evoking such similarity is that empathy presupposes that 
our living bodies are both physical things of the general perceptual type: ‘human (physical) body.’ 
However, this cannot be Husserl’s view, since he maintains that understanding one’s own lived 
body as a physical thing already requires the contribution of others.246 This is not only because 
                                                           
244 Hua IV-2/V-2 320 (Hua IV 309, translation modified) [1913]. 
245 Hua IV-2/V-2 678-9, 82 (Hua IV 340-1, Hua IV 8-9) [1916/17, 1912]. 
246 Hua IV-2/V-2 373, 454 (Hua IV 81, 167) [1915, 1922/23]. 
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one’s own lived body is a “remarkably imperfectly constituted thing,”247 since certain patches of 
my back are beyond the reach of my fingers and vast swathes of my flesh evade my visual gaze. 
Rather, the more fundamental point is that my own lived body is not a thing for me at all, at least if 
the constitutive consequences of intersubjectivity are abstractively disregarded.248 My lived body 
can never be apprehended as something ‘over there,’ whose horizon of co-intended aspects could 
be brought to fulfilment and further determination in ongoing perception, because in seeing or 
touching discrete bodily organs my own lived body is constantly functioning imperceptibly as the 
‘here’ of the subject perceiving. After all, “in all perceiving, in all experiencing, the lived body is 
there with its “sense-organs,” and all experienced things have in experience a relation to the lived-
body”, such that, in any attempt to apprehend the whole of one’s own living body as a perceptual 
object, “we are led back again to possible movements of the lived body”. 249 What is inescapably 
‘here’ can never acquire the way of being ‘over there’—that is, ‘there’ in a way which differentiates 
itself from my mobile ‘here’—that is the mark of the perceived thing. The idea that empathetically 
grasping another living body can be motivated by the similarity of two physical things is therefore 
ultimately unhelpful.250 
As several scholars have noted, it may be possible to formulate a more promising version 
of the claim that bodily similarity plays a role in the basic experience of embodied alterity if we 
first attend to the lived experiences that most intimately manifest the lived body as a sphere of 
affection and self-movement with a certain corporeal spread.251 After all, it would seem that bodily 
self-consciousness can only play a positive function in the exhibition of the subjectivity of foreign 
bodies if the former manifests my body, on the one hand, as intimately at one with my experiential 
life, and on the other, as having a spatiality whose type is recognisable in foreign bodies too. 
Moreover, while we have seen that an understanding of my lived body as a thing in space is not 
possible at this stage, this does not yet rule out the possibility that a part of another body might be 
given with a perceptual style that, in virtue of its overlapping sufficiently with the perceptual style 
of a ‘part’ of my living body (as given to me alone), motivates an empathetic appresentation of it 
as displaying foreign subjectivity.  
To further explore this last suggestion, it is worth reflecting upon the dynamic and complex 
nature of bodily expressivity as it functions in our empathetic comprehension of others. As Husserl 
notes in a manuscript likely dating from 1922 or 1923, the givenness of the other’s living body as 
expressive involves a “system of [experiential] appresentations,” one which “develops, as a system of 
ordered indications, only by means of continuous experience of other people, who are already 
                                                           
247 Hua IV 159. In fact, this well-known formulation may be the product of Stein’s editorial work, as there 
is no known original manuscript for §41 b), and one finds similar formulations in her doctoral 
dissertation, which according to her own account was written before she had encountered the Ideen 
manuscripts (Einfühlung, p. 57; Empathy, p. 41). The closest that Husserl comes to this statement in the 
manuscripts for Ideen is the (arguably subtler) claim that “the apprehension of one’s own living body is, in 
many respects, less perfect than that of the foreign living body (whatever privilege the former may have 
owing to the original grasping of lived-bodily sensations)” (Hua IV-2/V-2 28 [1912]; Hua V 112, 
translation modified). 
248 This point is made eloquently and explored in more depth by Franck (2014, Chapter 8). 
249 Hua IV-2/V-2 64, 57 (Hua V 124, 121, translation modified) [1912]. 
250 As Husserl moreover notes, my fingernails and hair comprise parts of my body which can shed and 
regrow without my lived body gaining or losing anything, since such corporeal parts lack the sensitivity 
and free mobility which characterises my lived body proper (Hua IV-2/V-2 81 (Hua V 7) [1912]). 
251 See, in this regard, de Warren (2009, pp. 230-7), Bernet (2013), and Luo (2016). 
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empathetically given.”252 In the concrete experience of everyday others, the other’s body functions 
as a field of expression in and across (spatially and temporally) extended patterns of bodily 
movement, which the empathising subject has learnt to grasp through the development of 
empathetic habitualities. These habitualities are passive-associative experiential structures which, 
on the one hand, apperceive discrete bodily occurrences as instantiating typical expressive styles—
in apperceptions which typically involve anticipation and can accordingly undergo fulfilment, 
determination, and cancellation—and on the other, appresent typical subjective events as expressed 
in the relevant bodily patterns. Moreover, even such subjective events are not given as isolated, 
but as contextualised by and contextualising for distinct but related events in the other’s 
experiential life. In this sense, the other’s bodily movements do not only function as expressive of 
her current experiences but “now for their part frequently become new signs, that is, signs for the 
psychic lived experiences which were indicated or surmised earlier and, in some cases, for those 
which were not otherwise indicated.” However, it is notable that, before any empathetic 
understanding of such complex bodily expressivity can get underway—that is, before “different 
appresented indications, in themselves underdetermined,” can begin to “work together”—“a point 
of departure for understanding foreign psychic life” must first be given.253 For the other’s living 
body to function as a complex and dynamic expressive field, something of her sensibly given body 
must first awaken my empathetic habitualities and their passive systems of associations and 
appresentations. In this sense, the empathetic recognition of a foreign corporeal body as an 
expressive whole is not initially motivated by the perception of the other’s body in its corporeal 
totality, but by a discrete corporeal movement or group of such movements which set into motion 
our empathetic regard—whether it be the sound of laughter echoing outside the window, the 
flickering of foreign eyes in the presence of an environing event, or the emergence of a facial 
expression. 
Now, it should not be assumed that the originally institutive experience of embodied 
alterity which we are here seeking is already sensitive to the integrated expressivity of the everyday 
other’s bodily movements. But in as much as our rich empathetic grasp of bodily expressivity 
already sees complex expressive units—with a spatiotemporal corporeal horizon and an immediate 
type of mentality—‘in’ discrete bodily movements which only partially comprise these units, we 
are justified in asking whether the original encounter with the other might bear the same 
motivational structure. Of course, a further complexity here is that, while the experience of the 
concrete other involves habitualities that have in part developed through the experience of empathy itself, 
such that I grasp the currently present other in a manner which depends upon my experience of 
past others, the same does not apply for the originally institutive experience of the embodied other, 
which can only relate the perceptual style of the other’s body to that of my own body. Intriguingly, 
in the manuscript just discussed, Husserl appears to suggest that the most original empathetic 
experience of the animate other proceeds through the perception of the other’s hand as a foreign 
tactile organ, an accomplishment which, in its turn, implies apprehending the other’s corporeal 
body as embodying a nexus of subjectivity that relates to this hand as I do to my own. This claim 
seems to hinge upon the privileged status that pertains to my hand as a bodily organ that is 
intimately lived as both subjective and corporeal, and which thus makes possible the 
appresentation of foreign subjectivity ‘in’ the corporeality of the other’s hand. Before turning to 
                                                           
252 Hua IV-2/V-2 452 (Hua IV 165) [1922/23]. 
253 Hua IV-2/V-2 453 (Hua IV 166, translation modified) [1922/23]. 
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Husserl’s instructive formulation of the role of the hand in the institutive experience of foreign 
subjectivity, then, it will first be instructive to explicate aspects of Husserl’s account of the self-
constitution of my living body.   
Husserl understands the notion of sensation [Empfindung] in a broad sense so as to include, 
not only the sensuous [sinnliche] sensations which make up the hyletic matter for perception in its 
various modalities, but also the entire sphere of bodily feelings—“the “sensuous feelings”, the sensations 
of pleasure and pain, the sense of well-being that permeates and fills the whole lived body, the general 
malaise of “corporeal indisposition,” etc.”—some of which serve a hyletic function for emotive 
acts of valuing, and even those “difficult to analyse and discuss,” which “form the material subsoil 
[stofflichen Unterlagen] for the life of desire and will, sensations of energetic tension and relaxation, 
sensations of inner restraint, paralysis, liberation, etc.” Moreover, he maintains that all of these 
sensations are lived as bodily in one way or another, and that, given the ubiquitous role played by 
sensuous affection and kinaesthetic mobility in conscious life, the “lived body” is thus involved 
not only with perceptual experience but “in all other conscious functions.”254 However, while “all 
sensations whatsoever are experienced in a certain manner as related to the lived body, and could 
therefore be called bodily sensations [Leibesempfindungen]”, Husserl notes there is a certain class of 
sensations, which he labels ‘sensings’ [Empfindnisse], in which the body is lived in a most intimate 
manner.255  
The mode of bodily self-awareness involved with the sensings is not captured in a 
phenomenologically acute fashion if we think of it through the initially tempting (psychologistic) 
model of a quasi-perceptual (or ‘interoceptive’) consciousness which presents a bodily event as a 
material process. Rather, it involves an affective event being lived as immediately localised in my 
lived body, where the latter is not merely a “thing” but also and primarily a “field of localisation” 
and “bearer of sensings.”256 What does this localisation involve? In the first place, it does not 
consist in the sensing showing up in visual or tactile perception as a material quality or feature 
which extends over and articulates the material surface of my body, at least in the way that redness 
spans my knuckles or hardness my fingernails. In feeling the “warmth on the back of [my] hand, 
coldness in [my] feet, sensations of touch on [my] fingertips” or “the pressure and pull of my 
clothes”, the bodily ‘qualities’ of which I am aware are clearly not given in the manner of the 
extended qualities of perceived material things discussed in §2.5.257 What is at issue here is the 
living through of bodily self-affection, rather than the perception of material features qua 
circumstance-related schematic unities.258  
On the other hand, the sensings do have a certain localised spatiality, in that they spread 
out [verbreiten] over my bodily organs in their ‘outwardly’ perceived or perceivable reality. In seeing 
my hand, or in touching it with my other hand, it is entirely accurate to say that not merely a thing, 
but “the feeling hand appears,” in that those of my current sensings that belong to my hand, while 
retaining their original intimacy, “are ordered into a new apprehension.” And even if we do not 
actually perceive the feeling hand in this way, we often ‘know where to look’ (or touch), having an 
“obscure” grasp of the spatial locality of the sensings that already delineates the courses of 
                                                           
254 Hua IV-2/V-2 50-51 (Hua IV 152-3) [1912]. 
255 Hua IV-2/V-2 42 (Hua V 118) [1912]. 
256 Hua IV-2/V-2 63 (Hua V 123, translation modified) [1912]. 
257 Hua IV-2/V-2 43 (Hua IV 145) [1912]. 
258 Hua IV-2/V-2 45-6 (Hua IV 149-50 [1912]; cf. Bernet (2013, pp. 49-51). 
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kinaesthetic movement required for the relevant bodily part to come into view.259 It is through 
such sensings, then, that the lived body not only functions anonymously as the motivating 
kinaesthetic circumstances of perceptual experience, but also feels itself as spreading out through 
the intimate space it occupies as a mobile ‘here.’ As Husserl puts it, with idiosyncratic subtlety: 
“Moving my fingers, I have motion sensations, whereby a sensation spreads over and traverses, in 
an ever changing way, the surface of the fingers, but within this sensation-complex there is 
simultaneously a composition which has its localisation within this digital space.”260 Since the visual 
sensations do not function as sensing in this way, and are therefore localisable only partially and 
mediately, Husserl maintains that it is only through touch that the lived body ever appears as lived 
body.261 Without the touch-sensings, what I know as my own (perceivable) body would be “an 
arbitrary other thing” that could, oddly, be immediately and freely moved, and that would relate 
to my sensibility merely through “functional dependency”.262 As a tactile subject, on the other 
hand, my body is originally lived as “a system of subjective organs fused with interiority 
[Innerlichkeit]; or all-together a two-sided being”, as he aptly puts it a later text.263 Consequently, 
even the forms of sensitivity which proceed “parallel” to touch, in that they have a degree of 
immediate localisation unthinkable in the case of vision—the field of warmth and cold, the field 
of taste, certain bodily feelings, and the like—ultimately owe their lived corporeal spread to their 
intertwinement with the Urfeld of touch.264 The visual or tactual perception of my hand as a feeling 
hand therefore comprises a basic kind of bodily self-experience, in which the hand’s corporeal 
exteriority appears as intertwined with a sensitive interiority that I currently live through.265 
While Husserl already notes in 1912 that the intuitive localisation of sensings in my 
corporeal body comprises a mode of bodily self-experience that precedes all socially mediated self-
objectification, it is only later that he carefully works out the role such localisation plays in the 
institutive experience of foreign subjectivity.266 In the manuscript from the early twenties discussed 
earlier in this section, the claim that the perceptual givenness of my own bodily organs exhibits 
the corporeal spread of my sensitivity is now formulated in terms of the distinction between primal 
presence (Urpräsenz) and that which is co-given (mitgegeben) in appresence or co-presence 
(Appräsenz, Kopräsenz). While this distinction between primal presence and co-presence had, at least 
in Ideen II, previously only been used only in the case of the experience of the other’s living body,267 
Husserl now applies it to the ‘solipsistic’ experience of one’s own localised bodily sensitivity: “In 
                                                           
259 Hua IV-2/V-2 63 (Hua V 123) [1912], emphasis mine.  
260 Hua IV-2/V-2 43 (Hua IV 145-6) [1912]. 
261 Hua IV-2/V-2 61, 44 (Hua IV 150, 148-9) [1912] 
262 Hua IV-2/V-2 40 (Hua V 122-3) [1912). 
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265 In this context, it should be emphasised that the visibility of my hand as mine does not only presuppose 
its tactile sensitivity, but also its free kinaesthetic mobility (cf. Hua IV-2/V-2 598; Hua IV 381 [1910-12]). 
As Husserl notes elsewhere, tactile sense is also “privileged amongst the contributors to the constitution 
of a thing.” This is, on the one hand, because the touch-organs are, unlike the eyes, whose functioning 
becomes superfluous in darkness, continually sensitive to worldly contact (“visually, the world is not 
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in disclosing spatial things in their orientation to my lived body (“By means of tactile perception 
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266 Hua IV-2/V-2 42 (Hua V 119) [1912]. 
267 Hua IV-2/V-2 309, 661-2 (Hua IV 199-200, 419, 678) [1917/18, 1917, 1916/17]. 
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the case of the solipsistic subject we have the distinctive field of touch in co-presence with the appearing 
bodily surface and, in union with that, the field of warmth; in second place, and mediated by the 
localisation of the field of touch, we have the indeterminate localisation of the common feelings”.268 
On the basis of this seemingly insignificant reformulation, Husserl offers a fresh account of the 
originally institutive experience of the other, one that hinges upon the corporeal similarity between 
the perceptual style of those of my bodily organs which immediately function as localising fields 
of sensings and certain foreign bodily parts. When something which looks or feels—and moves—
like my hand emerges in my perceptual environment but without localising my tactile sense-fields, 
an appresentation of a foreign tactile interiority (as corporealised in this bodily member) passively 
emerges.269 And since my localised hand is always accompanied by a horizon of bodily subjectivity 
that folds in upon and surpasses itself in the very act of localisation, the corporeal whole ‘there,’ 
of which the foreign hand only forms a part, is accepted as localising a similar kinaesthetic-sensory 
horizon. Husserl writes:  
What requires a closer investigation is the system of appresentations which…, in the case of the solipsistic 
subject, has its original basis in original connections of regular and ordered co-existence in such a way that 
the connected members and series of members in their co-presence are not just there together but refer to 
one another. […] Solipsistically there belongs to every position of my eyes an “image”-aspect of the seen 
object and thus an image of the oriented environment; but also, in the case of touching an object, there 
belongs to every position of my hand and finger a corresponding touch-aspect of the object, just as, on the 
other side, there is a touch-sensation in the finger, etc., and obviously there is visually a certain image of my 
touching hand and its touching movements. All that is given for me myself as belonging together in co-
presence and is then transferred over in empathy: the other’s touching hand, which I see, appresents to me 
his solipsistic view of this hand and then also everything that must belong to it in presentified co-
presence.270 
Just as the perceptual givenness of my own hand when touching something already incorporates 
an appresentation of the tactile self-affection which I currently live through, as well as a touch-
aspect of the thing which I touch, so too does a foreign bodily member with the same corporeal 
style as my hand appresent a foreign sphere of self-affection and a foreign touch-aspect of the 
thing which it touches. Moreover, the localisation of my tactile sensitivity—the experience of my 
tactile sensings as the interior of the appearing corporeality of my hand—is itself always lived as a 
kinaesthetic-sensory accomplishment, one which unfolds through movements of my eyes or of 
my other hand and the schematic appearances which follow accordingly. Consequently, the 
appresentation of the foreign hand as a field of localisation for foreign touch-sensings can only be 
sustained—rather than becoming cancelled out and unveiling a mere lump of hand-like flesh—if 
other bodily members permit appresentation as functioning within a foreign system of 
kinaesthetic-sensory organs, and one which is capable of its own localisation. Once the original 
acceptance of the other’s hand as a sensitive organ has emerged, the other’s eyes will typically come 
to prominence—in virtue of their style of movement and their corporeal proximity to the touching 
hands opaquely recalling my own case—as exhibiting a foreign gaze, one which participates in the 
same kind of ‘regular and ordered co-existence’ with the other’s hands as occurs in my sphere of 
bodily selfhood. On this basis, the other’s corporeal body emerges as a spatial ‘thing’ quite unlike 
                                                           
268 Hua IV-2/V-2 452 (Hua IV 165, translation modified) [1922/23]. 
269 As Stein notes, this is not a matter of the other’s hand looking exactly like my hand, but rather of both 
instantiating the same general and roughly delimited perceptual type (Einfühlung, p. 76; Empathy, pp. 58-9). 
270 Hua IV-2/V-2 452-3 (Hua IV 165-6) [1922/23]. 
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any other, or better, as the bodily stratum of a foreign embodied subject. By means of empathetic 
appresentation, the other’s body now presents itself as a corporeal being whose surfaces have a 
tactile interior, whose movements announce kinaesthetic systems, and from which an oriented 
perceptual contact with other things, and with its own corporeality, radiates. 
Admittedly, Husserl’s emphasis on the foreign hand as a point of transition from 
‘solipsistic’ to intersubjective experience shouldn’t be read too literally. After all, it would seem 
intuitively (and perhaps empirically) questionable to insist that a child who only came into contact 
with handless others could thereby never recognise foreign mindedness. A more fruitful reading 
would rather suggest that what is decisive here is the perception of a foreign bodily part as recalling 
a tactile organ of mine, or more specifically, a patch of my skin which is visible to or touchable by 
me and in which fields of touch find an immediate localisation.  And indeed, Husserl notes 
elsewhere that “the entire surface of the living body serves as tactile surface, and the lived body is 
itself a system of touch-organs, a totality within which the different touch-organs reside.”271 While 
the hand is undoubtedly the tactile organ which exhibits the most fine-grained and visceral mode 
of intuitive localisation, it certainly seems possible that a foot, arm, or leg, or even a chest or 
stomach, could play the constitutive function that Husserl is after. In other words, the view I am 
suggesting here does not seek to glorify the hand, but rather proposes that the foreign body first 
manifests itself perceptually by overlapping with and recalling the intimate double-sidedness of my 
lived body as a tactile body.  
We can further clarify this reading by comparing it to Theunissen’s interpretation of 
Husserl’s (in)famous account of the role of bodily pairing [Paarung] in the institutive experience of 
the other, as developed in Cartesianische Meditationen. For Theunissen, Husserl’s attempt to ground 
the apperception of the alter ego in bodily similarity can only be made intelligible once we assume 
that a twofold bodily pairing is operative here, one which first pairs the other’s physical body with 
my body as physical, and a second and motivationally subsequent pairing of the other’s living body 
with my lived body. One upshot of this reading is that, since the original function of pairing is 
seen as that of relating my physical body to the other’s, Husserl’s account remains untouched by 
the objection that the role he assigns to bodily similarity fails to account for the experiential 
difference between my own living body and the physical appearance of the other’s body. That is, 
it is only once my lived body has been ‘physicalized’ through its pairing with the other’s physical 
body that I can (analogically) apprehend the other’s physical body as appresenting a living body; 
and this in its turn is a presupposition for the pairing of my own and the other’s living body. As 
this already attests, however, Theunissen’s Husserl ultimately portrays the experience of the other 
as a highly mediate and egocentric accomplishment, in which the other’s body is first and foremost 
a physical thing, one that only becomes apperceived as sensitive and mobile through the way it 
physicalizes my lived body.272 
                                                           
271 “Wir haben zwei Hände, wir haben die ganze Leibesoberfläche als Tastfläche, und der Leib [ist] ein 
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specific ‘colouration’ (Ibid.). 
272 Theunissen (1984, pp. 63-7). 
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As should now be evident, I take it that we find Husserl outlining a somewhat different 
account in Ideen II.273 Rather than suggesting that bodily similarity first arises as a relation between 
the other’s physical body as a corporeal whole and the view of my own body that this forces upon 
me, Husserl there suggests that what is originally ‘paired’—though he does not yet use this 
language—is something which recalls a bodily member implicated in my own tactile and 
kinaesthetic bodily system, without itself partaking in that system. It is this which motivates an 
appresentation, to be confirmed in the ongoing course of experience, of a foreign bodily 
subjectivity as expressed in the corporeal whole to which the foreign bodily member belongs. For 
the Husserl of Ideen II, that is, the institutive experience of the other does not start from a 
recognition of a physical thing which resembles my body (whether as intimately lived or as 
‘physicalized’), but of a bodily member which recalls but transgresses the fractured and limited 
grasp I have of my own bodily spatiality. As was suggested earlier in this section, this way of seeing 
things has the advantage of rendering continuous the roles of bodily similarity and bodily 
expressivity in empathetic perception. In both cases, we find a movement from a single bodily 
member to a corporeal whole, this movement in its turn clarifying the empathetic sense of the 
initial bodily member—such that the other’s quivering hand further exhibits both its very 
embodied subjectivity and its affective significance when the rest of the bodily system it already 
intimates is brought into view. 
 
§3.4.2 | Reciprocal animate empathy 
 
We have seen that, for Husserl, the institutive experience of the other requires both the perceptual 
emergence of another corporeal body, or bodily member, and an antecedent form of bodily self-
consciousness. In this sense, “empathy already presupposes that each subject has living 
corporeality [Leiblichkeit] constituted in its surrounding world.”274 However, it is obvious that the 
intimate givenness of my body involved in the localisation of sensings is of a markedly different 
phenomenological character to the appresentation of an analogous sphere in the other’s corporeal 
body. This difference is important, not only because it marks a fundamental and irremovable 
contour of the self-other relation, but also because it illuminates the role of the other in making 
possible a novel form of self-understanding. The fusion of similarity and difference that 
constitutively ties the experience of the embodied other to my bodily self-consciousness does not 
leave the latter unaltered; rather, through it I become aware that my living body is not merely a 
sphere of orientation and a field of localisation which enters into outer perception only in a 
fractured manner, but also something visible for others as their living bodies are for me: as a 
corporeal whole which appresents my bodily subjectivity to others, where this subjectivity is as 
foreign to them as theirs is for me. More exactly, the empathetic experience of “the psychic life 
which is appresented along with the other’s living body” makes possible, on the one hand, an 
acceptance that my own living body has a corporeality and spatiality which is not wholly accessible 
to me, and on the other, a recognition that my experiential life has a certain “appurtenance or 
conjunction [Zugehörigkeit]” to this corporeal body that is only properly accessible to the other—
                                                           
273 I do not mean to suggest here that Theunissen’s reading should be taken as the last word on Husserl’s 
position in Cartesianische Meditationen, subtle and often incisive though it is. For a well-informed and more 
charitable reading of Husserl’s 5CM which overlaps with many of the themes developed in this chapter, 
see Smith (2003, Chapter 5).  
274 Hua IV-2/V-2 451 A [1922/23] 
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such that, in a single movement, my face and eyes become intelligible as, on the one hand, visible 
parts of a corporeal totality, and on the other, expressive organs that publically display my visual 
gaze and affective responses.275 Furthermore, in as much as bodily expressivity necessarily involves 
an articulation of mental sense through and across diffuse parts of a corporeal whole, we can now see 
that the experience of my own bodily expressivity presupposes the recognition of a foreign gaze. 
It is only through the encounter with another living body that I can recognise my own lived body 
as an integrated spatial whole comprised of distinct parts, and, on the basis of this, as expressively 
displaying elements of my experiential life.276 
Now, it may be, as Husserl suggests in this manuscript, that this kind of self-understanding 
can emerge in an anticipatory fashion just through my transferring the “closed unity, human being” 
first empathetically perceived in the other to myself.277 However, as he notes in a text written ten 
years earlier, such a self-objectification only properly arises when I find myself as the theme of the 
other’s empathetic gaze.278 In this sense, the recognition of my lived body as a publicly visible 
corporeal reality is only properly instituted through the form of mutual recognition discussed 
earlier in this chapter (§3.2.3). That is, it is only when our eyes meet that the foreign gaze actually 
fixes upon my bodily ‘here’ and fully reveals to me my own corporeal extension. Moreover, Husserl 
occasionally suggests that this (reciprocally instituted) self-recognition of my lived body as visible-
to-others itself serves to transform my experiential environment. For instance, in his analysis of 
the solipsistic thought-experiment discussed at the outset of this chapter, Husserl notes that, in 
ordinary life, each “thing of my experience belongs to my “environment,” and that means first of 
all that my living body is part of it precisely as living body.”279 As he continues, however, this is 
“not a matter of essential necessity in any sense.” Without living through the recognition, made 
possible by reciprocal empathy, of “its own lived body as one understandable for the “other” 
[eigenen Leib als einem für “Andere” vestehbaren],” Husserl maintains that the experiencing subject 
“would not know that many subjects can gaze upon the same world, one that simply appears 
differently to different subjects, such that the appearances are always relative to “their” living 
bodies, etc.” Husserl’s view appears to be, then, that the intersubjective commonality of the 
perceptual world can only fully emerge through the recognition of oneself as a “human subject” 
qua “intersubjective object”.280   
While Husserl doesn’t fully (so to speak) flesh out this thought, one way of reading it would 
be as suggesting that the corporealisation of my lived body inaugurated by the other’s gaze, along 
with the recognition of the other’s bodily here as itself corporealised, first fashions the sense of a 
                                                           
275 Hua IV-2/V-2 454 (Hua IV 167) [1922/23]. Husserl can therefore claim that the “psychic is 
subjectivity in the experience of empathy; it is there experienced as temporally co-existing with the 
Corporeal-physical [Leiblich-Physischen].” Hua IV-2/V-2 717 (Hua IV 363) [1916/17]. 
276 Bernet (2013, pp. 61-2) discusses this point revealingly, although he doesn’t make explicit the 
connection between corporeal articulation and bodily expressivity which, to my mind, necessarily anchors 
the latter in alterity. 
277 Hua IV-2/V-2 454 (Hua IV 167) [1922/23]. 
278 Hua IV-2/V-2 271 (Hua IV 242) [1912]. 
279 Hua IV-2/V-2 373 (Hua IV 81, translation modified) [1915]. Emphasis mine. 
280 Hua IV-2/V-2 373-4 (Hua IV 81, translation modified) [1915]. Incidentally, in locating a degree of 
contingency and facticity in the inner structure of transcendental subjectivity—or more exactly, at the 
very movement by which transcendental subjectivity broadens itself into transcendental 
intersubjectivity—Husserl makes a move which, in structure if not in specific detail, would be 
dramatically radicalised in the ‘existentialist’ phenomenologies of Heidegger and Sartre. 
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spatiality that is not fully reconcilable with either of our egocentric spaces. With the reciprocal 
corporealisation of self and other, in which my ‘here’ shows up as ‘there’ for the other and 
something ‘there’ appresents a foreign ‘here,’ a space emerges in which no bodily ‘here’ is 
absolute.281 In other words, Husserl ultimately leads us to the view that it is with the recognition 
of my bodily here—which constantly functions as absolute Nullpunkt for my own originary  
perceptual contact with things (§2.5)—as an ‘over there’ for the other, that the ‘common system 
of appearances,’ in which my own appearance-systems merely participate, is first set up as a 
normative ideal, typically presupposed in my perceptual contact with things and others, and only 
being called into question when perceptual abnormalities emerge (§3.2). The fixing of the other’s 
perceptual gaze upon my body is the only means by which the sense of a unitary perceptual world 
not tied exclusively to my bodily ‘here’—a spatial world which I traverse rather than egocentrically 
structure—can emerge in experience as motivated. 
 
 
§3.4 | Summary 
 
 
This chapter has covered an expansive array of topics, and it will be necessary at this stage to offer 
a brief summary, identifying the key claims that run through it. (1) We have seen that a 
phenomenological clarification of perceptual nature will remain incomplete if it does not strive to 
explicate the sense of perceived things, and the sensuous-material features which articulate them, 
as valid for other embodied perceivers too. In this way, our perceptual experience of material 
nature takes for granted that the way in which its objects are given has a certain exchangeability 
with the perceptual appearances of other embodied subjects. (2) In explicating this sense, we can 
proceed by attending to the way in which other embodied subjects are given in experience. This is 
a task which opens up two different directions of inquiry. (2a) On the one hand, we can attempt 
to explicate the generic character of other animate beings as so given, thereby bringing into view 
a kind of experience with which animate others are correlated, what I have called here ‘animate 
empathy.’ In animate empathy, others are given as unities whose bodily style serves to express a 
certain kind of world-directed subjectivity. In this way, the movements of the animate other display 
a form of perceptual contact with material nature, one that is often interwoven with affect and 
instinctive agency. Upon closer consideration, we can also say that the distinction between 
normality and abnormality is constantly operative here, in that others whose bodily style appresent 
a similar sensibility to mine, or rather to ‘ours,’ appear as ‘normal perceivers’ in contact with the 
same style of sensuous materiality, a privilege not enjoyed by all animate beings. (2b) On the other 
hand, animate empathy can also be fruitfully analysed from a transcendental standpoint. This 
involves inquiring into the basic form of experience which motivates our acceptance of 
intersubjective material nature, and thereby treats the experience of the (initially, ‘normal’) animate 
other as an institutive event that makes possible the opening up of a common perceptual horizon. 
On the one hand, this requires us to trace out how the sense, ‘animate other,’ first originates 
                                                           
281 Indeed, in an earlier manuscript, Husserl notes that intersubjectivity has transformative consequences 
for the primitive spatiality encompassed by the system of ‘theres’ in relation to my mobile bodily ‘here’ 
(Hua IV-2/V2 563-4 (Hua IV 87-8) [1905-10]). This connection between intersubjectivity and space was 
later explored by Merleau-Ponty, and has recently been powerfully engaged in Lisa Guenther’s ‘critical 
phenomenology’ of solitary confinement (2013, Chapter 7). 
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through a contrast with my own living body. In this regard, I have argued that the self-constitution 
of the living body through touch plays an indispensable role. On the other hand, closer reflection 
reveals that here reciprocity is ultimately decisive. On the last analysis, it is only through being 
recognised as an animate other by another animate other—which, of course, also has its 
constitutive implications for self-consciousness—that the acceptance of intersubjective nature 
becomes motivated experientially.
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4. The personal self: a first-personal approach. 
 
 
 
In that we have now offered an account of animate empathy, our thematic concern can fix upon 
the second mode of empathy delineated in Chapter 1, namely interpersonal empathy. But rather 
than directly considering the manner of givenness of other people, I will now turn to a detailed 
treatment of personal self-consciousness. This may raise suspicions that the account of 
interpersonal empathy which I offer in the next chapter will simply transpose the personal self as 
given first-personally onto other persons, a move which is evidently misguided if one seeks to do 
justice to the otherness of other persons. The reader will have to determine for his or herself 
whether I commit this error in Chapter 5, but I would like to emphasise that it is not my aim in 
beginning with the ‘first-person.’  
As we shall see in the next chapter (§5.2), the personal self is not something which can be 
simply transposed from self to other, because its proper sense is one that only emerges in and 
through intersubjective relations, and to this degree a phenomenology of personal selfhood must 
incorporate a second-personal analysis too. Nevertheless, I take it that in pursuing such a 
phenomenology scant progress will be made until one considers what it is to be a person, to live a 
personal life. This is because the distinctive character of the personal self is partially a matter of 
specific contours within the life of subjectivity, contours which can be most richly disclosed 
through reflection upon one’s own case. In this chapter, I will attempt to bring into view some of 
these contours on the basis of Husserl’s analyses of the personal self. I will first consider the sense 
in which voluntary movement and practical inclinations can be appropriated in intentional action, 
thereby manifesting a subject who is not merely a locus of instinctive tendencies but a person who 
decides (§4.1). This will then bring into view a conception of the personal self as a nexus of 
decisions and convictions, and who has a distinctive kind of motivational dependence upon its 
surrounding world, as well as a certain personal freedom and enduring character (§4.2). Finally, I 
will turn to the form of self-awareness and habituality that is implicated in our attitudes, exploring 
in particular the experiential grounds that motivate an understanding of oneself as a subject of 
enduring stances (§4.3). In so doing, I will try to show that Husserl’s thinking on these issues is 
remarkably contemporary, cohering with and sometimes arguably improving upon some of the 
recent decades’ most powerful philosophical thoughts regarding agency and selfhood. This will 
then leave us with a specific pair of tasks in the next chapter: first, that of determining the degree 
to which personal selfhood depends upon empathetic relations to other persons, and second, of 
discerning the recognition and understanding of other persons in interpersonal empathy, in its 
differences and similarities with the personal self-consciousness considered here. 
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§4.1 | The embodiment of the person 
 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter (§3.4.1), Husserl maintains that the lived body plays a 
fundamental role for the dimension of passivity that is interwoven within all experiential life. A 
primordial form of embodiment is to be found in the sphere of sensation (broadly understood), 
since this comprises a domain of lived experience in which, on the one hand, one’s own body is 
immediately lived, and on the other, an affection occurs which comprises the material subsoil for 
perceptual, affective, and volitional acts. However, Husserl maintains that this understanding of 
the lived body as an ‘aesthesiological unity’ is essentially an abstraction, one which we can be lifted 
by explicating the specific kind of activity which characterises our bodily being. Moreover, it is in 
lifting this abstraction that the personal Ego comes into view: 
Constituted together are the physical thing as nature, the lived body as aesthesiological unity, and the psyche 
as a founded reality, thus a non-selfsufficient one, with the lived body as its subsoil (the lived body always 
thought constitutively only as an aesthesiological unity). In this series we do not come across the personal 
Ego, although each founded psychic subject is a subject of lived experiences of acts. Concerning the 
constitution of the personal Ego, it must be considered as having the lived body as field of its free will, and 
especially in this respect, that the kinaesthetic processes, which already provide essential contributions 
towards the constitution of the thing at the lowest level, are characterised as free processes, to which are 
joined, as dependent, processes of other sorts of aesthesiological data.282 
In this section, I will follow the line of thought suggested by Husserl in this passage. I will first 
explicate Husserl’s claim that a certain ‘bodily freedom’ plays an essential constitutive function for 
perceptual experience, before indicating the involvement of the active embodiment of the subject 
in the manifestation and establishment of personal character. 
 
§4.1.1 | Bodily freedom and perception 
 
We saw in Chapter 2 that Husserl accords a constitutive role to bodily movement in his 
transcendental-phenomenological clarification of thing-perception. However, Husserl doesn’t 
merely claim that bodily movement serves a constitutive function in perceptual experience; he also 
maintains that in virtue of such movement “functions of spontaneity belong to every perception. 
The processes of the kinaesthetic sensations are free processes here, and this freedom in the 
consciousness of their unfolding is an essential part of the constitution of spatiality.”283 My aim 
will now be to clarify what this bodily freedom is, as well as to spell out why Husserl regards such 
freedom as necessary for perceptual experience.  
As a preliminary characterisation, we can say that what makes certain bodily movements 
‘free’ is that they are, in their total unfolding, lived as the actualisation of a set of concrete kinaesthetic 
possibilities, an actualisation which excludes sets of other, non-actualised, kinaesthetic possibilities 
of which the subject was also aware. Thus, in leaning backwards, turning my neck to the right and 
shifting my gaze so as to focus on a specific object outside of the window, I enact a course of 
                                                           
282 Hua IV-2/V-2 322 (Hua IV 310, translation modified) [1913]. 
283 Hua IV-2/V-2 60 (Hua IV 58) [1912], emphasis mine. My discussion in §4.1.1 of Husserl’s analysis of 
bodily freedom, and the role of bodily capacities played therein, builds upon a recent article by Hanne 
Jacobs (2014, pp. 15-18). 
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movement of which, Husserl insists, I had a certain kind of prior awareness, alongside other 
possible movement-courses of which I was similarly aware. That is, Husserl maintains that 
kinaesthetic awareness does not only function in perceptual experience as disclosing those actual 
bodily movements that are correlated with alterations in the sensuous sphere. Rather, the inner 
horizon of a perceptual object already implies, as the motivational circumstances for its possible 
disclosure, courses of possible kinaesthetic enactments.284  
Now, Husserl’s claim is certainly not that bodily activity of this sort necessarily involves a 
process in which the subject represents in thought or imagination the (significantly expansive) 
nexus of possible movements which she could bring about, and the perceptual correlates which 
would emerge through such movements. After all, if a subject’s lived awareness of her current 
kinaesthetic possibilities and their motivated perceptual correlates amounted to this, then such an 
awareness would surely be unable to serve the structural and constitutive function for all perceptual 
experience that Husserl proposes it does. In place of any cognitivistic or imagistic account of 
bodily movement and perceptual constitution, Husserl claims that within perceptual functioning 
our possible kinaesthetic courses are primordially there for us, not as possible situations posited 
in thought or imagination, but just as possibilities of self-movement, which may be actualized in 
self-movement. The original awareness I have of my bodily possibilities is not a cognitive grasp of 
logical possibilities, but a “practical consciousness” in which “a horizonal domain of possibilities 
of free movement—of possibilities as practical possibilities—is most properly present to me”.285 
This horizon of bodily possibilities is shaped and delimited by my own history of bodily 
engagement, since its contours depend upon what one is (aware of oneself as) able to do. Husserl 
emphasizes that what brings about this awareness is not an induction from past experience, but 
rather an element of practical consciousness and its constituted possibilities: a practical rather than 
a cognitive apperception.286 Hence, he uses the phrase ‘“I can”’ [„Ich Kann“] to refer to the pre-
reflective and immediately practical manner in which a subject is acquainted with each of his or 
her own bodily capabilities [Vermögen] and the practical possibilities they enable.287 Each of these 
capabilities are, as present to the embodied subject in the form “I can,” such that, as Husserl writes, 
they are “always ready to pass into activity, into an activity that, as it is lived, refers back to the 
corresponding subjective ability [Können], the capability.”288 The system of such bodily capabilities 
comprises, for each person, a distinctive “normal freedom” of which the subject is intimately aware, 
and which is ordinarily brought to thematic attention only when it is interrupted [durchbrochen], 
namely when I am unable to achieve an attempted movement of which I am normally capable.289 
However, there seems to be something insufficient about the claim that bodily freedom 
simply consists in the actualisation of possible movements, even if these possible movements are 
specified as ones which were previously lived as embedded within a nexus of practical possibilities 
                                                           
284 See, e.g., Hua XVI 190. 
285 Hua IV-2/V-2 657-8 (Hua IV 330) [mid-20s]; Hua IV-2/V-2 691 A. 
286 Ibid. 
287 “Es bedarf hier der Analyse des „Ich kann“, und zwar des Ich kann, wie ich je erfahrungsmäßig weiß 
bzw. was vor aller Reflexion als „bekanntliches“ „Das kann ich“ charakterisiert ist.“ (Ms. A VI 10/11; cf. 
Hua IV 254). While related to the Ideen II bundle, this specific manuscript is rather fragmentary and has 
thus been excluded from Hua IV-2/V-2. 
288 Hua IV 255; cf. Jacobs (2014, pp. 15-6). 
289 „Die intendierte freie Bewegung läuft nicht ab, „es geht nicht“. […] Meine Freiheit als normale Freiheit ist 
durchbrochen, es geht jetzt gerade nicht.“ Ms. A VI 10/11. See also the discussion of the “I cannot” and 
the experience of resistance to bodily activities found at Hua IV 258-9. 
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that are distinctively mine and as such open for voluntary actualisation. After all, many bodily 
movements that we would normally consider ‘involuntary’ would appear to fall under this 
description. Consider two of the examples of involuntary movement offered by G. E. M. 
Anscombe: “[t]he odd sort of jerk or jump that one’s whole body sometimes gives when one is 
falling asleep,”  and the case of a man who “withdrew his hand in a movement of involuntary 
recoil.”290 In both cases, we could arguably say that the embodied subject was minimally aware of 
the relevant movement as a practical possibility prior to its actual emergence, and that this 
emergence is in its turn lived as in some sense an actualization of this kinaesthetic possibility. 
However, such involuntary movements are intuitively thought of as deviations from, rather than 
instantiations of, free bodily movement. 
What is needed, then, is a further specification of the distinctive way in which voluntary 
movement involves the free actualisation of kinaesthetic possibilities. As such a further 
specification, I take it that Husserl would offer the claim that voluntary movements are necessarily 
consciously goal-oriented. In doing something voluntarily—that is, in my bodily freedom—I am not 
merely aware of a kinaesthetic constellation of mine emerging, but of the enactment of the 
kinaesthetic constellation actualising a possibility which I take as its practical end or telos. It is 
important to stress that Husserl’s claim here is not that bodily freedom is manifest exclusively in 
intentional actions. While teleological self-movement is a necessary feature of those actions which 
are robustly intentional in the sense of being rooted in reflective deliberation and decision, there 
are also forms of goal-oriented movement which, as phenomenologists, we cannot describe in 
such terms. Consequently, intentional actions represent only a certain type of voluntary movement, 
and is with regard to this broader class that we can speak of bodily freedom.291 Indeed, in a passage 
already partially quoted, Husserl points out that bodily movement retains a lived teleological 
character even when our self-movement, rather than being intentional in a stronger sense, simply 
alters the perceptual situation in a manner we find desirable or aesthetically pleasing: 
The Object exercises an allure, perhaps by virtue of its pleasing appearance. The “same” Object can be 
given to me in an unpleasing mode of appearance, and then I experience an allure to change my position 
appropriately, to move my eyes, etc. Presently, a pleasing mode of appearance is given once again, and the 
telos of the movement has been reached. Here, once more, movements of the body and of the eyes do not 
enter into the picture as real physical processes, but instead a horizonal domain of possibilities of free 
movement is most properly present to me, and an “I do” succeeds the “I can” according to the reigning 
allures and tendencies. Correlatively, the end of the process has the character of a telos, a goal.292 
Once the teleological aspect of voluntary movement is emphasised, it becomes clearer why Husserl 
maintains that perceptual constitution requires free (i.e. voluntary) movement. As we saw in 
Chapter 2, perceptual experience is itself teleologically structured, in that the perceptual sense of 
                                                           
290 Anscombe offers more relevant examples: “tics, reflex kicks from the knee, the lift of the arm from 
one’s side after one has leaned heavily with it up against a wall.” (1979: §7) In a less obviously compelling 
example of involuntary movement, Husserl—who was reportedly twice hospitalised with nicotine 
poisoning—discusses the “mechanical doing [Tun]” of reaching for (and even lighting) a cigar on the basis 
of an “urge to smoke,” “whereas my attention, my Egoic activity, indeed my being-affected consciously, 
are entirely somewhere else.” (Hua IV-2/V-2 672 (Hua IV 338) [1917]. 
291 For an intriguing parallel, consider Anscombe’s claim that voluntary movements are necessarily such 
that they can be known to their agent non-observationally, and that while not all voluntary movements 
embody intention, all intentional actions are voluntary in this sense (1979: §49). 
292 Hua IV-2/V-2 691 A [1917]; cf. Hua IV 216-8. 
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an object involves a certain kind of claim which is self-corrected and further determined through 
moving closer to the object and more closely approximating an optimal givenness of its features 
(§2.5). Consequently, the ability to accomplish teleological self-movement is a necessary 
precondition for perceptual constitution. A being who was wholly unacquainted with the 
possibility of its bodily movement being goal-oriented—and which was thus unable to do anything 
like, say, purposively turning its eye over there, or lurching towards its food hungrily—could not be 
experientially acquainted with even the intuitive, perceptual nature discussed earlier. The ideal of 
optimal givenness which tacitly functions as a norm in all perceptual experience is inseparable from 
the practical possibility of its accomplishment, and the sense of the latter is grounded in the lived 
possibility of teleological self-movement. 
At this stage, we can summarise Husserl’s account of bodily freedom as follows. The 
generic character of voluntary activity involves, first, the possession, on behalf of the agent, of 
bodily capabilities and hence of a nexus of lived practical possibilities attuned to the concrete 
situation which faces him or her, and second, the actualisation of certain practical possibilities in 
movements that are lived by their subject as teleologically oriented towards such actualisation. All 
movements which fulfil these two criteria embody bodily freedom, and a degree of first-personal 
familiarity with such self-movement is a necessary condition of perceptual experience. To relate 
this account of bodily freedom or the voluntary to Husserl’s claim that such freedom provides 
personal selfhood with its underlying basis, we can pursue the interrelation between two issues: on 
the one hand, the manner in which bodily movements manifest agential subjectivity, and on the 
other, the already-mentioned distinction between non-intentional and intentional voluntary 
movements. 
 
§4.1.2 | Bodily freedom and agential selfhood 
 
Crucially, for Husserl the teleological character of voluntary movement does not merely play a 
necessarily enabling role in the disclosure of perceptual objects; such self-movement is also an 
essential feature of the self-manifestation of embodied subjectivity. Or put differently, the lived body 
is not only essentially involved in the constitution of the perceptual world, but also in the self-
constitution of the subject. This becomes clear when we consider that, in at least the typical case 
of voluntary movement, we have some awareness that there is something we are doing, and, as 
interwoven with this, that there is some element of us which compels or drives this doing. When 
voluntarily redirecting our gaze, for example, we are not merely aware of a certain kinaesthetic 
course being actualised. Rather, our experiential episode would be more naturally described as, say, 
‘looking at the book’, an agential event that we live through as satisfying a certain urge or 
inclination to identify the book lying at the margins of our field of vision. Husserl emphasises this 
connection between voluntary movement and agential subjectivity in a manuscript dating from 
between 1915 and 1917, as follows: 
The Ego has as correlate its external surrounding world, and beneath this correlate it has its lived body as a 
field of the allures which penetrate it. However, the lived body is pre-eminent as a field of subjective 
movements and alterations, which occur in consequence of the allures, and which include the free, active 
alterations.  Primarily, the lived body is a field of subjective alteration, a field which has the form of the “I 
move” (I alter my posture, I clench my fist), a field of movements which are of consequence in determining 
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the courses of other appearances (the movements of my eyes in the “I see,” the movements of touching, 
etc.). The lived body thus has a specific subjectivity293 
He goes on to indicate the consequences of this line of thought, in a later note appended to this 
manuscript: 
Must it not then be said that the field of movement-sensations is “originally” the field of a subjective “I 
do,” and further, that it is a field with which the subjective courses go hand in hand, although mediately. 
Furthermore: is the lived body as sensation and field of sensation something intrinsically and originally 
subjective? But as we later see, it will not do to construe sensations as states of the ego.294 
The issue which Husserl appears to be raising here is as follows: while voluntary self-movement is 
lived through kinaesthetically, and can as such be described in sensuous terms, the danger of so 
doing is that it risks overlooking what is utterly distinctive about such self-movement. Namely, 
what is primordially (self-) manifest in the free actualisation of kinaesthetic possibilities, in lived 
and purposive bodily enactments, is not the passivity of sensuous affection, but the subject as a 
locus of living agency. My voluntary movements do not only ‘announce’ kinaesthetic actualisations, 
they also embody and manifest my doing. In this way, goal-oriented movements typically involve a 
certain distinctive kind of practical or agential self-consciousness. 
To add a further complication, however, Husserl emphasizes that all purposive doing 
presupposes a form of affection, in that it involves a lived response to a pregiven object or state 
of affairs which appears to it as a certain kind of demand or invitation: 
I become motivated to turn towards something, to pay attention and take pleasure in turning towards it. I 
experience the allure of beauty. Something reminds me of something else similar to it, the similarity lures 
me to compare and distinguish them. Something seen very obscurely determines me to get up and approach 
it. The room’s stale air (which I experience as such) lures me to open the window, etc. In each case, we 
have an undergoing of something and a passively being determined through something—and an active reaction to 
it, a transforming into conduct [Tun], and my conduct has a goal.295 
We can thus say that lived and purposive bodily enactments—that is, all voluntary movements—
manifest a purposive, consciously goal-oriented response to a certain feature of the subject’s 
pregiven environment. Such consciously purposive movements, that is, manifest living embodied 
subjectivity, a locus of agency that is not wholly reduced to (or lived as the causal effect of) its 
intentional environment, but which lives itself as responding to this environment in a determinate 
way. That is, this way of responding manifests both the agent’s capabilities of self-movement, as 
well as its selectively aiming at certain goals, goals which in their turn are intelligible only in relation 
to the perceptual, affective, and conative senses embedded in the agent’s environment as it is 
constituted in bodily passivity. 
 
§4.1.3 | The voluntary and personal action 
 
In the foregoing account of the self-manifestation of embodied subjectivity in voluntary 
movement, we have still not entirely clarified Husserl’s claim that the personal Ego ‘must be 
considered as having the lived body as its field of free will.’ After all, the account of bodily freedom and 
                                                           
293 Hua IV-2/V-2 312 A; cf. Hua IV-2/V/2 741-2. 
294 Hua IV-2/V-2 312 n. A. 
295 Hua IV-2/V-2 692 (Hua IV 217, translation modified). 
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embodied subjectivity so far given is plausibly applicable to those of our fellow creatures whose 
worldly comportment exhibits a certain form of agency, but not the one which we find ourselves 
condemned to embody in leading a life as persons.296 To see how it can be that the kind of lived, 
goal-oriented movement so far described takes on a distinctively personal form, we thus have to 
distinguish between different ways in which the activities of voluntary self-movement can embody 
and manifest subjectivity, and to examine these different ways within the broader horizon of 
personal life. The most relevant Husserlian distinction here is that between those forms of 
voluntary self-movement which manifest their subject simply as succumbing to a stimulus or allure 
[Reiz], and those forms which express or fulfil an attitude or position-taking [Einstellung, 
Stellungnahme] embedded within the life of a person—though, as we shall see, this distinction is 
complicated by the interdependency and interlocking of these two dimensions within personal 
life.297 
Many of the forms of self-movement possible for living beings simply manifest their agent 
as a subject of instincts [Triebe], inclinations [Neigungen], or tendencies [Tendenzen], that element of 
subjectivity which comprises the underlying layer or subsoil [Unterschicht] of personal agency.298 
Many of the movements which we enact are driven by our yielding to or following a course of 
movement which, in its sheer lived possibility, is delineated prior to any planning or deliberation. 
Rather than realising reason- and value-sensitive practical intentions and goals projected by their 
agent, such activities are rather lived as embodied responses to invitations or allures exerted by 
objects, the latter of which may only be known to the subject as background objects, or mere 
intentional ‘possessions,’ at the margins of her attention. While such activities involve voluntary 
self-movement and manifest a subject who self-moves in yielding to their allure, Husserl notes that 
for a personal subject such activities are nevertheless lived as passive accomplishments, in as much 
as they require no element of decision or active commitment: 
From the possession an allure may arise, a tendency towards grasping which goes out towards the subject: 
The subject is passive when it follows the allure and resolves the tendency in the form of a turning-towards. 
Pure passivity occurs wherever a subjective tendency issuing from a pregiven and possessed background 
object is yielded to, such as when the eyes turn towards something, or the hand grasps something, in 
consequence of its allure. We have here the allures of originally passive activities, e.g. eating, drinking, and 
smoking. A thought emerges, and from it a tendency, effective as an obscure intention, to follow a train of 
thought. I follow it passively. The sunshine beckons me to take “a stroll,” and I yield. Each of the entire 
host of inclinations is nothing more than an inclination to follow.299 
Considered in themselves, such cases of voluntary movement only seem to directly manifest their 
subject as the bearer of a tendency to move in a certain way under certain pregiven intentional 
circumstances.  
                                                           
296 Korsgaard (2009, pp. 109-16) has recently argued that many non-human animals possess a form of 
agency which, while not intentional and self-expressive in the distinctive sense in which personal agency 
is, is nevertheless goal-oriented and manifests its agent as an integrated and conscious locus of instincts 
and perceptions—a conclusion which I take it Husserl would be in full agreement with. 
297 On Husserl’s employment of the term Reiz, see Steinbock’s introduction to Husserl (2001a), as well as 
Husserl’s own discussion of the ‘naturalistic’ and the ‘personalistic’ concepts of allure (Hua IV-2/V-2 
298-9 (Hua IV 198-90) [mid-20s]). And for incisive discussions of his concept of Einstellungen or 
Stellungnahmen, see Hart (1992, Chapter 2) and Jacobs (2010). 
298 Hua IV-2/V-2 745 A [1915-1917]. 
299 Hua IV-2/V-2 742-3 A [1915-1917]. 
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However, what complicates this picture is that, at least when it comes to persons, what 
stands out as “alluring” an embodied response, a following through of a volitional tendency, is 
sometimes dependent upon the subject’s enduring personal interests, upon a deeply embedded 
nexus of stances specifying what she takes to be worth her doing. In illustrating this point, some 
examples will be of aid. Consider a mother who sympathetically embraces her crying child, a 
botanist who leans over to get a closer look at a flower she happens to pass while walking 
elsewhere, or a socially sensitive person who gives an overtly unhappy glare to an aggressive 
stranger shouting racist abuse. Each of these persons might live their response as simply driven by 
an ‘urge’ to act, one correlated with a felt demand arising from the situation they find themselves 
in. But in that they involve a certain kind of interest-arousal, such responses manifest the long-
standing commitments and values rooted in the agent’s enduring theoretical, evaluative, and 
practical attitudes.300 They imply something about what the agent takes to be true, about what she 
holds dearly, about a certain kind of claim she avows (regarding, perhaps, the value of her child, 
the importance of understanding one’s organic surroundings, or the necessity of maintaining a 
social space of solidarity and respect). In short, despite not embodying any immediate element of 
evaluative assessment or decision, some of the inclination-expressive voluntary movements 
enacted by persons nevertheless serve to express their agent’s own deeply personal stances. To 
employ terminology which will be later developed in this chapter, in such cases our actions are 
rooted in the immediate reawakening of certain evaluative and practical stances which are 
embedded in our personal lives. The latter belong to the sedimented nexus of positions or attitudes 
which make up who we are as active and responsive selves of enduring character, and it belongs 
to their very nature as such habitual stances that they can be immediately reawakened and 
actualised if intentional circumstances of a certain type are to emerge. 
As has already been emphasized, the forms of self-movement actualised in inclination-
expressive (i.e. minimally voluntary and purposive) bodily movements are not phenomenologically 
exhausted by their experienced actualisation. Even as mere possibilities, or as we can also say, as 
lived-bodily capabilities, they delineate a subject’s lived awareness of her embodied space of possible 
movement. Moreover, this lived awareness of a bodily capability as a course of movement which 
can be actualised at any time becomes strengthened through our exercising or practicing that 
movement. And, especially once it has become so strengthened, a lived bodily capability can 
ultimately be actualized in a way which goes beyond the mere expression of inclination, being 
rather fulfilling for a certain kind of willing rooted in a practical decision.301 As Husserl puts it, just 
as inclination-expressive voluntary movements are not experienced as mere events occurring in 
one’s surroundings, not all of our voluntary movements are lived as the mere ‘following of an 
inclination.’302  
                                                           
300 See, e.g., Husserl’s remark that theoretical interest, theoretical instincts, and theoretical acts of the will 
are related to the emotive sphere and belong to the personality (Hua IV-2/V-2 504 A [1915-1917]). My 
claim here is not that all activities involving the arousal of interest are person-manifesting in this sense; 
indeed, it may be that all ‘merely’ voluntary movements themselves involve arousal of ‘interest’ more 
broadly construed (cf. Hua IV-2/V-2 690-1 A [1916/17]; cf. Hua IV 261). Rather, my claim is that a 
certain kind of inherently interested response essentially involve the awakening and immediate operation 
of personal stances. 
301 Hua IV-2/V-2 657 (Hua IV 330) [mid-1920s].  
302 Hua IV-2/V-2 743 A [1915-1917]. 
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To see what this involves, it is worth first noting that even movements which ultimately 
remain on the level of inclination-expression can involve something more than merely succumbing 
to a tendency.  I might hesitate about yielding to a tendency, not immediately succumbing to the 
invitation or allure of an environing object but rather momentarily resisting it, in which case my 
eventual movement is not merely lived as a yielding to the allure but as an ‘acceptance’ [Zustimmung] 
of it. Or one might reject the allure in light of the overpowering appeal of a contrary urge, or 
remain in a state of conflict in which contrary tendencies compete for acceptance.303 Beyond this, 
however, it is also possible for the actualisation of a lived tendency to be driven forth by a decision 
of the will, one which takes into account not merely the allure of a goal predelineated by a tendency, 
but first and foremost the value which I take that goal to have: 
I can also be effective myself, a spontaneity of doing can proceed from me. The tendency from the object 
is still there, but it can be that I freely move myself, that I, on my part, want to do exactly what the tendency 
draws out of me. I decide for the tendency, and I do not merely let myself be drawn into and yield to it, 
being too inert to brace myself against it, etc. The goal stands there for me as valuable, and consequently I 
follow it. I feel the urge to judge: I have a look and grasp a justifying basis, and now I judge in the manner 
of the tendency, though I am not merely yielding to the urge.304 
On Husserl’s view, then, what distinguishes intentional actions proper from mere voluntary 
enactments is both an element of active decision, as well as the distinctive type of motivational 
context in which this decision is embedded. Rather than being driven to act simply to satisfy a 
volitional tendency—a possible movement which is lived as an embodied response to an alluring 
feature of my environment—my decision is responsive to considerations which strike me as 
justifying the action of mine which the bodily movement is here construed as constituting. In this 
case, I am no longer aware of my possible movement as simply something I am able and inclined 
to do. Rather the issue which my decision settles concerns the practical value of the act, that is, 
whether the activity which the tendency delineates is ‘worth’ doing, and why this is so. We can 
illustrate this point by modifying the examples previously offered of inclination-expressive 
activities that nevertheless reveal personal stances. Consider a single mother who decides to apply 
for a less demanding job than her current one in order to be able to spend more time with her 
child, despite the economic difficulties that will inevitably arise. This decision is not necessarily 
one which is merely compelled by an ‘urge’ to spend more time with her child—although such an 
urge may indeed be a painful aspect of her current daily life—but may rather be motivated by a 
deeply felt love for the child and a recognition of the value of his or her well-being, and an 
accordance of greater value to this well-being than to the additional financial stability generated by 
her current career. The botanist who decides to pursue one line of investigation over another is in 
part driven by the value she attributes to the goal of success in her studies, as well as by the features 
of the chosen line of investigation that seem to make it more amenable to the practical attainment 
of this goal. Finally, the person who joins a demonstration opposing racial injustice may be 
motivated by the value which she attributes to the collective task of creating a more just society, 
as well as perhaps by an assessment of how her participation in this demonstration can contribute 
to the struggle to attain this goal. 
As these examples illustrate, what makes a bodily movement free in a personal, and not 
merely bodily, sense—which is to say, what distinguishes it as an action [Handlung] in a more robust 
                                                           
303 Hua IV-2/V-2 743-4 A [1915-1917]. 
304 Hua IV-2/V-2 744 A [1915-1917]. 
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sense from a mere voluntary movement—is that, rather than merely manifesting an inclination, it 
actualises and embodies a decisively formed practical intention that is responsive to practically-
relevant reasons. That is, it reveals its subject as having taken a certain degree of critical distance 
from its embodied inclinations, and as placing the practical consequences of its possible 
movements in relation to whatever values or disvalues have justificatory relevance. To evoke the 
familiar Sellarsian phrase, it manifests a subject who situates a possible goal, already predelineated 
to him in a tendency, within a certain ‘space of reasons.’ Husserl emphasizes the connection 
between, on the one hand, action being responsive to practical reasons, and on the other, its 
manifesting personal freedom in passages which are worth quoting in depth: 
[The] “person” is to be delimited in the specific sense [as follows]: the subject of acts which are to be judged 
from the standpoint of reason, the subject that is “self-responsible,” the subject that is free and in bondage, 
unfree; freedom taken in a specific sense, and to be sure in the proper sense.305 
All rational activity is spontaneity and effective activity of the subject. In such activity the subject is purely 
autonomous, acting of its own accord. The subject is autonomous, not where it lets itself be determined by 
the “allure” of the matter, but where it honours its own sense and legitimacy, where the Ego is the subject 
of the intention which fulfils itself. The subject of “opinions,” who takes a position, the subject as subject of 
reason is active, where it strives towards and achieves its goal, and not where it lets itself be passively pulled 
along by instincts and inclinations. […] He who frequently lets himself be driven by blind instinct and 
tendencies (blind in that they do not emanate from the sense of the matters currently operative as allure, 
i.e. they do not have their source in this sense) is driven irrationally. But if I take something to be true or 
take a demand to be a moral one—thus as having a source in the corresponding values, etc.—and if I freely 
pursue the reputed truth or the reputed moral good, then I am being rational—yet only relatively so, for I 
may indeed be mistaken there.306 
For Husserl, then, a teleological series of bodily movements manifests autonomy as personal (rather 
than merely bodily) freedom, not when it flows from an allure or urge which the subject simply 
gives in to, but when it is appropriated from the domain of passive inclination and refashioned as 
an action, or an element of an action, with a certain rational or normative intentionality, of which 
justifying reasons can be asked and given. The thought that rational actions in this sense are 
personally free, are expressive of their agent as a person, gains further weight when we note that 
the normativity they embody is intelligible only with reference to the person’s operative nexus of 
judicative convictions, value-ascriptions, and practical commitments. The normativity which 
operates in personal freedom is ultimately a matter of one’s practical intentions being formed in 
such a manner that they are harmoniously concordant with the person’s nexus of embedded and 
habitualised attitudes, since it is these habitualised stances which make up both what the person 
takes to be true and, when viewed from another perspective, who the person is. Consequently, the 
degree to which an action is freely performed in this sense—the degree to which, as Husserl puts 
it in the passage above, the Ego is the subject of the intention which the action fulfils—is a function 
of the degree to which the action, as it is intended and performed, concords with the person’s 
other (truth-oriented and person-manifesting) stances; as well as of the degree to which the latter 
nexus is itself internally coherent, rather than being troubled by painful tears of self-conflict and 
self-doubt. 
                                                           
305 Hua IV-2/V-2 652 (Hua IV 257, translation modified) [mid-1920s]. 
306 Hua IV-2/V-2 744 A [1915-1917]; cf. Hua IV 221, where the last two sentences of this passage can be 
found. 
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§4.2 | From personal action to personal selfhood 
 
 
According to the universal he is a human person, but his kind as his character, his personhood, is a unity, 
constituted in the course of his life, of multifarious motivations based upon multifarious presuppositions. 
E. Husserl307 
 
§4.2.1 | Freedom and personal selfhood 
 
A helpful route into the theme of personal selfhood can be found by reconsidering the difference 
(already discussed in §3.1.4 above) between person-expressing and -involving acts of the will and 
the form of lived freedom encapsulated in bodily capabilities and their voluntary actualization. In 
a manuscript dating from the twenties, Husserl points out that solely considering such capabilities 
would fail to provide someone with an evidential basis for their own belief that they, being the 
person who they are, are thereby unable to commit a murder. The inadequacy of such a 
consideration stems from the peculiar fact that while many of us are bodily capable of a set of 
movements that would, when voluntarily performed in the relevant circumstances, lead to the 
death of another person occurring (e.g., pulling the trigger of a correctly positioned weapon, or 
the gentle push of a fellow hiker over a cliff), our actually performing the action in question is a 
different issue altogether. This suggests that while the notion of practical possibility as merely 
correlated with bodily capacities characterizes the essence of bodily freedom, when it comes to 
our personal lives as concretely lived by us it appears far too broad, failing to capture the space of 
possibilities that strikes us as relevant to our personal choices.  
Furthermore, in at least one sense of what a person can mean by claiming to be ‘unable’ 
to commit a murder, this claim does not rule out the possibility that the person could find 
themselves unreflectively performing a lethal act as driven by a momentary urge or desire. Rather 
intriguingly, it seems just about intelligible for a person to claim that “I could never go through with 
the act of killing someone,” while wearily acknowledging that they may be subject to buried 
instincts which, were they to momentarily erupt, would have fatally violent consequences. This 
intelligibility arguably arises because the person making this claim is thereby attesting that, at least 
in all circumstances she can foresee, there is no possibility of her decisively affirming that goal as one 
which she could allow her will to aim at. To specify this claim further, there is no foreseeable 
possibility, or so this person attests, of her actively committing herself to perform the grisly act in 
light of ‘her own’ values, projects, and convictions. Or to put the point slightly differently, this 
particular intentional action is not one which could conceivably concord with and manifest her 
enduring character as a person of such decisions. Husserl underlines that it is, at least in part, 
precisely this necessary implication—that, in “committing a murder” in this sense, one would be 
realising an actively formed stance of one’s own and as such expressing oneself—that makes, for 
many of us, the chilling ideal possibility of murdering someone so difficult to identify with as a 
practical possibility of one’s own: 
                                                           
307 Hua IV-2/V-2 730 (Hua IV 274, translation modified) [1917/18]. 
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What is most proper to the person resides in the Ego as substrate of decisions [Entscheidungen] and not in 
the Ego of mere capabilities [Vermögen]. When I say “I cannot carry out a certain decision, e.g., the decision 
to commit a murder,” when I say “I cannot do something like that,” I am saying something about the way 
I am (and perhaps about how I used to be and how I supposedly will be). All the motives pertaining to a 
murder as ones which could possibly determine it are not, for me, effective ones. The possibility of a murder 
is a practical possibility to the extent that I, assuming I desired it, had the ability to carry it out. Each action 
of the will [Willenshandlung] is related to a practical realm and thus so is this one. And in that sense I can 
perform almost any wrong act (although, more precisely many acts which have been carried out by others 
go beyond my practical abilities [Können], e.g., climbing up facades). But with regard to position-taking 
[Stellungnahme], its possibility does not belong at all in the space of practical possibilities.308 
Husserl’s line of thought here can be easily reformulated in terms of Harry Frankfurt’s more recent 
claim that a person, in merely having a desire to perform a particular act, does not thereby have a 
motivating reason to perform the relevant action, since a desire is only able to become a reason, and 
its respective act a goal, for me as an acting person, through my ‘practically identifying’ with it.309 
As far as persons are concerned, the practically relevant sense of truly wanting a certain goal ought 
to be distinguished from the mere having of a (first-order) desire to bring that goal about310—or, 
in Husserl’s more complex and phenomenologically detailed language, from feeling a certain goal-
oriented practical tendency as issuing from an alluring intentional object. Indeed, in a recent 
publication Frankfurt gives a compelling description, remarkably similar to the one offered almost 
a century earlier by Husserl, of the difference between, on the one hand, a person having a 
murderous desire, and on the other, a person actively identifying the desired murder as a goal they 
truly want to achieve.311  
What, then, is required in the transition from a merely desired practical possibility to one 
which the person freely wills? Or, in Frankfurtian language, what is it exactly to identify with a 
certain desire, that is, to make it a desire of one’s own? According to Frankfurt, the decisive 
element here is an activity which is unique to persons, namely that of reflectively “developing 
higher-order attitudes and responses to oneself”. This occurs when we “disrupt ourselves from an 
uncritical immersion in our current primary experience, take a look at what is going on it, and 
arrive at some resolution concerning what we think about it or how it makes us feel.”312 In cases 
where this reflexive evaluation of our desires leads to our identifying with them, we “accept them 
as conveying… what we truly desire,” and “consent to having them and being influenced by 
them.”313 More exactly, this consists in our having a higher-order volition directed towards our 
first-order desire, such that we do not merely have a first-order desire to act in a certain way, but 
a second-order desire that this first-order desire govern our actions.314 As Frankfurt puts it, “we 
                                                           
308 Hua IV-2/V-2 657 (Hua IV 331, translation modified) [mid-20s]. Cf. Hua IV 330: “For we need to 
establish a fundamental essential distinction, distinguishing all other subjective events (according to the 
type: “I move”) from all position-takings. These are not subordinate to the will…. A position-taking is not 
a practical possibility like just any kinesthesis in the system of my kinaesthetic “I can.””  
309 Frankfurt (1988, p. 68). 
310 Frankfurt (1988, pp. 163-4). 
311 Frankfurt (2006, pp. 12-3). As he also makes clear, refusing to approve of or ‘externalising’ a desire 
does not thereby prevent that desire from being effective in one’s behaviour. But it does mean that any 
acts which are driven by this desire are not freely willed, and are consequently not “authentic expressions of 
ourselves” (10, 8). 
312 Frankfurt (2006, p. 6) 
313 Frankfurt (2006, p. 8). 
314 Frankfurt (1988, p. 164). 
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will freely when what we want is what we want to want—that is, when the will behind what we do 
is exactly the will by which we want our action to be moved.”315 Consequently, personal agency 
can be described as a form of self-constitution, in that it involves not merely acting upon a desire 
but appropriating that desire as one’s own, as a desire which I want myself to act upon.316 
We have seen that Husserl, too, recognises the distinction between acting upon a desire 
and acting on the basis of a free decision of the will, and that the latter requires the subject to take 
a certain critical distance towards her own desires (§4.1.3). However, the account offered by 
Husserl of the activity which transforms a merely desired act into an action freely willed is subtly 
different from that offered by Frankfurt. Husserl emphasises that, in the typical case of practical 
decision, the agent is not primarily concerned with the matter of which desire she wants to be 
governed by, but rather with evaluatively assessing her possible action. The most primitive case of 
practical identification, for Husserl, does not consist in identifying with an accepted desire, but 
rather with facing up to one’s practical possibilities and determining what of value would be 
achieved in accomplishing them. As we have seen Husserl’s transcendental analyses emphasise 
(§4.1), such practical possibilities cannot be phenomenologically separated from the tendencies in 
which they are first disclosed, and with which they are originally constitutively correlated. Needless 
to say, however, the immersed practical agent is obviously not doing exactly what the reflecting 
philosopher does when he reflectively builds up an account of practical agency. And while the 
activity of forming a practical decision presupposes some form of self-awareness of one’s 
desires—exactly that form of pre-reflective self-awareness which is involved in desiring or being 
inclined towards a certain practical possibility—the thematic concern of one’s practical evaluation 
is not exactly one’s own volitions but rather the possible actions which one feels inclined towards. 
Consider the following, decisively world-directed, descriptions that Husserl offers of the 
deliberative process and its culmination in a decision: 
This sense is the one by which the beginning of the situation and the assessment of value [Wertbeurteilung] 
would motivate me, being the one I am, as a sort of consequent, to decide in this or that way and to act 
accordingly; whereby it is not claimed that it would be the right thing to do, for I can also find the I would 
decide in favour of the temptation.317 
Suppose I do not yet have a judgement, a will, or a decision concerning value [Wertentscheidung]. I can 
proceed to acquire such. I look around for motives and once I have them the decision follows, not in an 
arbitrary fashion, but as a motivated consequence. And it arises prior to the question of the insightful 
foundation, unless I had already made such a foundation my goal.318  
This subtle, even seemingly frivolous, difference between Frankfurt and Husserl’s accounts of the 
form of self-awareness involved with decision has, it seems to me, important consequences for 
the latter’s theory of personal selfhood. In the moment of decisive action, my personal character 
comes to the fore, not as a kind of standard or self-conception which I reflectively integrate my 
desire into, but as the broader domain in which my very agential response belongs.319 The self 
                                                           
315 Frankfurt (2006, p. 15). 
316 Frankfurt (1988, p. 170). 
317 Hua IV/2-V-2 655 (Hua IV 329, translation modified) [mid-20s].  
318 Hua IV-2/V-2 658 (Hua IV 331) [mid-20s]. 
319 While this talk of a standard or self-conception might be a slightly unjust reading of Frankfurt—
although he does occasionally use such language (e.g., Frankfurt, 2006, p. 10)—it is fully endorsed by 
Korsgaard (1996, p. 100-1; see the footnote after the next). It may then be that the difference between 
Frankfurt and Husserl is more terminological than substantial, hinging upon different definitions of 
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which is manifested in my action is a self who ‘exists’ in this action, and its determinate character 
consists in a certain kind of motivational style, a typical way of actively responding to determinate 
circumstances. In this way, the domain of personal selfhood involved with freely willed agential 
accomplishments is not operative as something invoked or appealed to in the approval of a desire 
but—to paraphrase the passage above—as the ‘who I am’ which my motivated decision flows 
from, ‘as a sort of consequent.’ Husserl makes this point even more emphathically as follows: “The 
way I am, as the subject of my previous convictions, and the way within this sphere motives 
determine me precisely as this Ego: that is how my decision is produced.”320 The decision I form, 
then, is in some manner dependent upon and expressive of ‘who I am’ as an enduring and creative 
agent of such decisions, and this dependency and expressivity is in place without my needing to 
appeal to a normatively guiding self-conception in the process of practical deliberation.321 
 
§4.2.2 | Person, motivation and surrounding world. 
 
As we have seen, for Husserl there is no conflict between our decisions being on the one hand 
freely performed, and on the other their being uniquely expressive of, even in a certain sense 
determined by, one’s personal character.322 That is, in acting freely and on the basis of decision I 
typically do not radically transcend my personality—understood as a nexus of attitudes and stances 
which make up my enduring ‘take on things,’ and that ‘character-ise’ both who I am qua active 
subjectivity, and my surrounding world in its very familiarity (see §5.2.2)—but rather deepen it and 
occasionally render it more consistent, extending or strengthening certain attitudes while 
relinquishing others. 
One might quite naturally object to such a line of thought that it is flatly contradictory. To 
speak of a decision being enacted freely doesn’t appear to be reconcilable with understanding it as 
being the outcome of something that was already specified in advance, namely the enduring 
character of the person who makes the decision. For one thing, it seems intuitive that a necessary 
condition for a decision to be have been made freely is that the person could have chosen 
otherwise than the way he or she did, in fact, do. Another decision having been possible, however, 
seems to be ruled out by the stipulation of an overarching character in which each decision is 
embedded. In response to this worry, which Husserl would likely regard as presupposing a tacitly 
naturalistic, that is “extrinsic” and “inductive,”323 account of persons and their decisions, we should 
first note that Husserl’s claim that genuine decisions (unlike the taking of stances by means of 
uncritical or coerced appropriation from others) are freely performed is not meant to be 
                                                           
‘desire’ and ‘reflection.’ See here the discussions of Husserl and Frankfurt in Hart (1992, pp. 92-3) and 
Mulligan (2010). 
320 Hua IV-2/V-2 659 (Hua IV 331) [mid-20s]. 
321 This does not mean that personal ideals—in Korsgaard’s sense, practical norms, often socially 
embedded, which are putatively regulative for a person’s agential life (2009, pp. 19-26)—cannot be 
guiding for personal agency on Husserl’s view. But he maintains that this process is secondary to the basic 
condition of personal agency, allowing for a deepening and a renewal of its condition, rather than 
comprising its underlying element. I develop this thought in §5.2.2. 
322 Indeed, Husserl goes so far as to say that “freedom taken in a specific sense, indeed the proper sense” 
is possible only for “the “person” in a specific sense… the subject of acts which are to be judged under the 
standpoint of reason, the subject that is “self-responsible”” (Hua IV 257, translation modified (Hua IV-2/V-
2 652) [mid-1920s]). 
323 Hua IV-2/V-2 659-60 (Hua IV 331-2) [mid-1920s]. 
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understood in causal terms. Husserl nowhere defends the view that there is a unique quasi-causal 
power that intervenes within the (ordinarily causal) functioning of psychic life so as to bring about 
a unique and uncaused event, and nor does his position commit him to such a view. Rather, 
Husserl maintains that the sense of freedom which he describes literally becomes invisible and 
unintelligible for us when we adopt a third-personal attitude towards human persons, i.e., an 
attitude in which all physical and mental events are thought of as caused (and perhaps occasionally 
and inexplicably uncaused) by prior events in accordance with causal laws. 324  
In contrast, the sense of freedom which Husserl locates in position-taking acts and 
decisions, as modes of personal comportment, cannot be understood apart from a self-professed 
Grundbegriff of Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy: that of motivation.325 According to Husserl, 
motivation plays an analogous role within the functioning of the mind of a person [Geist] to that 
of causality in nature, to such an extent that he occasionally describes motivation as a “subjective-
Objective “causality””, or a “specifically personal causality”, adding that such Motivationskausalität 
is not “real causality” but rather something with a sense wholly its own.326 As we saw in §2.5, 
Husserl argues that, even on the level of pre-judicative perceptual experience, things of nature 
manifest their specifically natural properties in the way in which their states [Zustände] alter in 
accordance with causal circumstances [Umstände]. As such, the modes of behaviour of a thing in 
relation to its causal circumstances perceptually manifest both the causal properties of that thing 
and the causal relationships pertaining between it and its surrounding objects. Motivational 
relations, on the other hand, are originally located within the intentional sphere of the mind, as 
opposed to the natural world. Broadly put, modes of intentional consciousness are essentially 
responsive to certain noematic and noetic circumstances, in that they are motivationally (as opposed 
to causally) related to those circumstances. Such a motivational relatedness to circumstances is a 
matter of the intelligible manner in which modes of intentional comportment (the ‘motivated’) are 
enacted—and their respective noematic correlates constituted—in light of certain noematic senses, as 
well as other modes of awareness such as kinaesthesia (the ‘motives’). This intelligible relation 
between motivating circumstances and motivated acts is rooted in a further structural feature of 
motivation: namely that the motivated enactment implies (often tacitly and unthematically) 
motivational norms, or ‘motivations.’ In light of this extremely broad construal—which conceals, 
in its abstractness, the diversity of modes of motivation operative within subjective and 
intersubjective life—we can nevertheless say that motivation is analogous to causality in that both 
involve a form of law-governed responsiveness to circumstances, one without which their 
respective spheres (mind and nature) would be wholly unintelligible.327 
We have already seen Husserl arguing that the passive functioning of perceptual experience 
has a complex motivational structure, in that the perceptual sense of an object appeals to and takes 
account of kinaesthetic self-movement. Clearly, this type of (‘passive’) motivation is far removed 
from the (‘rational’) motivation that distinctively characterises the responsiveness of persons. One 
pertinent difference between the two cases is that, while in perceptual apprehension my actual and 
possible kinaesthesia provide the motivating circumstances for my passive perceptual 
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325 Hua III 112 n. 
326 Hua IV-2/V-2 690 (Hua IV 216) [1916/17]. 
327 The strictly defined framework of motive-motivated-motivation is admittedly not always rigorously 
followed by Husserl, though what he says regarding motivation can usually be translated in these terms. 
For a slightly different take on the analogy between motivation and causality, see Staiti (2014, p. 215). 
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apprehension, the motives effective in personal modes of comportment are rather the things, 
persons, and social formations of my surrounding world.328 In texts dating, respectively, from 1912 
and 1913, Husserl nicely articulates this aspect of personal activity: 
Among the things of my environment, that one there steers my regard onto itself; its special form “strikes me.” 
I choose the fabric “for the sake of its beautiful colour or its smoothness.” The noise in the street irritates me; 
it makes me close the window. In short, in my (theoretical, emotional, and practical) comportment—in my 
theoretical experience and thinking, in my position-taking as to pleasure, enjoyment, hoping, wishing, 
desiring, wanting—I feel myself conditioned by the matter in question, though this obviously does not mean 
psychophysically conditioned. Just as in my own case, so I apprehend everyone else as directly dependent 
upon such matters. […] I apprehend myself as dependent in my comportment, in my acts, on the things 
themselves, on their beautiful colour, on their special form, on their dangerous properties.329 
As person, I am what I am (and each other person is what he is) as subject of a surrounding world. The concepts 
of Ego and surrounding world are related to one another inseparably. […] The surrounding world is the 
world that is perceived by the person in his acts, is remembered, grasped in thought, surmised or revealed as 
such and such, it is the world of which this personal Ego is conscious, the world which is there for it, to 
which it relates in this or that way, e.g., by way of theorizing as regards the appearing things or by way of 
feeling, evaluating, acting, shaping technically, etc. […] And a person is precisely a person who represents, 
feels, evaluates, strives, and acts and who, in every such personal act, stands in relation to something, to 
objects in his surrounding world.330 
Personal modes of comportment take as their motives the events and situations that a person has 
as components of his or her surrounding world. That is, they are enacted in light of such matters 
and their experienced or anticipated determinate features, and they thus involve specific ways in 
which a person responds to worldly objects in their noematic sense.331 Such comportment 
evidently, then, naively presupposes that a meaningful world has already been constituted for the 
subject in one way or another—even if specific pre-given things may, in certain cases, ultimately 
prove to be misconstrued, illusory, or non-existent. What it contributes, moreover, is a further 
determination of such objects and states of affairs as elements of the person’s surrounding world, 
through a diversity of active stances in which worldly objects are taken, in equally diverse ways, to 
have a certain personal significance. Of course, this is not to say that the noematic correlates which 
motivate personal modes of comportment always coincide exactly with the objects they directly 
target and take as having a novel sense. Rather, in many of the most sophisticated personal 
accomplishments I take an object to have a certain sense in light of certain other noematic 
correlates which serve as the motives of my act. But the central point here is that personal 
subjectivity is originally manifest in a subject’s way of responding to her pregiven surrounding 
world—a theme which will be explored in more depth in the next Chapter (§5.2.2). 
However, personal acts are not always thematised as enactments of a person; rather, this 
only occurs through a certain form of reflection. As Husserl puts it in the above-quoted passage 
from 1913, “the personal Ego “relates” to this world in acts upon which it can reflect at any time, 
as is the case, for example, when it takes notice of itself as a personal Ego”332. As we shall see later, 
                                                           
328 See, in this regard: Hua IV-2/V-2 298-9 (Hua IV 198-90) [mid-20s]. 
329 Hua IV-2/V-2 35-6 (Hua IV 140-1) [1912]. 
330 Hua IV-2/V-2 231-2 (Hua IV 185-6) [1913]. 
331 Hua IV-2/V-2 274-5 (Hua IV 326-7) [1913]. 
332 Hua IV-2/V-2 232 (Hua IV 185) [1913]. As Husserl immediately continues, this possibility of personal 
reflection is not limited to the first-personal case, since “any other person can reflect on these same acts, 
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what is aimed at in this mode of reflection—which presupposes some degree of prior acquaintance 
with the motives and constitutive accomplishments of a certain personal enactment—is a thematic 
understanding, not of the enactment itself as an isolated experiential complex, but rather of the 
character of the subject who enacts it (§5.1). To put the point slightly differently, it is one thing to 
understand what a person decides, feels, or does, and even the motives which account for why this 
is so, and something else to take this motivated enactment as exhibiting who this person is. On the 
other hand, while these two issues differ in their direction of inquiry, they cannot be addressed in 
isolation, but are rather dialectically interwoven. In a manuscript written at some point between 
1915 and 1917, Husserl explicates just this point: 
In active comportment—just as in the passive being-driven and being-determined of allures, tendencies, 
and passions—each and every subjectivity exhibits its individual peculiarity, its acquired and innate character. 
When I understand the subject in its individual comportment, I get to know this character, and in ongoing 
experience of his individual nexuses I co-grasp his individual type. Certainly, here one goes hand in hand 
with the other. A sufficiently deep knowledge of his nexuses of motivation already requires knowledge of 
his character, and knowledge of his character requires prior knowledge of his motivational nexuses. But 
this is not circular. In our ongoing experience of human persons, and with regard to both ourselves and 
others, we acquire sufficient knowledge of the individual nexus and an immediate assessment of character, 
one which is then retained and also constantly corrected, etc.333 
We will later return to this deep interconnection between the ‘who’ of a person’s character and 
their ‘what’ and ‘why’ of her individual attitudes and actions. But first, we must explicate a 
structural feature of personal subjectivity upon which this very interconnection hinges; namely, 
the sedimentation of one’s decisions, beliefs, and emotions into personal habitualities, and the 
distinctive kind of self-awareness which accompanies such habitual depth. 
 
 
§4.3 | Position-taking, habituality, and self-acquaintance: Husserl and Moran 
 
 
In a cluster of manuscripts written towards the end of his years spent in Göttingen (most likely 
between 1914 and 1916)334, Husserl offers a detailed analysis of the manner in which active forms 
of comportment (judging, grudging, loving, hoping and resolving are amongst those discussed), 
when repeatedly accomplished by an individual over the course of his or her life, may establish 
and manifest a distinctive form of self-identity. I will consider here aspects of the detailed analysis 
offered in this manuscript (henceforth: Göttingen Manuscript), particularly focussing on what he 
has to say about lasting convictions [Überzeugungen] as enduring features of the active Ego. My aim 
will be to clarify the sense in which egoic or personal character manifests itself in active modes of 
comportment, an aim that will be pursued by considering the way in which attitudes or stances 
[Einstellungen, Stellungen], of which convictions serve well as an example, are formed and disclosed 
                                                           
even if in a correspondingly modified way (reflection “in” empathy), when the other apprehends these acts 
as acts of the person in question, for instance, whenever the other speaks, with clear understanding, of that 
person precisely as a person.” I will consider in detail the nature and experiential preconditions of 
interpersonal understanding, in this specific sense, in the next chapter. 
333 Hua IV-2/V-2 747-8 A [1915-17]. 
334 Hua IV-2/V/2 425-46. Parts of this manuscript can be found, although ordered differently and 
occasionally modified, in Hua IV 112-9.  
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to their agent through habitually rooted and sustained acts of position-taking [Stellungnahmen]. I will 
try to show that Husserl’s account can be helpfully clarified when compared with the recent 
treatment of self-knowledge offered by Richard Moran, arguing that while Husserl anticipates 
central features of Moran’s account, his claim that egoic habituality is a condition of possibility for 
personal self-understanding permits him to offer a more nuanced picture, one that avoids some 
problems which arise from Moran’s excessive emphasis on the role of deliberation in self-
knowledge. 
 
§4.3.1 | Husserl on attitudes, lived experience, and position-taking 
 
Husserl begins his reflections by noting that a conviction does not consist simply in a solitary act 
of judging, understood as a concrete lived experience that is enacted for a certain temporal duration 
before receding into the lived past. Rather, we ordinarily consider somebody to be convinced of 
something when they are in the habit of repeatedly assuming an already formed judgement over 
temporally distinct phases: “We endure in the sphere of the psyche. I make a judgement now, I 
make “the same” judgement again. I have an abiding conviction.”335 This description loses its apparent 
obviousness, however, when we note that two discrete acts of judging, enacted during different 
temporal phases within a subject’s experiential life, cannot be ‘the same’ in the strict sense, since 
they are precisely different instances of lived experiencing, even if they somehow repeatedly 
instantiate or manifest something identical.336 Rather, for an individual act of judgement to 
manifest an enduring conviction, it must stand in a certain kind of relation to other acts of judging 
within the retained past or anticipated future of a subject’s life: 
The various enduring lived experiences [of judging or grudging, etc.], belonging to spans of duration which 
are discrete within phenomenological time, have a relation to one another and constitute something that lasts and 
endures (the conviction, the grudge), which once, at such and such a point in time, and from these or those 
motives, originated. From then on it has been a lasting property of the Ego, existing also in those intervals 
of phenomenological duration in which it was not being constituted as a lived experience.337 
Moreover, for two acts of judging to manifest an enduring conviction, it is insufficient that they 
share a logical identity with respect to the state of affairs which they posit. To use an example of 
Husserl’s, on two different occasions I may give a logically identical description of a certain 
landscape when perceptually confronted with it, picking out exactly the same features in exactly 
the same way on both occasions, my judgemental acts being correlated with the same categorical 
object in both cases. But I may do all that without the logically identical ‘judgement’ being a 
conviction in the proper sense, without it counting as an enduring feature of my thinking as such.338 
Thus, what is necessary for a conviction is not merely that a certain propositional content is 
repeatedly instantiated in acts of thought, but that the repeated acts of judging manifest a certain 
enduring feature of the thinking subject, namely the conviction itself. In this sense, enduring 
convictions cannot be exhaustively characterized simply in terms of the worldly content they pick 
out, just as much as they are not simply a matter of the individual or repeated acts of lived 
experience in which they are manifest. Rather, they are better characterized as enduring thought-
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337 Hua IV-2/V-2 427-8 (Hua IV 113-4) [1914-16], emphasis mine. 
338 Hua IV-2/V-2 428 (Hua IV 114) [1914-16]. 
 99 
motifs, unities which are embedded within the enduring character of a person’s world-directed 
thinking. Indeed, as with all position-takings, convictions can ultimately only be rendered fully 
intelligible when understood as persistent nexuses of possible and actual subjective enactments 
and the objective correlates thereof, a claim which will be further explained in the following. 
In light of their non-identity with any specific episode of thinking, one might in fact 
wonder whether convictions are something directly accessible in experience at all. We might rather 
suspect that convictions are things that could only be disclosed through a certain kind of reflective 
or interpretive analysis of a person’s past and present mental life, one which would perhaps seek 
to identify the invariant theses which her concrete episodes of thinking only vaguely and partially 
point towards. However, whatever merits such an approach might have in identifying certain 
consistent themes which our thinking manifests, and perhaps thus indirectly revealing our 
convictions, Husserl claims that it does not constitute the only or even the most basic mode of 
awareness we have of them. For the most part, he insists, we are aware of our convictions in a way 
which simply does not presuppose any sort of abstractive or idealizing reflection upon our 
experiential lives, and we can thus distinguish between a conviction as a “concrete unity of lived-
experience,” and the same conviction as represented by a “mere abstraction or idea” generated 
through a process of self-interpretation, even if explicating what this distinction amounts to is far 
from easy.339 
Moreover, just as a conviction is not something merely identical with a concrete 
experiential episode, nor is it accessible in the same way as the latter; rather it “is a unity with a 
peculiar phenomenological character and constitution.”340 Consequently, the transition from a 
lived to a reflective awareness of one’s own convictions is non-identical to the manner in which 
an experiential episode (such as an episode of feeling, perceiving, or thinking) is brought to 
attention through a reflective gaze directed towards that episode in its concreteness. To adopt the 
terminology Husserl employs in this manuscript (and which will be explained below), rendering 
our convictions thematic does not amount to reflectively attending to an experiential episode 
already pre-reflectively lived through in ‘inner consciousness’. But this should not lead us to 
conclude that one’s own convictions are gleamed only through a more thoroughgoing analysis of 
the introspectively given, as if rendering our convictions thematic simply involved assembling a 
multiplicity of experiential episodes and divining what is somehow ‘within’ (or ‘behind’) them. 
Rather, I am familiar with a conviction of mine in a primitive and irreducible way as something 
which, as Husserl puts it in only slightly metaphorical terms, “lasts in me, “lives away in me” (so 
long as it does not undergo its own cancellation).”341 While our awareness of our own convictions 
should not be thought of simply in terms of the form of pre-reflective self-awareness involved 
with the self-manifestation of lived experiences, Husserl nevertheless insists that we enjoy some type 
of pre-reflective awareness of our convictions, and he seeks to shed phenomenological light on 
these distinctive subjective unities exactly by explicating their pre-reflective familiarity. 
In pursuing this methodological direction, Husserl is led to the view that we are first aware 
of our own convictions, not as inner objects, but as judicative theses (specifying and categorically 
articulating some transcendent state of affairs) that we accept (taking the theses to be true) and remain 
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(Ibid.) 
 100 
committed to (in that we continue to assume and accept them). Husserl’s formulations of this point 
are worth quoting at length: 
If I now “acquire” a conviction, while executing the appropriate judgement, then the acquired conviction 
(an enduring acquisition) “remains” with me as long as I can assume [aufnehmen] it again, can bring it “again” 
to givenness for me (in a new execution). I may also abandon [aufgeben] the conviction, now rejecting the 
reasons for it, etc. Then again, I can turn back to “the same” conviction, but in truth the conviction has 
not been persistent throughout. Instead, I have two convictions, the second of which restores the first after 
it has broken down.342 
Hence these unities, which we are calling convictions, have their duration; they can cease to be and then 
again be “instituted [gestifitet]” anew. If they are instituted, then they have their “being”, their subjective 
validity [Geltung], as long as opposing motives do not arise, as long as they are not “struck out.” If I acquire 
a conviction and if I represent to myself thereby a future in which I would come back to this conviction, 
then I am representing myself immediately as “taking part in [mitmachend]” the conviction and not merely 
as remembering again the lived experience of it.343 
One could express part of Husserl claim in these passages as follows: we are primarily aware of 
our convictions as theses that we take to be valid, that is, to whose truth we are committed, and this 
is because convictions can only be (pre-reflectively given as) ours, can only be self-revealing—in 
the specific sense in which one’s own convictions are—in as much as we ‘take part in’ or endorse 
them.344 As he further explains, what is at stake in such an endorsement is the accomplishment of 
the relevant judgement on the basis of motives or reasons which we take to legitimize it, to render 
its thesis valid; or at least this is ideally so, as we shall see below.345 Similarly, we are most clearly 
aware that a conviction which we previously felt committed to continues to have a grip on us, that 
it is still ours and not merely a feature of our past, when we become aware of it as still being 
‘convincing’, when we acknowledge again that it is rationally motivated—whether the grounding 
motives are the same ones previously appealed to, or the old motives are supplemented, perhaps 
even replaced, by fresh considerations.346 
Husserl’s line of thought here anticipates at least one central feature of the rich account of 
self-knowledge recently developed by Richard Moran.347 Like Husserl, Moran argues that to have 
a basic and immediate awareness of a conviction as one’s own just is to affirm that conviction’s 
validity with regard to the way in which it specifies and articulates a transcendent state of affairs, 
and that any merely observational grasp of a conviction as one’s own is derivative to, and fails to 
                                                           
342 Hua IV-2/V-2 428 (Hua IV 114, with slight modifications) [1914-16]. 
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344 As Husserl remarks in a manuscript from January 1917: “all simple or complex acts stand under the 
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[Hua IV 112]). 
346 Hua IV-2/V-2 434-5 (Hua IV 115-6) [1914-16]. 
347 Notably, Moran’s account is explicitly indebted to Sartre and Wittgenstein (cf. Moran, 2001, p. xxxiv). 
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regard, see also Zahavi (1999, p. 256). 
 101 
fully capture, the self-intimacy acquired through such an affirmation. As he puts it, “as I conceive 
of myself as a rational agent, my awareness of my belief is awareness of my commitment to its 
truth, a commitment to something that transcends any description of my psychological state.” For 
both Husserl and Moran, it is a mistake to understand the unique first-personal epistemic authority 
we have with regard to many of our own (theoretical, emotive, or practical) attitudes as being the 
product of a process in which we ‘observe’ or ‘perceive’ our psychological states. Having such 
distinctively first-personal awareness of our attitudes is rather afforded by our forming and 
sustaining such attitudes, by our taking a position. Moreover, for both thinkers, such position-
taking is importantly connected with what Davidson famously calls the “constitutive ideal” for the 
mental, namely, rationality.348 To adopt Moran’s language, in ‘making up my mind’ about an 
issue—in endorsing the truth of a world-directed attitude and thereby becoming aware of that 
attitude as my own—I typically make some appeal to the motives which rationally ground the 
possible positions I can take on some matter, and which ultimately settle the issue of which stance 
I actually take (as mine). 
 
§4.3.2 | Detectivism, Deliberation, and Habituality 
 
However, the accounts offered by Husserl and Moran of such motivated endorsement, or 
position-taking, differ in important ways. To consider Moran first, he is committed to the so-called 
Transparency Condition for self-knowledge regarding (judicative, emotive, and practical) attitudes, 
which specifies that a person’s attitude is transparent (i.e. immediately recognizable by that person 
as his or her own attitude), when it “is expressed by reflection on its subject matter and not by 
consideration of the psychological evidence for a particular belief attribution.”349 In short, in 
ordinary (i.e. non-pathological) cases, the direct mode of epistemic access we enjoy with regard to 
our own attitudes just consists in the outcome of our deliberation concerning the truth of the 
attitude’s claim. Unless we are alienated from our attitudes to such a degree that our very status as 
rational agents is under threat, we are able to know whether an attitudinal stance on some issue is 
our stance (whether it is what we believe, how we truly feel, or what we are resolved to do) through 
critically assessing whether the world-directed claim made by that stance is one we are rationally 
justified in accepting.350 As Moran puts it, in “the standard situation of deliberation,” the “person’s 
conclusion is his belief or intention”, and in the ‘avowal’ which brings such ‘normal deliberation’ 
to a close we thus find “the fundamental form of self-knowledge, one that gives proper place to 
the immediacy of self-knowledge and the authority with which its claims are delivered.”351 
One of the appealing features of Moran’s account is that he offers a coherent alternative 
to what he labels the perceptual model of first-personal authority: the claim, held by sceptics and 
Cartesians alike, that if one enjoys a privileged access to facets of one’s own mental life, then this 
                                                           
348 Davidson (1980, pp. 221-3). I take it that Husserl would be in sympathy with this idea (cf. Hua IV 
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349 Moran (2001, p. 84, emphasis mine). 
350 See, e.g., Moran (2001, pp. 63, 82, 85, 89-94) 
351 Moran (2001, pp. 132, 150). 
 102 
distinctively first-personal access must be understood in terms of an ‘inner gaze’ through which 
such facets are observed, in a manner which embodies the same subject-object structure as our 
perception of ‘outer’ objects.352 In his influential book Expression and the Inner, David Finkelstein, 
who also opposes the perceptual view, dubs this way of thinking ‘detectivism,’ defining a detectivist 
as “someone who believes that a person’s ability to speak about her own states of mind as easily, 
accurately, and authoritatively as she does may be explained by appeal to a process by which she 
finds out about them.”353 As Finkelstein notes, sophisticated detectivists are nowadays able (at least 
on the face of things) to avoid making use of any mysterious notion of ‘inner sense’ by appealing, 
as an explanation for first-personal epistemic authority, to the seemingly more palatable construct 
of a higher-order process which ‘scans’ the cognitive system, providing it with some degree of 
information about its own contents.354 However, Finkelstein argues, if a mental state is such that 
its agent can think and talk about it with first-personal authority, then that mental state must 
already be one which is conscious, since we are unable to claim direct epistemic authority with regard 
to whatever unconscious beliefs, desires, or agendas our conscious states may betray upon closer 
analysis.355 And as this point already indicates, it is mistaken to think of the conscious status had 
by mental states which are amenable to first-personal authority as something produced by any 
higher-order detective process. While we are required to appeal to evidence in ascribing mental states 
to others and unconscious mental states to ourselves, there is no such requirement with regard to 
our own conscious states, and this is exactly what gives them first-personal authority.356 
Consequently, Moran and Finkelstein urge us to look beyond the detectivist assumption that first-
personal authority can be explained with reference to a reflexive inner process through which we 
become aware of our (otherwise unconscious) mental life. 
Unfortunately, as with detectivism, Moran’s ‘deliberative’ account of first-personal 
authority easily finds itself confronted with a number of persuasive objections, and it will suffice 
here to briefly mention three. First, Finkelstein points out that while Moran’s account is of value 
in offering a non-detectivist account of first-person authority with regard to those mental states 
which are transparent to deliberation (i.e. which can be ‘avowed’ through our deliberatively 
endorsing their claims on the basis of justifying reasons), it understands the access we have to 
states which are not so transparent in squarely detectivist terms, thus ruling out the possibility of 
first-personal authority with regard to such states. This causes difficulties for Moran, because there 
are several types of mental state which are wholly unaffected by the achievements of deliberation, 
but which we are nevertheless often able to think and speak about with first-personal authority; 
namely, our sensations, our past mental states, those attitudes which we have but know to be 
unjustifiable, or those which are neither demanded nor prohibited by justifying reasons, and finally 
many of our preferences or desires.357  
A second, though related, objection takes issue with Moran’s claim that transparency to 
deliberation is the ground of first-personal authority even with regard to belief, that is, even for 
those states which are in principle open to deliberative endorsement or rejection. As Jane Heal 
points out, many of the beliefs with which we are able to speak with first-personal authority are so 
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deeply rooted that “an enterprise of assembling reasons for accepting them would be a mere 
charade.” While certain of our beliefs are transparent to deliberation, their status as ours being 
revealed just through our assessment of whether their claims are justified, other beliefs serve as 
the basic footing from which deliberation proceeds. These ‘hinge-propositions’ may be so deeply 
embedded in our world-view that we are not only disinclined but unable to call them into question, 
yet we often have the same first-personal access to them as we do to those beliefs that we endorse 
deliberatively. While in some cases we have, in the past, deliberatively endorsed these deeply held 
beliefs, in many other cases the origin of such beliefs lies in our uncritically taking them over from 
trusted other persons, critical reflection having played no essential role in their formation.358 I will 
return to this issue in the next chapter, when discussing Husserl’s remarks regarding the role of 
sociality in personal self-formation (§5.2.2).  
Finally, in an article which covers similar ground to the Husserlian view which I present 
here, Jonathan Webber argues that Moran’s emphasis on deliberation as the vehicle of 
transparency leads him to overlook the temporal structure of rational agency. Drawing on 
contemporary research in the cognitive sciences, Webber suggests that while deliberation is often 
able to generate a passing attitudinal stance towards the matter reflected upon, it has severe 
limitations in disclosing deeply habituated and enduring attitudes, these latter attitudes being more 
reliably manifest in our immediate judgements, affective responses, and desires. This point is 
important because, on the one hand, many of these deeply habituated attitudes are not limitations 
upon our rational agency but important components of it, their claims having a rational basis which 
is rooted in the past life of the subject, in her earlier experiences, deliberative episodes, etc. On the 
other hand, such habituated attitudes are plausibly regarded as directly manifesting the enduring 
character of the rational agent—in a certain sense, who she is, herself—in a way which can only 
apply for the stances reached through deliberation if those stances have already been habituated, 
once they have undergone the temporal process of integration into the nexus of attitudes which 
make up the agent’s personality.359 
It seems to me that many of the passages earlier quoted reveal that Husserl is concerned 
with offering an alternative to detectivism. Unlike Moran however, Husserl’s account of (the self-
manifestation of) active position-takings is deeply connected to his phenomenological account of 
enduring personal character. As he notes, convictions are not merely ways in which we temporarily 
fix our view on matters; they are rather “unit[ies] of consistency [Einheit der Konsequenz]”, enduring ways 
in which our thinking in its very spontaneity maintains a certain kind of rational continuity.360 And 
importantly, the degree to which my thinking possesses a certain type of self-identity throughout 
my ongoing life, that is, to which I continue to be who I am qua thinking subject, depends upon the 
extent to which I remain so consistent in my thinking, to which I continue to hold my convictions 
and accept their validity. As Husserl puts it, my continued acceptance of a conviction as a judicative 
position-taking is “something I have a stake in. As long as I am the one I am, then the position-
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Husserl on this issue, persuasively shows the relevance of habituality and habituation for first-authority, 
he holds back from offering a positive account. As the next section makes clear, my aim has been slightly 
more ambitious.  
360 Hua IV-2/V-2 428 A [1914-16]. 
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taking cannot but “persist,” and I cannot but persist in it.”361 However, one might wonder whether 
Husserl’s thought that we endure in our convictions is really compatible with the claim, endorsed 
in one way or another by both Husserl and Moran, that convictions are positions that we take, that 
is, features of our mental lives which only properly exist if we endorse them. For this claim appears 
to leave us with a picture of our attitudes as being rather fleeting and transitory mental features, 
features which are only really ours when we ‘take part’ in them and endorse their validity actively. 
And were this true, it would be difficult to see how such attitudes could sustain and manifest 
anything like an enduring personal character; rather, they would seem to sustain and manifest 
nothing more than the fact that, at one point in time, one decided in favour of that attitude, 
endorsing its theses on the basis of certain legitimizing motives. 
What enables Husserl to avoid this problem is his claim that the intelligibility and reality 
of personal character is dependent upon the habitual or historical character of self-involving (or 
‘egoic’) activity (such as becoming convinced, responding emotionally, or willing oneself to act). 
In order to understand this claim and its importance, we can note that for a previously instituted 
or endorsed conviction to remain operative for us, it is not always necessary that we, as it were, 
repeatedly ‘refresh’ our conviction through further deliberation on the matter. Rather, when we 
are required to take a position on an issue that we have previously made up our mind about, it is 
often evident to us what our attitude is prior to any deliberation in the present, in that we are 
immediately aware of our own position on the matter without it being necessary that we explicitly 
affirm it on the basis of rational motives. Moreover, if in this context I (non-deceptively) 
acknowledge the relevant attitude as something that I continue to hold, as opposed to merely 
regarding it as an attitude that I once held in the past, it appears that this acknowledgement cannot 
be merely an ‘empirical’ appeal to what I can remember myself as endorsing on a prior occasion, 
since such an appeal would provide no insight regarding how my mind is made up in the present.  
To consider an example, if someone were asked their opinion on a novel that they have 
read at some point in the past, it would be somewhat disappointing if the person were to simply 
recall the attitudes that they have previously had towards the novel, and to report these to their 
interlocutor just as recollected attitudes. (One can easily imagine the irritation of a teenager who is 
patronisingly and evasively told by an elder, “I loved the novel, but I was only your age at the 
time…”) Surely a more adequate response to this question would involve the person attempting 
to give expression to her genuine stance towards that novel, thus informing the other, say, what 
that novel strikes her as truly consisting in, why it does so, and what the merits of this are; even if 
this could only be achieved in the honest admission of her inability to form a clear and definitive 
stance (that, for example, “every time I read or think about it I feel differently”, or even “I used 
to like it, though I thought differently then and I can’t be sure if I still would.”). And if this person 
has previously formed a definite view on the matter, one which she has had no recourse to abandon 
in the intermediary period, she will then typically feel herself able to give expression to this opinion 
as one that is still hers—and not merely as one which she has previously held.  
Such an appropriation or assumption (Übernahme, in Husserl’s German) of one’s earlier formed 
stance is not, in and of itself, something that one actively achieves by means of a present 
reassessment of the rational basis for one’s earlier judgement. In order to keep a hold of one’s 
earlier formed opinion of a novel, say, one does not have to continually reassess whether that 
opinion was appropriately motivated by the relevant features of the thing itself. Such an active 
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assessment might occur, of course, if one encountered reasons for doubting the validity of one’s 
earlier judgement (one of which could be a belief that one’s own judgemental style has changed in 
some way, an issue I will return to later), or if one sought to ‘strengthen,’ ‘subject to scrutiny,’ or 
‘renew’ one’s already acknowledged stance, or simply if one becomes swept away in intellectual 
curiosity.362 But such active achievements all, in one way or another, rest upon the more passive, 
yet nevertheless actively self-involving (and self-preserving), process of habitually ‘taking over,’ or 
‘assuming’ one’s earlier instituted convictions in the present, this habituality being the very medium 
through which the self remains consistent in its active stance-taking and hence retains a certain 
identity or ipseity. In the Göttingen manuscript, Husserl describes this form of ‘participation’ in 
one’s earlier endorsement, an achievement which significantly blurs the distinction between 
passivity and activity, in some detail: 
The earlier conviction (judgement, experience, etc.) remains valid for me, and this says nothing other than 
that I “assume it”; by reproducing it, I participate in the belief. It is not an approving or an affirming of the 
kind that occurs in a question, a doubt, or a simple presumption. And yet I have to do something like give 
approval, insofar as we can indeed distinguish the two strata: the memory connected with the earlier subject 
and earlier lived experience, the earlier belief, conviction, experience, etc., with the present subject not 
taking part in them. And, on the other hand, the same things, but now with participation, whereby, to be 
sure, the participation is not a proper separate step, not an affirmation in the proper sense, but instead, in 
a homogenous unity of the memory, the remembered is there for me and the quality of the present positing 
enters into the remembered.363 
Or consider a unitary and persistent joy. The originally instituted joy-thesis is, with its definite content, an 
enduring theme: we repeatedly come back to it, we assume the joy, we take part in it, giving ourselves over 
to the joy, which is old and yet ever new. Or we form a resolution, and we are enduringly resolved. In 
renewed acts (namely, the reproductive ones) we have recourse to the old resolution and participate in it. 
We do not strike it out, we do not alter our position; we continue, as it were, to will the old willing. This is 
not an affirmation in the sense of answering yes to a question. Here, do not call into question a possible 
volitional theme again, we execute no volitional doubting; the resolution is not something hitherto held in 
abeyance, to which we would now have to say a decisive yes (a volitional yes). The resolution is rather a 
continuous “yes”—if one still wishes to employ that word—where this designates the same as 
“appropriation,” “acceptance,” “co-willing,” however imperfect these expressions might also be.364 
One of the features of the habitual Übernahme of convictions, emotions, and resolutions 
emphasized in these passages is the constitutive role played therein by the reference to one’s past 
activity. For Husserl, such a reference plays a necessary role in the functioning of habitual activity, 
and more specifically, in the present appropriation of that earlier activity’s thesis, in my now ‘taking 
part in’ the belief that I previously endorsed actively. As in the above texts, Husserl tends to 
emphasize the most clear-cut case of this, in which we enjoy some degree of memorial reproduction 
with regard to our past active endorsement, although he sometimes implies that this is not strictly 
                                                           
362 As Husserl remarks: “The relation to the motives of the judgment [in the case of habitual assumption 
of past position-takings] can thereby be very unclear, and so can the relation to the various cases of 
renewal and reinforcement of the conviction.  Yet it is clear that the unity constituted here is not the unity 
of the lived experience of the one who is judging, but it is the unity of “the” judgment, which persists for 
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re-grasped.” (Hua IV-2/V-2 434-5 (Hua IV 116-7) [1914-16].) 
363 Hua IV-2/V-2 435 (Hua IV 117) [1914-16]. 
364 Hua IV-2/V-2 439 A [1914-16]. 
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necessary in that a pre-reproductive retention of one’s past-position-taking might be sufficient.365 
Crucially, this should not mislead us into thinking that the appropriation involves the past 
endorsement being appealed to as an empirical feature of my past, as might be the case if someone 
were to adopt a stance, as it were, on the grounds that they can recall having previously endorsed it. 
What is at issue here is not one’s ‘copying’ one’s past stances, but rather simply one’s continuing 
to accept their enduring theses as valid and rationally motivated; and we are only aware of ourselves 
as so continuing in as much as there is some awareness of our past acceptance co-present ‘in’ our 
current habitual acceptance. In Husserl’s dense formulation: “That which is posited by an act of 
the cogito, the theme, is, with reference to repeated reproductions and repositions, which extend 
“throughout” the chain of reproductions of the original theme reproduced in them, something 
lasting, at least as long as the reproduction is precisely not just any reproduction but rather a “re-
positing,” or better: an actual taking part in, an assumption [Übernahme] of what was posited “earlier.””366 
In light of this, I take it that Husserl would be sympathetic to Moran’s remark that, rather than 
primarily knowing our enduring theoretical, emotive, and practical stances through viewing our 
past and present mental life observationally, we are most basically aware of such a position as 
enduringly ours in as much as we continue to endorse its truth and, in so doing, remain answerable 
to its legitimizing reasons.367 However, unlike Moran, for Husserl there is nothing contradictory in 
maintaining that this endorsement and answerability endures habitually; that our past (theoretical, 
practical, and emotional-evaluative) commitments do not persist as ours only in as much as we 
endorse them deliberatively, but retain the normative force they have for us just until we are moved 
to relinquish them—this being manifest in our ability to ‘assume’ or ‘take part in’ these 
commitments whenever doing so is demanded of us. 
 
§4.3.3 |  Pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness 
 
We can now return to this question of whether, and in what sense, we can be pre-reflectively aware 
of our enduring position-takings as such, and of how this relates to our reflective thematisation of 
them. As was emphasized earlier, convictions differ from experiential episodes, both in their 
generic features, and in their basic mode(s) of first-personal acquaintance.368 Experiential episodes 
are pre-reflectively lived through in that intentional acts (or complex wholes thereof) are, on the 
one hand, directed towards an object as apprehended or construed in a certain manner, and on 
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366 Hua IV-2/V-2 438 (Hua IV 119) [1914-16]. 
367 Moran (2001, p. 82). As Husserl at one point remarks: “The conviction [Überzeugung] is the same if the 
testimony [Zeugung] remains the same.” (Hua IV-2/V-2 434 (Hua IV 116) [1914-16].) 
368 Moran emphasizes that his ‘deliberative’ account of self-knowledge should be understood as mainly 
applicable to “attitudes: beliefs, desires, intentions, and various emotional states.” As he then notes, this is 
a different issue to the question of “whether a person can be said to know his qualitative sensations in a 
way that is essentially unavailable to another person and if so, how such “knowing” is to be understood” 
(2001, p. xxxiii, emphasis mine), admitting a few pages later that his study has “comparatively little to say 
here about the case of sensations, which I believe raise issues for self-knowledge quite different from the 
case of attitudes of various kinds.” (2001, pp. 9-10) I take it that Husserl would be sympathetic to 
Moran’s distinction between the mode of self-awareness pertaining to truth-sensitive attitudes and that 
for lived experiences, but he would reject the implication that only the former can be considered properly 
first-personal (see, e.g. Moran 2001, p. 107). Indeed, as will become clear, his view is actually that the pre-
reflective self-awareness pertaining to lived experiences is a condition of possibility for the self-awareness 
of position-takings. 
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the other, immediately self-manifesting. In being consciously directed to an object, we are not solely 
conscious of the object, since we are also aware of the present object-directed experience itself as 
inhering within an ‘inner’ temporal horizon of retained past and protended futural object-directed 
experiences. These retained and protended lived experiences, which make up the temporal horizon 
of the awareness of the present experience, are themselves given in a non-objectifying manner, 
which is to say, as (retained past and protended future) forms of intentional directedness with their 
own (past and future) objective correlates. And, for Husserl, this total nexus of past, present, and 
future modes of awareness brings about the very temporal form of consciousness, and as such 
exactly comprises the first-personal givenness of experience. In other words, it amounts to the 
(temporally ‘stretched’) self-awareness essential to all conscious experience, and it thus illuminates 
the ubiquitous and basic sense in which a self or (‘pure’) ego is manifest in conscious life.369 
Such a mode of self-awareness precedes and renders possible any active form of reflective 
directedness towards our experiential episodes. In the Göttingen manuscript, Husserl distinguishes 
between two ways in which such a reflective directedness can occur. On the one hand, there can 
be a memorial ‘reproduction’ of a past lived episode which was, prior to this reproduction, merely 
retained as a component of the pre-reflectively constituted ‘inner’ temporal horizon. On the other 
hand, there can be a reflecting in the memorial reproduction, such that one does not merely ‘live 
in’ the memory (as in the former case), but rather fixes it in view as a unitary past experiential 
episode of one’s past, one which can be identified, repeatedly returned to, and described.370 In the 
Göttingen manuscript, Husserl (with evident reluctance) uses the term ‘immanent perception’ to 
describe this second form of reflection, which presupposes reproduction and, thus, also ‘inner 
consciousness’ (that is, the pre-reflective self-awareness in which the very temporal field of 
experiencing is constituted): 
To be sure, every act is an “impression,” it is itself existing in inner temporality, is something constituted 
in the consciousness that constitutes time originally. We can reflect on each act and in so doing turn it into 
an object of an act of immanent “perception.” Before this perception (to which belongs the form of the 
cogito), we have the “inner consciousness” (which lacks this form), and from this arises, as an ideal 
possibility, the inner reproduction, in which the earlier act again comes to consciousness in a reproductive 
way, and consequently can become the object of a reflective memory. In other words, the possibility is 
thereby given of reflecting, in the reproduction, on the earlier having-perceived, or if not the having-
perceived in the proper sense, then on the originary having-lived-through as having-had-an-impression.371 
Leaving aside, for now, the issue of our anticipatory awareness of futural experiences, we can thus 
distinguish (at least) four possible modes of (self-)awareness with regard to one’s past and present 
lived experiences. An Erlebnis can either be pre-reflectively lived through in the mode of the 
present, pre-reflectively retained in the mode of the past, re-presented or brought to mind as a 
past experience through memorial reproduction, or, finally, reflectively identified and thematized 
as a unitary experiential complex. 
We can now consider the case of enduring position-takings. As we have seen, Husserl 
rejects the idea that we are primarily aware of our convictions, emotions, and resolutions through 
                                                           
369 This is admittedly an overly simple account of the relationship between temporality and self-
awareness, an issue which Husserl explored in detail and that has been the object of both detailed 
attention and controversy in the secondary literature; cf. Brough (1972), (2010), (2011) and Zahavi (1999, 
pp. 63-90), (2005, pp. 49-72), (2011). 
370 Cf. Zahavi (1999, pp. 144-6) 
371 Hua IV-2/V-2 436-7 (Hua IV 118) [1914-16]. 
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a detached, quasi-perceptual stance in we which attend to empirical features of our past and present 
psychological life. Indeed, immediately prior to the just-quoted passage where ‘inner perception’ 
is referred to, he notes that when it comes to an enduring position-taking such as a mathematical 
conviction or an enduring hope, “what institutes the unity is not a perception as an act (a cogito) 
that posits a temporally fixed being, but rather another act.”372 As he then continues: 
[In] the case of a mathematical conviction, the originating act is the relevant judging (in inner consciousness 
it is an act constituted originarily, as an impression, and is of such and such a duration in inner time), a 
judgement-material along with a positing of being. This material contains nothing of temporality. A non-
temporal state of affairs is posited as being. In repeated emergence of the judgement we may have chains 
of reproductions of the original judgement-impression.373 
We have seen that our position-taking acts are in some sense manifest, first, in the initial act 
institutive for that position-taking (our actively endorsing the validity of its theses, which articulate 
a transcendent state of affairs, typically on the basis of motives), and, second, in our appropriation 
of an attitude previously instituted in a retained, and in principle reproducible, past endorsement-
activity.374 However, is at this stage worth recalling Husserl’s insistence (§4.3.1), that a position-
taking is a unity which is properly manifest in the relatedness of various different lived experiences 
to one another.375 This is so because a position-taking is something non-identical to a particular 
lived experience, having its own form of temporal duration. Consequently, it seems doubtful 
whether an initial act of endorsement of a certain attitude, preceding the habituation of that 
attitude, could comprise anything like a pre-reflective awareness of it. Rather, such an achievement 
would only seem to involve a lived awareness of one’s actively ‘stepping forth’ and committing 
oneself to the validity of a certain thesis on the basis of motivating reasons, at best accompanied 
by an anticipation that this acceptance will habitually endure in the future (or perhaps, in some cases, 
a practical resolution towards this end). As these considerations make clear, what would be 
required for a pre-reflective awareness of a position-taking would be an experience in which not only 
an individual act is lived, but in which we non-reflectively live in the “chain of reproductions,” as 
Husserl puts it in the above passage, in which the enduring position-taking inheres. And I would 
now like to suggest that we find something akin to this in cases of habitual appropriation. 
In habitually appropriating a past position-taking we are typically aware of ourselves exactly 
as remaining committed to the validity of a certain position. It may be that this habitual 
appropriation can operate without any memorial reproduction of our earlier active institution of 
this position, a retention of this act rather serving as the opaque point of reference for our now 
‘taking part in’ the stance. As I noted earlier, however, in as much as this habitual appropriation 
involves us being aware of the assumed position as an enduring position with which we are familiar 
from our past and to which we remain committed, then some element of memorial reproduction 
must be operative, some directedness to (at least one of) the past acts of institution or 
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374 Notably, in other texts Husserl emphasises that the very lived experience of egoic activity is 
phenomenologically distinct from that of passivity. In the life of the subject, he writes, “there are many an 
event of ‘undergoing of allure, being driven, and actively taking a position,’ and, in unity with this, a 
continual enrichment of the stream of lived experience, one which is accomplished by the Ego-subject; 
the holding sway of the Ego is a lived experience which it propels forth from itself.” Hua IV-2/V-2 736 A 
[1915-17]) 
375 Hua IV-2/V-2 427-8 (Hua IV 113-4) [1914-16]. 
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appropriation which pertain to it.376 Consequently, if a habitual assumption of a previously 
instituted position-taking is to comprise an awareness of that position as one’s own, then it must 
involve a minimal form of reflection, in that it requires the reproduction of a past act of 
endorsement (whether this reproduced act is of the ‘passive’-habitual or active-institutive sort). 
Given, however, that reproduction comprises a rather minimal form of reflection, and furthermore 
that it might be inappropriate to conceptualize the modes of awareness we have of our convictions 
on the same model employed for experiential episodes, we should be wary of concluding from this 
that the basic form of awareness we have of our convictions in habitually endorsing them must be 
conceptualized as being essentially reflective in nature. After all, such a conclusion would seem to 
imply exactly what Husserl repeatedly denies—that the ‘unity’ of the position-taking itself cannot 
be evinced in the present act of appropriation, but is rather only brought into view through a 
reflective comparison of this present act to experiences from one’s memorial past. Indeed, once 
one recalls that egoic positions are non-identical to lived experiences, then there appears to be 
nothing obviously contradictory in maintaining that we may be pre-reflectively self-aware of such 
positions—that is, aware of them as our own, and in a manner that does not derive from a detached 
survey of the pre-reflective sphere such that unities are identified within it—even when that 
awareness includes as a component part a minimally reflective (i.e. reproductive) directedness 
towards elements of our past experiential life. 
To clarify this important point, some more general examples will be helpful. In recollecting 
an episode of my own thinking, feeling, or acting that manifested a certain personal stance that I 
have taken and continue to hold—say, in recalling a conversation in which I formulated a subtle 
point in a way that I felt myself able to wholly identify with, or a witnessed event in which I felt 
myself wholly convinced, perhaps for the first time, of the truth of a certain sociological theory or 
political doctrine, or even, to use an example of Husserl’s, the first time I recognized a loved one 
as someone who has a profound bearing on me377—I am certainly reproductively aware of this 
episode as something of my experiential past. Indeed, to remember an experiential episode just is 
to reproduce that episode as one which I once lived through, and this involves the awareness of a 
unitary self in and through temporal difference. An act of remembering, that is, manifests both 
the past ‘I’ of the remembered experience and the present ‘I’ of the very remembering, and yet the 
latter is aware of the former as being itself in the modality of the past. As Zahavi notes, it is only 
through presentifying experiences, such as recollection, that the Ego discovers itself as an act-
transcendent yet identical unity, as enduring beyond the present temporal field of self-presence 
which comprises its original and pervasive mode of manifestation.378 Moreover, Husserl 
emphasizes that the possibility of reproducing one’s past experiences and thus becoming aware of 
one’s streaming “identity”—i.e. that I, as an experiencing subject, transcend and persist between 
                                                           
376 To complicate matters further, Husserl occasionally distinguishes between the sheer passivity of 
retention, the reproduction of memory, and an intermediary level, namely a primitively active directedness 
towards a past egoic activity which doesn’t yet involve reproductive givenness: “every spontaneity sinks 
down into passivity, and that means here that each objectivity can originally enter into consciousness as 
productive in its originary constitution (or in the quasi-originary constitution of reproduction, memory, 
mere phantasy, etc.), or it can come to consciousness as “sensuous” in the form of a passive after-
consciousness [Nachbewusstsein] which, after productive consciousness runs its course, remains behind and 
admits a retrospective gaze (the most primitive single-rayed spontaneity) upon the object that was just now actively 
constituted, or a memory can emerge…” (Hua IV-2/V-2 666 (Hua IV 333) [1917], emphasis mine.) 
377 Hua IV-2/V-2 438-9 A [1914-16]. 
378 Zahavi (1999, pp. 149-51). 
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and unite my discrete experiential episodes—is a presupposition for any appropriative relation one 
might have to one’s earlier instituted position-takings.379 To enjoy first-personal access to one’s 
past experiential episodes, or even to one’s past position-taking acts, is not necessarily a matter of 
taking part in the thesis of an earlier position-taking; rather, such an appropriative directedness 
towards one’s past is founded on a more primitive form of a diachronic self-identity, which simply 
consists in one’s past experiences manifesting themselves as belonging to one’s own streaming 
experiential life.380 
However, in the kind of peculiar case exemplified in the preceding examples, something 
more than experiential continuity is present. If the position evinced in my past experiential episode 
is one that I have not rejected during the intermediate period, then I do not merely recollect the 
episode as one of my past. Rather, I live through my past position-taking as one in which I continue 
to participate, and we can thus say that I assume its validity(-for-me) “without further ado,” that is, 
without requiring any further deliberation.381 This acceptance is not a matter of a separate act but 
is rather something interwoven within the recollection itself, and its nature only becomes evident 
when contrasted with those past position-takings of ours that we have since rejected. If we 
compare cases involving an enduring stance with, say, an adult recollection of one’s younger self 
lying awake on Christmas Eve wondering when Father Christmas will finally arrive, then the 
difference should become clear. What is presumably lacking in the latter case, but present in the 
previous examples, is a certain unity between the heartfelt positing evident in the recollected 
episode and the nexus of theses which continue to remain valid for the remembering subject in 
the present. Crucially, this unity is not something constituted through an explicit activity of 
contrasting; rather, it is immediately manifest in our reproductive directedness towards the past, 
in that this very directedness is lived as including appropriation as a constitutive moment.382 We 
remember a past way of thinking, feeling, or acting as exemplified in a prior episode in a certain 
distinctive fashion when it remains continuous with our current way of thinking, feeling, or acting. 
And we remember it in a different fashion if we have since renounced it in favour of another way 
of thinking, feeling, or acting concerning the same issue. 
As should be evident, this experience of appropriating-in-remembering is of essentially the 
same structure as the kind of habitual appropriation accompanied by memory described earlier.383 In 
such a quasi-active appropriation, we are aware in a primitive way of a unitary position-taking both 
as stretching back into the past and as still holding sway in us. To really see the sense in which we 
can legitimately describe this primitive awareness as pre-reflective in nature, one must understand in 
what sense it grounds and motivates a reflective thematisation of the position-taking which it brings 
us into contact with. And in fact Husserl attends to just this, immediately after his explication of 
its pre-reflective givenness in institution and appropriation: 
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381 As Husserl at one point writes in the Göttingen manuscript: “Habitual means ‘without further ado,’ 
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imply different motivational contexts, the former typically being brought about by an interest in one’s 
past, and the latter typically arising through a present position-taking being demanded of the subject. 
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In repeated emergence of the judgement we may have chains of reproductions of the original judgement-
impression. The regard can be focused on them and can penetrate into them. In that case I have possibilities for 
memories of various levels. I recall my earlier memory: I now have a reproduction of a second level and 
can focus on it, and I then have a memory of the memory. Or my regard can penetrate into it; I focus on 
the state of affairs which was intended in the reproduced reproduction, on the earlier judgement.384 
Husserl’s claim here is that ‘chains of reproductions’ are formed and sustained through habitual 
appropriation, in that each appropriative position-taking partially involves the reproduction of 
prior acts of institutive or appropriative position-taking, the latter of which may themselves 
constitutively involve reproductive elements. Yet these reproductive chains are not rendered 
thematic as such in the very act of appropriation, which rather involves the formation of a further 
‘ring’ in the chain through a habitual avowal of the reproduced position-taking’s theses as 
continuing to hold. Such a thematisation rather requires a reflective ‘regard’ being directed towards 
these chains as such (as Husserl emphasizes in the italicized sentence of the above passage). As 
Husserl goes on to explain, this reflective regard involves bringing into focus the history of 
appropriations, ultimately leading back to the act’s institution, and considering the manner in 
which they were reproductively related to one another—a task which can also look towards the 
noematic correlates of those past acts by our reflectively ‘penetrating’ them. I will argue in the next 
chapter that this rather formal account of reflectively thematising one’s enduring positions can be 
further fleshed out when we consider the different ways in which it occurs; and indeed that one 
pre-eminent way is through the weaving of personal narratives. Such a narrative self-understanding 
involves situating the inner histories of one’s positions within the context of one’s broader 
personal history, bringing the manner in which our positions have formed themselves temporally 
in relation, both to the formation of other positions, and to the situations in which they have been 
instituted (and, perhaps, sustained, altered or abandoned). 
To conclude this section, it will be worthwhile considering how the Husserlian picture I 
have here fleshed out fares with regard to the criticisms levelled at Moran’s position. Finkelstein’s 
worry that Moran’s account of first-personal authority limits it to a small domain of attitudes—
namely, those few cases in which the ‘Transparency Condition’ actually applies—is unproblematic 
for Husserl, since he claims that the generic basis of first-personal authority is not rooted in our 
ability to deliberatively approve our attitudes, but rather in our lived experiences being lived through 
consciously.385 It is only in the special case of position-taking acts that some degree of endorsement (or 
perhaps more accurately, acceptance) is a condition of possibility for the mental item being first-
personally accessible. Finally, we have seen that Husserl agrees with Webber that an adequate 
account of first-personal authority with regard to attitudes must be attentive to the fact that 
attitudes proper are enduring and habituated features of a person rather than fleeting conclusions. 
We will have to wait until the next chapter to determine whether Husserl responds effectively to 
                                                           
384 Hua IV-2/V-2 437 (Hua IV 118) [1917], emphasis mine. 
385 On the face of things, this view is not too dissimilar to that defended by Finkelstein, who also 
emphasises the deep connection between a mental state’s being conscious and first-personal authority. 
However, the decisive difference here is that Finkelstein defends what is to my mind a somewhat 
idiosyncratic understanding of consciousness, summarised by the slogan: “Someone’s mental state is conscious 
if he has an ability to express it merely by self-ascribing it.” (2003, p. 120) As Finkelstein acknowledges, this 
commits him to the claim—which I take it Husserl would reject—that non-human animals have no 
conscious mental states, since they (presumably) lack the conceptual capacities required for the self-
ascription of such states (2003, p. 144).  
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Heal’s plea for an account of first-personal authority that does not conflict with the social origins 
of many of our attitudes. But we can already see that Husserl’s account of the self-awareness of 
attitudes appears to avoid the pitfalls of detectivism and deliberativism. 
 
 
§4.4 | Concluding remarks 
 
 
In this chapter, I have sought to bring into view the personal self from a set of diverging 
perspectives. I began by considering the sense in which embodied activity can function within and 
manifest personal agency, arguing that the personal self presupposes certain bodily abilities and 
world-responsive practical inclinations, but that it goes beyond such inclinations, appropriating 
them as components within novel kinds of motivational context. What is decisive here is that one’s 
(inclination-delineated) practical possibilities are affirmed on the basis of a decision which appeals 
to evaluative grounds, these grounds in their turn being a function of one’s enduring nexus of 
attitudes. I then tried to shed further light on the connection between such attitudes and the kind 
of freedom and character unique to persons, as well as the distinctive sort of motivation and world-
relatedness implicated in personal life. Finally, in the last and longest section of this chapter, I 
considered the form of self-awareness we have of our attitudes, arguing that we can speak of a 
unique form of pre-reflective awareness that persons have of their sustaining an attitude habitually. 
We are now well-prepared to consider the social preconditions of personal selfhood, as well as 
ultimately to address the kind of empathetic contact we have with other personal selves.
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5. Interpersonal empathy and the person as interpersonal. 
 
 
 
Whereas Chapter 4 was concerned with offering a solely first-personal account of personal 
selfhood, this (methodologically necessary) shortcoming is corrected in Chapter 5, which considers 
together interpersonal empathy and the deeply intersubjective being of the person. Building upon 
the findings of the previous chapter, I begin by explicating the analyses of personal self-
understanding found in Ideen II, arguing that Husserl allows us to distinguish between a range of 
levels of self-acquaintance. While Husserl’s reflections, I contend, ultimately lead us towards the 
thought that narrative constitutes the most apt medium for personal self-understanding, he also 
argues that there are more primitive ways in which I am aware of myself as a subject of abiding 
personal character or style. I then develop Husserl’s claim that the person necessarily exists in a 
nexus of other persons, spelling out the roles of mutual recognition, the constitution of a common 
surrounding world, and the appropriation of others’ attitudes, in both pre-reflective personal 
agency and reflective, narrative-embedded, personal self-understanding. Later, I address the sense 
in which, as persons, we are empathetically acquainted with other personal selves, arguing that 
such interpersonal empathy both rests upon and transgresses the animate empathy discussed in 
Chapter 3. In this regard, I first suggest that a minimal form of interpersonal empathy can be 
equated with what Axel Honneth has recently called ‘elementary recognition,’ where this 
designates a basic and perception-like recognition of another (embodied) personal self, and which 
grounds and is explicated by emotive and practical forms of interpersonal recognition. Revisiting 
the contrast of Husserl and Stein with Stueber, I then argue that interpersonal empathy can go 
beyond interpersonal recognition, and aim at an understanding of the ‘who’ of the other’s actions, 
emotions, and beliefs—of the personal self who ‘lives’ in them—an accomplishment which 
requires a sensitivity to (rather than a levelling over) the embeddedness of the person’s acts in her 
own personal history, and their intimate relation to her personal character.  
 
 
§5.1 | Personal self-constitution: life, style, and narrative. 
 
 
I. No one in the world feels the weakness of general characterizing more than I. 
J. G. Herder386 
 
§5.1.1 | Self-awareness and self-understanding. 
 
For Husserl, self-consciousness and personhood are intimately interconnected. This is perhaps 
nowhere more obvious, in that thematically understanding one’s own personal character involves 
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a certain type of self-apprehension or -interpretation, and similarly in understanding other persons 
as persons we simultaneously take them to be other selves. Now, what makes this claim 
philosophically interesting and controversial, and not merely a tautology (what makes it 
fundamentally different, that is, from the claim that in attributing certain features to an object we 
take those features to attributed to the object ‘itself’), lies in the positive content of Husserl’s 
distinctive account of selfhood, as well as in his claim that a basic form of selfhood is necessary 
but insufficient for personhood. As we saw in the previous chapter, Husserl locates a primitive 
self, or pure Ego, already within the inherent structure of conscious experience, and he thus 
maintains that conscious experience exhibits selfhood before any explicit kind of self-apprehension 
or self-thematisation. For Husserl, then, a primitive self is manifest in all intentional experience, 
irrespective of the object to which such experience is directed. This is because such selfhood is 
not a specific type of intentional object, but is rather a matter of the inherent and non-objectifying 
manifestation of intentional experience to itself, in short, the pre-reflective self-awareness of 
experiential life. In light of this, we can note that in the specific case of self-conscious 
intentionality—by which I mean any experiential act in which subjectivity is directed towards 
itself—one finds a peculiar double-movement of self-differentiation and self-identification. As 
Husserl puts it: 
The peculiarity is that, “in” the minded subject, an apperception of the “I” arises, an apperception in which this 
minded subject is itself the “object” (even when it is not the thematic Object). The apperception, “thing,” 
does not arise in the thing, but only in subjects. We must therefore distinguish the “I” in the “I am” on the 
side of the subject from the “I” in the “I am” as Object for myself, an Object which is represented, constituted 
in the existing “I am,” and which is perhaps intended in the specific sense: the Me. What is intended here 
is “I, the person”, constituted for me—for the Ego which is conscious of itself.387 
In any intentional act in which subjectivity is actively directed towards itself, we must distinguish 
the dimension of selfhood manifest in the subject’s very experiential directedness (towards itself), 
from that dimension which is disclosed as the intentional object [Gegenstand]. The self-as-object 
ought to be conceptually separated from the self-as-subject in light of their different yet correlated 
roles within the intentional structure of self-consciousness. On the other hand, thematically self-
conscious, or reflective, intentional acts obviously differ from all other forms of intentional 
experience in that the domain which they direct themselves towards is the same domain in which 
they themselves operate, namely that of pre-reflectively self-aware experience. Since the pervasive 
self-awareness inherent within experience involves the most primitive and original form of self-
consciousness (one of a non-objectifying or pre-reflective variety), it follows that if reflection did 
not attempt to thematise this sphere, and were it not motivated by what occurs at the pre-reflective 
level, it would simply not hold any claim to be self-conscious experience. 
What are the implications of this line of thought for another Husserlian claim, namely that 
personal self-understanding is rooted in a certain type of reflective self-consciousness? If acts of 
reflection are indeed able to provide a basis (though not, as we shall see, the sole basis) for those 
judgements, assertions, and questions which have as their theme ‘I, as a person…’, then we can now 
see that such reflective acts must in their turn be motivated by, and seek to thematise, occurrences 
on the level of pre-reflective (self-)experience. Moreover, for Husserl, this personal self-
understanding involves a specific way of reflectively thematising one’s pre-reflective experiential life. 
This is because the personal self only comes thematically into view when a certain episode of 
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actively motivated comportment concretely manifests its subject as a subject who, in enacting such 
motivated modes of comportment, has a certain habitual character. As Husserl puts it in a 
manuscript from the early 1910s: 
Under the title, “person” (the minded Ego), we do not understand merely a pure Ego-point, taken as the 
subject-point of cogitationes in its stream of experience. Rather, we understand something concrete; the Ego 
with its stream of experience, but this understood as the life of the Ego. And what is more, we are here 
concerned with the Ego as it manifests itself in this life, and as it manifests itself as an individual with 
individual character in its empirical self-comportment towards its surrounding world. For we are concerned 
with this concrete life only insofar as it carries the individual.388  
Moreover, those forms of self-consciousness which thematically disclose their subject as a person 
cannot be simply concerned with an isolated moment or even a self-enclosed duration of lived 
experience. Rather, in personal self-understanding I seek to uncover—in and through my concrete 
actions, emotions, or episodes of thought—my enduring ways-of-actively-being-motivated. Indeed, 
such understanding seeks out the habitual features embedded in a personal life which reaches into 
the immemorial past and which is expected to extend into the future, and which consequently 
‘out-lives’ even the specific enduring features which currently articulate it. Even if we do not 
actively traverse the constellation of episodes in which our active habitualities have actually 
exhibited themselves, even if we do not explicitly delve into the subject’s own personal ‘history’, 
without at least emptily recognising this personal horizon we would not be, in self-understanding, 
concerned with ourselves as persons. And such an understanding obviously gains further insight 
and a deepening evidential basis the more it interrogates this horizon. I more richly disclose my 
specific habitual features in their inner complexity and historical development through recollecting 
how my different modes of comportment are and have been responsive to their motivating 
circumstances, and in doing this I gradually acquire more insight into the infinitely nuanced, and 
often conflicted and painful, issue of who I am qua thinker, feeler, and actor. 
We will shortly return to the ‘what’ and the ‘who’ of such personal self-awareness, but the 
first point to be emphasized here is that the kind of self-disclosure which may be gained through 
such self-understanding is of a quite different sort to the pre-reflective self-awareness inherent 
within and ubiquitous for conscious experience. After all, the basic selfhood (or ‘pure Ego’) 
manifest on the pre-reflective level is simply, as Husserl puts it in 1913, “the pure subject of each 
cogito in the unity of a stream of lived experiences” 389; unlike the personal self, it is evinced 
irrespective of any recognition of one’s own trans-temporal habitual character, and indeed it is just 
as ubiquitous in the sphere of affection as it is in spontaneity. A further difference between the 
pure and the personal self lies in their ontological status, namely, that the personal ego has a reality 
not enjoyed by its pure counterpart. While the pure Ego merely designates the formal self-
awareness inherent within conscious experience, persons are concrete and intelligible unities, 
unities which can be identified and, in the ideal case, understood in their specificity, as well as in 
their individual acts (just as they can be so evaluated, recognized, responded to, influenced, 
theoretically studied, and so on). In asserting this, Husserl is merely attempting to do justice to our 
pre-theoretical belief that such features as convictions, emotional dispositions, and enduring 
practical commitments are real aspects of who we are, and that, in this sense, a person him or 
herself is the concrete reality which his or her personal features articulate. Like the objects and 
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states of affairs whose ‘natural’ features we are perceptually familiar with, and which we are able 
to conceptually articulate and convey linguistically, personal features are also intersubjectively 
accessible and intelligible as such, even if this intelligibility is unintelligible from the standpoint of 
the naturalistic attitude. As this last point already implies, however, personal reality should be 
distinguished from natural reality, despite the two bearing certain analogous ontological features, 
features which legitimize the classification of both as forms of reality. As Husserl puts it, “Mental 
[Geistige] “substance” is something fundamentally different to thingly “substance,” whereby 
substance is here only another expression for “real object [Gegenstand],” bearer of real features 
[Eigenschaften].”390 
But perhaps the most crucial, complex, and controversial aspect of Husserl’s distinction 
between the pure and the personal self lies in a point already mentioned, namely his claim that 
they play correlative structural roles with regard to personal self-consciousness, and consequently 
(at least as far as thematic personal self-understanding is concerned) that the pure Ego constitutes 
itself as a person. Husserl brings out this claim in his 1913 manuscript by noting that any appeal 
to selfhood is only intelligible with regard to the sphere of intentional experience. We can thus 
broadly say that the “Ego”—whether considered purely or personally—“has the surrounding 
world over and against itself” and “carries out, with regard to what is first given in the surrounding 
world… certain active modes of comportment: it evaluates, it desires, it acts…. Likewise it 
comports itself as passive… finds itself influenced by persons… etc.” As he immediately 
continues, however, when we consider how such intentional experience manifests selfhood, the 
issue of whether we are concerned with the pure or the personal self becomes decisive: 
From the standpoint of pure consciousness all [active comportment] is reduced to intentional lived 
experiences together with their concomitant intentional correlates, and with regard to all these lived 
experiences the pure Ego is something identical. As subject of all such modes of comportment, however, 
the pure Ego adopts a realising apprehension, one that can be performed by a new act of the pure Ego in 
relation to itself and to its past modes of comportment of which it is conscious in memory…. That is to 
say, each pure Ego, as identical subject of its pure consciousness, can be apprehended as something which 
has its determinately specific modes of relating to its surrounding world, its determinate ways of letting 
itself be motivated by it in active and passive kinds of comportment; and everyone who has developed to 
maturity apprehends himself in this way, is aware of himself as a person.391 
We have already seen one aspect of what such formulations are meant to show. Since the pure 
Ego is evinced in each and every intentional experience, it follows that, in the very activity of 
reflection in which one’s own personhood is thematised, the pure ego is simultaneously manifest 
as the formal subject of the self-conscious reflecting itself. Moreover, a further condition for 
personal self-understanding, and more generally for any form of self-interpretation, is that the 
experiential episodes which I take to exhibit who I am qua person are ones that I take myself, on 
the basis of memory or other grounds, to have once lived through in a pre-reflectively self-aware 
manner. The pure Ego is thus involved in a double sense in personal self-apprehension, since it is 
both evinced in the very act of apprehension itself (the self which apprehends), and presupposed 
as the subject of whatever experiential enactments serve as its pre-given basis (the self ‘through’ 
which the apprehension is directed); indeed an intentional activity only holds a claim to the status 
of self-apprehension in as much as pre-reflective selfhood is involved in this twofold way. 
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However, Husserl’s claim that an asymmetrical constitutive relation holds between the 
pure Ego and the person can also be read in more problematic terms. After all, in suggesting that 
the person is the constitutive correlate of a self-apperception accomplished by the pure Ego, 
Husserl seems to further imply that the personal self is merely a constituted phenomenon, and that 
transcendental subjectivity is therefore to be wholly characterised in terms of the pure Ego. And 
indeed, on Steven Crowell’s subtle and critical reading, it is precisely with this point that the 
constitutive analyses in Ideen II contain a certain tension. While achieving a number of radical 
insights that anticipate the work of such later transcendental-phenomenologists as Merleau-Ponty 
and Heidegger, Crowell’s Husserl is regrettably unable to fully grasp the transformative 
implications of such insights, due to his uncritical commitment to the postulate that transcendental 
subjectivity is reducible to absolute consciousness.392 On the one hand, Crowell notes, Husserl 
recognizes that “the constitution of the spiritual world – the world of expression and meaning” 
necessarily involves habituality, sociality, and practical immersion; in short, that such constitution 
is “a function of embodied egos and their practices.”393 On the other hand, Crowell maintains that 
Husserl’s subjectivism hindered him from according the functional role played by embodied and 
socialised praxis in world-constitution an absolute and properly transcendental status. For if the 
embodied person is ultimately the result of a ‘realising apprehension’ of the pure Ego, then it 
would appear that personal subjectivity is exclusively a “transcendental product” rather than 
operating as constitutive.394 
While a discussion of the transcendentality of the person will have to wait until the next 
section, of paramount importance at this stage is an assessment of Crowell’s construal of the 
Husserlian personal self as something that first emerges through a self-apperception of the pure 
Ego. And Husserl does indeed occasionally illustrate the distinction between the pure and the 
personal Ego by describing the former apprehending itself as the latter.395 However, in other places 
                                                           
392 Crowell (2013, p. 154). Notably, the references which Crowell gives to substantiate this particular claim 
lose some of their force when one consults the original manuscripts Husserl prepared for Ideen II. Of the 
three passages which Crowell refers—from Hua IV 281, 289 and 179—the original manuscript for the 
first two cannot now be located. As the Textkritische Anmerkungen testify (Hua IV 414), Husserl was 
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draft that the “multiplicity of monads” which make up “absolute consciousness” must be considered as 
communicating (ibid.); an emphasis which incidentally calls into question Crowell’s reading of Husserlian 
‘absolute consciousness’ as solitary, disembodied, and disengaged (cf. Zahavi 2010a). While the absence 
of locatable original manuscripts in these two cases does not wholly rule out that they represent Husserl’s 
intended formulations, it does suggest that we should be wary of giving them too much interpretive 
weight. An original manuscript which is near-identical to the third passage Crowell refers to has been 
located (Hua IV-2/V-2 222), but notably it resides at the rather programmatic opening section of 
Husserl’s 1913 text on the personalistic attitude, and it thus predates many of the most penetrating 
analyses of Ideen II. Indeed, in later sections of the same text, Husserl has already begun to offer a 
different view, claiming that “what gives nature its sense,” and is thus “absolute,” is not the pure Ego but 
rather the concrete, and ultimately embodied and socialized, Geist (Hua IV-2/V-2 284-5 (Hua IV 297-8) 
[1913]), in formulations which Crowell notes but downplays (2013, p. 157). 
393 Crowell (2013, p. 160). 
394 Crowell (2013, p. 163). 
395 Hua IV-2/V-2 3-4, 398-9, 273-4 [1912, 1913, 1915]; cf. Hua IV 109-110, 325-6. Incidentally, one of 
the two passages that Crowell refers to as exemplifying this claim (Hua IV 354) is absent from the new 
edition of Ideen II, despite the pages immediately surrounding it being present (cf. Hua IV-2/V-2 705-6). 
More often, Husserl contrasts the pure Ego not with the person but with the psyche or real psychic 
subject. See, for instance: Hua IV-2/V-2 6, 378, 401-2 (Hua IV 92-3, 120) [1912, 1915]. 
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he characterises the personal Ego or mind [Geist] as the subject which is not merely lain out and 
disclosed through acts of self-apprehension, but which is itself self-conscious. For instance, in a 
text dating from 1916 or 1917, Husserl asks: “A mind has self-consciousness—what role does that 
play? A soul does not need to have self-consciousness. What has self-consciousness is a person, an Ego (which 
are here the same).”396 In a similar vein, Husserl maintains that the person in the pregnant sense 
should be sharply opposed to the empirical subject, being the dimension of subjectivity which 
responds to its pregiven surrounding world in a manner whose (ideal) character is one of freedom, 
self-responsibility, and answerability to rational norms.397 And in earlier manuscripts, he suggests 
that, rather than being merely something which we understand through reflective acts of self-
interpretation, the personal self is originally a “unity of self-preservation,” a style that pervades my way 
of actively thinking, feeling and acting, and which is “necessarily developing and developed”.398 Seen 
in this light, the pure and the personal Ego are not opposed as the apprehending is to the 
apprehended, but rather converge as the subject of mental activity: “The unity of the mind as 
personal individuality is that which is sustained in its engagement with the surrounding world, the 
one which is surrounding world for the Ego who acts in it, the Ego of freedom. This Ego is initially 
the pure Ego, something identical in a course of cogitationes”.399 More precisely, and as this 
formulation already attests, the personal Ego is not merely the pure Ego, in as much as its modes 
of comportment express attitudes that are tied to its history, and in this way manifest a concrete 
individuality than surpasses the merely formal selfhood of first-personal awareness. Nevertheless, 
Husserl resists the assumption that this historical depth and concrete individuality is first 
constituted through self-interpretation. 
We can make more sense of this position by building upon the account of self-awareness 
of attitudes developed in the previous chapter (§4.3). As we saw there, Husserl suggests that the 
distinction between pre-reflective and reflective self-consciousness as it pertains to lived 
experiences cannot be simply mapped on to the case of egoic activities. In undergoing a bodily 
feeling or perceptual episode, or in acting on the basis of a passing compulsion, I live through a 
certain experience [Erlebnis] within a temporal horizon (of retained and protended Erlebnisse). To 
this degree, an experience currently undergone manifests a pure Ego as the dative of manifestation 
that spans a ‘living present,’ one that encompasses yet temporally surpasses the lived experience 
of the moment. But in avowing a belief, feeling a familiar emotion, or honouring a resolution, a 
self is manifest not merely as living through an experiential nexus, but as living in a spontaneous 
accomplishment. Moreover, the participation of the self in this spontaneous accomplishment is, 
for Husserl, primarily a matter of my momentary experience (of thinking, emoting, or acting) 
bringing to the fore an enduring attitude: a feature of me which transgresses the living present, residing 
just as much in past accomplishments as in the present act. And this historical tie is not one which 
is first constituted reflectively, on the basis of, say, a similarity holding between my past and present 
activity; rather, my current egoic activity is habitualised, in that its very pre-reflective operating 
involves ready-formed stances—whose subsistence-in-me is originally disclosed through the 
experience, which evidently fascinated Husserl, of memorial acceptance or appropriation. 
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 As was already intimated in the previous chapter, I take it that, for Husserl, the lived 
enactment of egoic stances, and in particular the appropriative-memorial experience of my already 
having a position on something, constitutes the most primitive form of personal self-
consciousness. The first traces of personal self-consciousness emerge through the awareness of 
my thinking, feeling, and acting sustaining an attitude, an awareness which is not the end-point of a 
self-observation but an appropriative avowal of an earlier-formed stance.400 One consequence of 
this thought is that a more active, thematic, and reflective mode of personal self-understanding is 
ultimately a way of explicating myself as a subject of attitudes, an explication which involves 
reliving my experiential history and shedding light on the motivational contexts through which my 
attitudes—and myself as their subject—have come to be. Crucially, as we shall see in the next 
section, this active form of (personal) self-understanding is not, and could not be, a wholly solitary 
affair. On the one hand, the development of egoic attitudes takes place within an interpersonal 
context, in that it presupposes relations of mutual recognition with other personal Egos, the 
appropriation of their attitudes, and my thereby entering into a (or, initially, ‘their’) shared world 
of cultural meaning. On the other, the activity of personal self-understanding itself aims to 
understand my individual case through the employment of types and concepts that apply to 
persons in a more general fashion. In this way, personal self-understanding is not merely a survey 
of my inner life, but aims at (my) intersubjective personal reality; it aims at explicating the nexus of 
attitudes which are uniquely lived as mine, but in a way that is in principle intelligible to and 
recognisable by other persons who can empathetically grasp me as an embodied person. 
 
§5.1.2 | Personal style and self-consciousness: association, induction, and envisaging. 
 
For Husserl, then, it is important to emphasize that personal self-apprehension ultimately aims to 
thematise, explicate, and understand features of experiential life that are already evinced on the pre-
reflective level, bringing them to attention reflectively and tracing their interrelations, 
developmental contours, and motivational contexts. As has already been emphasized, the central 
features which such self-apprehension discloses—and those which characterise it as a form of 
personal self-understanding—are the habitualities exhibited in such self-manifesting, and even 
actively self-involving, activities as thinking, emoting, and acting. In a text probably written during 
the mid-twenties, Husserl succinctly articulates the basic construal of self which personal self-
apprehension targets and seeks to understand in its particularity: 
I as subject of my decisions and my position-takings, my resolutions [Entschiedenheiten] that have arisen from 
original, instituting [stiftenden] position-takings, my fixed positions on these or those questions; and with this 
is connected: I as subject of motivations in the specific sense, that I let myself be motivated by whatever 
types of motives in such and such a way, i.e., to take such and such a position.401 
As this text emphasizes, when thematising myself as a “personal subject of actual and possible 
decisions” with a “unique character [Eigenart]”,402 I specify the manner in which my position-taking 
acts are both deeply habitual and freely enacted decisions in which I continuously articulate and 
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form myself. But the important point for now is the link which Husserl draws between personal 
self-apprehension and individual ‘style.’ As he immediately continues: 
As this subject, I have my more or less fixed style, although I do not retain my position-takings in all 
particulars, a style which necessarily expresses itself, necessarily puts associations into play, necessarily 
constitutes apperceptions about myself in my life, so that I have always constituted and continue to 
constitute of myself, according to my unique character, an inductive “outer presentation [Vorstellung]”.403 
What does Husserl mean when, in this dense but important passage, he describes self-
understanding in terms of the emergence of associative self-apperceptions that serve to express one’s 
own individual style? On the one hand, he is clearly emphasising that not all forms of self-
apprehension require me to adopt a reflective, ‘theoretical’ attitude towards myself.404 A person’s 
sense of his or her enduring style is not fully identifiable with, and need not even require, a 
conceptually articulated judgement in which specific features of the self are isolated and identified. 
Rather, it is minimally and basically present in a passive process which provides an evidential basis 
for any such judgement; namely, the emergence of a complex of (self-)apperceptions in which 
certain episodes or features of my life become passively associated. I take it that what Husserl is 
referring to here, at least in part, is the familiar experience of an activity of one’s own bringing to 
mind certain past enactments of one’s own as being ‘similar’ to it. Consider, for instance, that my 
failure to intervene in a witnessed act of aggression recalls pasts occasions in which I have acted 
timidly; that my current desire for chocolate reminds me of my earlier-formed commitment to 
only indulge after lunch; or that an impassioned defence, before surprised companions, of a 
political movement brings to mind earlier years when I cared more about such matters. The 
connection between such episodes is not one entirely constituted through association, resting also 
upon the streaming ipseity of the pure Ego with its living present and retentional horizon, as well 
as the habitual subsistence of my attitudes (and the appropriative mode of self-awareness which 
sometimes accompanies this). But such cases do involve the functioning of association, in as much 
as I do not actively seek out and discover the similar past episode; rather, the remembered episode 
merely emerges as similar, as if propelled from the depths of my past. 
But what of Husserl’s claim that these passive-associative apperceptions in some way 
‘express’ my enduring ‘style’? To address this issue we should first get clear about what Husserl 
has in mind in this talk of individual style. As Husserl makes clear in this manuscript, my style in 
this sense is one which “I have as subject of position-takings and habitual convictions”; that is, it 
is primarily a matter of that way of acting decisively, valuing emotively, and avowing my beliefs 
with conviction which we considered in the previous chapter. 405 Importantly, in thematising such 
habitual character under the heading of style, Husserl evidently means to suggest that it is not 
something originally correlated with a judgement or evaluation which picks out stable character 
traits and predicates them of a person—indeed, as he notes elsewhere, a person’s individual style 
is exactly something “very difficult to describe”.406 We saw in Chapter 2 that the perceptual style 
of a material thing comprises a domain of sense which surpasses and precedes judicative 
articulation (§2.5), and this applies all the more here, since the uniqueness and ambiguity of a 
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[1913]. 
405 Hua IV-2/V-2 659 (Hua IV 331) [1920s]. 
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person’s style downright evades the generality of descriptive conceptualisation. As we shall see 
shortly, Husserl does maintain that personal style is something which can get to know 
[kennenlernen], both in our own case and that of others. However, this is not a matter of simply 
perceiving or judging the person to be the bearer of (reified) ‘features;’ rather, it involves gradually 
acquiring a familiarity with the personal subject in her specificity and historicity, a familiarity which 
can only be approximately expressed through the predication of generic character traits to him or 
her.  
Moreover, while, for Husserl, personal style peaks in a subject’s habitual way of actively 
taking a position [Stellung nehmen], it would be misleading to construe it as disconnected from the 
habitualities through which a person comes into a more passive form of contact with a meaningful 
world, as well as from the facticity of her particular bodily being and the social and material 
surroundings in which she is embedded. Indeed, it seems intuitive to think that the individual style 
of a human subject characterises more than merely an innermost nexus of deeply held attitudes, 
the peculiarity of a person’s way of being also infusing her bodily habits and sensibility. This 
intuition was not foreign to Husserl, as this list of suggestive questions makes clear:  
Those habits which pertain to the Ego in its way of comporting itself (e.g. the habit of drinking a glass of 
wine in the evening) are features of the subject, acquired features; but are they features of its individuality? 
Do not the latter features rather lie on the side of the proper activities of the Ego? And how are we to 
distinguish individual features—those which characterise mental individuality—from other features? Or 
should we after all say that what comprises individuality is the total style and habitus of the subject, which runs, 
as a harmonious unity, through all of its modes of comportment, all of its activities and passivities; and to 
which the entire psychic subsoil, in providing the material composition, contributes?407 
As this passage nicely evinces, there is a certain tension at the heart of Husserl’s reflections on this 
matter, which, on the one hand, locate personal style solely in those modes of comportment which 
actively engage personal subjectivity (in the specific sense discussed in the last chapter), and on the 
other, recognise that a person’s unique style can also manifest itself in other, non-attitudinal and 
decision-independent, modes of comportment. (To name just a few examples of the latter, 
consider a subject’s distinctive way of being affected and what invites or demands of her a 
response; those absent-minded thoughts or desires that contrast with the stances that her thoughts 
and actions typically uphold, and which may even elicit inner resistance; and those ‘arational’ but 
not entirely ‘impersonal’ bodily activities, which, for instance, merely actualise urges and 
tendencies, more-or-less involuntarily express emotional states, or which evince little more than 
one’s passive appropriation of the typical bodily style of a specific person or social group.) Is 
Husserl here merely oscillating between two seemingly impertinent philosophical positions, even 
arbitrary definitions; or might it rather be that this tension is itself philosophically important and 
can be put to positive theoretical use? 
That there may be something to the latter thought becomes clear when we note the deep 
interrelation and interdependence holding between a subject’s nexus of position-taking acts and 
her typical way of perceiving and being bodily. As we already saw in the previous chapter, Husserl 
repeatedly emphasises that personal individuality and freedom is something evinced in the way an 
embodied subject responsively takes positions towards its surrounding world. Crucially, this 
surrounding world is one which is first constituted through the functioning of ‘pre-personal’ 
modes of perceptual, affective, and practical intentionality; it is, after all, a perspectivally given 
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horizon of things, the perceptual styles of which both affect us as pleasing or frightening and 
arouse in us tendencies to engage with them. That is, my surrounding world is, in its genetically 
prior and ever-present stratum, one which I share with all creatures to the degree that they 
approximate my bodily constitution, such that a degree of intersubjective concordance can be 
reached between the typical style of my sensibility, primitive affects, and inclinations, and those of 
my companions.408 And were it not for the typically stable and harmonious style of such pre-
personal world-constitution, then the kind of motivational situation which demands settling 
through position-taking acts would simply not arise, since no worldly events would be pregiven 
for judicative construal, motivating of emotive valuation, and demanding of decisive action. In a 
relatively early manuscript treating the understanding of foreign persons, Husserl puts the point 
as follows: 
If I seek to understand [another’s] motivation and, with this, [his or her] individuality, then I must also be 
able to empathetically understand the underlying basis of the motivation, that is, the motivating. And must 
one not say that the person is not only the subject of act-motivation and the subject of those of his features which 
are characterised by this motivation, in that motivation presupposes an underlying basis, one which changes 
in dependence upon “external” circumstances, such that [in understanding the foreign person] I must also 
get to know the relevant dependencies?409 
Over the years, Husserl would begin to refine this picture. In a manuscript likely dating from 1915 
or 1917, he notes that many of our (‘pre-attitudinal’) inclinations are not unrelated to our personal 
past, but are rather habitual in as much as they have a genesis in our subjective history; and that 
our practical tendencies “are not only there and operative (they precisely tend me), but I also know 
that they have acquired their “strength” from repeated yielding. I remember that I have often 
succumbed, and experience that they have become stronger through repetition (or that resistance 
to them has become ever harder, that succumbing is ever more likely).”410 Husserl’s point here is 
not merely that my embodied tendencies become, as it were, ‘personalised’ through my reflectively 
accepting and encouraging those desires and instincts which I rationally endorse while diminishing 
the force of others through self-restraint. Rather, his thought is that, while some of our immediate 
inclinations are instinctive in the sense that they lack genetic intelligibility, many others have arisen 
for, and become sedimented deep within, agential subjectivity in and through the events of its 
prior practical and affective engagement—whether these events haunt the subject as traumatic or 
satisfying, as disheartening or enlightening. Moreover, not only is the case that my nexus of 
inclinations is dependent upon my history of (reason-responsive) personal engagement, but also 
that “an irrational residue always plays a role” in personal agency. “For instance, the unique 
character of this subject shows itself already in what originally stimulates or allures him, insofar as 
not all allures are originally effective for all subjects in the same way.”411 Since neither the 
habitualities of egoic activity nor those of embodied ‘passivity’ owe their origins solely to their 
respective domains, to the degree that the development and inner intelligibility of egoic style is 
shaped by my passive-habitual familiarity with the world and vice versa, it thus seems evident that 
                                                           
408 I take it that this is what Husserl is intimating when, in a marginal note intended to expand a sentence 
beginning “The world of things is, at its lower level, intersubjective material nature”, he writes: “Sensuous 
feelings and drives interlace sensuous experience.” ([“Der sinnlichen Erfahrung reihen sich an die 
sinnlichen Gefühle und Triebe.”] Hua IV-2/V-2 241 [1913].) 
409 Hua IV-2/V-2 619, n. A. [1910-12].) 
410 Hua IV-2/V-2 746 A. [1915/17]. 
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a construal of personal style purely in terms of the content of one’s operative position-taking acts 
would be inadmissibly abstract and one-sided. On the other hand, Husserl would insist that it is 
only with the (higher-order) emergence of a habitual way of taking a position—or at least, as in 
the intriguing case of young infants, when we recognise dispositions for the futural emergence of 
such position-takings412—that it makes sense for us to think of a subject’s (active and passive) 
comportment as manifesting personal style. 
 With this in mind, we can now see that the clusters of associative self-awareness 
introduced earlier function as ‘expressive of personal style’ to the degree that they begin to reveal 
the habitual contours that tie specific episodes of my personal life to my broader personal history. 
In certain of my active accomplishments and passive affections recalling and becoming associated 
with others—and thereby obliquely manifesting me as an individual being who endures within and 
between them—I already have a tacit, fractional, and fractured form of personal self-
consciousness. But what of his claim in the earlier-quoted passage that such primitive modes of 
personal self-apperception function together to bring about in subjectivity an external, or inductive, 
presentation of itself? Husserl’s though appears to be here that, while a multiplicity of self-
apperceptions passively arise, many of which may be conflicting and divergent, at least some of 
these apperceptions are themselves integrated into a unitary grasp of oneself as a being of 
concordant and enduring style. The features of one’s own active life which are picked out and 
unified in and through this Vorstellung are retained through sedimentation, and this leads to the 
development of a domain of sense that articulates who I know myself to be, one that continues to 
be enriched, and occasionally partially cancelled out or modified, with the emergence and 
integration of new associative self-apperceptions. In this way, a person who has reached maturity 
will be familiar with him or herself to a certain degree, and what this familiarity involves is a grasp 
of oneself as a “unity of determinations,” of “positions and other peculiar characters in them”; a 
grasp of one’s operative convictions, emotions, and practical commitments, and their 
developmental history, as articulations of who one is.413 What makes this self-familiarity inductive, 
moreover, is that while it takes its evidential basis in associative apperceptions regarding one’s past 
modes of comportment, it claims to gain insight into ‘who I currently am,’ and not merely ‘who I 
was,’ into my habitual character as something still operative, and thus into something which is 
clearly relevant to how I will act in the future. 
However, what can be accomplished by such self-understanding, in as much as it remains 
solely inductive, has serious limits. After all, as Husserl notes, as a personal subject of actual and 
possible position-takings I am “a unity not based on mere association but preceding it”, and this 
is exactly what makes me “the one that I am, not only as nature, but as a position-taking Ego.”414 
While my present and future enactments are in some way dependent upon my habitual character, it 
is not the case that I can acquire any definitive knowledge of how they will unfold simply by means 
of knowing my character. And this deficiency is not simply due to a limit in one’s factual 
knowledge, as if one’s knowledge of a future action was limited just by one’s not yet having 
experienced that action, leading to a consequent inability to specify its factual nature. What makes 
one’s futural and present actions resistant to inductive prediction is not simply that they are 
occurrences that we do not yet know enough about, but that our most basic awareness of them is 
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as things that we can do, as issues that we will settle actively as opposed to events that we can 
observe or predict. In this sense, inductive prediction concerning our current and futural actions 
is not merely undetermined but inappropriate, in that it fails to address the fundamental issue of 
what it is that we are to do, and which motives we are to take in doing it. Similarly, to think that an 
associative grasp of our past life could provide compelling evidence for a prediction of which 
convictions we will accept or reject, or which emotional episodes we will undergo, would be to 
underestimate the extent to which intellective and affective enactments enjoy a certain spontaneity 
and creativity. In thinking, feeling, and acting, we face up to a situation and actively respond to it, 
and only when we can subsequently obtain some distance from this moment of decision (broadly 
construed) does it appear relevant to characterise it as the unfolding of a pre-delineated character.  
Husserl would thus be sympathetic with Sartre’s observation (in probably the best-known 
section of L'Être et le néant) that only when under the allure of mauvaise foi do we pretend that a 
unifying self-understanding, rooted in the typical features of our past doings, could disclose the 
course which our present and futural comportment must take—and that so pretending is to 
absurdly and insincerely “affirm facticity as being transcendence and transcendence as being 
facticity.”415 However, Husserl insists that this should not constitute the final word on the issue of 
the relation between self-understanding and present and futural activity. After all, not only is it the 
case that an inductive self-apprehension, rooted in the ways I have acted in the past, feigns the 
solidification of my current and future decisions; there are also cases in which such a self-
apprehension can lead me to pretend that I will perform actions that I, being the person that I am, 
really ‘know’ myself unable to perform. Suppose that I compulsively crave and indulge in 
chocolate, but that I have, in past situations, typically or even universally resisted a repeatedly 
occurring and overwhelming desire to eat chocolate for breakfast, and that I have ‘drawn the line’ 
here, not without substantial difficulty, in order to protect my health and social image from the 
potentially damaging consequences of acting upon that desire. And suppose that, one evening, 
somebody presents me with a particularly delicious box of chocolates. In asking myself whether I 
will find my habitual resistance to this desire crumbling in the face of temptation tomorrow 
morning, I can gain some optimism by saying to myself, ‘I have since managed to remain strong 
all of those previous mornings, I can do so once more.’ But crucially, I can also in some way 
recognise that this line of thought is in fact mere self-deception, that whatever I have done in the 
past, and irrespective of whatever consequences it has on my figure and reputation, I will be unable 
to resist my desire to gorge on chocolates with tomorrow’s morning coffee. Here, it seems that 
my “empirical hypothesis” regarding what I will do finds itself at odds with and undercut by a 
more primitive understanding of my projected future actions. I can, in a non-empirical way, “also 
see that I, as I am factually, cannot summon this power, that it will be beyond me”, and I can thus 
predict, in a non-empirical manner and with a degree of certainty, that “if the occasion arises” my 
powers of resistance to this future action “will surely be found wanting and will certainly be 
overcome by the passive power” of allure exerted by the tempting action.416 As this example 
suggests, we can frequently gain a closer insight into how our personal activity would unfold in 
possible situations of the future by a peculiar kind of imaginative (quasi-)‘seeing’ of how we would 
react in such situations, than we can by simply reflecting upon how we have actually acted in past 
situations that have been similar in certain respects.  
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It is at least sometimes possible for us, then, to imagine ourselves in situations which are, 
at this stage, merely possible, and to thereby (quasi-)‘see’ how we would face up to them; and while 
such an activity does not yield the same degree of evidence for personal self-understanding that 
flows from reflection upon our past (in that it thematises not an actual response of ours but only 
an imaginary one), it nevertheless gives us some preliminary insight into the futural horizon of our 
personal lives, a horizon which, of course, implicates ourselves in the toil of upholding and 
developing ourselves throughout changing circumstances. To this degree, envisaging how one 
would act in possible situations can function as a genuinely informative contrast to an inductive 
self-understanding that predicts one’s personal future on the basis of its past. On the other hand, 
we should evidently be wary of treating such an ability as a crystal ball through which we could 
actually see our future lives. For to do so would not only risk fostering in ourselves a sense of dread 
and powerlessness over our own future; it would also be to treat our future actions in a way which 
is only appropriate to those of our past, as settled matters that can be (fallibly) reflectively accessed 
rather than open possibilities which we must, in the future, identify with actively. Indeed, what 
interests Husserl here is not primarily the degree of accuracy possessed by such predictions—
which are quite clearly not apodictic assertions—but of the very fact that I can form predictions of this 
kind in a way which is not wholly arbitrary, both in my own case and for others.417 And I take it 
that part of his interest in this envisaging lies in what it reveals more generally about personal self-
consciousness and interpersonal understanding—namely, that understanding the action of a 
person requires ‘seeing’ the motivational context as faced by its agent, and thereby taking account 
of what strikes the agent as decisive in its accomplishment. As we shall see later, this line of thought 
has important implications for interpersonal understanding. But at this stage, we should consider 
a further form of personal self-understanding, one that, to my mind, goes deeper than the passive-
associative, inductive, and imaginative forms considered so far. 
 
§5.1.3 | Narrative self-understanding. 
 
We have seen that seeking to understand an actual or possible action of one’s own requires 
explicating the motivational situation in which that action was (or would be) embedded, by 
attending to the relevant worldly events, evaluative meanings, commitments, inclinations, potential 
ends and means for action, etc., to which my decision responded (or would respond).418 Especially 
when I compare my action, in its concrete motivational nexus, to other actions accomplished by 
me, I can begin to glimpse something of my typical motivational style, in that the kind of situations 
which function for me as motivating for certain kinds of action—or what Husserl elsewhere calls 
the circumstances [Umstände] of my practical habitualities419—can come into view, shedding light 
on the enduring cares and concerns embedded in my pre-reflective agential life, and generating an 
informative and valuable form of self-comprehension. When carried out with regard to oneself, 
this typically involves a reflective form of thought and communicative speech concerned with 
describing, with detailed reference to concrete cases, my typical ways of thinking, emoting, and 
acting. Such a mode of reflective thought employs general concepts, appropriated from my 
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linguistic community, so as to explicate and interpret the associative self-apperceptions that already 
bind together those of my past activities and passivities which exhibit a typical similarity.420 
Yet it is tempting to object that such a mode of understanding only gets us so far, in as 
much as it simply adopts or ‘assumes’ the current agential outlook of its subject, thus treating my 
operative nexus of attitudes and tendencies as brute and inexplicable givens. That is, the account 
it offers of why I acted in the way I did does little more than explicate how the worldly situation 
that my decision responds to—or a generic kind of worldly situation that elicits a generic kind of 
response from me—is taken account of by my habitual way of deciding. But a more 
comprehensive understanding of personal action must shed light on the specific personal history 
from which (to again exemplify with the case of action) pregiven motivational situation, decision, 
and action emerge, thereby making possible an understanding of this emergence itself as a 
phenomenon deeply embedded in a living personal history. As Husserl puts it, “through gradual 
experience of a subject, I get to know empirically the unique character [Eigenart] of its motivations; 
I understand this subject in its comportment under given cases, insofar as I know through 
experience that he lets himself be motivated in this way under circumstances of this kind. But, of 
course, I first have a deeper understanding only when I can clarify the “origin” of this manner of 
motivation; when I can understand the subject himself.”421 To put the point differently, a richer 
understanding of my way of acting—an understanding which clarifies not only why I acted as I did, 
but also why such situations strike me as demanding a certain way of being inclined, of deciding, 
and of acting—requires support from a certain kind of autobiographical reflection. It requires me to 
weave a ‘story’ or ‘narrative’ about my own personal history, one which does not only explicate, 
through the description of particular life-episodes, the motivational style which currently prevails 
‘in’ me, but which also describes the lived events implicated in the changes my personality has 
undergone over the years, as well as my way of living prior to the onset of those changes. 
It is here that we reach the thought that the ongoing development of a personal narrative 
constitutes a novel and important form of personal self-understanding. While it should be fairly 
evident from the previous chapter that Husserl would resist the claim, excitedly pronounced today 
by some, that the self is something first generated through narratives (a resistance to which I will 
return below), I take it that his account ultimately tends towards the conclusion that narratives 
furnish an important and novel form of self-understanding. Not only does he emphasise that 
biography and history already constitute a kind of pre-philosophical familiarity with the “infinitely 
rich field of immanent motivations,” in virtue of their concern with rendering ““intelligible” the 
psychic development of a personality.”422 He also repeatedly emphasises that egoic style and 
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personal individuality is a matter best disclosed, not by a static focus on my currently operative 
stances, but through engaging in the infinite and fallible task of seeking to bring alive my 
developmental history, through a mode of reflection fed by memory, imagination, and 
communicative understanding.423 Moreover, as the following passages from Phänomenologische 
Psychologie and Cartesianische Meditationen testify, Husserl was certainly sensitive to the thought that 
getting to know one’s personal style is not limited to recognising the mere endurance of certain 
attitudes, but ultimately involves acknowledging a (personal, as well as pure) ipseity that remains 
constant throughout the fluctuation in one’s convictions and decisions: 
The Ego has its mode of continuing through time as an enduring Ego amid the fluctuation of its acts, and 
thus of its convictions, its decisions. But it does not merely endure on in the manner as it were of an empty 
stage for such fluctuation, or better, in the manner of a mere substrate of this fluctuation. Rather, what we 
call “I” in the proper sense (abstracting from the communicative relation to a you or we) means a personal 
individuality. This concept implies an identically persisting unity constituted amid the fluctuation of 
decisions. It is somewhat analogous to the unity of a real thing vis-à-vis the fluctuation of the thing’s 
conditions. In the way in which the Ego lets itself be motivated to its fluctuating decisions with relation to 
the surrounding world of which it is conscious, and thus in the particular character of its decisions 
themselves and of their connections, the Ego preserves an individual style which can be recognized. The 
Ego-pole has not only its fluctuating sediments but a unity constituted in this style throughout their 
fluctuation. The Ego has its individuality, its individual total character which identically permeates all its 
decisions and resolutions; as an individual character it has peculiarities, special features which are called 
properties of character.424 
I myself, who am persisting in my abiding will, become changed if I strike out my decisions or repudiate my 
deeds. The persisting, the temporal enduring, of such egoic features, or the peculiar way the Ego itself changes 
in respect of them, manifestly is not a continuous filling of immanent time with lived experiences—just as 
the abiding Ego himself, as the pole of abiding Ego-features, is not a lived experiences or a continuity of 
lived experiences, even though, with such habitual determining features, he is indeed related back to the 
stream of lived experiences. Since, by his own active genesis, the Ego constitutes himself as identical 
substrate of enduring Ego-features, he constitutes himself also as a steadfast and persistent personal Ego—in 
a maximally broad sense, which allows us to speak also of sub-human persons. Though convictions are, in 
general, only relatively abiding and have their modes of alteration (through modalisation of the active 
positions—for example, striking out or negation, the nullifying of their validity), the Ego shows, in such 
alterations, an enduring style with a unity of identity throughout all of them: a personal character.425 
One of the central thoughts delineated in these passages is that my individual style or personal 
character is not, after all, wholly defined by the subsistence of my position-takings. The identity I 
have as a personal Ego spans beyond those convictions, emotions, and resolutions which I am 
currently in the habit of avowing; indeed, it properly resides in a style which spans my entire 
personal life, a ‘character’ which my current nexus of sedimented positions exhibit only when placed 
in relation to my earlier positions and those still yet to come. We can add to this that the elucidation 
of this style becomes all the richer once we relate the fluctuation of my opinions, affective 
valuations, and practical ideals, to changes in the motivational situations tied to those attitudes 
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(changes in the worldly events whose perceptual or judicative acceptance they presuppose, the 
inclinations and desires which they honour or resist, the institutional frameworks in which they 
respond to or are embedded, etc.), as well as to whatever changes in the kind of exposure I have 
had to other persons, and to the development or deterioration in me of self-critical habitualities.426 
To this degree, it seems highly plausible that the most adequate way to explicate the life-history in 
which such a style resides is through narrative thinking or speech, and that Arendt and Ricoeur 
are hence correct in suggesting that the best way to answer questions which concern the “who” of 
personal action is to tell the story of a life.427  
However, Husserl would also insist that the import of such narrative understanding is not 
to construct a self ex nihilo; rather, narrative self-understanding already presupposes—amongst 
other things—both the streaming self-manifestation of experiential life, and the memorial 
accessibility of one’s past modes of thinking, emoting, and acting as evincing motivated stances 
that I either continue to accept or have since given up. That is, it presupposes the functioning of 
active and passive habitualities, from whence the inclinations embedded in personal agency 
originate, and a minimal form of personal self-consciousness already flows. To return to a 
formulation citied in the previous chapter: “If I knew nothing of association and habit, then 
knowledge of the course of the lived experience of subjectivity, viewing this course 
comprehensively [Überschau], would be of no avail.”428 Or as Husserl puts it in the manuscript from 
Göttingen we considered in §4.3: 
1) The unity of the lived experience as unity of duration in phenomenological time. 2) The unity of the 
memory, the expectation, the conviction, the joy, the hope, the wish, the resolution, and so on, as habitual 
unity (unity of ἕξις [being in a permanent state or habit]; or should one say unity of διήγησις [narrative]? 
But the difference here seems to be one between only giving his position, and analysing and determining 
it).429 
As I read this passage, Husserl is suggesting that a personal narrative (διήγησις) analyses and 
understands our attitudes, by locating them within the life-history in which their inner intelligibility, 
as well as temporal and motivational interrelations, can be thematised. But since the habitualities 
themselves are not first ‘given’ through narratives but rather originate and are originally ‘lived’ in 
pre-reflective agential life, it follows that narratives do not first constitute the personal self, but merely 
provide the most adequate medium for its reflective self-understanding.430 
                                                           
426 Husserl himself emphasises the necessity of a change in motives for the abandonment of a position-
taking act to be “rational,” and suggestively writes that in such a case “I am not unfaithful to myself, I am 
constantly the same”; though he also recognises the possibility that a fluctuation in Stellungnahmen can 
occur through the blind following of others (Hua IV-2/V-2 440-1, 442-4 (Hua IV 112) [1914/16]). He 
also discusses the relationship between personal development and the inculcation of self-critical 
habitualities in the Kaizo articles of the 1920s (e.g., Hua XVII 29-30). 
427 See Arendt (1958, p. 186) and Ricoeur (1988, p. 246)  
428 Hua IV-2/V-2 747 A [1915/17]. 
429 Hua IV-2/V-2 429 A [1914/16]. My translation of Husserl’s ancient Greek was guide by the online 
edition of Liddell and Scott’s classic A Greek-English Lexicon (see, for ἕξις: 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0057:entry=e(/cis ; and for 
διήγησις: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0057:entry=dih/ghsis ). 
430 Of course, Husserl ultimately maintains that narrative self-understanding can be deepened and 
radicalised by a form of self-comprehension made possible by phenomenological reflection, in as much as 
such reflection can both critically clarify the generic conditions of possibility for narrativity (the line of 
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§5.1.4 | Summary. 
 
As I hope to have made clear in this section, the analyses of selfhood and self-awareness developed 
by Husserl in Ideen II allow us to distinguish a variety of different kinds and levels of personal self-
consciousness. The first traces of personal self-consciousness originate in the streaming ipseity of 
the pure Ego, and more specifically in the habitual subsistence and memorial appropriation of 
attitudes characteristic of (pre-reflective) personal life. Based upon this, a second level of personal 
self-consciousness consists in the associative self-apperceptions which tie together certain 
episodes, stances, or tendencies evinced in my personal life with others that are similar to and 
recall them. This in its turn provides a motivational basis for a more inductive form of self-
understanding, which forms conclusions about ‘who I am’ on the basis of the typical way of 
responding evinced in the previous levels. Another form of self-understanding, which can 
sometimes serve to correct the excesses of induction, involves an imaginative envisaging of how I 
would ‘face up to’ possible situations in the future. Finally, I have suggested that a deeper form of 
self-understanding involves reflectively comprehending my personal life by means of 
autobiographical narrative, and in this way situating particular life-episodes, and even my enduring 
attitudes, within a developmental history. Finally, we have seen that these modes of self-
consciousness are best understood as ways of giving expression to my personal ‘style,’ where this 
designates an ambiguous form of ipseity that pervades my active position-takings and pre-
attitudinal passive habitualities, and even the historical fluctuations that these have undergone in 
my life-history. 
 
 
§5.2 | The person as interpersonal. 
 
 
We are now in a position to consider whether, and in what sense, personal subjectivity is to be 
considered an interpersonal accomplishment, that is, to assess in what way the person might depend, 
in its very being, upon relations to other personal subjects. In addressing this issue, we can make 
use of our earlier analyses insofar as they have allowed us to formulate a variety of distinctions 
pertinent to the theme of personal subjectivity. As we have already seen, getting to know one’s 
distinctive personal style or unique character [Stil, Eigenart] is a matter best achieved through modes 
of thinking and speaking with a narrative structure; and yet this reflective mode of self-
understanding rests upon a mode of self-acquaintance that emerges in and through the pre-
reflective engagement of personal life. With this in mind, I will first consider the extent to which 
the reflective activity of personal self-understanding rests upon a social context, before leading 
back to the question of whether and how sociality is implicated in and makes possible pre-reflective 
personal life itself.  
 
 
 
                                                           
thought I have followed here), and shed a more comprehensive light on the genesis of my concrete 
personality. On this latter issue, see Hart (1992, Chapters 1 & 2).    
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§5.2.1 | Self-understanding and interpersonal relations. 
 
I argued earlier in this chapter that the account Husserl offers of personal selfhood lends support 
to the thesis that narrative thinking or speech provides an appropriate medium for personal self-
understanding. In narrating the history of my life, I can not only evoke the habitual character which 
manifests itself in concrete cases of my thinking and speaking, emoting and valuing, and deciding 
and acting, I may also shed light on how such habitual character has mutated in and through what 
common English terms ‘personal experience.’ As we have also seen, however, Husserl would reject 
the thought that the act of narrating the experiential life intimately displayed in one’s memories 
and ongoing experiences literally brings one’s personal self into being. In addition to the argument 
offered in the preceding section, we can now consider a second Husserlian objection to such a 
strongly narrativist view of the self.431 Were the strongly narrativist thesis true, then the difference 
between the mode of acquaintance I enjoy with respect to my own personal life and the familiarity 
I have with the life of another person could not yet be understood as evincing a difference between 
self and other, this difference only emerging through the formation of two distinct narratives. I 
take it that this thought is not an easy one to stomach, at least to pre-philosophical thought. For 
what could appear more innocent and unproblematic than the suggestion that the mental strain of 
writing a certain book was one lived through uniquely by someone (its author, and perhaps, in a 
different sense, those close to the author at the time of writing), while the boredom or 
apprehension it elicits in a reader was lived through uniquely by someone else? Of course, the 
narrativist can respond at this stage by agreeing that the stresses and strains undergone by an 
author were lived experientially only by one self, while the task of understanding the book was left 
to others—it is just that this thought has meaning only at a narrative level of description. But this 
way of thinking underplays or overlooks the manner in which the difference between self and 
other pervades pre-reflective experience. Against the strong narrativist, who is committed to the 
opposed direction of explanation, Husserl would insist that a personal narrative can enable self-
understanding because the narrator employs it to explicate that experiential life which, before any 
narrating has begun, she lives as her own; while narrative can further interpersonal understanding 
because it is employed (or listened to) to render intelligible another experiential life, that is, because 
it is of aid in explicating an experiential history with which the narrator is, at best, familiar 
empathetically. However, this insistence should not be understood as stipulating that narrative 
understanding is, or could be, an entirely private or solipsistic accomplishment, as if it led us to a 
shielded domain aloof to the public world or uncontaminated by others. As we will see later, the 
most basic reason for this is that pre-reflective personal life already evades characterisation in such 
terms. But first, we should consider the sense in which personal self-understanding is intrinsically 
connected to sociality. 
To begin with, Husserl argues that the reflective application of general concepts in thinking 
or speaking about one’s own mental life already presupposes a degree of intersubjective contact. 
The concepts I use to describe my own personal life implicitly refer to other persons to which they 
could jointly apply, and in applying them to my own mental life I have already taken that life to be 
one recognisable by actual or possible others, as having a certain publicity or worldliness. As 
Husserl puts it a text from 1912, “as soon as we speak of an “individual subject,” as soon as we 
                                                           
431 I have in mind here the positions articulated by MacIntyre (1985), Schechtman (1996), and, perhaps 
most provocatively, Dennett (1992). For a similar critique, see Zahavi (2014, p. 59). 
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designate ourselves as, for instance, an “individual human being” with an “individual living body” 
and “individual soul,” we have already apprehended ourselves Objectively, as an individual against 
an actual and possible multiplicity, and hence as an Object that is experienceable by many and 
identical in the experiences of many.”432 In a text from 1915, Husserl develops this thought by 
noting that everyday statements regarding persons do not ascribe the states and features they pick 
out to an interior domain of sheer privacy, nor to a purely material universe of bodies. 
Furthermore, such discourse sees no difficulty in applying the same general mental concepts first-
personally and second- or third-personally, despite the divergence in modes of givenness between 
one’s own mental life and that of others. Rather, the reality which everyday empirical self-
descriptions target and describe is first and foremost the “I as a human being” [Ich-Mensch], that is, 
an individual which is in principle accessible and intelligible to the conceptual thought of others, 
and which all of my bodily and psychological states and features are taken to belong: 
Let us immediately proceed from this last concept of the Ego [i.e., the concept of the “I as a human being”], 
the ordinary one, which is especially rich in content. Everyone grasps, in “self-perception,” precisely 
himself, and likewise, in the experiential knowledge of another, precisely this other. When anyone uses the 
first person, he speaks of his acts and states in the form, “I perceive, I judge, I feel, I will.” Similarly, with 
the expression, “I am of such a kind,” one speaks of his personal qualities, of his innate or acquired traits 
of character, his capabilities, and of his transient and only relatively permanent dispositions. Likewise for 
others: we say that so-and-so is a man of character, virtuous temperament, is in love, etc. […] Similarly, 
someone will say that he has been beaten, stabbed, or burnt when it is his living body that has undergone 
the corresponding actions, when it, as we also say, has been beaten, stabbed or burnt. We say of someone 
that he is dirty when it is his finger that is covered with dirt; that he is anaemic or full-blooded, weak in the 
heart, or sick in the stomach, etc. Hence in the normal saying of “I” (or in the normal use of personal 
pronouns in general), the expression “I” encompasses the whole human being, living body and soul. It can 
therefore very well be said: I am not my living body, but I have a living body; I am not a soul, but I have a 
soul. Now, if it is correct that the unity of man encompasses these two components not as two realities 
externally linked with one another but instead as most intimately interwoven and in a certain way mutually 
penetrating (as is in fact established), then one can understand that conditions and features of either of these 
components count as ones of the whole, of the “I as a human being” itself.433 
With his concept of the Ich-Mensch, Husserl anticipates two thoughts which would be influentially 
articulated nearly half a century later by P. F. Strawson: first, that mental concepts have the same 
sense in our everyday descriptions of self and other; and second, that the concept of the ‘I as 
human being’ (Husserl) or ‘person’ (Strawson) has, at least with regard to pre-philosophical 
thought about individual selves, a logical priority over that of a disembodied mind or a purely 
physical human body.434 In his efforts to further explicate this implicit reference to actual or 
                                                           
432 As he continues: “We apprehend all that is experienceable in according with this Objectivity—things, 
living bodies, souls or psychic subjects, human beings, and animals. Everything is included within the one 
Objective spatiotemporal world.” (Hua IV-2/V-2 65-6 (Hua V 125, translation modified) [1912].) 
433 Hua IV-2/V-2 379-80 (Hua IV 93-4) [1915]. 
434 Strawson (1959, pp. 99, 101-2). Mohanty also notes the proximity between Husserl’s Ideen II and 
Strawson’s Individuals (2011, p. 61). Intriguingly, however, Husserl would be equally sympathetic to a 
criticism raised by Frankfurt (1971, p. 5-6), namely that Strawson’s concept of an entity to which both 
corporeal and psychological predicates can be equally ascribed does not exactly map onto our concept of 
ourselves as persons. Indeed, I take it that Husserl employs the term Mensch rather than Person here, not to 
reduce the empirical individual to a biological organism, but to avoid squarely and unambiguously 
identifying it with the personal self as the subject of a personal life. 
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possible others, both as concrete individuals and recognising companions, in conceptual thought 
and speech concerning one’s own individual being, Husserl then raises the transcendental issue of 
how this implication is possible.  
The question he now poses is the following one: by what means does it comes about that 
I can think of myself using concepts that apply in a general way to human subjects? In asking this, 
one does not have to level out the pre-reflective difference between self and other, the “abyss” 
which separates the manner of givenness of my own experiential life as lived first-personally, and 
that of the other as only accessible through empathy.435 As Avramides has recently argued 
(following Wittgenstein), it is precisely because I can, for instance, feel my own pain but not the 
pain of another, that our everyday application of a unified concept of pain to my own and another’s 
mental life appears, to the philosopher, as problematic and in need of clarification.436 And indeed, 
Husserl’s own attempt to explicate the emergence of a way of seeing oneself as a publically 
accessible human being, and thus as an appropriate target for empirical conceptualisation, involves 
tracing out the origins of this mode of self-understanding in pre-predicative modes of self-
awareness, empathetic acquaintance, and mutual recognition. In a rather dense passage from 1913, 
Husserl offers a detailed sketch of how he takes such mundane self-understanding to emerge. 
After noting that the “human being in the personal world” is first given, by means of empathy, as 
“unity of the living body as expression of mind and of mind as expressed in the living body,” 
Husserl continues as follows: 
This apperception of mind is transferred to one’s own ego, which, in apperceiving other minds, obviously 
does not have to be apperceived for itself in this way, and if it is not apperceived in this way, then it 
functions as non-objectified pure ego. I arrive at the apprehension of myself as a human being (in the sense 
of mind) by way of a comprehension of others, i.e., insofar as I comprehend them as centres not only for 
the rest of their surrounding world but also for my lived body, which is for them an object of their 
surrounding world. It is precisely thereby that I comprehend them as apprehending me similar to the way 
I apprehend them, thus as apprehending me as a social man, as a comprehensive unity of lived body and 
mind. Therein is rooted an identification between the Ego I encounter in direct inspection (as Ego which 
has its lived body over and against it) and the Ego of the other’s presentation of me, the Ego that others 
can understand and posit, one with my living body, as, for him, an “external” presentation, in acts which I 
for my part attribute to him. The comprehensive representation others have, or can have of me is of service 
to me as regards the apprehension of myself as a social “man,” hence the apprehension of myself totally 
different from the way I grasp myself in direct inspection. By means of this apprehension, with its 
complicated structure, I fit myself into the family of man, or, rather, I create the constitutive possibility for 
the sense of this “family.” I can now say “we,” and then for the first time do I become “Ego” and the other 
precisely “another”.437 
Husserl’s bold claim in this passage is that recognising in myself an “I as human being,” a concrete 
reality to which both corporeal and psychological predicates can be ascribed, presupposes a foreign 
gaze turning my way and disclosing me as an other for the other. What the other’s gaze exposes me 
to, and in turn exposes to me, is a presentation [Vorstellung] of myself which is entirely different 
from anything I can accomplish alone. For in the other’s eyes, my mental life is not the one which 
                                                           
435 Hua IV-2/V-2 321 (Hua IV 309) [1913]. 
436 Avramides (2001, p. 224); cf. Wittgenstein (1968, §§302, 305). 
437 Hua IV-2/V-2 270-1 (Hua IV 325, 242) [1912]; cf. Hua XIV 418. Zahavi (2014, p. 248) has argued 
that this line of thought has important implications for the distinctive phenomenology of we-
intentionality, a topic which I have largely avoided here. 
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she intimately lives but something expressed in a living body ‘over there,’ just as her mental life is 
for me. It is this identification of, on the one hand, my lived body and experiential life as pre-
reflectively self-aware, and on the other, the sense of myself which the others’ gaze forces upon 
me, that Husserl regards as pivotal for the constitution of oneself as a ‘comprehensive unity,’ to 
which, amongst other things, the generality of conceptual thought and speech can apply. 
To put this thought differently, it is through the experience of a certain kind of mutual 
recognition that I come to understand myself as an empirical reality to which general concepts can 
apply. It is through being recognised as an other embodied person by an other (embodied person), 
and the recognition of oneself, elicited by this, as of the same generic type for others that they are 
for me, that it becomes intelligible for me to apply the range of concepts reserved for human selves 
to myself. Evidently, a question emerges here concerning the relationship between this kind of 
mutual recognition and that discussed in chapter 3, by means of which the other’s (animate) gaze 
discloses me as an animate being, and thereby opens up the perceptual world as one which my 
living body traverses. Giving an adequate response to this question will have to wait until later on 
in this chapter (see §5.3.4), once we have considered the role played by interpersonal sociality in 
enabling pre-reflective personal life, and once we have subjected this recognition itself to thematic 
consideration. But we are now in a position to consider how the generic sense of myself as a 
human being recognisable by others enables personal self-understanding. 
I argued in §5.1 that a reflective form of personal self-understanding must ultimately aim 
to trace out and disclose one’s personal style by means of explicating one’s life-history. But as 
Husserl notes, the “individual type of this person” is something which “exhibits itself within the general 
types of human existence”.438 While personal narratives aim to intimate the individual personal 
style glimpsed in a subject’s habitual way of relating to the world, and the intelligible mutations 
which this way of relating undergo in the course of a life, it nevertheless does so by employing 
those general concepts which apply to the ‘I as human being.’ While narrative self-understanding 
is certainly not exhausted by the self-ascription of thoughts, feelings, actions, character traits, bodily 
conditions, and the like, it must nevertheless begin with such self-ascriptions as a means of gradually 
and indirectly bringing to prominence a more ambiguous form of selfhood.439 Or to put the point 
differently, reflectively thematising the ‘who’ opaquely intimated in my actions, feelings, and 
thoughts, cannot avoid considering ‘what’ those personal events are. And to this degree, the 
experience of mutual recognition serves as a condition of possibility for narrative self-
understanding. In beginning to think about who I might be as a person, I cannot avoid treating 
myself as someone to whom general descriptions of empirical human selves apply; and in this 
sense I have already acknowledged a minimal degree of otherness within myself.440 It is not only 
the descriptive element of narrative which contains the traces of sociality, moreover, but also the 
very experiential episodes which narrative seeks to describe. Not only is it the case that personal 
                                                           
438 Hua IV-2/V-2 579 [1916/17]. 
439 In a related vein, Goldie (2012, p. 9) argues that the process of what Ricoeur (1984) terms 
‘emplotment,’ by which a multiplicity of events are given narrative structure, can only get off the ground 
if “the raw material for emplotment include descriptions of a person’s mental, cultural, and physical 
condition at various points in time—“rich descriptions of people’s thoughts, feelings, moods, and 
emotions, rich descriptions of people’s actions, and rich descriptions of other things, such as institutions, 
cultures, cultural practices and customs.” On the other hand, Arendt is surely correct in noting a certain 
danger that flows from the necessity of beginning with the ‘what’ in explicating the ‘who’ (1958, p. 181). 
440 For rich descriptions of the relationship between narrativity and alterity, see Ricoeur (1992). 
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self-understanding in the narrative mode typically incorporates others’ perceptions and evaluations 
of myself, both in order to provide the context in which my remembered thoughts, emotions, and 
actions show their intelligibility, and as a means of describing periods of my life which I cannot 
remember well or even at all (such as my childhood, or a weekend irretrievably ‘lost’ to despair or 
chemical excess). As Goldie has recently pointed out, many of the autobiographical memories 
which personal narratives draw upon are so-called ‘field memories,’ that is, they involve 
remembering my actions and responses ‘from the outside,’ as if seen from the perspective of 
another.441 To this we can add that even when memories of this kind do not involve seeing oneself 
from the perspective of a specific other but more from an anonymous ‘view from the outside,’ they 
necessarily presuppose a comprehension of oneself as an intersubjectively accessible human 
subject, this self-recognition in turn only arising through reciprocal empathetic contact with 
others.442 
Before considering the role of sociality in personal modes of comportment, we should 
dwell for another moment on this last point. It was suggested in the previous section that the 
perennial task of personal self-understanding lies in giving expression to one’s own personal style. 
A person’s style in this sense pervades, at least typically if not universally, their way of deciding, 
forming beliefs, and responding emotionally. As a ‘way’ of responding not tied to any specific 
stance, personal style it is not negated when a person’s attitude is cancelled out, but can rather be 
better understood by taking account of such fluctuations. While I have emphasised that the 
description of such personal style is a social affair, employing linguistic concepts that apply in a 
general way to human beings, an issue which has yet to be fully clarified concerns the extent to 
which such personal style can be intuitively disclosed in an intersubjective fashion. That is, to what 
degree does personal self-consciousness in this sense rely not only on the self-awareness of 
habitualities discussed in the preceding chapter, but also on an empathetically acquired grasp of 
how my individual personal style looks from the outside? This question is not entirely settled by 
noting that recognising myself as an entity to which general human concepts can be applied 
requires relations of mutual recognition. At least this cannot be so for Husserl, who maintains that 
the application of general concepts only functions in personal self-understanding as a means of 
explication, one that first presupposes a field of intuitive disclosure to explicate.443 And indeed, in 
an early manuscript Husserl notes that the empathetic givenness of a person to others can play a 
similar role to self-awareness in providing the pre-predicative givenness for the “intuitive 
understanding” of “personal being in personal accomplishments.” As he notes:      
This kind of experience is one which opens up; it is not a conceptual judgemental inference but an intuitive 
disclosing [Erschließen], the results of which are not propositions but systematically unified intuitions, 
                                                           
441 Goldie (2012, pp. 48-53). Intriguingly, Goldie suggests that we are particularly prone to remember past 
events in this way when there is a degree of “irony” between the occasion remembered and the time that 
the remembering takes place, due to my now knowing things which place my past actions in a new light. 
He also proposes that a dissonance between my current emotive take on the past action and the emotions 
I was undergoing while acting can make first-personal memory difficult and tend us towards 
remembering the event from the outside. 
442 For a similar line of thought, see Stein (Empathy, p. 10; Einfühlung, p. 18). 
443 I take it that Husserl has in mind this non-identity of personal style and general descriptive concepts 
when he notes, in a passage quoted in the previous section, that personal individuality only comes into 
view when “abstracting from the communicative relation to a you or we” (Hua IX 214-5)—a brief and 
ambiguous remark which he regrettably did not unpack. 
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whereby what is intuitive-objective there is personal being and life itself, as it would be, or could be, directly 
intuitive to the thematic personality or to others in its nexus.444 
In the late 1920s, Husserl further develops this thought in a note written in the margins of 
Landgrebe’s draft of Ideen II. Expressing discomfort with a passage in Landgrebe’s draft—of which 
no original manuscript in Husserl’s Nachlass can be found—which suggested that personal self-
understanding could be accomplished in abstraction from all relations to others, Husserl poses a 
suggestive question: “As personal Ego, however, I am a man among other men. What is prior 
here, the formation of the inductive apperception of the personal kind [persönlichen Art] of others 
or of my own kind?”445 In a note written immediately afterwards, he gives the beginnings of an 
answer: 
The personal Ego is the Ego of the human being [Menschen-Ich]. I experience the comportment of others 
within the circumstances of their surrounding world, and out of repeated reflection on their similar 
behaviour under similar circumstances an inductive apperception arises. Insofar as I apperceive myself as a 
human being in a human nexus and thus find occasion enough to observe my own behaviour and find it 
to be regulated (i.e., I find habits, active regularities in my behaviour), I get to know [kennenlernen] myself as 
a personal “reality.” The personal reflection which I exercise in this way is therefore a very mediated one 
in its intentionality.446 
As this passage acknowledges, getting to know one’s personal character would be a largely fruitless 
and perhaps even incomprehensible task if we were not able to notice similarities and differences 
that hold between ourselves and other persons as given empathetically. And in so doing, we treat 
ourselves as persons who are, like the others, intersubjectively accessible unities, whose expressive 
behaviour reveals enduring habits. As Husserl remarks later in this note, this should not lead us to 
overlook that the intimate self-awareness of one’s own bodily abilities and habitual attitudes does 
not itself depend upon such a comparison, for an “active faculty” is “not an inductively constituted 
property, not a mere product of association”. Nevertheless, getting to know one’s personal 
character involves “an interplay between the observation of others and self-observation, with a 
continued extension of inductive apperception as a consequence.”447  
What emerges from these remarks is the thought that the reciprocal-empathetic givenness 
of ‘how I am for others’ and the pre-reflective givenness of my experiences and habitual features 
stand on equal footing as ways of seeing myself as a person. It is not only that I must recognise my 
intersubjective accessibility in order to apply general concepts to myself; rather, my being-for-
others runs so deep that my personal style inhabits the me that others see just as much as it does 
my self-lived egoic responses. For a characteristically impeccable illustration of this thought, one 
only need consult the example Bernard Williams offers in making a similar point:  
Suppose a magician is hired to perform the old trick of making the emperor and the peasant become each 
other. He gets the emperor and the peasant in one room, with the emperor on his throne and the peasant 
in the corner, and then casts the spell. What will count as success? Clearly not that after the smoke has 
                                                           
444 Hua IV-2/V-2 591-2 (Hua IV 377-8) [1910-12], emphasis mine. While this remark occurs in the 
context of Husserl’s reflections on the role of imagination in historical understanding, I take it that the 
point he makes here—that the intuitive givenness of a personality can occur in empathetic experience—
applies just as much to genuine forms of self-awareness and empathy, as it does to the modes of historical 
imagination which derive from and modify the latter. 
445 Hua IV 249; for context see Hua IV 412. 
446 Hua IV 250; cf. Hua IV 413. 
447 Ibid. 
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cleared the old emperor should be in the corner and the old peasant on the throne. That would be a rather 
boring trick. The requirement is presumably that the emperor’s body, with the peasant’s personality, should 
be on the throne, and the peasant’s body with the emperor’s personality, in the corner. What does this 
mean? In particular, what has happened to the voices? The voice presumably ought to count as a bodily 
function; yet how would the peasant’s gruff blasphemies be uttered in the emperor’s cultivated tones, or 
the emperor’s witticisms in the peasant’s growl? A similar point holds for the features; the emperor’s body 
might include the sort of face that just could not express the peasant’s morose suspiciousness, the peasant’s 
a face no expression of which could be taken for one of fastidious arrogance. These ‘could’s are not just 
empirical—such expressions on these features might be unthinkable.448 
What Williams’ example makes clear is arguably not only that the concepts of personality and 
personal characteristics are applicable just as much in the second- or third-person as they are when 
applied to one’s own case, but also that what Husserl calls my personal reality and the features of 
such reality becomes accessible only when I recognise myself as an expressive body visible to 
others. Ultimately, then, the self-awareness involved in one’s attitudes and the complex of 
associations built upon this only function as a form of personal self-consciousness by means of the 
‘identification’ instituted through interpersonal mutual recognition. 
 
§5.2.2 | Personal agency and the interpersonal nexus. 
 
Having spelled out several respects in which reflective personal self-understanding is 
intersubjectively mediated, we are now in a position to consider in what manner sociality is 
presupposed on the level of the pre-reflective activity of personal selves. While this is a huge and 
complex topic to which an entire book could be dedicated, I will limit my considerations to three 
central themes. 
(1) In the first place, it is evident that concepts appropriated from a linguistic community 
infuse and condition the attitudes of a person. This is not only the case with regard to the more 
obvious case of judicative beliefs. As Drummond has recently emphasised in his Husserl-inspired 
account of emotive intentionality, it makes sense to regard an emotion as rationally motivated by 
the object or situation to which it responds only if the subject of that emotion has some 
understanding of a relevant range of axiological and non-axiological concepts. This holds because 
the implication of conceptual understanding makes it possible for the subject of the emotion to 
think self-critically about whether his or her emotion responds appropriately to the situation which 
elicits it, as well as enabling others to pose the same kind of question.449 Finally, while Husserl 
would emphasise that the lived experience of willing and acting essentially involves pre-predicative 
modes of practical intentionality, it is clear that many of the activities involved here—such as 
projecting oneself into the probable future, considering what counts as means and ends, and 
weighing up the motivational force of conflicting possibilities and reasons, and so on—would be 
unrecognisably altered if stripped of all their conceptual content. Schutz and Luckmann put this 
point aptly: 
Of course, various extra-societal achievements of consciousness must be presupposed “before” action. 
Action itself, however, is based on the sociality of the actor. The project, the choice between projects, and 
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emotions presupposes their answerability to norms of emotional appropriateness, these norms being in 
their turn intersubjectively generated and appropriated by persons from their social surroundings. 
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the performance of the act—and not only later narratives about the act—presuppose various, mainly 
linguistic or languagelike social objectivations of subjective processes, objectivations in which the subjective 
processes take on form and stability.450 
The ability to speak and think by means of linguistic concepts, then, counts as one quite general 
and relatively uncontroversial sense in which the engagement characteristic of persons depends 
upon socialisation. 
(2) A less evident, indeed distinctively Husserlian, connection lies in the deep 
interdependency binding personal activity and interpersonal surrounding world. As we saw in the 
previous chapter (§4.2.2), Husserl maintains that personal activity depends upon a pregiven 
surrounding world in as much as our beliefs, emotions, and decisions always take for granted and 
respond to certain recognised worldly objects or situations. Thus, for instance, my choice to wear 
a particular shirt is made in virtue of its smart collar, and with an eye to the important meeting I 
will be attending later; in getting up to close the window, I seek to shield my thoughts from the 
irritating noise outside, while grumbling to myself about the deadline awaiting me tomorrow; my 
hope regarding a political struggle is restored after attending a busy and enthusiastic meeting; or I 
begin to accept an improbable description of what happened at the meeting after I left, once my 
interlocutor provides me with convincing evidence for her bizarre claims.451 As this list of examples 
makes clear, the situations that I respond to in my personal acts are to a significant degree 
interpersonally constituted. To mention just a few possibilities, this can be a matter of specific 
commitments I have made to others as well as of a recognition of their practical projects and 
interests (which I may myself share and jointly partake in), of demands which arise from the more 
anonymous cultural powers of “legal institutions, morals, and religious prescriptions,” or simply 
of things presenting themselves to me as valuable and usable in typical ways that reveal the cultural 
practices in which I partake or know others to partake.452 Indeed, a single personal activity can 
very well be simultaneously responsive in each of these directions. Moreover, as Husserl is well 
aware, it makes little sense to maintain here that what is appealed to in personal acts belongs merely 
to the domain of sense fashioned by the person’s own constitutive accomplishments. Rather, 
personal comportment responds to “intersubjective unities,” to things and situations that pertain 
to the “sole and unique world constituted in intersubjective association.”453 
In other texts, Husserl analyses more extensively the structure and genesis of this cultural 
surrounding world, with his thoughts on this issue developing in two, not obviously concordant, 
directions. On the one hand, Husserl emphasises that a level or dimension of the surrounding 
world is correlated solely with the personal subjectivity to whom it is pregiven and which responds 
to it in personal acts: “As person, I am what I am (and each other person is what he is) as subject of 
a surrounding world.”454  
This claim can be understood in both a structural and a genetic fashion. In a structural 
vein, what functions as pregiven and motivating for a subject’s position-taking acts is evidently 
always a limited selection of worldly affairs, and Husserl’s thought here is that it is the person’s 
current way of being perceptually, affectively, practically, and intellectively oriented that ultimately 
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delimits the range of phenomena relevant to her act of deciding, her emotional response, or her 
belief-formation. As he puts it, the “surrounding world is the world that is perceived by the person 
in his acts, is remembered and grasped in thought, surmised or revealed as such and such; it is the 
world of which this personal Ego is conscious, the world which is there for it, to which it relates 
in this or that way, e.g., by way of theorising as regards the appearing things or by way of feeling, 
evaluating, shaping technically, etc.”455  
In a genetic-developmental register, Husserl’s suggests that the sense-content of the 
surrounding world pregiven for my personal acts is typically dependent not only upon my nexus 
of presently operative intentionalities but also upon my personal history. As he notes, “the 
surrounding world is in a certain way always in the process of becoming, constantly generating 
itself anew, by means of transformations of sense and ever new formations of sense along with 
the concomitant positings and annullings of positings.”456 And the developments and alterations 
which the pregiven surrounding world temporally undergoes are, at least to a certain degree, 
constituted through the sedimentation of the person’s earlier beliefs, emotive responses, and 
decisions.457 In an instructive example from a later manuscript, Husserl notes that someone of the 
right persuasion can immediately see the aesthetic value of an old Amati violin without it being 
necessary that she currently feels pleasure in the perceived instrument, indeed without her needing 
to take a good look at it or hear its resounding tone cry out. Here, the perceived violin is given as 
having “the feature of pleasantness, even when it does not actually bring pleasure. At present, the violin does 
indeed affect my emotions, though not in an “alive” act but in the analogue of “symbolic” modification, 
of “obscure” presentation.”458 This case exemplifies how a person’s judicative, affective and 
practical habitualities—here, her tendency to feel the beauty of a certain type of thing once 
perceptually acquainted with it in a pre-eminent manner—can sink down into the passivity of her 
perceptual-embodied world-constitution, in such a way that things can show up for her as having, 
in this instance, an evaluative significance which ‘symbolically’ points towards possible emotive 
acts (and their perceptual circumstances) without such acts being presently alive. And as Husserl 
continues, this ‘cold’ and yet pre-predicatively evaluative recognition of the violin can in its turn 
serve to motivate a higher-order response, in which “I consider the violin with a loving gaze, with 
awe for this “work of art,” in virtue of its noble tone, which is familiar to me from experience, but 
not actually given or reproduced in the present. Likewise, the awe, the love, can, in its turn, be 
currently active—though, on the other hand, it also needn’t be.”459 The fundamental point which 
this example brings to the fore is that one’s history of judicative, affective, and practical position-
takings ‘creases’ (to employ a phrase from Sokolowski) the surrounding world which is always 
pregiven for personal acts.460 And this leads us to the thought, explicitly taken up in Husserl’s late 
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manuscripts, that personal subjectivity is not merely a theme for ‘empirical’ self-understanding but 
can be treated, in phenomenological reflection, as an agent of transcendental constitution.461 
On the other hand, a seemingly different picture of the constitution of the surrounding 
world comes into view once we attend to its social and intersubjectively accepted character. As 
Husserl notes, the lowest level of the surrounding world is the domain treated in Chapters 2 and 
3, that is, “intersubjective material nature as common field of actual or possible experience of 
individual minds.”462 After all, in choosing the smartly-shaped white shirt, shutting out the din 
from the street below, or responding emotively to the political meeting, it is always taken for 
granted that certain things and events have those material features which I perceive them as having, 
and this not just for me but for all other (‘normal’) embodied subjects. Building on the arguments 
of Chapter 3, we can thus say that being in experiential contact with a surrounding world 
presupposes that I have undergone the institutive event of being recognised as an embodied 
perceiver by another embodied perceiver who I recognise as such. But as has already been 
mentioned, the surrounding world pregiven for personal life is more than mere intersubjective 
nature, in that it incorporates an array of richly sociocultural phenomena. And for Husserl, the 
furnishing of a person’s surrounding world with this richly social stratum comes about through 
empathetic recognition of and engagement with other persons. The full sense of the matters with 
which I engage in thinking, emotively valuing, and acting—as well as the generic values and ideals 
and specific goals which guide my personal activity—depends to a large degree upon my 
participation in both more anonymous interpersonal communities and in specific interpersonal 
relationships. Taken from this point of view, it is not the surrounding world as such which is 
squarely correlated with personal subjectivity, but only its specific way of being apprehended: “For 
every subject that in this way is a member of a social association as a totality, there is constituted 
one and the same world of spirit, although from the “standpoint” of this or that subject it is 
apprehended with a corresponding (hence different from subject to subject) apprehensive 
sense.”463 Consequently, it  cannot be the case that the interpersonal surrounding world is built 
upon a merely personal or egological Umwelt, such that the entirety of the latter could be thought 
of in separation from the former (a somewhat Cartesian position which Husserl at one point 
entertains).464 Rather, the ‘creases’ in the surrounding world instituted by my position-taking acts 
are typically interwoven with and motivationally responsive to features of intersubjectively 
accepted social reality, whether this be a matter of appealing to scientific theories, evaluating 
political projects or cultural practices, or deciding to actively participate in collective endeavours. 
If the constitutive tie binding personal subjectivity and world does not, then, single out a 
self-enclosed and separable core, how are we to characterise the discrete roles played by self and 
other(s) in the constitution of the Umwelt? In a manuscript dating from 1916 or 1917, Husserl 
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suggests that the primary phenomenological difference here is simply that between self-
manifestation and empathy. On the one hand, there is a pervasive dimension of the surrounding 
world which the personal subject alone “can experience immediately and in the manner of perceptio—
immediately in terms of its own content,” this dimension encompassing the subject’s nexus of 
actual and possible appearances, as well his egoic activities and their constitutive correlates. On 
the other hand, there is a second dimension of the surrounding world, intimately interwoven with 
the first, whose apprehensive sense is furnished by others’ world-directed experiences as given in 
possible or actual acts of empathetic presentification. As Husserl emphasises, in as much as worldly 
things are always pregiven for personal engagement as displaying rich soiciocultural senses 
[Geistesobjekten], this latter dimension is always tacitly operative: “Everywhere in this kind of experience, 
a moment of presentification [Vergegenwärtigung] through empathy is involved that can never be redeemed 
through immediate presencing [Gegnwärtigung].” Nevertheless, this moment of presentification always 
functions as a “co-presence on the basis of what is actually perceptively experienced or what may 
be perceived in the course of experience, a co-presence that is not perceptible itself and which 
cannot be converted into the subject’s perceptions, i.e., in terms of his own existential content.”465 
Thus, while personal activity responds to a surrounding world whose sense necessarily appeals to 
foreign experience, the way in which foreign experience is appealed to in the pregivenness of these 
objects constantly exhibits a degree of dependence upon the concrete manner in which matters—
including, of course, the other’s expressive living body—show themselves perceptually to me. To 
this degree, the respective strata of the world correlated with self-givenness and with 
empathetically grasped others are reciprocally motivated by one another. 
In fleshing out this rather abstract model, it is worth noting some of the different ways in 
which an empathetic understanding of others can serve to render accessible the social surrounding 
world. In the first place, the other’s expressive movements can serve to empathetically display her 
personal way of being “related to objectivities, to which we are also related; to earth and sky, field 
and forest, to the room in which “we” dwell communally, to the picture which we see, etc.”466 That 
is, seeing another person is not a matter of peering into a closed vessel, but of empathetically 
grasping another world-engaged subject, a subject whose attitudes are thereby recognised both as 
intelligibly responding to a shared world, and as creasing that world in a way which, at least initially, 
only the other originally lives (see §5.3.2). Beyond this rather minimal way in which the sense of 
the surrounding world can be broadened, a whole sphere of social understanding is opened up 
through communicative engagement. As Husserl puts it: 
The common surrounding world acquires communalities of a new and higher sense by means of acts of 
personal mutual determination which arise on the basis of mutual comprehension. […] Persons do not only 
apprehend themselves comprehensively inasmuch as one understands the living Corporeality of the other 
belonging to his surrounding world and its spiritual sense, thereby interpreting the facial expressions, 
gestures, and spoken worlds as intimations of personal life. In their spiritual activity they direct themselves 
to one another, they perform acts with the intention of being understood by the other and determining 
him, in his understanding grasp of these acts (as expressed in this intention), to certain personal modes of 
comportment. […] In this way relations of mutual understanding are formed: speaking elicits response; the 
theoretical, valuing, or practical appeal, addressed by the one to the other, elicits, as it were, a response 
coming back, assent (agreement) or refusal (disagreement) and perhaps a counter-proposal, etc. In these 
relations of mutual understanding, there is produced a conscious mutual relation of persons and at the same 
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time a unitary relation of them to a common surrounding world. Furthermore, this might be not merely a 
physical and animal (or personal) surrounding world but also an ideal one, e.g., the “world” of 
mathematics.467 
In not merely empathetically grasping the other but also listening to her given voice to her 
thoughts, emotions, and plans, in then attempting to make myself understood in a similar fashion, 
and in the mutually accepted agreement and conflict that can arise through this, my personal 
surrounding world acquires a more deeply social status and is furnished with otherwise inaccessible 
(ideal and cultural) dimensions. Indeed, Husserl goes so far as to maintain that “sociality is 
constituted by specifically social, communicative acts”.468 After all, without communicative 
engagement and the ability to jointly act intimately related to it, it is evident that we could have no 
grasp of “works as works, as works of the individual and works of the community, but also the 
apperceptions of thoughts and feelings, etc., of the individual as motivated by his milieu, through 
the “influences” of others, whether of others in immediate inter-commerce or in the mediate way 
of understanding their works by what of tradition, etc.”469 And once these empathetically and 
communicatively disclosed senses and types become habitually incorporated into my passively 
constituted Umwelt, we can indeed say that the worldly situations pregiven for personal acts are 
always already interpersonally constituted.470 Hence, as Theunissen aptly puts it, for Husserl just 
as much as Heidegger there is already an ontological rather than merely an ontic presence of others 
in my world-embracing horizon, and this holds just as much for the surrounding world in its richly 
sociocultural meaning as it does for its underlying stratum of intersubjective nature.471 
(3) We ought to consider one final sense in which personal agency depends upon 
interpersonal relations. Here the issue is not so much the roots of conceptual understanding or 
the sociality of the surrounding world, but rather the social origins of our personal attitudes 
themselves.472  In this regard, we can begin to amend a shortcoming of Chapter 4, which focussed 
largely on those enduring attitudes which arose from acts of rationally motivated endorsement 
achieved by the subject who holds them. However, as we saw Heal emphasising in her objection 
to Moran (§4.3.2), it is the case that many of our attitudes were not first approved by us on the 
basis of justifying reasons, but were rather at some stage passively taken over from others. Not 
only is this an issue which any adequate philosophical account of attitudes, and of the kind of 
awareness and knowledge their subject has of them, must accommodate; it is also a matter which 
reveals the socially embedded character of personal life. 
We saw in the previous chapter that Husserl locates a primitive self-awareness of attitudes 
in the experience of passively taking over or sustaining a thought, emotion, or resolution we had 
previously held. Intriguingly, in the manuscript discussed there, Husserl claims that the same 
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structure of appropriation is exhibited in cases where we take over the attitudes of others as it is 
when we preserve ourselves through habitually assuming our past attitudes: 
This unity of an opinion [Meinung] can exceed the individual Ego and become a unity within a community 
of communicating subjects. Within a subject a unity of “opinion” is constituted, one which endures in that 
the originally given opinion (the originarily awakened conviction, the original perception or “experience,” 
the original decision) “comes to life again” in repeated reproductive acts, and the theme is assumed 
[übernommen wird], hence the thesis is active in the form of appropriation [Übernahme]. Now, this may involve 
one person “taking over [übernehmen]” a conviction from another, it can be a joy passing over from subject 
to subject, and the same can apply for a wish, an enthusiasm, a will. The conviction, which someone else 
expresses, can enter into me immediately [ohne Weiteres]. The “empathetic, comprehending” presentification 
plays the role of the authentic reproduction (the memory). I do not only understand and comprehend, I 
co-judge, co-believe, and the theme with the posited thesis enters into me immediately—irrespective of 
whether this occurs with insight. Someone presents me with an argument, I understand the argument and 
participate in it. Someone expresses an axiomatic proposition, I understand and appreciate it with him. 
Someone else presents me with compelling reasons for the hoped-for victory of our troops: I understand 
the reasons, I incorporate them (participate in the justification) and take over the hope. Someone expresses 
a hope, I participate in it, it is now not only in general my wish, but rather a co-accomplished, appropriated 
wish.473 
We find ourselves, in certain cases, taking over attitudes that we find taken by other persons whom 
we empathetically encounter. In so doing, we do not merely take the other’s attitude as something 
endorsed by the other but endorse it ourselves, accepting the validity of the manner in which it 
articulates a transcendent state of affairs. The examples offered by Husserl in this passage already 
indicate that this can occur with varying degrees of passivity. In particularly passive cases, we 
simply accept the truth of the other’s position-taking without bringing its motives into view. In 
less passive cases, however, we appropriate the position-taking only once we have been exposed 
to the motives which the other appeals to as legitimizing her position-taking, only once she has 
indicated in one way or another the relevant reasons. As Husserl emphasizes, even in cases of the 
latter sort, where “a secondary constitution, a secondary originality arises,” this is nevertheless 
something different from “the originality of a conviction, a joy, etc.” that one has formed for one’s 
own reasons. As he concludes, it is only if we are able to regard such intersubjectively appropriated 
attitudes as nevertheless attitudes which are lived as our own, that we can distinguish within the 
domain of our attitudes those which are formed autonomously and those which are not: “True 
autonomy [Selbständigkeit] pertains only to he who constitutes, from himself and in himself, a 
conviction, a joy, etc., one which is originarily conceived on the basis of its motives. Where this 
autonomy is lacking, there is, however, a great difference between wholly passive acceptance in 
passive following, and acceptance in re-enacting, recreating production, in being carried along by 
a presented argument.”474 
One intriguing consequence of this line of thought is that there can be varying degrees to 
which an appropriated attitude is lived as ‘mine,’ and correspondingly, to which I am influenced 
by others. Thus, on the one hand, when passively appropriating an attitude from another, the very 
act of appropriating fails to exhibit any enduring and unified features of the self. Of course, the 
appropriated attitude does exhibit a transcendence with regard to the act of appropriation, in that 
the attitude is simultaneously (empathetically) given as co-accepted by the other—and to this degree 
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a certain intersubjective unity is manifest in such acts. In another manuscript, Husserl terms this 
intersubjective unity a “connection of involvement” [Verbindung der Ingerenz], and argues that such 
connections play an analogous role for the development and intelligibility of persons as causal 
relations do for physical things.475 Moreover, in a line of thought famously associated with 
Heidegger—who, being familiar with the Ideen II manuscripts, may have been guided by a certain 
unacknowledged appropriation on this issue—Husserl notes that such unities are not limited to 
the manner in which persons can be influenced by the attitudes manifest in the bodily expressions, 
spoken words, or writings of concrete other persons, but also by stances which have become 
detached from particular subjects and are rather attributed to an anonymous “someone” [Jemand], 
thereby articulating what, generically, “one” does as a normal person or type of person within our 
cultural community.476 Seen in this light, “General morals and practices appear as indeterminate 
general imperatives, foreign and characterised as foreign—“one” judges in this way, “one” holds 
the fork in this way, etc.—these are the demands of the “one [Man],” of the social group, the rank, 
etc., which is evidently no person.”477 In a somewhat Bordieusian manner, Husserl is here gesturing 
towards the sense in which a person can, in her appropriated bodily habitualities just as much in 
the attitudes she has picked up from others, function as a bearer or carrier of tradition.478 And of 
course, many of the stances which have passively arisen from a person’s involvement with others 
lose their foreign character over time, having been habitualised into her own way of being, and 
perhaps even showing themselves in appropriative-memorial acts as enduring features of who she 
is. Once could even say that if a conviction appears to be so intimately my own that I cannot 
remember a time when I did not hold it, it is all the more likely that I have formed that conviction 
less through rational endorsement than through the influence of others upon my younger self. 
However, the account which Husserl offers of the effects of sociality upon the person is 
not limited to this rather gloomy picture of internalisation and anonymization. On the one hand, 
he notes that even passive appropriation is typically not a matter of habits seamlessly flowing into 
an empty vessel, since the ability of a foreign attitude to take hold of me depends not only upon 
the relevant social and material circumstances but also upon my current nexus of operative 
habitualities.479 On the other hand, through critical reflection I can sometimes find my own reasons 
for endorsing or rejecting a passively appropriated attitude—whether upon initially encountering 
it in another or after the event of appropriation and even habituation—such that I can “adopt it 
myself independently, and it then becomes Mine [es wird zu Meinem]. It now no longer has the 
character of an imperative which I have allowed myself to bear, which has determined me from without. 
Rather, it has become a position-taking which arises and proceeds from my Ego (not merely an 
allure which leads it forward).”480 Consequently while there is here, as Husserl puts it, “a tension 
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between authority and freedom”, this does not exclude the possibility of “dedicating myself” to 
those projects, values, and beliefs I have picked up from others, in a way which exactly involves 
“following myself,” that is, “acting freely, being rational in my activity, and allowing true autonomy 
to hold sway.”481 Moreover, as Husserl emphasises in his Kaizo articles of the 1920s, identifying 
with and committing oneself to an interpersonally constituted and normatively structured “form 
of life” can, particularly when motivated by a eudemonic (and presumably narratively structured) 
reflection that strives to identify the ideals and values which make my life enduringly worth living, 
serve as a means of personal renewal and a vehicle for autonomous self-realisation. In dedicating 
myself to a career or artistic project with which I identify intimately, to a political movement whose 
goals or ideals I cherish, or to a family, community, or communal activity in which I feel at home 
with myself, I can strive to cultivate a form of concordance in my life which goes beyond the 
stability of my habits and which may ultimately approximate the ideal of “universal self-
regulation.”482 At this point, Husserl comes remarkably close to Korsgaard’s thought that, in 
identifying ourselves with a normatively guiding ‘practical identity,’ we quite literally constitute 
ourselves as personal agents.483 But as was emphasised in the previous chapter, Husserl would 
nevertheless insist that such reflectively informed practical ‘self-constitution’ does not bring into 
existence the personal self; rather, it is more a medium through which the person cultivates and 
sublimates herself, thereby striving to actualise a “higher level” or “form” of personal existence.484 
In this way, social life can be not merely an imposition of normalising influences, but a scaffolding 
for self-actualisation and personal freedom; and the degree to which this is the case depends both 
open the fabric of one’s social conditions—which, of course, shape the space of possibilities open 
for personal life—and on whether self-critical rationality, and ultimately reflective self-
understanding, holds sway in one’s thought, speech, and action. 
 
§5.2.3 | Summary. 
 
Lifting an abstraction under which the analyses preceding it had been conducted, this section has 
elucidated several ways in which the personal self is embedded in interpersonal relations. Beginning 
with the social conditions of personal self-understanding, we saw that the ability to describe oneself 
in terms of general empirical concepts rests upon relations of mutual recognition to others. 
Moreover, the distinctive kind of self-understanding enabled by narrative thought is not only 
socially dependent in this way, but also in that involves taking my very life and style as a person as 
accessible to the empathetic gaze of others. I have then indicated three ways in which the 
enactments of pre-reflective personal life depend upon a social context. Not only is it the case that 
my attitudes depend upon (socially mediated) forms of conceptual understanding. It is also the 
case that the surrounding world pregiven for personal acts is correlated not only with my personal 
history but also with the lives of others who I know by means of empathy and communication, as 
well as involving more anonymous forms of social reality. Finally, I emphasised that the nexus of 
habitualities which make up one’s personal style are, in various ways, appropriated from foreign 
sources. 
                                                           
481 Hua IV-2/V-2 735 A [1917]. 
482 Hua XVII 23-30. For further discussion of this element of Husserl’s thought, see in particular the 
valuable contributions from Drummond (2006, 2013b), Melle (2007) and Loidolt (2009). 
483 Korsgaard (1996, pp. 100-103; 2009, pp. 18-21). 
484 Hua XVII 25, 26-7. 
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§5.3 | Interpersonal empathy as recognition. 
 
 
Now that we have considered various kinds of personal self-understanding and elucidated 
Husserl’s thought that the personal self necessarily lives in an interpersonal nexus, we are well-
prepared to consider the nature of our empathetic experience and understanding of other persons. 
With this end in mind, I will consider in this section a ubiquitous and primitive form of 
interpersonal empathy, which involves a perception-like recognition of another personal self, 
before turning in the next section to a more active mode of empathy, which, as a form of inter-
personal understanding, displays similarities as well as differences with the forms of personal self-
understanding considered in §5.1. My approach in this section will be somewhat unorthodox, in 
that I begin by critically engaging with an analysis of the nature of interpersonal recognition found 
in the late Frankfurt School critical theory of Axel Honneth. My reasons are doing this are do not 
only reflect a general belief that both phenomenology and social theory can mutually benefit from 
an engagement of this kind.485 Rather, a more specific motivation for my approach arises from the 
impossibility of adequately thematising interpersonal empathy in abstraction from our concrete 
encounters with others in the midst of the social world. More specifically, I hope to show that the 
character of a basic form of interpersonal empathy—or what I will here call empathetic 
recognition—can come more clearly into view once we both situate it in the web of other modes 
of interpersonal responsiveness at play in our encounters with others. And I take it that Honneth’s 
recent work on ‘emotional’ and ‘elementary recognition,’ building upon decades of sustained and 
remarkably multi-faceted reflection on this issue, can be of aid in bringing into view the manner 
in which concrete encounters with others involve these various dimensions of interpersonal 
recognition. I will begin by singling out a primitive and ubiquitous form of interpersonal 
recognition indicated, though not unambiguously, in Honneth’s work (§5.3.1), before arguing that 
developing Husserl and Stein on empathy allows us to single out a modality of interpersonal 
empathy that captures the primitive interpersonal recognition which Honneth is after, and indeed 
does so more aptly than his own suggestions manage (§5.3.2). 
 
§5.3.1 | Honneth on Social Visibility and Recognition 
 
In a recent work entitled Unsichtbarkeit, Axel Honneth seeks to clarify what he calls the ‘moral 
epistemology of recognition’ by means of an analysis of ‘social visibility’.486 The initial question 
guiding his discussion is the following: “what must be added to the perception of a person—to 
taking cognizance of him—in order to make it into an act of recognition”?487 Honneth raises this 
issue because he starts from the assumption that for a person to be either socially visible or 
                                                           
485 This idea is not new, for there is a proud if relatively unknown tradition of valiant attempts in this 
direction. See, more classically, Duc Thao (1986), Paci (1972), and Sartre (1960), and more recently, 
Steinbock (1995), Zahavi (2001), and Guenther (2013). 
486 Honneth (2003, p. 10). In regard to Honneth’s broader project of reconstructing a critical social theory 
based on recognition, see the detailed study found in Petherbridge (2013), as well as Honneth’s own 
presentation in his inaugural lecture (2007, pp. 63-79). 
487 Honneth (2001, p. 111). 
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invisible, her literal visibility must already be established488—although, as we will see, his discussion 
ultimately shows that this apparently obvious premise requires nuancing. But what does this 
alleged distinction between literal and social visibility amount to? Honneth stipulates that someone 
is literally visible to someone else when that person is correctly identified, by another person who 
perceptually encounters him or her, as a currently present individual of determinate features. In 
short, someone’s being literally visible is a matter of her being perceptually present to another 
person, who in their turn apprehends one in a veridical, and predicative-judgemental, act of 
cognition or Erkennen.489 When it comes to social visibility, on the other hand, matters are not so 
simple. Indeed, we must consider characterisations deriving from two perspectives: that of the 
socially visible person, and that of the person for whom she is socially visible. To begin with the 
former, Honneth writes that to be socially visible is a matter of living in a social space of 
“interactive relationships” in which one is aware of having been accorded a “social validity” (or 
“affirmed”) with respect to the “role of a specific social type” (whether this be an acquaintance, a 
cleaning lady, or a fellow traveller in a train carriage) by one’s interactive partners in that social 
space.490 This can be helpfully contrasted with the experience of one’s own social invisibility, which 
Honneth describes as “non-existence in a social sense”.491 Despite (indeed, precisely as) being 
visible to others in the literal sense, the socially invisible person experiences the “humiliation” of 
encountering others who fail to offer her any visible acknowledgement that she is a person engaged 
in the social world.492 Honneth’s prime example of such invisibility is the first-person narrator of 
Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man: a black person who feels himself rendered ‘invisible’ by the near-
constant and ritualized manner in which the white people he encounters in his social world ‘look 
through’ and actively and publicly fail to ‘see’ him as a person. 
A more detailed characterization of social visibility (and its negative counterpart) is offered 
by Honneth in his description of the recognitive activity that renders another person ‘socially 
visible’. Since literal visibility is allegedly necessary for both social visibility and social invisibility 
and sufficient for neither, and since social invisibility is suffered by subjects who are routinely 
denied visible acknowledgement, Honneth stipulates that the activity of rendering somebody 
socially visible must consist, at least in part, in some form of expressive and publicly performed 
bodily activity directed towards that person in her visible presence. This bodily expression, which 
comprises the properly public aspect of an act of “recognizing” a perceptually present person, 
conveys to this person that the one who performs it is aware of her, and is aware of her not merely 
“cognitively” but in the manner of an “affirmation”.493 To illustrate this, Honneth offers the 
following examples: 
Even adult persons usually make clear reciprocally in their communications, through a multitude of finely 
nuanced, expressive responses, that the other is welcome or deserves special attention: a friend at a party is 
worthy of a sparkling smile or a strongly articulated welcoming gesture, the cleaning lady in one’s apartment 
is offered a gesture hinting at gratitude that extends beyond the speech act of greeting, and the black person 
                                                           
488 Honneth (2001, p. 114). 
489 Honneth (2001, p. 113). 
490 Honneth (2001, p. 119). 
491 Honneth (2001, p. 111). 
492 Honneth (2001, p. 114). 
493 Honneth (2001, p. 115). 
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is greeted like all other persons in the train compartment with changing facial expressions or a quick nod 
of the head.494 
In Honneth’s discussion of such recognitive gestures, several intriguing claims emerge. On the one 
hand, Honneth notes that while such bodily movements are in one sense voluntary actions in and 
of themselves, in another sense they are better described as a kind of “meta-action,” in as much 
as they make it clear to the other person that their agent is willing to act in a particular type of way 
in the future, hence allowing the other to form an expectation of the kind of treatment she will be 
in for as the encounter unfolds. Thus, “a welcoming gesture among adults expresses the fact that 
one can subsequently reckon upon benevolent actions,” while “the absence of gestures of 
recognition” suggests, in the space of the encounter, that the other “must be prepared for hostile 
actions”.495 
Importantly for Honneth, such meta-practical recognition of the other is not merely a 
matter of a habitual compliance with social codes, as if recognizing another person were simply a 
matter of being willing to act towards another individual in a merely customary fashion; rather, he 
claims that all “direct” forms of recognition—i.e. those by means of which a perceived other is 
rendered socially visible in one way or another—possess a “moral core”. This moral dimension of 
direct recognition appears to stem from the fact that the meta-practical commitments it institutes 
are rooted in an acknowledgment that the other is a person, an acknowledgement that is partially 
constituted by a certain kind of evaluation, in which the other’s personhood is taken to be something 
of moral significance. In performatively recognizing the other, the recognizing subject makes it 
clear that she takes the other to be a person and that she is willing to treat the other in a way that 
persons, and only persons, ought to be treated. As Honneth puts it, the diverse forms of direct 
recognition each involve an appraisal of the personality of the other as having a certain “worth,” 
and this appraisal is implicit in the reciprocally understood meaning of the public gesture, since 
such gestures reveal to the recognized person that their agent is “motivated to treat him in the 
future according to his worth”.496 Furthermore, Honneth notes that the spectrum of different 
forms of direct recognition is far from homogenous, and that it includes “fine distinctions” insofar 
as different recognitive gestures betray different types of evaluative appraisal, as well as being 
directed towards and appraising different aspects of the other’s personal life in its social 
dimensions. Although acknowledging that these three “possibilities” are far from exhaustive, 
Honneth offers as examples of direct recognition those gestures which betray love, respect, and 
solidarity.497 
Thus, Honneth’s claim here is that recognition involves a certain kind of personal appraisal 
of the other, one which is simultaneously publically intelligible as something that will serve as 
guiding for the recognizing subject’s practical activity. But what more exactly is the nature of this 
appraisal? While his account to some extent vacillates on this point, Honneth seems to suggest 
that the evaluative character of direct recognition arises in part from its being expressive of a 
specific type of emotional stance, one which is held by the recognizing subject and directed towards 
the other person.498 Thus, what the recognitive gesture most directly expresses is an affectively 
                                                           
494 Honneth (2001, p. 119). 
495 Honneth (2001, p. 120). 
496 Honneth (2001, p. 122) 
497 Honneth (2001, pp. 122-3). 
498 See the interesting, although apparently slightly different, account offered by Honneth his discussion 
of the Kantian notion of respect (2001: 222). 
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grounded evaluation of the other (of one or another form), and this emotional stance is 
furthermore immediately intelligible to the person recognized as having motivational 
consequences, namely as eliciting in the recognizing subject a desire to treat the recognized person 
in a morally appropriate fashion (in one or another sense). As Honneth writes: “Whether someone 
smiles lovingly or merely greets one respectfully, whether someone extends his hand emphatically 
or merely nods his head in a benevolent way, in each case a different type of emotional readiness to 
engage morally with the addressee is signalled with the expressive gesture.”499 This is not to say, of 
course, that all forms of recognition merely involve a person being affectively moved, or even 
involve affect at all. Certainly, the examples offered by Honneth in Invisibility seem to involve the 
act of recognition being rooted in a certain type of affective stance, in that they each involve a 
certain type of emotionally expressive gesture or movement.500 On the other hand, the recognition 
of a person’s legal rights, for example, might not require any specific emotional response, personal 
evaluation, or even bodily gesture, since here an implicit or explicit commitment to act in 
accordance with certain practical norms is often sufficient.501 
Ultimately, Honneth notes that an important consequence of his analysis is that the notion 
of cognition with which he began is in need of revision. When the manner in which we immediately 
respond to those who we take as socially visible is considered, it becomes clear that (in such cases 
at least) our most basic comportment towards others is fused with recognitive elements. Honneth 
thus suggests that the perception of others is rarely the value-neutral cognition of an identifiable 
object, but is rather an “evaluative perception in which the worth of other persons is directly 
given.” Indeed, when it comes to everyday social experience, value-neutral and purely judicative 
identification is a rather rare case, one that occurs only when “an original recognizing is 
neutralized”.502 In short, recognition is grounded in a form of evaluative intentionality already 
present in our perceptual awareness of others. Honneth thus wonders whether his initial construal 
of literal visibility might be in need of revision, given that it now seems questionable to postulate 
a form of cognition uncontaminated by recognitive elements as a basic and self-sufficient layer in 
our relations to others. 
In a later text, Reification, Honneth revisits and deepens his suggestion that affect plays a 
central role in recognition. Here he is at pains to describe a distinctive and basic form of 
recognition, one that, he claims, is already presupposed by forms of recognition in which other 
persons’ cognitive and moral attitudes and social statuses are taken as “a corrective authority” to 
one’s own.503 Drawing on developmental psychology as well as conceptual analysis, Honneth 
argues that the ability to take over another person’s perspective through communication is 
“attached to the hardly accessible prerequisite of emotional receptivity or identification”.504 He 
moreover describes such a recognitive stance as a form of ‘sympathy’ (Anteilnahme), by which he 
means an emotional mode of comportment in which the rhythm of the other’s emotional life 
affects the sympathetic subject, presenting itself as having a certain value and thus as an “invitation 
                                                           
499 Honneth (2001, p. 122, my emphasis). 
500 Honneth (2001, p. 119) 
501 Honneth discusses the different forms of recognition pertaining to love, rights, and solidarity, in his 
seminal work, The Struggle for Recognition (1995a, pp. 92-139). 
502 Honneth (2001, pp. 125-6). 
503 Honneth (2008, p. 42). 
504 Honneth (2008, p. 46). 
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to act”.505 Thus, and following a distinction already present in his discussion of invisibility, 
Honneth seeks here to distinguish this “emotional recognition,” in which the other is recognized 
in a sympathetic or benevolent manner, from “that particular form of mutual recognition” in 
which the “other person’s specific characteristics are affirmed”.506 
Honneth also seeks to delineate a certain type of general stance towards other persons, one 
which is presupposed and articulated by specific acts of recognition and recognitive relationships, 
and which he thus describes as an “elementary” or even “existential” mode of recognition.507 
Crucially, this general stance is also taken to be a presupposition for any active denial of substantial 
recognitive acts. Like the different modes of positive recognition, the forms of social activity 
rooted in the denial of recognition constitute a broad spectrum, from the basic act of responding 
to others in an emotionally negative way, to the more extreme cases of ‘reification,’ in which the 
other person is treated in a purely instrumental fashion and denied any moral significance 
whatsoever.508 And yet all of these stances, like all specific acts of positive recognition, are rooted 
in this elementary recognitive stance, which Honneth characterizes as a “practical, non-epistemic 
attitude that must be taken up if one is to attain knowledge of the world or other persons”.509 
In a further step, one which is on the face of things tempting to follow, Honneth connects 
the two claims, maintaining that this elementary mode of recognition itself “contains an element 
of affective sympathy”,510 or more strongly, that it just is a stance of sympathetic-affective 
recognition.511 One consequence of this move is that Honneth must then offer an account of how 
sympathy and affective valuation can indeed comprise a fundamental and universal layer in our 
other-relations, since this is exactly the role which elementary recognition is supposed to play. 
After all, it is far from obvious that all of our relations to others, and in particular those involving 
mere indifference or the active denial of positive recognition, are rooted in sympathy. Honneth is 
certainly aware of this problem, and he claims that an appropriate account can be given for both 
of the characteristic cases of recognitive denial already mentioned—namely, negative emotional 
responses, and reification. In enacting a negative emotional response to another person, Honneth 
writes, “we still always have a residual sense of not having done full justice to their personalities. 
In such a situation, the element in our recognitional stance which we customarily call ‘conscience’ 
would be at issue.”512 
Now, I take it that Honneth here identifies a relatively prevalent and philosophically 
interesting facet of our social and, more broadly, emotional being—namely, the sense in which 
our emotional responses can be appropriate or inappropriate to the matters which they target, and 
                                                           
505 Honneth (2008, pp. 45, 49f., 57f.). In the English version of this text, published before the German 
edition (2005), the (not readily translatable) German term “Anteilnahme” is mostly rendered as “empathic 
engagement,” but given my broader use here of the slightly different (phenomenological) notion of 
empathy, I use here the translation “sympathy.” 
506 Honneth (2008, pp. 46, 51). 
507 Honneth (2008, pp. 51, 90) 
508 Honneth (2008, pp. 51, 58f.) 
509 Honneth (2008, p. 54). 
510 Honneth (2005, p. 59 [2008, p. 50]) 
511 Thus, to cite one example of many, Honneth writes of “einer vorgängigen Einstellung der 
Anerkennung oder Anteilnahme” as being prior to all cognitive attitudes with regard to the world of social 
relations (2005, p. 63, my emphasis). 
512 Honneth (2008, p. 51). For reasons of space I am unable to discuss here Honneth’s attempt to render 
cases of reification compatible with his claims regarding elementary recognition (2008, pp. 52–63). 
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can moreover be immediately lived as such, through their accompaniment by an element of 
second-order and self-directed affect (such as pride, embarrassment, shame, or guilt).513 However, 
as a defence of the claim that our other-relations necessarily and universally contain an element of 
sympathetic recognition, Honneth’s allusion to this phenomenon seems unpersuasive. Perhaps we 
can concede that, in those instances where we are aware of unsympathetic responses as being 
normatively inappropriate, a sedimented form of sympathetic recognition thereby shows itself to 
be operative in our experience. But whatever the merits of this line of thought, it appears to have 
no bearing upon the diversity of situations in which an individual responds unsympathetically to 
another person and does so without any sense of her response being inappropriate. Indeed we 
frequently feel, whether correctly or incorrectly, our negative response to another person to be 
fully justified. Honneth’s claim that sympathetic recognition plays a ubiquitous and fundamental 
role in our relations to others thus appears questionable, or at least in need of further 
argumentation. After all, one would surely have to be an unusually compassionate and self-critical 
individual to experience all of one’s non-sympathetic feelings for and engagement with others as 
being inappropriate in nature. And as this observation suggests, not only is it the case that many 
of our responses to others contain no identifiable trace of sympathy, but the extent to which we 
do respond to others sympathetically is just as much rooted in our specific emotional personalities, 
and in the specific nature of the perceived actions and suspected personalities of those that we 
respond to, as it is in our bare recognition of those others as persons. 
It follows from this that if we are to hold onto the notion of an elementary recognition 
underlying even our non-benevolent and merely indifferent responses to others, the terrain in 
which such recognition is to be located must lie below the level of any specific form of emotional 
or practical comportment. That is, any attempt to identify elementary recognition with emotional 
recognition is ultimately unsustainable. On the other hand, and as Honneth has persuasively 
illustrated, elementary recognition must be such that it can be made intelligible how emotional 
recognition can function immediately in our relations to others. We should retain our grip on the 
insight that our basic recognition of others as persons is typically infused with and accompanied 
by forms of other-directed affect, and while these primitive affective responses to others may not 
be as unconditionally affirmative as Honneth seems to suggest, his insistence that an element of 
sympathetic emotional recognition can be operative already at a very basic level of our other-
relations—at least in certain cases and under certain conditions—is both intuitively persuasive and 
in need of further clarification. In the remainder of this section, and taking my basis in Husserl 
and Stein’s analyses of empathy and other-directed emotions, I will delineate one way in which 
these two desiderata can be fulfilled. My basic claim will be that if elementary recognition is 
identified with empathy, then it becomes intelligible how it can provide an immanent basis for 
emotional recognition, while simultaneously allowing that the details of specific cases of emotional 
recognition (or its denial) have a certain dependency upon the interpersonal context in which they 
are enacted (or denied).514 
                                                           
513 For a discussion of the manner in which emotions of self-approbation or -disapprobation (such as 
pride, embarrassment, shame, or guilt) can be directed towards a first-order emotional response, bringing 
about a lived and pre-reflective sense of that response being normatively appropriate or inappropriate, see 
Drummond (2004, pp. 123f.). 
514 The convergence between elementary recognition and empathy has been briefly noted, but not 
discussed in any detail, by Zahavi (2010b, p. 305). See also the phenomenologically-minded discussions of 
elementary recognition from Varga (2010), and Varga and Gallagher (2012). 
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To summarize briefly, Honneth’s suggestive analyses of the relations between social 
visibility, recognition, and emotion raise the following points. On the one hand, our lived visibility 
to one another in a social (as opposed to ‘literal’) sense, is not exhausted by our perceived spatial 
proximity, but is also shaped by the bodily gestures we direct towards one another, inasmuch as 
these gestures serve to express recognitive stances. In many cases, such recognitive stances point 
towards the affirmation of the other persons’ social status and indicate nothing more than an 
intention to treat the person accordingly. Other recognitive gestures, however, are more accurately 
understood as primarily expressive of an emotional stance held by the recognizing person and 
directed towards the person recognized. Such expressive stances of emotional recognition also 
confirm certain moral expectations on behalf of the recognized subject, inasmuch as they convey 
a certain kind of affective valuation of the other as a person, and a willingness to do justice to the 
other’s personal value in the ongoing course of the encounter. On the other hand, they are not 
ordinarily the product of a process of deliberation, nor are they motivated by instrumental or 
egoistic purposes. Rather, such emotional recognition is a matter of an immediate and affective 
responsiveness to the personhood of the other, a responsiveness which appears just as basic as the 
literal ‘seeing’ of the recognized person. Finally, I have suggested that, in order to account for the 
variety of possibilities for emotional recognition, as well as its possible denial, we need to turn to 
a level of recognition below any emotional stance proper—and this we can find in interpersonal 
empathy. 
 
§5.3.2 | Empathy as elementary recognition 
 
Our critical engagement with elements of Honneth’s social theory has brought into view a 
conception of ‘elementary recognition’ characterised by three generic features. Elementary 
recognition in this sense designates  (i) an acknowledgement of the personhood of others which lies 
below the level of both objectifying judgement and any evaluative appraisal or practical 
acknowledgement of the other’s specific properties, (ii) a universal way in which persons respond 
to other persons, and (iii) a stance which nevertheless functions immediately in our evaluative and 
practical responses to others and which is hence articulated by more positive and specific acts of 
emotive or practical recognition. We can now begin to consider whether interpersonal empathy, 
or a certain level thereof, might satisfy these three conditions.  
(I.) We can first consider in what sense interpersonal empathy functions as a pre-
predicative and pre-evaluative recognition of the personhood of the other. To this end, we should 
first recall the conclusions reached in the first chapter. We saw there that intuitive experience of 
other human beings cannot be accurately captured through simply appealing to the model of thing-
perception. Rather than presenting themselves as spatiotemporal unities of sensuous-material 
features (§2.5), other people show up for us perceptually as expressive units, whose bodily 
movements display elements of a foreign mental life, and where both of these dimensions 
participate in a unitary whole. Importantly, Husserl suggests that other people’s bodily movements 
do not merely expressively reveal discrete mental events; rather, from the outset, they co-exhibit a 
personal self of unique character. He writes:  
Now, as to the persons we encounter in society, their living bodies are naturally given to us in intuition just 
like the other Objects of our environment, and consequently so are their personalities [Personalitäten], unified 
with their living bodies. But we do not find here two things, intertwined with one another in an external 
way; living bodies and persons. We find unitary human beings, who have dealings with us; and their living 
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bodies participate in the human unity. In their sensuously intuitive content—in what is generically typical 
of living bodies, and in the many particularities which vary from case to case—ones of facial expressions, 
of gestures, of the spoken “word,” of the individual’s intonation, etc.—is expressed the mental life of 
persons, their thinking, feeling, desiring, what they do and what they omit to do. What is also already 
expressed here is their individual mental character [individuelle geistige Eigenart], which, to be sure, comes to 
givenness in an ever more perfect way in the unfolding of the states which become understandable to us in 
their nexus as well. Everything is here of an intuitive character; as are external world and living body, so is 
the unity of living body and mind of the man there before me.515 
This passage may appear at first sight to offer a somewhat romanticised interpretation of our 
experience of other human persons. Nevertheless, my contention is that by relating these remarks 
to other elements of Husserl’s thinking regarding empathy and personal selfhood, a 
phenomenologically compelling account of interpersonal empathy can be developed. 
To begin with, we should recall that others present themselves empathetically as 
consciously engaged in a common surrounding world. Not only is it the case that the other’s living 
body manifests a kinaesthetic-sensory system, in that is given as directly embodying a foreign 
perceptual ‘here’ to which various kinds of perceptual ‘theres’ correspond; and that these ‘theres’ 
are normally taken to cohere with my own bodily-relative ‘theres’ within a common system of 
perceptual appearances (Chapter 3). Rather, the mentality evinced in ‘seeing’ another human 
person incorporates more than her perceptual intentionality, and it accordingly draws in layers of 
worldly significance that outstrip the sensible features of intersubjective nature—and 
consequently, interpersonal empathy incorporates but goes beyond animate empathy.516 To 
illustrate this, consider that I see a man across the street from me get out of a car and walk into a 
pizzeria. Assuming that the lighting conditions and spatial proximity are sufficient for me to get a 
good look at this unknown other, then there will be a range of descriptive assertions that I can 
make that merely explicate what is directly given in this experience, and an indefinite plethora of 
questions that arise from these assertions, and which thought and imagination can speculatively 
traverse. Thus, I can say, and on perceptual (or perception-like) grounds, that the man saw the 
pizzeria as such and was purposively walking into it; that his facial expressions and posture 
betrayed an emotive condition in a more or less determinate manner, his gruff scowl and bulky 
walk manifesting a certain frustration; that the slightly exaggerated way he glares at the watch 
shows he is not in the mood to be kept waiting, and so forth. And beyond such descriptive 
assertions, I can think to myself about, for instance, where the man was coming from, what he is 
after in the pizzeria, and whether there is somewhere he needs to be or if he is ‘always like this.’ 
Evidently, such assertions and questions only scratch the surface of the man’s personal life, and it 
can hardly be said that I have a deep understanding of his world-directed thoughts, emotions, and 
actions and of the character which they engage. But what my thoughts do betray is a 
comprehension of the man’s bodily activity as engaging certain kinds of emotive and practical 
attitudes. Moreover, even with such an anonymous other I will still have some understanding, 
whose source is admittedly difficult to determine, that such attitudes respond to and further 
‘crease’ a worldly situation, and that they do so in a manner which is responsive to certain norms. 
For instance, I might say to myself, “I can see he’s angry about something,” and I will likely at this 
                                                           
515 Hua IV-2/V-2 259 (Hua IV 234-5, translation modified) [1913]. 
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stage stop staring, fearful of the further irritation and even practical consequences which are bound 
to emerge if his irritable gaze locks onto mine and sees it is as an affront.  
As these last considerations evince, it is often extremely difficult to neatly separate out the 
senses which the other’s expressive movements display perceptually, and the more probable or 
evaluative sense-articulations that emerge from the imaginative, judicative, emotive, and practical 
activity of the empathising subject.517 However, Husserl would argue that we can only attempt to 
actively explicate the motivational context of another’s attitudes through thought, imagination, 
and our own personal responses, once we have become intuitively acquainted with them as attitudes. 
One way of motivating this claim is by noting that, when faced with another’s angry behaviour, 
we do not have to first imagine ourselves being angry, apply a body of general theoretical 
knowledge, or actively respond to the other in emotion or practice, in order to begin immediately 
treating the other’s emotive condition as a world-responsive and norm-governed attitude. Rather, 
just as our perspectival experience of a thing as having a certain shape or colour implies 
appearance-systems in which such features can be further exhibited, our empathetic recognition 
of another’s anger implies a foreign motivational context in which that anger inheres and actively 
participates. To employ a Wittgensteinian metaphor, to recognise another’s anger is not to identify 
an isolated mental state but to become acquainted with a pattern within the weave of a personal 
life.518 And while this personal context is evinced in my empathetic grasp of an unknown other 
only as a “horizon of indeterminateness and unknownness,” it is nevertheless co-accepted in my 
empathetic-perceptual grasp of the other’s emotive condition.519 Moreover, even if the other’s 
motivational context is only properly lived through originally, in her emotive and practical 
engagement, by the other, this does not makes it something wholly inaccessible to me. Not only 
does the other’s motivational nexus depend upon and articulate the cultural world and its 
meaningful things, events, norms, and institutions (§5.2.2); it is also a domain of sense whose 
distinctively personal ‘creases’ can be gradually disclosed through further empathetic experience 
(see §5.4).  
But what are the implications of this line of thought for the claim that interpersonal 
empathy already accomplishes a recognition of another personal self? In this connection, Husserl 
suggests that in witnessing another’s embodied comportment as manifesting certain emotive and 
practical stances, I often feel myself to have come into a certain kind of ambiguous experiential 
contact with her unique personal style. For instance, in seeing another’s emotive response, we 
typically comprehend in the other not merely a momentary episode but an emotional disposition 
or habituality, or as one can also simply say, an ‘emotion’ that persists beyond its specific episodic 
appearance.520 As Stein puts it, “I not only grasp an occurring feeling in the friendly glance, but 
friendliness as a habitual feature,” just as “an outburst of anger reveals to me a ‘violent 
temperament’ [Gemütsart]”.521 Building upon the analyses of the previous chapter, we can say that 
what this involves is my taking the other’s emotive episode to manifest an abiding emotive attitude, 
a way of responding emotionally that ‘displays,’ albeit most minimally and provisionally, the other 
                                                           
517 Matters are evidently more tricky here than they are with the relatively clear-cut case of thing-
perception, and this is one reason why, as Zahavi has aptly put it, the problem of empathy was for 
Husserl the “preoccupation of a lifetime” (2014: pp. 123-4). 
518 Cf. Wittgenstein (1968, II §i). 
519 Hua IV-2/V-2 680 (Hua IV 342) [1916/17]. 
520 On this matter, see also Goldie (2000, pp. 12-16), Drummond (2004). 
521 Stein (Einfühlung, p. 104; Empathy, p. 86), translation modified. 
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as a subject of habitual emotive character. As we shall see below, Husserl maintains that, as a form 
of interpersonal understanding, this mode of comprehension has a limited veridicality and ‘depth;’ 
and the kind of claim it makes regarding the other’s character is one whose rationally motivated 
acceptance requires fulfilment through ongoing experience. But the important point for now is 
that it in encountering another’s expressive bodily movements as manifesting an emotive stance—
as a genuine outburst of the other’s feelings, rather than merely a set of arbitrary bodily 
movements—we already accept that the ‘who’ we are in encountering is a person with a specific 
character. Just as a material thing perceptually displays its enduring features through the 
circumstance-relative fluctuation of its ‘states,’ a brick displaying its red hue in the dampening of 
its colour-states which accompany changes in the lighting conditions, our empathetic grasp of 
another’s anger as a motivated enactment already manifests ‘something’ of the habitual style of the 
expressive unity we have before us, even if we cannot really describe ‘what’ it manifests. Or put 
more acutely, it manifests someone; where this designates not merely a locus of experience but a 
person with a style and history of their own. As Husserl puts it: “The Ego of the person with its 
stream of lived experience, and with the stream of acts which flow forth with it, is grasped in 
empathy; and within the kind of motivations that are thereby co-grasped, in their habitual type, 
the individuality is also grasped. The other person is grasped in his Ego-life, his Ego-willing, and 
his Ego-working, etc.”522  
(2) We can now consider the degree of universality with which such an empathetic 
recognition of another personal self operates. In this regard, Husserl draws an instructive analogy 
with the case of perceiving an oak tree. The sticking point in this analogy is that becoming 
perceptually familiar with the individual character of the tree is a gradual process, and that this 
process involves the perceived tree acquiring a greater specificity with regard to its perceptual type. 
The shine of a torch reveals the unknown ‘spatial thing’ lurking in the darkness as ‘a tree’; and 
upon closer inspection I notice its typical height, texture, and shape: it is ‘an oak.’ Eventually I 
recognise, in its specific features, ‘that tree’; the one which I have gazed up at and clambered upon 
for years now, but whose labyrinthine branches still contain a universe of possibilities for future 
exploration. Similarly, when perceiving another person we frequently (even, in the bustle of 
contemporary life, generally) know [kennen] very little of their individual character, and rather 
comprehend their bodily comportment and gait “in terms of universal Ego-being.” 523 What this 
means is that the limit-case of our encounter with a stranger involves recognising the other as 
instantiating the wholly general type, “a person, a man,” or in the more normal case, “a man of 
this class, of this standing, of this age, etc.” Importantly, this generic and typified grasp of others 
is not simply a matter of our taking them to be a certain kind of ‘cultural object,’ as ‘something’ 
which is evaluated and used for certain ends in our culture. Leaving aside the important question 
of how, and in what sense, such (reifying) social engagement is possible, Husserl emphasises that 
our grasp of others as of generic social types informs our empathetic comprehension of their 
emotional expressions and of the intentions and projects guiding their witnessed actions, 
particularly when we have amassed prior empathetic experience of other individuals of the relevant 
type.524 Thus, for instance, while the well-heeled older man walking briskly towards the pizzeria 
                                                           
522 Hua IV-2/V-2 611 (Hua IV 389-90) [1910-12]. 
523 Hua IV-2/V-2 575 (Hua IV 228) [1916/17]. 
524 Hua IV-2/V-2 575-6 A [1916/17]. The concept of limit-case is not employed explicitly by Husserl 
here, but is used forcefully in this way by Schutz (1967), who offers a detailed analysis of the role of 
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might look to us as hungry and feeling entitled to good service, the younger man with a delivery 
bag on his shoulder, moving at the same pace and towards the same location and even with a 
similar gait and posture, instead appears to be reluctantly fulfilling his work duties. The essential 
point here is that such typified others are originally present to us as exhibiting forms of personal 
life, as emoting and acting in a way which exhibits typical and socially inculcated motivational 
structures. In this way, even highly anonymous and typified social encounters involve a certain 
form of interpersonal recognition. And just as the perceptual grasp of ‘a tree’ can gradually 
transform itself into one of ‘this familiar tree,’ so too can a generically typified grasp of another 
person develop into a familiarity with the other’s individual personal character or style (see §5.4). 
(III.) We have seen that interpersonal empathy converges with Honneth’s conception of 
elementary recognition, in that it involves a way of perceiving and understanding others as persons 
that is ubiquitous within social life, and which underlies everyday social judgements. A question 
immediately arises here, however, as regards the relation between interpersonal empathy and 
emotive recognition. For on the Husserlian view here developed, while empathy may discern the 
other as personal subject of emotive-evaluative attitudes, it is in and of itself a non-
emotional and evaluatively neutral form of experience. In what sense, then, can we say that empathy, 
as a purely ‘epistemic’ givenness of the other as an embodied person, provides an immanent 
ground for and is immediately articulated by more full-blooded modes of recognition? 
In the following, I will sketch an answer to this question by applying the account Stein 
offers of the relations between empathy and other-directed emotions, with the aim of further 
clarifying Honneth’s conception of emotional recognition. As we saw earlier, what distinguishes 
elementary and emotional recognition is that instances of the latter involve the recognizing subject 
responding emotionally to the person recognized, while the former is rather the underlying 
experience of the other as a person that is articulated by and makes possible such emotional 
responses. In fact, one can find in Stein a description of how, in various ways, our emotional 
responses to other persons articulate and are grounded in empathy. As Stein points out, there is a 
distinctive class of emotions which are characterized by their uniquely targeting other persons: 
“Sentiments (Gesinnungen) of love and hate, thankfulness, vengeance, animosity, etc., which have 
the other person as their object, also belong to the feeling acts in which layers of the person are 
exposed”. However, she goes on to note that, if such emotions are indeed responses to the other 
person, then they must be based in “the grasping (Erfassen) of the foreign person,” which is to say 
in a certain type of empathy in which the other person is given as such.525 Thus if an act of 
emotional recognition targets another person as another person, or in her personhood, then it 
must be motivated by interpersonal empathy. 
Now, one initial worry might be that this line of thought is excessively cognitivistic; indeed, 
it might appear that we have lost sight altogether of Honneth’s insight that emotional recognition 
                                                           
typification in social encounters. The connection between social types and the phenomenology of 
empathy has also been illuminatingly discussed by Zahavi (2014, pp. 145-6) and Taipale (2015). 
525 Stein (Einfühlung, p. 120; Empathy, p. 101), translation modified. In a similar vein, Husserl notes that 
“persons who belong to the social association are given to each other as “companions,” not as opposed 
objects but as counter-subjects who live “with” one another, who converse and are related to one another, 
actually or potentially, in acts of love and counter-love, of hate and counter-hate, of confidence and 
reciprocated confidence, etc.” Hua IV-2/V-2 304 (Hua IV 194) [1910-12]. 
 156 
has a certain priority over an evaluatively neutral and purely cognitive stance towards the other.526 
To my mind, however, this worry is ultimately misguided. As has already been emphasized, 
empathy needn’t involve a cognitive identification in any strong sense, being in its basic form more 
analogous to perceptual experience than to any type of judicative attitude. Furthermore, the claim 
that empathetic givenness grounds or motivates emotional recognition needn’t be understood as 
the idea that we somehow infer our emotional responses from empathetic data, nor even as 
entailing that empathy and emotional recognition are always two wholly separate acts. Rather, as 
Stein explicitly affirms, our concrete experience of the world always contains a constitutive 
moment of affective evaluation, such that objects are always given with some degree of axiological 
sense: “A value-constitution goes hand in hand with every object-constitution, every fully 
constituted object is simultaneously a value-object, and the value-free fact-world is ultimately an 
abstraction.”527 Importantly, this also applies to empathy. When we consider our directedness 
towards other persons in its totality, we discover that empathy is typically accompanied by emotive 
elements, such that the sense others have for us involves, from the outset, not only empathetic 
apprehension but also affective valuation. While empathetically grasping another person’s 
emotional state, we generally feel an immediate response of our own that contributes to the sense 
the state has for us, in that, for example, the other’s anger strikes us frightening, her pride as 
irritating. However, it is also the case that the constitutive role played by empathy and that played 
by the stirrings of affect are in principle different, and moreover that our interpersonal emotive 
responses are responsive to empathetic senses, without the inverse applying in the same way.528 
This line of thought becomes clearer when we consider Stein’s descriptions of such 
emotional responses. Stein takes the most minimal affective interpersonal response to be a basic 
form of sympathy (Sympathie) or antipathy (Antipathie) that arises when we feel ourselves being 
touched by or coming into contact with (Berührtwerden) another person. She moreover claims that 
such affections “are not sentiments that I hold towards a person for the sake of this or that deed 
or feature, but rather an attraction or repulsion exerted upon me by a simple quale, his unique 
                                                           
526 For a rich and original phenomenological account of moral emotions in the spirit of this critique, see 
Steinbock (2015). In this respect at least, Steinbock’s position develops the conception of the 
intentionality of the emotions classically defended by Scheler (1979), and recently criticised in a more 
Husserlian vein by Drummond (2013). My account of the relation between interpersonal emotions and 
empathy is indebted to Drummond’s writings, and in particular to his phenomenological account of 
respect (2006), which construes it as moral emotion of the recognitive strand, and as motivated by acts of 
empathy. 
527 Stein (2010, p. 134 [2000, p. 160, translation modified]). 
528 I include the caveat ‘in the same way’ here, since it may be that when we examine the way in which 
empathetic enactments in their temporal unfolding are motivated, then a unidirectional foundational 
relationship between empathy and affective response will become unsustainable. After all, and as Stein 
herself points out, our epistemic interest in getting to know a certain matter more closely is itself shaped 
by our affective responses to that matter, as well as being dependent upon a more general stance towards 
the value of a specific type of knowledge (Einfühlung, p. 125-6; Empathy, p. 108). One consequence of this 
is that an active empathetic interest—what Stein at one point calls the “characteristic stance (Haltung)” of 
empathy, namely our actively “turning towards and submerging ourselves within foreign lived experience” 
(Einfühlung, p. 36; Empathy, p. 23, translation modified), one mode of which we discuss in §5.4 under the 
heading of ‘interpersonal understanding’—may often be rooted in our affective response to the other, as 
well as in our own prevailing personal values and interests. However, these more genetic-
phenomenological considerations do not challenge the central theses here, namely that (i) our 
interpersonal affective responses are essentially motivated by and founded upon empathetic senses, and 
that (ii) at least certain basic forms of empathy do not presuppose an affective response. 
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character (Eigenart)”.529 Stein is here suggesting that there is a certain type of elementary other-
directed affect that needn’t involve an explicit appraisal of the other in light of her specific personal 
features, emotional responses, or actions. Rather, to put the point in the now-familiar Husserlian 
language, we often find ourselves feeling sympathetic or antipathetic towards another embodied 
person more in light of a certain style already manifest in their expressive and affectively coloured 
movements, one which is utterly distinctive and difficult to describe. While the givenness of this 
style is immediately infused with the element of feeling it arouses in us, it is nevertheless the case 
that this style is something recognised empathetically (albeit imperfectly and approximately), and 
that my affective stirring is exactly aroused by this style and by no other. Consequently, even an 
indeterminate and vague sympathy (or antipathy) for another presupposes and articulates her 
empathetic givenness as a person. Moreover, Stein distinguishes from such minimal interpersonal 
affect what she calls “emotional position-takings” with regard to the foreign person, such as 
approval, admiration, contempt and indignation (which, interestingly, she suggests are in some 
sense based upon or grounded in (aufgebaut) primitive sympathy/antipathy). When it comes to 
these emotional stances we are dealing with the “moral valuation and assessment of the character 
of another person, her sentiments and deeds”.530 In such cases, it is also clear that, in quite different 
and often rather complex ways, the emotional response can only be motivated if the relevant 
“persons, personal features, and personal modes of comportment” it targets are themselves given, 
or at least anticipated as potentially displayable.531 Furthermore, while higher-order forms of 
interpersonal affect are sometimes already interwoven in our experience at the level of perceptual 
empathy, they may gain further motivational import from deeper, and often communicative-
embedded, forms of interpersonal understanding, in which the motivational complexity of the 
other’s emotional and practical engagement is re-accomplished and explicated (§5.4).532 
I take it that the foregoing analysis lends some support to the claim that empathy grounds 
and motivates a certain class of emotions that are directed to the other as a person. But a crucial 
issue remains whether such forms of emotional directedness are sufficient for a 
genuinely recognitional stance. Here too we can take guidance from the way Honneth’s examples of 
the forms of activity that serve to actively render the other socially visible, such as the sparkling 
smile directed towards a friend, or a gesture serving to welcome the other or express gratitude to 
her. As we saw earlier (§5.3.1), such gestures (i) are characterized by their publicity, by having a 
determinate sense within the social space of the encounter that the recognized subject ought to 
understand, (ii) serve to express a certain type of evaluative affirmation of the recognized person, and 
simultaneously (iii) intimate a readiness for a certain type of practical engagement on behalf of the 
recognizing subject. It seems to me that Husserl and Stein’s work can help support and further 
clarify Honneth’s suggestion that some forms of emotional response might fulfil these criteria. In 
regard to (i), Stein importantly underlines a certain empathetic achievement, namely what she calls 
iterative empathy (iterierte Einfühlung). In iterative empathy, an achievement which should remind 
us of Husserl’s discussion of reciprocal empathy (see §§3.2.3, 3.4.2, 5.2, and 5.3.3), I am not simply 
aware of the other as perceptually, affectively, and practically engaged with her material and cultural 
environment, but also as empathetically experiencing other embodied persons, including myself—
                                                           
529 Stein (2010, p. 222 [2000, p. 265-6, translation modified]; cf. 137 [163]). 
530 Stein (2010, p. 221-2. [2000, p. 265, translation modified]). 
531 Stein (2010, p. 137 [2000, p. 163, translation modified]). 
532 Stein also claims that emotional sharing (Mitfühlen) is grounded in empathy (Einfühlung, 25-6; Empathy, 
pp. 14-5); see Zahavi (2014: 245). 
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a situation which involves a curious type of self-othering, since I become aware of myself in a 
wholly new way, namely as an object of empathetic perception for the other.533 Now one 
implication of such iterative empathy is that, in emotionally responding to the other, I often grasp 
that the other may be empathetically aware of the emotional significance of my response. To this 
extent my emotional response to another person, without being strictly communicative in the 
sense of embodying an intention to convey something to her, may nevertheless be lived as an 
enactment that is laid open for her gaze. 
Thus in assessing whether the criteria of (ii) evaluative affirmation and (iii) practical 
implication may apply for interpersonal affective responses, we should consider more closely the 
empathetic awareness which a subject responded to emotionally might have of the subject of the 
emotional response. In fact, Stein’s descriptions of our empathetic grasp of others’ emotions are 
strikingly relevant here: 
Just as my own person is constituted in my own mental acts, the foreign person is constituted in acts 
experienced in the mode of empathy. I experience his every action as proceeding from a will and this, in turn, from an 
emotion. Simultaneously with this, I am given a stratum of the person and a realm of values in principle 
experienceable by him, which in turn simultaneously motivates the expectation of future possible volitional acts 
and actions. Accordingly, a single action and a single bodily expression, such as a look or a laugh can give me 
a glimpse into the core of the person.534 
I not only grasp an actual feeling in the friendly glance, but friendliness as a habitual feature.535 
As Stein emphasizes in these passages, in seeing another person enact a certain type of glance, 
grimace or gesticulation, or in hearing her omit a vocal sound of a certain rhythm, we are often 
immediately aware of her movements as not only having a certain affective colouring, but also as 
immediately embodying a certain type of evaluative stance which this person has taken towards 
something—something which could be one’s own behaviour or personal style.536 While the various 
types of affective response manifest in this way encompass a broad spectrum, it is surely the case 
that some of them can be accurately described as satisfying (ii), i.e., as forms of recognitive 
affirmation. Indeed, not only Stein’s friendly glance, but also Honneth’s sparkling smiles and 
welcoming gestures seem to illuminate just this connection. Furthermore, Stein also indicates here 
that the forms of evaluative comportment manifest in the other’s affectively coloured bodily 
movements ground, in the empathizing subject, certain expectations regarding the possible actions 
which the other will perform. And in those cases in which the other’s emotional stance is given as 
a response to oneself, we are typically led to expect that we are in for a certain kind of treatment 
from the other. This suggests one way in which such interpersonal affective responses may, in 
certain cases, satisfy recognitional criteria (iii).537 
                                                           
533 Stein (Einfühlung, pp. 30, 80-1, 106-7; Empathy, pp. 18, 63, 88-9). 
534 Stein (Einfühlung, p. 127; Empathy, p. 109, translation modified), emphasis mine. 
535 Stein (Einfühlung, p. 104; Empathy, p. 86, translation modified), emphasis mine. 
536 On this point, cf. Honneth (1995b, p. 162–164). 
537 It is worth noting a further implication of this line of thought, one which could have implications for 
broader discussions regarding recognition. We should not overlook here that an act of emotional 
recognition is itself a publically accessible manifestation, not merely of a certain type of elementary stance 
that could in principle be enacted by anyone, but of the unique personality of the individual enacting it. In 
witnessing the sparkling smile of a friend or the welcoming look of a fellow traveller, I do not merely feel 
myself to be the object of an anonymous evaluation. Rather, I simultaneously become aware of the 
subject of this stance as a person, with a unique affective style that reaches beyond the individual act of 
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§5.3.3 | Summary 
 
In recent publications Honneth has cast doubt on the assumption that recognizing another 
individual, such that they feel themselves to be affirmed as socially visible, is always an achievement 
that is substantially constituted by evaluative judgements and practical commitments. Rather, there 
are forms of person-recognition that are primarily rooted in perception and emotion. While 
Honneth’s treatment of the issue has tended to conflate perceptual and affective recognition, I 
have argued that the account of empathy developed by Husserl and Stein allows us demarcate a 
form of perceptual (or perception-like) recognition that is distinct from and makes possible 
emotional recognition. Identifying empathy with a basic and ubiquitous form of recognition that 
does not yet involve any type of evaluative or moral stance, it then becomes intelligible how a form 
of recognition which does involve such a stance can function—or fail to function—immediately 
in our experience of others. I then suggested that Stein’s account of other-directed emotions, 
which she understands as evaluative responses to other persons that find a motivational basis in 
empathy, illuminates the sense in which our basic recognition of others can be intimately 
interwoven with (without necessarily involving) emotional recognition, i.e. with an expressive and 
affectively rooted appraisal of the other in her personhood.  
To put this claim slightly differently, we can actually be social visible to others in (at least) 
a twofold manner. On the one hand, when being basically or empathetically recognized, we may 
become aware of ourselves as visible to others as persons who are perceptually, affectively, and 
practically immersed in the world, and thus as subjects whose personal lives are perceptually 
accessible and directly intelligible to others, albeit in a complex and often ambiguous way. On the 
other hand, when being emotionally recognized, we can also become aware of ourselves as being 
the object of a certain kind of affective appraisal by another person, one which allows us to expect, 
on the basis of past experience and familiarity with emotive and practical norms, a certain kind of 
treatment in our dealings with her.  
It is worth dwelling on the consequences of the line of thought for the case of reciprocal 
interpersonal empathy discussed earlier in this chapter (§5.2.1). We can now see that such a mode 
of reciprocal recognition goes beyond what in Chapter 3 I called reciprocal animate empathy 
(§3.2.3, §3.4.2), and does so in various ways. Not only does the form of mutual recognition at stake 
here involve an awareness of myself as a personal self—an embodied subject of world-responsive 
and norm-governed attitudes—expressively displayed before the gaze of the other. It also involves 
becoming aware of my vulnerability to the other’s possible or actual emotive valuations, to a nexus 
                                                           
recognition, even if my awareness of this determinate personality is often itself somewhat indeterminate 
and imprecise. While this point might appear inconsequential, it underlines that whether or not an act of 
emotional recognition emerges is a matter which ‘depends’ upon the emotional character, and ultimately 
the biographical history, of the recognising subject, as does indeed the denial of such acts. Furthermore, 
the aspect of personality brought to light in emotional recognition belongs to its social or interpersonal 
dimensions, since it is a person’s enduring style in her emotional responsiveness to other persons. This 
suggests that a penetrating analysis of the conditions under which emotional recognition can become, in 
its different forms, a basic feature of our social lives—and equally, of the origin of the habitually rooted 
and socially reproduced forms of recognitive failure characteristic of what Honneth calls ‘social 
pathologies’ (1996)—would benefit from giving a closer consideration to the structural role played therein 
by emotional personality in its social dimensions, as well as to the social conditions under which such 
personality is shaped. 
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of stances which, in being visibly directed my way, could penetrate uncomfortably far into ‘how I 
feel,’ ‘what I am doing,’ and ultimately ‘who I am.’ And this vulnerability can destabilise my self-
understanding in various ways; affecting my claim to have certain rights, to be participating 
correctly in interpersonal activities, and to be responding appropriately in my emotive and practical 
life. Moreover, just as being recognised as an animate and perceptually immersed living body is 
decisive for the accessibility of intersubjective nature, I would suggest that being empathetically 
recognised as a personal self is a condition of possibility for the emergence of socially constituted 
senses in my surrounding world.  Without being recognised as immersed in a common cultural 
surrounding world by others, I would be unable to set up culturally-embedded meanings, norms, 
and values as guiding for my personal activity, lacking the awareness of myself as ‘one’ to whom 
such norms and traditions could be applicable. 
 
 
§5.4 | Interpersonal Empathy as Personal Understanding. 
 
 
In the final section, I argue that empathy can ground a form of interpersonal understanding that 
approximates the kind of personal self-understanding discussed in the first section of this chapter. 
However, this requires empathetic understanding to go beyond a mere perceptual recognition of 
another personal self and aim at an imagination-like envisaging of the other’s personal activity as 
lived by the other. Distinguishing Husserl’s account of this from one developed in contemporary 
simulation theory, I argue that such envisaging requires the recognition of personal difference, and 
as such functions best when participating in a narratively structured understanding of the other’s 
personal history, one which is informed by sustained empathetic contact and interpersonal 
relationships. 
In order to underline the distinctive character of the conception of empathy developed by 
Husserl and Stein, we can return again to the sophisticated simulationist account recently offered 
by Karsten Stueber, which hinges upon a distinction between two different types of empathy. As 
we briefly saw the first chapter (§1.1), basic empathy involves a quasi-perceptual ability to recognize 
other persons as minded beings, as well as to identify certain of their more embodied mental states, 
such as the anger expressed in one’s trembling hands or the intention expressed in the grasping of 
a cup. Reenactive empathy, on the other hand, involves ‘simulating’ the other’s mental states by 
imagining myself as their subject, and thereby seeking to understand the relation of such states to 
the motives, reasons, and norms that render them intelligible. Importantly, Stueber argues that 
without reenactive empathy we would be unable to understand others as rational agents. In support 
of this claim, he appeals to two distinctive features of mentality which, he claims, are on the one 
hand necessarily appealed to in any description which does justice to the rationality and norm-
responsiveness of a mental occurrence, and on the other, can only be made intelligible through 
imaginative reenactment. On this basis, Stueber argues that understanding others’ mental 
states as enactments of rational agents requires reenactive empathy, since it necessarily requires us 
to put ourselves “in the other person’s shoes” and seek to understand her mental states as if they 
were our own, thus providing them with the first-personal framework necessary for their 
rationality to be comprehended and assessed.538 
                                                           
538 Stueber (2006, pp. 21, 152, 160, 164-5). 
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The first feature of rational agency which Stueber appeals to is its contextuality. The thought 
here, briefly, is that in understanding what a person could appropriately specify as a reason for her 
beliefs, emotions, or actions, reference to a universal framework of norms will typically be 
insufficient. Rather, what counts appropriately as a reason is largely a context-dependent issue, and 
this context is only something which we understand through being first-personally immersed in it, 
or by imagining ourselves to be so immersed.539 The second feature of rational agency concerns 
the essential indexicality of thoughts as reasons. Stueber’s argument here is that in order to 
understand a thought as a reason for action, that thought must be conceptualized as integrated 
into a unitary subjective perspective, since it is only then that it can be construed as a thought 
‘owned’ by an agent and which could thus serve as guiding for (the same agent’s) behaviour. 
Stueber thus concludes that another person’s thought can only be understood as a thought of a 
rational agent—as opposed to simply an ‘internal event’ that one might identify in a quasi-
perceptual manner—in as much as the empathizing subject understands it as a thought that could 
be her own, and which could, if it were her own, serve as a reason for her own action. And clearly, 
this way of understanding an agent’s thoughts involves some form of reenactment.540 In short, to 
construe a person’s thoughts, emotions, and actions as context-appropriate and as motivationally 
related to other thoughts, emotions, and actions had by the same person—and thus as participating 
in rational agency—it is necessary to imaginatively reconstruct the other person’s own first 
personal perspective (reenactive empathy), and not merely to perceptually identify the other 
person’s discrete mental states (basic empathy). 
It is worth noting that Stueber’s distinction between basic and reenactive empathy roughly 
coincides with at least one of the distinctions drawn by Stein in her account of empathy. We have 
already seen that Stein distinguishes between empathetic perception and empathetic explication 
(§1.2.2). While the former involves my ability to directly grasp the mindedness of the other in her 
expressive bodily movements, the latter involves a form of self-displacement (Hineinversetzen) or 
re-accomplishment (Mitvollzug, Nachvollzug), in which the other’s intentional experiences are 
understood in their motivational interconnectedness, through my bringing them to givenness in a 
manner that resembles the way my own experiences are lived through by me.541 Moreover, Stein 
would not be unsympathetic to Stueber’s claim that the quasi-first-personal character of 
reenactment can often serve to deepen our understanding of the rationality of other people’s 
actions and emotions. As she at one point notes, understanding (Verstehen) a person’s actions and 
emotions in a fulfilling manner requires “living through in experience (erleben) the transition from 
one part to another within an experiential whole (not: to have [such parts] objectively),” and this 
is presumably something which can only be achieved through re-accomplishing the other’s 
experiences for oneself.542 
However, the epistemic role that Stein assigns to empathetic presentification differs subtly 
but importantly from that which Stueber take re-enactive empathy to play. While Stueber claims 
that we first become acquainted with others as normatively embedded, world-directed, and unitary 
subjects through reenactment, for Stein these features are already implicit within the empathetic 
sense others have for us on the perceptual level, and they rather become more richly and precisely 
                                                           
539 Stueber (2006, pp. 152-61). 
540 Stueber (2006, pp. 161-5). 
541 See, e.g., Stein (Einfühlung, pp. 18-20, 32-3, 39, 51; Empathy, pp. 10-11, 20, 25, 34), translation modified. 
542 Stein (Einfühlung, pp. 102-3; Empathy, pp. 84), translation modified. 
 162 
understood through our re-accomplishing and explicating the other’s experiences. On her view, 
empathetic presentification doesn’t first introduce a domain of categories that are wholly lacking 
on the perceptual level; rather, it merely “allow[s] us to realize what was first vaguely meant” in 
our perceptually based grasp of the other person’s experiential acts in her expressive bodily 
movements.543 One benefit of Stein’s account is that it allows us to capture an experience which, 
it seems to me, is relatively prevalent in our daily lives, namely, those cases in which we perceive 
another person as being in some way purposively immersed in a norm-responsive practical or 
emotional attitude, but feel ourselves unable (or simply lack the interest required) to reenact the 
detailed motivational situation in which the other’s action or emotion is embedded.544 Similarly, 
Stein’s account might be better equipped to deal with those cases in which one is directly aware of 
someone else as responding in emotion or action to a situation whose normatively relevant features 
are evident to both self and other, an awareness which seems to frequently occur without any 
explicit act of reenactment taking place, one’s empathetic understanding rather resting upon a 
shared context of normative relevance with which both subjects are familiar. To put this point in 
the terms of the previous section, our direct empathetic recognition of other persons already takes 
their embodied (affective and practical) enactments as norm-governed responses to a personal 
situation, and as embedded within a distinctive experiential life. Consequently, Stueber’s stipulation 
that we only recognise the contextuality and indexicality of another’s mental life through 
imaginatively projecting ourselves into it can be accused of downplaying the manner in which 
other people’s expressive movements, on the one hand, draw in a richly meaningful surrounding 
world, and on the other, manifest a conscious and engaged form of subjectivity. 
This is obviously not to reject entirely the claim that quasi-imaginative modes of 
empathetic re-accomplishment have an important and irreducible function for interpersonal 
understanding. While contesting the thought that empathetic re-accomplishment is necessary for 
a recognition of the other as a subject of norm-governed attitudes, Husserl and Stein would 
acknowledge the role of such experiential ‘re-living’ in acquiring a deeper understanding of another’s 
personal life and the character manifest therein. In this context, Husserl notes that the extent to 
which we take ourselves to have a sufficient understanding of the actions or emotions of another 
person is largely a matter of our practical interests.545 In our daily encounters with others we often 
remain satisfied with empathetically comprehending them merely in accordance with general types, 
lacking the interest required to go beyond our initial grasp of the other as a token of the universal 
type, ‘someone,’ or as someone exhibiting a type of comportment (as someone walking briskly, 
smiling happily, or lost in thought) or embodying a certain socio-cultural type or role. However, if 
we are so interested, it is also possible for us to aim at a deeper empathetic understanding of the 
others’ comportment, by uncovering the relevant facets of the motivational situation in which that 
action was embedded. As Husserl puts it:  
If we now take an individual nexus—such as a train of theoretical thought, a practical nexus of aims, the 
setting of means, realisations, a plan, an attempted project, a fluctuation between mediating 
accomplishments, etc.—then such a nexus is something “intelligible.” This means that if I have someone 
given over and against me, and if I grasp by means of empathy that he has accomplished one or another 
individual action, then I have still not understood his acting. I have understood this, and have done so 
                                                           
543 Stein (Einfühlung, p. 31; Empathy, p. 20). 
544 Cf. Stein (Einfühlung, p. 113; Empathy, p. 115). 
545 Hua IV-2/V-2 578 A [1916/17]. 
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entirely, once I have reconstructed the motivational nexus: what stands before him as a goal, what appears 
to him as an attainable medium, which inclinations and allures assailed him and which of those he rejected, 
and why he acted as he did. In short, I understand the “why” if, above all else, I grasp him as a subject, and 
indeed as a subject of passivities and activities, and if I glean from this nexus where he was driven passively 
and where he actively decided, and how things stood with regard to his reasons, which reasons were valid 
for him. I understand his theorising (which I recognise as false), if I have forth his entire course of evidence, 
and if I see that he has committed this error here and that one there, and where these errors lay, that he 
confused two different symbols which, due to his bad handwriting, appeared as sensuously very similar, 
etc. These are then nexuses of intelligibility in a precise sense.546 
It is with regard to such an active mode of interpersonal understanding that Husserl speaks of the 
necessity of my re-living [Nachleben] the other’s personal activity, where this means not merely 
perceptually grasping another embodied person but envisaging with ‘intuitive flair’ [intuitiv] the 
very lived experience of such activity in its concrete motivational context. And as he readily admits, 
in doing this “I must be able to, as it were, co-feel, co-think, and co-act; and I must do this in such 
a manner that it is ‘as if’ I actually feel what the person feels, and that I touch upon, and exactly in 
the manner of empathy, the relevant motivations; indeed, it is as if I am myself motivated by them.”547  
Importantly however, Husserl also emphasises that in acquiring a genuine understanding 
of another’s actions I cannot simply imagine what I would think, feel, or do if faced with the 
other’s situation, or in a situation of a similar kind—although, as we saw in §5.1.2, such an 
envisaging can arguably contribute to our self-understanding. In interpersonal life we do, of course, 
sometimes make use of such an egocentric transposition, just as we apply general bodies of 
psychological knowledge in order to explain other’s behaviour.548 But in such cases, we should be 
wary of assuming that we have genuinely understood the other’s activity in its inner intelligibility. 
For in order to thematise ‘why’ a person’s action, emotion, or belief has emerged, we must not 
only gleam ‘what’ motivates the subject but also ‘who’ she is; that is, we must be able to understand 
how the other, as a subject with a unique habitual character, ‘saw’ the situation as demanding of 
her the response which it did. In this way, genuine interpersonal understanding does not involve 
projecting my own habits onto the other, but requires a prior recognition of personal difference.549 
More specifically, this means that envisaging another’s personal activity is primarily informed not 
by how ‘I would behave,’ but by the relevant features of the other’s personal history that render 
intelligible her habitual way of responding. On the one hand, this means that my knowledge of 
that person’s past life and her habitual character can inform my understanding of particular 
episodes of her life. To cite an example of Husserl’s, my knowledge that a person has previously 
spent time in Paris allows me to know that “[t]his image of a Parisian building will soon remind 
him of his stay, leading his thoughts in this direction,” and perhaps, given his well-known romantic 
tendencies, arousing in him feelings of nostalgia.550 On the other, we can now see that 
understanding another person is an infinite task, and reaching its ideal form would require me to 
relive the other’s personal live in extenso, and to comprehend the developmental contours of her 
personal character by situating them within an infinitely detailed narrative.551 In this way, a deep 
                                                           
546 Hua IV-2/V-2 745-6 A [1915-17].) 
547 Hua IV-2/V-2 580 A [1916/17].) See also Hua IV-2/V-2 730 (Hua IV 274) [1917/18]. 
548 Cf. Stein (Einfühlung, pp. 105-6; Empathy, pp. 86-7). 
549 Hua IV-2/V-2 576 A [1915/17]. 
550 Ibid. 
551 Hua IV-2/V-2 580 A [1916/17]. 
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understanding of the another person’s actions, emotions, and beliefs can always be informed by 
better understanding their personal character and the history of its emergence, and on the other 
hand, such an understanding is exactly a way of acquiring and increasing such knowledge.552 
Consequently, our ability to envisage and understand the motivational context of another’s actions 
is best seen as embedded within ongoing personal relationships, in which our epistemic familiarity 
with the other person’s character has gradually developed through repeated empathetic contact, as 
well as through communicative engagement and joint action.553  
 
                                                           
552 Hua IV-2/V-2 746-7 A [1916/17]. 
553 Hua IV-2/V-2 730 (Hua IV 274) [1917/18]. This thought may also be one facet of Husserl’s slightly 
opaque remark that the possibility of communication is given eo ipso with the apperception of another 
human being (Hua IV-2/V-2 448 (Hua IV 162) [1916/17]). 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
In concluding this work, it will be necessary to return to the guiding distinction introduced at the 
end of the first chapter, that between animate and interpersonal empathy. We saw in Chapter 3 
that animate empathy involves perceiving another bodily subjectivity as attuned to a common 
perceptual world. In interpersonal empathy, on the other hand, such a recognition is already 
presupposed, and what we comprehend are rather the attitudinal responses of others to features 
of a common interpersonal or social world (§5.3), the latter containing the intercorporeal field of 
perceptual nature only as its underlying layer (§2.4). Here, we perceive the other as a subject with 
a certain historical-personal depth, as a person whose individual style may already come to the fore 
in her distinctive way of emotively and purposively comporting herself, and who we respond to in 
manifold forms of recognition, communication, and social action. 
Now one complication which emerges here, already mentioned in Chapter 3, is that our 
experience of non-human animals as expressive beings often grasps their expressive behaviour as 
displaying forms of emotion and agency. One only need consider Husserl’s playing cat or Wallace’s 
distressed lobster to see that the animate other presents itself as just as much affectively and 
practically relating to its environment as it does perceptually. To this degree, animate empathy 
should not be seen as limited to a recognition of foreign perceptual intentionality. And this may 
appear to raise difficulties for our characterisation of the empathetic recognition of other persons. 
For we appear to left with a rather odd picture according to which our grasp of another person 
contains a layer of animate empathy—in which their perceptual, and pre-personal affects and 
inclinations are apprehended as the lived experiences and enactments of an animal—and a layer 
of interpersonal empathy superimposed on top of it. 
I would like to suggest another way of describing this matter. One thought we have seen 
emerging in the last two chapters (§4.1, §5.1.2) is that within personal life one’s instinctive 
inclinations and pre-attitudinal affects do not comprise a self-sufficient domain but rather function 
as the underlying layer for our very personal agency, our norm-responsive and socially inculcated 
attitudinal responses. To this degree, we are originally acquainted with such primitive affects and 
inclinations—both in ourselves and in others—as matters which allure and are occasionally 
challenged by our decisions, convictions, and enduring emotive stances, and to which we have a 
lesser degree of responsibility than we do for our attitudes proper. Seen from this point of view, 
the difference between animate and interpersonal empathy is not simply a matter of the kind of 
inert mental ‘states’ we attribute to others but is more fundamentally a difference in the kind of 
subjectivity we recognise. And in experiencing another person we do not take her ‘pre-personal’ 
affects as manifesting an animate other, but as elements which infuse her personal life and 
enduring style. Accordingly, while interpersonal empathy always involves an element of animate 
empathy—in that the other is recognised as a fellow embodied experiencer of perceptual nature, 
as well as occasionally acting in a purely instinctive fashion—its primary ‘target’ is the other person 
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who lives through, articulates, appropriates, and resists her passive-embodied perceptual, affective, 
and volitional contact with the world. 
We can also return here to the distinction introduced in Chapter 1 between empathetic 
perception and empathetic explication or re-accomplishment, and ask how it intersects with the 
distinction between animate and interpersonal empathy. It should by now be evident that the two 
distinctions cannot simply be mapped onto each other. On the one hand, and contra Stueber, 
interpersonal empathy can either operate at the level of perceptual recognition, or as a deeper, and 
far more difficult, way of truly understanding another’s personal life and distinctive character 
through reliving her personal history. Moreover, as Stein notes, something similar can be said with 
regard to animate empathy, since another’s bodily subjectivity can also either be perceptually 
recognised or quasi-imaginatively re-lived. While the former is relatively ubiquitous in our 
experience of non-human animals, the latter ability is greatly impoverished, sometimes to the 
degree of near-impossibility, when the animate other has a different kind of bodily sensibility to 
our own.554 Finally, we saw the previous section that, and again in contrast to strongly simulationist 
theories of empathy, Husserl argues that a quasi-imaginative re-enactment has a genuinely 
informative role with regard to interpersonal understanding, primarily when it comes to our 
attempts to recognise the personal distinctiveness of another’s action, emotion, or belief—its 
situatedness within her personal life as a whole—an attempt which is far rarer than mere 
interpersonal recognition 
Beyond this, I hope to have indicated that Husserlian phenomenology, and more 
specifically the ultimately aborted project of Ideen II and the rich explorations contained within, 
provide a fertile ground for philosophical reflection, and that this holds just as much in the 
contemporary philosophical climate as it did a hundred years ago. Indeed, our understanding of 
Husserl’s thinking can be furthered by engaging it with contemporary work, just as the discussions 
of our era can, I believe, also be enriched by such an engagement. 
 
  
                                                           
554 Stein (Einfühlung, pp. 74-78; Empathy, pp. 57-62). 
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Appendix: Texts from Hua IV-2/V-2. 
 
 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 14 
 
Für das Materielle ist also das Mannigfaltige, das als Zustand fungiert, vom Typus Schema (Phantom, 
sinnlich erfüllte Körpergestalt im Raum). Das Schema aber ist selbst eine Einheit der Bekundung, näher: 
der Abschattung. Das bloße Raumschema ist die körperliche Gestalt, die notwendig „einseitig“ und immer 
wieder nur einseitig gegeben ist. Sie stellt sich als Einheit dar und in originärer Beurkundung dar, in 
Kontinuen von Abschattungen, die ihr gegenüber die Mannigfaltigkeiten sind. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 51-2 
 
Auf diese Weise ist also das Gesamtbewusstsein durch seine stoffliche Unterlage mit dem Leib in gewisser 
Weise verbunden, aber freilich, dieses selbst ist nicht lokalisiert, es  bildet keine Schicht mehr am Leib. […] 
Die mitverflochtenen Empfindungsinhalte haben wirklich anschaulich gegebene Lokalisation, die 
Intentionalitäten nicht, und nur in Übertragung werden sie als leiblich bezogene, auch als im Leib seiende 
angesprochen. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 216 
 
Hinsichtlich der konstituierenden Grundarten der Auffassung waren also aufeinander gebaut: die physische 
Erfahrung als grundlegende, auf ihr ruhend und sie mitumfassend die Leibeserfahrung und zuletzt die 
animalische Erfahrung, die Mensch und Tier konstituierende; der Letzteren gehört als konstitutive Schicht 
zu die Seelenerfahrung. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 296-7 
 
Er hat die Eigenschaft der Gefälligkeit, auch ohne aktuell zu gefallen. Er berührt wohl auch jetzt das Gefühl, 
aber nicht in einem „lebendigen“ Akt, das Analogon der „symbolischen“ Modifikation, der „dunklen“ 
Vorstellung. 
Eine alte Amati-Geige hat eine „herrliche“ Form. Ich erfasse sie in einem Blick, obschon ich mit dem Blick 
die Formen in bestimmter Weise durchlaufen, die Geige drehen und wenden müsste, was ich aber jetzt 
nicht tue. Das Gesehene weist vor und weist auch auf die Gefälligkeiten vor, erst recht der schöne Ton, den 
ich jetzt nicht höre. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 297 
 
Ich betrachte die Geige mit liebevollem Blick, mit Ehrfurcht vor dem „künstlerischen Werk“, um des edlen 
Tones willen, der mir aus der Erfahrung bekannt ist, aber jetzt nicht aktuell gegeben oder reproduziert ist. 
Und die Ehrfurcht, die Liebe kann auch jetzt aktuell sein – andererseits aber braucht auch sie es nicht zu 
sein. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 301 
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Also 1) Abstraktion: der Mensch, solipsistisch, und eine bloß dingliche Umwelt; […] 2) der Mensch und 
andere Menschen, die Personen in einer personalen Umwelt. Und dazu gehört eine gemeinsame physische 
Umwelt, ein offener Horizont einer unbekannten, … Dingwelt.” 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 302 
 
Kommunikation als Einheit des Wechselverständnisses (doxisches Wechselverständnis). / Ich verstehe nicht nur 
den Anderen, ich erfasse einfühlend nicht nur sein persönliches und seelisches Sein, sondern in eins damit 
auch umgekehrt erfasst er das meine: In eins ihn als Menschen in meiner Umgebung erfassend, erfasse ich 
ihn auch als Menschen, der mich soeben als Menschen seiner Umgebung erfasst. Ich „erblicke“ ihn, und 
er erblickt mich. Und wir sehen einander auch das an. Wir sehen uns in die Augen und sehen uns in die 
Seelen, und dazu gehört jetzt dieses Hineinsehen selbst. / Ein zweites Stück ist aber das praktische 
Einverständnis…. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 312 
 
Das Ich hat als Korrelat seine äußere Umwelt, darunter seinen Leib als ein Feld der auf es eindringenden 
Reize, der Leib [ist] aber ausgezeichnet als ein Feld der subjektiven Bewegungen und Veränderungen infolge 
der Reize, darunter der frei tätigen Veränderungen. Primär ist der Leib ein subjektives Veränderungsfeld, 
ein Feld der Formen des „Ich bewege“, ich verändere [meine] Gestalt, ich balle die Faust, und ein Feld der 
Bewegungen, infolge deren Abläufe von anderen Erscheinungen bestimmt sind: der Bewegungen meines 
Auges im Ich-sehe, der tastenden Bewegungen etc. Der Leib hat also eine besondere Subjektivität, er vermittelt 
als Organ der Wahrnehmung alle Wahrnehmungen der übrigen Außendinge und dann ebenso alles äußere 
Wirken des Ich in die Außenwelt hinein 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 312 n. 
 
Muss da nicht aber gesagt werden, dass „ursprünglich“ das Feld der Bewegungsempfindungen Feld eines 
subjektiven Ich-tue ist, womit dann weiter, aber mittelbar, Abläufe des Subjektiven Hand in Hand gehen. 
Ferner: [Ist] der Leib als Empfindungsfeld und Empfindung in sich schon ein ursprünglich Subjektives? 
Aber siehe das Spätere. Es geht nicht an, Empfindungen als Ichzustände zu fassen.” 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 323 
 
Natur, als die in sinnlicher Erscheinung unmittelbar gegebene und mit sinnlichen Qualitäten erscheinende 
Natur, unterschieden von der Natur der mathematischen Physik. […]  
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 325 
 
Die mathematische Natur ist also nicht eine unmittelbar wahrgenommene, nicht eine intersubjektiv 
einstimmig unmittelbar-erfahrene und erfahrbare Natur, sondern eine im Erfahrungsdenken sich 
konstituierende, eine „erdachte“ Natur.” 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 332 
 
Hierbei fordern die in diesen Einstellungen vollzogenen Akte der Gemütswertung und der Praxis ebenfalls 
ihre Vorgegebenheiten, zu denen sie Stellung nehmen und an denen sie in phänomenologisch 
eigentümlichen Formen neue konstituierende Leistungen vollziehen. Die Gegenstände der vorgebenden 
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intentionalen Erlebnisse üben gleichsam Reize auf das je nachdem theoretisch, praktisch [oder] axiologisch 
sich einstellende Subjekt. Dieses reagiert auf den „Reiz“ mit entsprechenden logischen, axiologischen und 
praktischen Akten. 
 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 335 
 
Die vorgegebenen Gegenständlichkeiten sind im Vollzug der Gemütsakte bewusst in Charakteren der 
Gefälligkeit und Missfälligkeit, der Schönheit und Hässlichkeit, Zweckmäßigkeit und Zweckwidrigkeit usw. 
Sie sind so bewusst, sind aber so nicht in theoretischer Spontaneität bewusst als Subjekt-Gegenstände mit 
den Prädikaten der neuen Stufe, den Prädikaten gefällig, schön usw. Dazu bedarf es der theoretischen 
Einstellung mit den entsprechenden objektivierenden Blickwendungen und neuen theoretischen 
Spontaneitäten, mit denen sich dann aber von neuem Gegenstände höherer Stufe konstituieren….  
 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 354 
 
Wollen wir nun diesen Begriff gültig bestimmen, d.i. sein Wesen nicht aus der vagen Idee und 
überkommenen Urteilen entnehmen, sondern aus der klaren Gegebenheit heraus bestimmen, so haben wir 
exemplarisch auf das Bewusstsein zurückzugehen, in dem materielle Dinge originär und so vollkommen 
gegeben sind, dass uns für die Erfassung der allgemeinen Wesensform, der Idee, welche derartigen 
Gegenständlichkeiten die notwendige Regel vorschreibt, nichts fehlen kann. Sich irgendein Ding in dieser 
Art zur Gegebenheit zu bringen, heißt […] in kontinuierlicher Erfahrung dem wahrnehmungsmäßig 
Vermeinten „nachzugehen“. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 355 
 
Das Wahrnehmen hat ja seinen „Sinn“, es vermeint Etwas, und nicht ein leeres Etwas, so z.B. dieses Buch 
hier. […] Eigentlich gegeben ist z.B. hinsichtlich der Gestalt nur diese Vorderseite mit ihrer viereckigen 
Begrenzung und hinsichtlich der Färbung nur das Grau dieses Flächenstücks. Aber in der Gestaltmeinung 
liegt mehr, als was von der Gestalt „eigentlich“ gegeben ist, sie weist uns auf eine soeben unsichtbare 
Rückseite hin und weist damit auf gewisse Wahrnehmungsabläufe voraus, in denen wir, den „Kopf 
wendend“, die „Augen bewegend“ usw., immer Neues vom selben Ding (dem Vermeinten), von seiner 
Gestalt, seiner Farbe usw. zu Gesicht bekommen würden. Vorgezeichnet sind dabei die verschiedenen 
offenen Bestimmungsrichtungen, die im Dingvermeinten als solchen liegen, und für jede die zugehörigen, 
in ihrem Fortgang motivierten Wahrnehmungsabläufe, denen wir uns gleichsam nur hinzugeben haben, um 
die entsprechende Klarheit und Gegebenheit zu erzeugen. Nur wer sich so leiten lässt (und das gilt für alle 
gegenständlichen Wesensanalysen phänomenologischer Art), nur wer das Noema, die Dingmeinung selbst 
befragt und sich von ihr im Vollzug ihrer Anweisungen Antwort geben lässt, gewinnt die 
Wesenskomponenten des Vermeinten selbst und die Wesensverflechtungen, denen sie sich einordnen. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 369-70 
 
Indessen, für die Herstellung einer vollen Gegebenheit eines materiellen Dinges, in derjenigen, in der es 
seine wirkliche Wirklichkeit ausweist, ist diese Selbstvergessenheit nicht wohl angebracht. Wir brauchen 
bloß zu überlegen, wie ein Ding sich als solches, seinem Wesen nach, ausweist, und wir erkennen, dass im 
Sinn solcher Auffassung von vornherein Komponenten enthalten sein müssen, die auf das Subjekt 
zurückweisen, und zwar als menschliches Subjekt (oder reiner gefasst: animalisches Subjekt) in einem festen 
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Sinn, aber auch gleich weiter: zurückweisen auf eine Vielheit miteinander sich verständigender, ihre 
Erfahrungen austauschender Subjekte. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 370 
 
Fehlt dieses apperz[eptive] Gebiet, so bestimmt es also auch nicht meine Dingauffassungen, …. Im Übrigen 
habe ich dieselben Empfindungsmannigfaltigkeiten, schematischen Mannigfaltigkeiten, es erscheinen mir 
„dieselben“ realen Dinge mit denselben Eigenschaften, sich, wenn alles gut stimmt, ausweisend als 
„wirklich seiende“…. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 372 
 
Dieses Wie ist zunächst sehr rätselhaft, da wir doch, wie es scheint, nicht immerfort, wenn wir eine 
Dingauffassung vollziehen, eine Anzahl von Nebenmenschen mitgedacht und mitgesetzt haben, und zwar 
als [von] solchen, an die sozusagen zu appellieren wäre. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 416-7 
 
So ist Unveränderung Grenzfall der Veränderung, sie ordnet sich der Regel ein, vermöge der zu gleichen 
Umständen die gleichen funktionell abhängigen [Schemata] gehören. […] Die Regel ist nicht als solche 
bewusst. Sie drückt hier eine zur Apperzeption der realen Eigenschaft gehörige Form aus. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 421 
 
Vorerst ist zu notieren, dass das Ding der erfahrenden Anschauung, besser das Wahrnehmungsding, 
bestimmt apperzipiert ist in Hinsicht auf bestimmte reale Eigenschaften, aber dass vielerlei Eigenschaften 
dieser Art offen bleiben. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 427 
 
Bleiben wir in der „psychischen“ Sphäre. Ich urteile jetzt, ich urteile „dasselbe“ wieder. Ich habe eine 
bleibende Überzeugung. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 428 
 
Da ist von psychophysischer Disposition keine Rede. Es ist eine phänomenologisch eigentümlich 
charakterisierte und konstituierte Einheit. Es ist eine Einheit der Konsequenz. Ich bleibe konsequent in meiner 
Überzeugung. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 429 
 
1) Die Einheit des Erlebnisses, als Einheit der Dauer in der phänomenologischen Zeit. 2) Die Einheit der 
Erinnerung, der Erwartung, der Überzeugung, der Freude, der Hoffnung, des Wunsches, des Entschlusses 
usw. als habituelle Einheit (Einheit der ἕξις, oder soll man sagen διήγησις? Das scheint aber zu sagen: seine 
Stellung geben oder auch auseinanderlegen und bestimmen).” 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 437 
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Haben wir nun z.B. die Einheit einer bleibenden mathematischen Überzeugung, die Einheit einer 
fortdauernden Hoffnung usw., so ist das die Einheit Stiftende nicht eine Wahrnehmung als ein Akt (ein 
cogito), der ein zeitlich fixiertes Sein setzt, sondern ein anderer Akt. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 438-9 
 
Zum Beispiel, die Erinnerung an die erste Begegnung mit der Geliebten kehrt immer wieder. Sie wird in 
dem Wiederkehren übernommen, wir machen die Erinnerungsthese mit (nicht wie in den Fällen, wo wir 
die reproduzierte These des Themas durchstreichen, die Erinnerung nicht mehr gelten lassend). 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 439 
 
Oder [nehmen wir] die eine und ständige Freude. Die ursprungstiftende Freudenthese des bestimmten 
Inhalts ist ein dauerndes Thema. Wiederholt darauf zurückkommend, übernehmen wir die Freude, wir 
machen sie mit, geben uns hin an die alte und immer neue Freude. Oder wir fassen einen Entschluss, und 
wir sind fortdauernd entschlossen. In erneuten Akten (nämlich in reproduktiven) rekurrieren wir auf den 
alten Entschluss und machen ihn mit. Wir streichen ihn nicht durch, wir ändern nicht unsere 
Stellungnahme, wir kontinuieren sozusagen wollend den alten Willen. Es sind nicht Bejahungen in dem 
Sinn eines Ja bei Fragen. Hier stellen wir nicht von neuem das mögliche Willensthema in Frage, wir 
vollziehen keinen Willenszweifel, es ist nichts vorher in [der] Schwebe, um erst daraufhin ein 
entscheidendes Ja zu sagen (ein Willens-Ja). Es ist ein kontinuierliches Ja, wenn man das Wort noch 
gebrauchen will, eben das, was Übernahme, Hinnahme, Mitwollen sagt, wie unvollkommen die Ausdrücke 
auch sein mögen. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 442-3 
 
Diese Einheit der Meinung kann über das einzelne Ich hinausgehen und Einheit innerhalb einer 
Gemeinschaft von kommunizierenden Subjekten werden. Innerhalb eines Subjekts konstituiert sich die 
Einheit der „Meinung“, der bleibenden, dadurch dass in wiederholten reproduktiven Akten die 
ursprünglich gebende Meinung (die originär erwachsene Überzeugung, die ursprüngliche Wahrnehmung 
oder „Erfahrung“, der ursprüngliche Entschluss) „auflebt“ und das Thema übernommen wird, die These 
also in der Form der Übernahme aktuell ist. Es kann nun aber eine Person von einer anderen eine 
Überzeugung „übernehmen“, es kann eine Freude von Subjekt zu Subjekt übergehen, ebenso ein Wunsch, 
eine Begeisterung, ein Wille. Die Überzeugung, die jemand mir gegenüber ausspricht, kann ohne Weiteres 
in mich eingehen. Die „einfühlende, einverstehende“ Vergegenwärtigung spielt die Rolle der eigentlichen 
Reproduktion (der Erinnerung). Ich verstehe nicht nur und verstehe nicht nur ein, ich urteile mit, glaube 
mit, das Thema mit der setzenden Thesis geht mir ohne Weiteres ein: einsichtig oder nicht einsichtig, das 
ist einerlei. Man führt mir einen Beweis vor, ich verstehe den Beweis und mache ihn mit. Man spricht mir 
[gegenüber] einen axiomatischen Satz aus, ich verstehe ihn und sehe ihn mit ein. Man vertritt mir gegenüber 
mit Wahrscheinlichkeitsgründen den erhofften Sieg unserer Truppen. Ich verstehe die Gründe, ich nehme 
sie auf (mache das Begründen mit) und übernehme die Hoffnung. Es spricht jemand einen Wunsch aus, 
ich mache ihn mit, es ist nun nicht nur überhaupt mein Wunsch, sondern ein mitvollzogener, 
übernommener Wunsch. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 444 
 
Wir haben hier also zweierlei Übernahmen, wie überall in der Intersubjektivität, einmal ein passives Folgen, 
die Thesis wird mitgemacht, aber in passiver Übernahme, das andere Mal ein Folgen in der 
nachgestaltenden Aktivität, ein Folgen in dem inneren Nacherzeugen der hervorgeholten, vorgeführten 
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Begründungen, wodurch ein sekundäres Konstituieren, eine sekundäre Originalität erwächst, die doch nicht 
Originalität der Überzeugung, der Freude etc. ist. Wahre Selbständigkeit hat nur der, der von sich aus und 
in sich die Überzeugung, die Freude etc. konstituiert bzw. originär auf seine Motive hin sie konzipiert. Wo 
diese Selbständigkeit fehlt, gibt es aber noch den großen Unterschied der völlig passiven Hinnahme im 
passiven Folgen und im nachgestaltenden, nachmachenden Erzeugen, im Mitführen des vorgeführten 
Beweises usw. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 447 
 
In der Erfahrung, in der Sphäre ursprünglicher Konstitution, ist ursprünglich gegeben die Vielheit der Dinge in 
Raum und Zeit in mannigfaltigen Erscheinungen, ursprünglich gegeben auch Zoa, darunter Menschen 
(„vernünftige“ Lebewesen), nicht als Verbindungen (von getrennt Gegebenem), sondern als 
Doppeleinheiten, Einheiten, die zwei Schichten in sich unterscheiden lassen, Einheiten von Dingen und 
Subjekten mit ihren Subjektivitäten (alles zusammen „Seelen“).  
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 448 
 
Ursprünglich gegeben ist auch die Identität der Natur für alle Menschen und Tiere eben wieder durch die 
diese Wesen konstituierende App[erzeption].  
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 448-9 
 
Psychologie [ist] die Wissenschaft vom Geist im Naturzusammenhang..., d.i. die Wissenschaft... von der 
gegenständlichen Einheit Mensch und Tier nach der Einheitsschicht des Seelischen, [von] Menschen, die sich als 
Einheiten für unsere Erfahrung vor aller theoretischen Forschung konstituiert haben, und konstituiert 
innerhalb der Gesamteinheit Welt = Natur. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 451 
 
Wahrnehmungsgegenstände […] nicht nur einem Subjekt urpräsent sein können, sondern vielmehr die, wenn sie 
einem urpräsent sind, identisch  jedem anderen Subjekt, das mit dem vorausgesetzten in möglichen 
Einfühlungszusammenhängen steht, idealiter urpräsent gegeben sein könnten. Die Gesamtheit der 
möglicherweise urpräsenten Gegenstände, die allen kommunizierenden Subjekten einen Bereich 
gemeinsamer Urpräsenz bilden, ist die Natur im ersten und ursprünglichen Sinn. […] Prinzipiell setzt 
Gemeinsamkeit zweier Subjekte voraus Einfühlung und Einfühlung schon voraus, dass jedes Subjekt in 
seiner Umwelt Leiblichkeit konstituiert hat. Prinzipiell ist, was zwei Subjekten gemeinsam ist, nach idealer 
Möglichkeit allen Subjekten gemeinsam. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 460, n. 
Das Auge erscheint nicht visuell. Also, wir haben nicht eine visuelle Raumerscheinung des Auges, die wir 
in verschiedenen Punkten, Flächenstücken u.dgl. mit Farbe belegt finden und der wir dann außerdem 
Tastempfindungen einlegen könnten. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 463 
 
Das Ding selbst hat aber das Optimum an Eigenschaften (was ich von ihm sehe bei klarer Luft, bei hellem 
Tageslicht etc., ebenso schon das okulomotorische „Ding“, das bei bester Akkomodation gesehene etc.). 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 464 
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Die Dinge als Phantome sind Gestalten im Raum, mit einem Bestand von Qualitäten ausgefüllt. Alle Dinge 
stehen miteinander in der Einheit der Konstanz in kausalen Beziehungen, und dieser Titel drückt aus 
funktionelle Abhängigkeiten der Phantomveränderungen. Ein heißer Körper macht die Körper, alle Körper 
in seiner Umgebung, wärmer, bringt sie eventuell zum Schmelzen. Ein rot leuchtender Körper verbreitet 
sein rotes Licht über alle umgebenden Körper und modifiziert ihre Farbe. Ein Magnet setzt eine bewegliche 
Eisennadel in Bewegung, und in bestimmt zugehöriger Art, etc. Gehe ich diesen Abhängigkeiten nach, so 
erfasse ich neue Einheiten. Der Körper ist von einer bestimmten Eigenart in seinen kausalen Beziehungen 
und ist identisch derselbe, hat identische kausale Eigenschaften in Mannigfaltigkeiten seiner 
Veränderungen, abhängig von Ursachen. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 468-9 
 
Zum Sinn oder Wesen jeder Dingveränderung gehört es, dass sie eine kausale ist. Die Kausalität, von der 
aber hier die Rede ist, die reale Kausalität, führt uns in einen funktionellen Zusammenhang, in dem jede 
dingliche Veränderung (also kausale Veränderung) in Abhängigkeitsverhältnissen steht von anderen 
ebensolchen Veränderungen. Scheinbar führt uns das in einen Zirkel. Denn Dingveränderung ist nur 
Dingveränderung, wenn sie abhängig ist von anderen Dingveränderungen, die wieder nur in solchen 
Abhängigkeiten überhaupt Dingveränderungen sind, usw. Die Sachlage ist in voller Deutlichkeit die, dass 
Dinge Einheiten sind, die sich in schon vorkonstituierten Einheiten, den Vollschemata, bekunden bzw. in 
deren funktionellem Zusammenhang. Vollschemata sind noch keine Dinge, Gestaltänderungen oder 
Qualitätsänderungen der Schemata sind noch keine Veränderungen im realen Sinn. Sie gewinnen diese 
Bedeutung erst durch eine höhere Auffassungsstufe, in derjenigen, die wir schlechthin äußere Erfahrung 
(materielle, raumdingliche Erfahrung) nennen. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 486 
 
Wir haben zwei Hände, wir haben die ganze Leibesoberfläche als Tastfläche, und der Leib [ist] ein System 
von Tastorganen, und innerhalb des Ganzen [gibt es] verschiedene Teilorgane. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 493-4 
 
Aber […] wir […] betrachten die Eigenschaften, so hat dasselbe gestaltidentische Objekt je nach seiner 
Lage zu einem leuchtenden Körper [eine] verschiedene Erscheinungsfarbe (Erfüllung der Gestalt), ….. 
Dabei haben wir eine Norm: Beziehung zur Sonne, zum hellen Himmel (was freilich kein Ding ist) und 
Absehen von anderen, die Erscheinungsfarbe bestimmenden Körpern. Das „Optimale“, bei hochstehender 
Sonne etc., gilt als die Farbe selbst, und nicht das Abendrot etc., das alle eigene Farbe „überstrahlt“. Alle 
anderen Erscheinungsfarben sind „Aussehen von“, „Erscheinung von“ dieser ausgezeichneten 
Erscheinungsfarbe…. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 497 
 
In der niederen sinnendinglichen Stufe der Apperzeption (vor dem Denken) ist nicht nur die jeweilige 
momentane Farbe unexpliziert auf kausale Umstände bezogen, vielmehr ist zugleich die gegebene 
momentane Farbe Ähnlichkeitssymbol für eine optimale Farbe, die zugehört zu optimalen Umständen. Und es 
ist das eine vermittelte Intentionalität, sofern der Übergang in den optimalen Fall mit seinen 
kontinuierlichen Wandlungen der momentanen Farben und ihrer Umständlichkeiten erfahrungsmäßig 
vertraut ist…. 
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Hua IV-2/V-2 504 
 
Der Mensch hat seinen normalen Leib, aber er hat auch eine normale Personalität. Und dazu gehört: Er 
hat die Fähigkeit, logisch zu denken, braucht aber nicht immer wirklich korrekt zu denken (doch vorher 
noch die Fähigkeit, normal zu apperzipieren, und dazu gehört eben, dass er Subjekt einer einstimmig sich 
durchhaltenden Welt ist, Subjekt eines ideellen Systems von normalen Orthoästhesien, aber auch offen 
bleibenden normalen Heteroästhesien). Die Gemütssphäre kommt hier nicht in Betracht, es sei denn, 
soweit theoretische Interessen, theoretische Triebe und Willensakte in Frage sind. Die Ortho-Systeme 
machen die Idee einer eigenen, eben idealen Normalität [aus]. Laufen Erscheinungen im orthoästhetischen 
System ab, so haben wir hinsichtlich der Auffassungen bzw. der Auffassungssinne Deckung und nach 
fortschreitenden Komponenten Erfüllung in der einen Bedeutung: Immer Neues aus dem Sinn tritt in die 
Leibhaftigkeit, füllt sich mit der gemeinten Fülle. Andererseits, die Doxa erfährt durch diese Erfüllung 
Bekräftigung, die auch durch den Bereich der Mitwahrnehmung hindurchgeht, in der Weise des „Anteils“, 
und so bekräftigt sich (Erfüllung im zweiten Sinn) die ganze Wahrnehmungsdoxa. 
 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 513 
 
Verdeckt ein Körper einen anderen, und Verdeckung ist doch ein Grundstück für die Konstitution erster 
Stufe der Welt als einer Mannigfaltigkeit von Phantomen im Raum, so habe ich dynamisch im Durchgang 
durch die Verdeckung stückweise Verdeckung. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 537 
 
Die Begriffe, die man in der sinnlichen Abstraktion als Typenbegriffe bildet, all die beschreibenden Begriffe im 
Alltagsleben, wie kurz und lang, dick und dünn, rund und eckig, zackig, all die Gestaltbegriffe, die in der 
Naturgeschichte in Anlehnung an bekannte konkrete Gegenständlichkeiten allgemeiner verwendet werden, 
wie fächerförmig, bandförmig, lappen-, kelch-, lanzettförmig, gefedert, strauchförmig usw., sind, so 
unentbehrlich sie in der Morphologie sind, durchaus ungeometrische. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 542-3 
 
Und es gehört eben zum Wesen der Natur, dass sie zunächst „erscheinende“ Natur ist einer rein exakten 
„Natur an sich“, welche bestimmbar ist als eine ideale Grenze, der wir uns in Reihen von 
Annäherungswerten eben in infinitum annähern können. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 554 
 
Die Logifizierung des Raums, der Zeit und der Materialität, die raum- und zeitfüllend ist, ergibt nach Eidos 
und Faktum die mathematische Naturwissenschaft. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 555-6 
 
…ist die Wahrheit der deskriptiven Wissenschaften bezogen auf Erkennende von normaler „Sinnlichkeit“. 
Sie hat Relation zu einer Gemeinschaft Erfahrender und auf Grund der Erfahrung Denkender, die ihre 
gemeinsame Welt inhaltlich1 mit typischer Gleichartigkeit erfahren, in sinnlichen Begriffen also beschreiben 
können, die sie als normal Erfahrende gemein haben können. Das setzt also das Faktum normaler 
Erfahrung, normaler Anschauungsgegebenheiten voraus, korrelativ zur Erfahrung also Erscheinungsdinge 
mit typisch gleichen Inhaltscharakteren, mit denselben Farben, sinnlichen Formen etc. Die deskriptiven 
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Typenbegriffe, die „sinnlichen“, haben Beziehung auf meine „normale Sinnlichkeit“. […] „Gewöhnlich“ 
sehe ich die Dinge mit gewissen Bestimmtheiten und laufen alle Wandlungen in einem gewissen Stil. […] 
Die Identität des Dinges erhält sich bewusstseinsmäßig (in den Zusammenhängen der Erfahrung, die zur 
Erfahrung des einen und selben Dinges anschaulich zusammenhängen) im Relativismus der Kausalitäten 
der Außendinge. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 574 
 
Also, das Feld der immanenten Motivationen ist ein unendlich reiches, und vor der Bewusstseinsanalyse ist 
nur ganz Geringfügiges davon bekannt, aber immerhin mancherlei. Sonst könnte gar nicht die Aufgabe für 
uns eine sinnvolle sein, die sich jeder Historiker stellt und jeder Biograph: die seelische Entwicklung einer 
Persönlichkeit „verständlich“ zu machen. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 575-6 
 
Ich weiß, was das [für] eine Persönlichkeit, ein Mensch ist, dem Allgemeinen nach, and es ist Sache der 
Einfühlungserfahrung, in ihrem Fortgang mich über den Nebenmenschen, über seinen Charakter, über sein 
Wissen und Können, über seine habituellen Dispositionen verschiedener Art und Richtung zu belehren. 
[…] Je mehr Erfahrungen ich in Bezug auf einen Menschen, und zunächst in Bezug auf Menschen 
überhaupt, in Bezug auf Menschen dieser Klasse, dieses Standes, dieses Alters etc. habe, um so reicher, 
bestimmter ist meine einfühlende Auffassung von ihm (ich kann auch sagen: meine Vorstellung und 
Kenntnis von ihm), um so mehr kann ich ihn „durchschauen“…. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 576 
 
Ich fühle gleichsam mit ihm die Neigung zu den Versuchungen, das Aufkommen der und der Affekte unter 
den jeweiligen motivierenden Umständen, das Empor-Tauchen der Assoziation, auf Grund der für sein 
Bewusstsein reproduktiv wirksamen Momente usw. Er war in Paris. Dieses Bild eines Pariser Gebäudes 
wird ihn alsbald an seinen Aufenthalt erinnern, seine Gedanken also in diese Richtung lenken usw. Ich 
selbst verhalte mich in diesen Verhältnissen ganz anders, meine Vorstellungen, Wahrnehmungen usw. 
haben in meinem Ich eine ganz andere Motivationsweise, sie assoziieren andere Gedanken, haben andere 
Gefühlsbegleiter, es werden andere Urteile in mir motiviert, andere Leidenschaften werden aktualisiert, 
kurzum: Ich bin ein anderer Mensch, habe einen anderen, sei es intellektuellen, sei es emotionellen, Habitus, 
Charakter. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 578 
 
Es hängt aber von den uns leitenden Interessen, vor allem von den praktischen des handelnden Lebens ab, 
wie große Bestimmtheit wir für das Verständnis verlangen müssen. Das Verstehen ist ein vollkommenes, 
wenn es diesen Interessen angemessen ist. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 579 
 
Was dieser Mensch gefühlt, gedacht, getan hat, nicht bis ins Einzelste hinein, für jede Minute, für jede 
Stunde etc. seines Lebens, sondern den Individualtypus dieser Persönlichkeit, wie sie sich innerhalb des 
allgemeinen Typen des Menschendaseins darstellt, will ich erforschen. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 580 
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Ich muss dieses Leben intuitiv nachleben und in diesem Nachleben die Persönlichkeit zur „lebendigen“ 
Anschauung bringen. Es genügt nicht eine beliebige „Anschauung“, die eine beliebige Beschreibung, auch 
die schlechteste, liefert. Die Einheit der Persönlichkeitsanschauung, die hier als „Nachleben“ bezeichnet 
ist, ist eine besondere: Ich muss mich nicht ihrer in vereinzelte Akte derselben einfühlen, sondern ich muss 
das einheitliche Leben in extenso nachleben können, d.i. gleichsam mitfühlen, mitdenken, mithandeln 
können in einer Weise, als ob ich wirklich so fühlen etc. müsste, dass ich eben in einfühlender Weise von 
den betreffenden Motivationen berührt, ja gleichsam selbst motiviert bin. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 617-8 
 
Der Geist ist [...] eine Einheit der Selbsterhaltung als Erhaltung der Individ[ualität] in ihrer Dauer, die 
Entwicklung ist. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 618-9 
 
Unter dem Titel „Person“, geistiges Ich, verstehen wir nicht nur einen reinen Ichpunkt, sofern er 
Subjektpunkt von cog[itationes] ist im betreffenden Erlebnisstrom, sondern das Konkretum: das Ich mit dem 
Erlebnisstrom, aber diesen als Leben des Ich. Und weiter, wir nehmen das Ich als sich in diesem Leben, in 
dem Sich-Verhalten zur Umwelt empirisch als Individuum einer individuellen Eigenart bekundend. Das 
Konkretum nehmen wir da ausschließlich nur, insofern es Träger des Individuellen ist. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 619 n. 
 
Will ich die Motivation und damit die Individualität verstehen, so muss ich auch die Unterlagen der 
Motivation, das Motivierende einverstehen können. Und muss man nicht sagen, die Person ist nicht nur Subjekt 
der Aktmotivation und in ihren Eigenheiten durch sie charakterisiert, sondern, sofern sie eine 
Motivationsunterlage voraussetzt, die von „äußeren“ Umständen abhängig sich verändert, so muss ich auch 
die Abhängigkeiten, die in Frage sind, kennenlernen? 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 621  
 
Die geistige Einheit als Person, als Individualität ist doch Einheit des Sich-Erhaltens in der Umwelt, die 
Umwelt für das Ich ist, das da tätig ist, das Ich der Freiheit. Es ist zunächst reines Ich, Identisches einer 
Reihe von cogit[ationes], und die cog[itationes] schließen Auffassungen und Setzungen ein, in denen für 
das Ich Sachen da sind. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 641 
 
Einerseits gehört es zum Geistesleben selbst, dass der Mensch sich gegenüber hat, sich gegenüber 
wahrnimmt und sonstwie bewusstseinsmäßig gegeben hat eine Dingwelt, die ja das Feld seiner Arbeit und 
Leistung ist. Und er hat sie sich gegenüber als eine Umwelt, von der er in seinem Seelenuntergrund abhängig 
(real-kausal abhängig) ist. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 678 
 
Das Ding, „objektiv“ bestimmt durch bloß „primäre Qualitäten“. Demgegenüber das anschauliche 
substanzielle Ding [als] „bloße Erscheinung“, bezogen auf den animalen Menschen. Das Animal (zunächst 
der Mensch) als Natur. 
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Hua IV-2/V-2 690-1 
 
Erfahrene Objekte der Umwelt sind bald aufgemerkte, bald nicht, und sind sie es nicht, so üben sie einen 
größeren oder geringeren „Reiz“, sie „wecken“ ein Interesse. Und vermöge dieses Interesses üben sie eine 
Tendenz der Zuwendung, und diese Tendenz fließt frei ab in der Zuwendung, oder sie fließt erst ab, 
nachdem Gegentendenzen geschwächt, überwunden sind usw. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 691 
 
Das Objekt übt einen Reiz, eventuell vermöge seiner Erscheinungsweise, die eine wohlgefällige ist. 
„Dasselbe“ Objekt kann mir in einer ungefälligen Erscheinungsweise gegeben sein, und ich erfahre den 
Reiz, meine Stellung passend zu ändern, meine Augen zu bewegen usw. Und die gefällige 
Erscheinungsweise ist da, das Telos der Bewegung ist erreicht. Hier kommen Körper- und 
Augenbewegungen wieder nicht als reale Vorgänge der Physik in Betracht, sondern ein Horizontbereich 
freier Bewegungsmöglichkeiten als praktischer Möglichkeiten ist mir eigentümlich gegenwärtig, und dem 
„Ich kann“ folgt gemäß dem Walten der Reize und Tendenzen ein „Ich tue“, und korrelativ hat das Ende 
den Charakter eines τέλος, des Ziels. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 699 
 
Das personale Ich […] ist notwendig sich entwickelnd und entwickelt habend, es hat seine notwendige 
Genesis (Teleiosis). 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 701-2 
 
Das Eigentümliche [ist], dass „im“ geistigen Subjekt die Apperzeption „Ich“, in der dieses Subjekt der 
„Gegenstand“ ist (wenn auch nicht das thematische Objekt), auftritt. Im Ding tritt nicht eine Apperzeption 
Ding auf, sondern nur in Subjekten. Also Scheidung: Ich im Ich-bin auf Subjektseite und Ich im Ich-bin als 
Objekt für mich, das im seienden Ich-bin vorgestelltes, konstituiertes, eventuell gemeintes im spezifischen 
Sinn ist: das Mich. Gemeint ist hier: „Ich, die Person“, konstituiert für mich; das Ich, das als selbstbewusstes 
ist. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 702 
 
Ein Geist hat Selbstbewusstsein. Welche Rolle spielt das? Eine Seele braucht kein Selbstbewusstsein zu 
haben. Eine Person hat Selbstbewusstsein, ein Ich (das ist dasselbe). 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 733 
 
Es ist dadurch eine Erfahrungseinheit zwischen Person und Person hergestellt, oder deutlicher, eine Verbindung 
der Ingerenz, so wie zwischen den physischen Dingen Erfahrungseinheiten bestehen, Einheiten in der 
Erfahrung gegeben sind, so das Stoßen und Gestoßenwerden, das Sich-Verändern der Dinge in Folge 
physischer stoßender (wirkender) Ursachen, oder Verbindungen des Zusammengeklebt-, zu einem 
physischen Dingverband Verbunden-Sein, wie bei einer Kette etc. [...]“[Wir haben] Subjekte, durch 
Ingerenz aufeinander Einfluss nehmend, einander personal bestimmend, unmittelbar im leiblichen 
Ausdruck. Leiblich vermittelte äußere „Zeichen“, nicht nur flüchtige Laute, sondern auch bleibende 
Schriftzeichen u.dgl. (also vom Subjekt erzeugte Erfahrungsgegenständlichkeiten) dienen der Ingerenz. [Es 
gibt auch eine] Loslösung von dem bestimmten Subjekt, [eine] Beziehung auf ein unbekanntes Subjekt: 
Jemand hat das geschrieben. 
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Hua IV-2/V-2 734 
 
Der fremde Gedanke kann unter wechselnden Umständen, je nach meiner psychischen Situation, nach dem 
Stand meiner Entwicklung, der Ausbildung meiner Disposition etc., eine verschiedene, eine ungeheure oder 
ganz geringe Wirkung üben; derselbe Gedanke auf verschiedene Personen unter „ähnlichen“ Umständen 
verschieden wirkend. [...]Eventuell eigne ich es mir selbsttätig an, und es wird zu Meinem. Es hat nun nicht 
mehr den Charakter einer Zumutung, der ich träge nachgegeben [habe], die mich von außen bestimmt [hat], 
es ist eine Stellungnahme geworden, die von meinem Ich entspringt, ausgeht (nicht ein bloßer Reiz, der 
darauf hin geht). [...] Allgemeine Sitten und Gebräuche [erscheinen] als unbestimmt allgemeine 
Zumutungen, fremd und charakterisiert als fremd: „Man“ urteilt so, „man“ hält so die Gabel etc., 
Forderungen des „Man“, der sozialen Gruppe, des Standes etc., der freilich keine Person ist. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 735 
 
[Wir haben eine Spannung zwischen] Autorität und Freiheit. a) Nicht fremden Einflüssen folgen (es sei 
denn, dass ich sie mir zueignen kann), sondern mir selbst folgen, b) nicht von Neigungen, Trieben getrieben 
sein, sondern frei tätig sein, vernünftig tätig sein und wahre Autonomie [walten lassen]. Fremde Einwirkung 
ist blinder Trieb, oder ich folge der Vernunft, dann [entscheide ich] aus mir selbst. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 736 
 
Gewohnheiten als Gewohnheiten des Ich, sich zu verhalten, wie die Gewohnheit, am Abend seinen 
Schoppen zu trinken, sind Eigenheiten des Subjekts, erworbene Eigenheiten, aber sind sie Eigenschaften 
seiner Individualität? Liegen diese nicht vielmehr auf Seiten seiner eigentlichen Aktivitäten? Und wie wären 
individuelle Eigenschaften, die die geistige Individualität charakterisieren, auszuzeichnen? Oder sollen wir 
doch sagen: Der gesamte Stil und Habitus des Subjekts, der als eine zusammenstimmende Einheit durch 
alle Verhaltungsweisen, durch alle Aktivitäten und Passivitäten hindurchgeht, und zu dem auch der ganze 
seelische Untergrund, der materialen Bestand beisteuert, seinen Beitrag leistet, mache die Individualität aus? 
[...] [Es gibt] ein mannigfaltiges Reiz-Erfahren, Getriebenwerden und Aktiv-Stellung-Nehmen und damit 
in eins eine beständige Bereicherung des Erlebnisstroms, die vom Ichsubjekt geleistet ist, sein Walten ist 
ein Erleben, das es selbst aus sich hervortreibt. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 737 
 
Aber wirklich einheitliche Person ist das Ich, wenn es einen gewissen durchgängig einheitlichen Stil hat, dessen 
Beschreibung eine schwierige Sache ist. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 742 
 
Überall vermittelt bei der Tätigkeit an Objekten und Objekterscheinungen (perzeptiven) der Leib als 
ursprüngliches Feld freier Tätigkeit. Aber in solchen Zusammenhängen fungiert auch das Erwägen, 
Nachdenken, das vermittelnde Phantasieren und phantasierende Entwerfen von Zielen und Wegen etc.  
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 742-3 
  
Vom Gehabten geht eventuell ein Reiz aus, eine auf das Subjekt hingehende Tendenz zum Erfassen: Das 
Subjekt ist passiv, wenn es dem Reiz folgt, die gespannte Tendenz sich löst, in Form einer Zuwendung. 
Pure Passivität [liegt vor], wo immer einer von einem Hintergrundobjekt, einem bloß gehabten, 
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vorgegebenen, ausgehenden Tendenz vom Subjekt Folge geleistet wird. [Zum Beispiel] das infolge des 
Reizes erfolgende Hinwenden des Auges, aber auch das Ergreifen mit der Hand. [Hier haben wir] Reize zu 
ursprünglich passiven Tätigkeiten, Essen und Trinken, Rauchen etc. Ein Gedanke taucht auf, und von ihm 
geht eine Tendenz aus zur Verfolgung einer Gedankenreihe, die als dunkle Intention wirksam ist. Ich folge 
passiv. „Ein Spaziergang“, der Sonnenschein lockt, ich folge. Das ganze Heer der Neigungen: [den] 
Neigungen folgen und nichts weiter. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 743 
 
Aktionen: Einer Neigung folgen, das ist nicht ein bloßes Geschehen, wie wenn in meiner Umwelt ein Ding 
sich bewegt ohne jedwedes Mittun meinerseits (ein anderer Begriff von Passivität) – andererseits ist nicht 
jedes Tun ein solches Einer-Neigung-Folgen: Ich als eigentlich aktives Subjekt, als eigentliches 
Willenssubjekt, ich als eigentlich handelndes Subjekt. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 743-4 
 
Ich kann mich aber auch dem Reizenden zuwenden (in unserem Beispiel [etwa], ohne noch das Auge 
hinzubewegen). Ich gebe dem Reiz noch nicht nach, lasse mich aber nachher von ihm hinziehen. Ich gebe 
nach. Das ist eine Zustimmung. Oder ich gebe nicht nach, ich lehne ab, Negation. Im Widerstreit 
[hingegen], da ist keine Ablehnung, wenn ich dem a nachgebe und nicht dem b, es sei denn, dass ich auf 
Seiten des b wirklich eine Durchstreichung vollziehe. Aber immerhin, es ist ein bloßes Befolgen, Nachgeben 
der Tendenz, oder kann es sein. Ebenso [kann es sein, dass] ich widerstrebe, aber die Kraft der sich nun 
steigernden Tendenz überwiegt, und so werde ich fortgeschoben. Die Wirkung geht aus vom Tendierenden, 
das Reizobjekt ist das Wirkende, ich bin leidend. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 744 
 
Ich kann aber auch selbst wirken, eine Spontaneität des Tuns kann von mir ausgehen. Die Tendenz vom 
Objekt her ist da, [aber] es kann sein, dass ich [mich] frei bewege, von mir aus eben dahin will, wohin die 
Tendenz mich zieht. Ich entscheide mich für die Tendenz und lasse mich nicht bloß von ihr ziehen und 
gebe nicht bloß nach, weil ich zu faul bin, mich dagegen zu stemmen etc. Das Ziel steht mir als wertes da, 
und darum folge ich. Ich fühle den Drang zu urteilen: Ich sehe hin und erfasse einen berechtigenden Grund, 
und nun urteile ich gemäß der Tendenz, aber nicht bloß dem Drang nachgebend. Alle Vernunfttätigkeit ist 
Spontaneität und wirkliche Aktivität des Subjekts. In ihr ist es rein wirkend, selbsttätig, von sich aus. 
Selbsttätig ist das Subjekt, wo es sich nicht von dem „Reiz“ der Sachen bestimmen lässt, sondern wo es 
ihrem eigenen Sinn und Recht Ehre widerfahren lässt, wo die Intention, deren Subjekt das Ich ist, sich 
erfüllt. Das „meinende“, stellungnehmende Subjekt, das Subjekt als Vernunftsubjekt ist tätig, wo es sein Ziel 
erstrebt und erreicht, und nicht, wo es von Trieben, Neigungen passiv sich ziehen lässt. […] Wer sich oft 
von Trieben, Neigungen, die blind sind, weil sie nicht vom Sinn der als Reiz fungierenden Sachen ausgehen, 
nicht in ihm ihre Quelle haben, ziehen lässt, ist unvernünftig getrieben. Halte ich aber etwas für wahr, eine 
Forderung für sittlich, also aus den entsprechenden Werten entquellend etc., und folge ich frei der 
vermeinten Wahrheit, der vermeinten sittlichen Güte, so bin ich vernünftig, aber relativ, sofern ich mich 
darin ja irren kann. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 745 
 
Das Ich, das Subjekt der cogitationes, ist zugleich Subjekt der auf es abzielenden Reize, Subjekt der 
Neigungen, Triebe … Im Erleben waltet immerfort Subjektivität, wir haben immerfort eine 
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Bewusstseinsschicht des cogito, des spezifischen Bewusstseins-von, und eine Unterschicht, von der aus die 
Reize, Tendenzen ausgehen. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 745-6 
 
Nehmen wir nun einzelne Zusammenhänge heraus, wie einen theoretischen Gedankengang, oder einen 
praktischen Zusammenhang von Abzweckungen, Ansetzungen von Mitteln, Realisierungen, ein Planen, ein 
Versuchen von Projekten, ein Schwanken zwischen vermittelnden Ausführungen usw., so ist solch ein 
Zusammenhang „verständlich“. Das sagt: Wenn ich jemanden mir gegenüber habe und durch Einfühlung 
erfasse, dass er die und die einzelnen Handlungen vollzogen hat, so habe ich damit sein Handeln noch nicht 
verstanden. Ich habe es, und [zwar] voll verstanden, wenn ich den Motivationszusammenhang rekonstruiert 
habe, was ihm als Ziel vor Augen stand, was ihm als erreichbares Mittel erschien, welche Neigungen, Reize 
auf ihn einstürmten, welche er abwies, und warum er es tat. Kurz, überall verstehe ich das Warum, wenn 
ich ihn als Subjekt erfasse, und zwar als Subjekt von Passivitäten und Aktivitäten, und im Zusammenhang 
herausbekomme, wo er passiv getrieben war und wo aktiv sich entscheidend, und wie es mit seinen 
Gründen stand, was ihm als Gründe galt[en]. Ich verstehe sein Theoretisieren (das ich als falsches erkenne), 
wenn ich seinen ganzen Beweisgang heraus habe und sehe, dass er da und dort die und die Verwechslungen 
begangen hat, und woran es lag, dass er verwechselte, etwa seine schlechte Schrift, durch welche zwei 
verschiedene Zeichen sinnlich sehr ähnlich ausfielen etc. Das sind also Zusammenhänge der 
Verständlichkeit in bestimmtem Sinn. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 746 
 
Tendenzen haben ihre Genesis, so alle gewohnheitsmäßigen Tendenzen. Ich führe bei mir eine Art [von] 
Tendenzen auf Gewohnheit zurück: Sie sind nicht nur da und wirksam (sie tendieren eben), ich weiß auch, 
dass sie aus Wiederholung des Nachgebens ihre „Stärke“ gewonnen haben. Ich erinnere mich, dass ich 
öfter nachgegeben hatte, und mache die Erfahrung, dass sie mit der Wiederholung an Stärke zunehmen 
(bzw. dass der Widerstand gegen sie immer schwerer, das Nachgeben immer wahrscheinlicher wurde). 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 746-7 
 
Dabei aber spielt immer ein irrationaler Rest seine Rolle: [z.B.] die Eigenart dieses Subjekts, die sich in den 
ursprünglichen Reizen schon zeigt, sofern nicht alle Reize ursprünglich bei allen Subjekten in gleicher Weise 
wirken werden etc.” 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 747 
 
[I]ch durch Erfahrung in Betreff dieses Subjekts allmählich die Eigenart seiner Motivationen empirisch 
kennenlerne, ich verstehe dieses Subjekt in seinem Verhalten im gegebenen Fall, sofern ich 
erfahrungsmäßig weiß, dass es sich unter solchen Umständen so motivieren lässt. Aber freilich, ein tieferes 
Verständnis habe ich erst, wenn ich den „Ursprung“ dieser Motivationsweise klarlegen und ihn selbst 
verstehen kann. 
Assoziation und Gewohnheit sind Titel, unter denen der Ursprung der passiven Tendenzen steht. Die 
Kenntnis des Erlebnislaufs der Subjektivität, ihre Überschau würde nichts nützen, wenn ich von 
Assoziation und Gewohnheit nichts wüsste. Andererseits konstruiere ich das eigentliche Ichleben, wenn 
ich die eigentlichen Ichzusammenhänge, die Art, wie auf dem Untergrund von passiven Tendenzen das Ich 
als tätiges eingreift, sich bald treiben lässt, bald verständig eingreift, aufkläre. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 747-8 
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Im aktiven Verhalten wie im passiven Getrieben- und Bestimmtsein von Reizen, Neigungen, 
Leidenschaften erweist jede Subjektivität ihre individuelle Eigenart, ihren erworbenen und angeborenen 
Charakter. Ich lerne sie kennen, indem ich, das Subjekt im Einzelverhalten verstehend, und nach einzelnen 
Zusammenhängen, und das in wiederholter Erfahrung, seinen individuellen Typus miterfasse. Allerdings 
reicht hier eines dem anderen die Hand. Eine hinreichend tiefe Erfassung seiner 
Motivationszusammenhänge fordert schon Kenntnis seines Charakters, und Kenntnis des Charakters 
fordert vorgängige Kenntnis von Motivationszusammenhängen. Aber das gibt keinen Zirkel. In unserer 
beständigen Menschenerfahrung haben wir an uns und anderen hinreichend vereinzelte und 
Zusammenhangs-Erkenntnisse gewonnen und unmittelbare Charakterbeurteilung, die sich dann bewährt 
und immerfort auch korrigiert etc. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 754 
 
Im bloßen sinnlichen Anschauen unterster Stufe lebend, es theoretisch vollziehend, haben wir eine bloße 
Sache in der schlichtesten Weise theoretisch erfasst. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 755-6 
 
Wir können im wollenden Sich-Entschließen bzw. im ausführenden Tun leben. Dann sind vorausgesetzt 
gewisse vorstellende Akte, eventuell Denkakte verschiedener Stufe, wertende Akte, aber sämtlich sind es 
Akte, die nicht im ausgezeichneten Sinn vollzogen sind, die nicht den Modus theoretischer Akte haben, 
den Modus des in den Akten „vollziehenden Lebens“. Der eigentliche Vollzug liegt im Wollen und Tun. 
 
Hua IV-2/V-2 759 
 
Es handelt sich hier also in der Tat um allgemeine Wesenseigentümlichkeiten, die zu allen Akten, 
insbesondere zu den fundiert gebauten Akten, gehören. Das erlebende Subjekt kann zunächst überhaupt 
im Vollzug eines Akts leben. Und gleichwertig damit ist der Ausdruck: Im ausgezeichneten Sinn ist das Ich 
auf das „Gegenständliche“ gerichtet, ist dem Gegenständlichen hingegeben. Dabei ist das Gegenständliche 
je nach der Grundart des Akts als in verschiedener Weise charakterisiert bewusst: Urteilsgegenstand, 
Wertgegenstand, Willensgegenstand. A priori gehört aber zu dieser Sachlage die Möglichkeit einer 
Einstellungsänderung des Subjekts, vermöge deren es immer, wenn es nicht von vornherein in einer 
theoretischen Einstellung war, in eine theoretische Einstellung übergehen kann, in welcher also das 
Gegenständliche theoretischer Gegenstand wird, Gegenstand einer aktuell vollzogenen Seinssetzung, in der 
das Ich lebt und das Gegenständliche erfasst, als Seiendes fasst und setzt. 
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Thesis Summary - English 
 
In this work, I offer a new interpretation of Edmund Husserl’s seminal work on the deeply 
interrelated, but mutually irreducible, themes of intersubjectivity and selfhood. Drawing upon a 
significant body of still-unpublished manuscripts, I argue that Husserl’s take on the self-other 
relation can only fully come into view once we trace out its implication in his rich discussions of 
empathy, embodiment, and personal life. In Chapter 1, I introduce and motivate the dissertation 
by offering a preliminary take on one of its central thematic threads: the phenomenology of 
empathy. Chapter 2 lays the groundwork for my later discussion of ‘animate empathy,’ by 
explicating Husserl’s conception of nature as a domain of perceptible materiality.  In Chapter 3, I 
develop Husserl’s thought that not only one’s own but also other perceiving bodies are implicated 
in the perception of material nature. I then suggest that what this thought lead us towards is a 
conception of a kind of empathy I term ‘animate empathy’ that comprises our perceptually-based 
understanding of animals, whether human or non-human, as bodily beings perceptually sensitive 
to a common world. Chapter 4 breaks thematically with the previous chapter, in that it temporarily 
puts empathy aside and focusses instead on the issues of self-consciousness and personal self-
acquaintance. Whereas Chapter 4 was concerned with offering a solely first-personal account of 
personal selfhood, Chapter 5 considers together interpersonal empathy and the deeply 
intersubjective being of the person. 
 
Thesis Summary – Danish  
 
Jeg vil i denne afhandling præsentere en ny fortolkning af Edmund Husserls indflydelsesrige 
arbejde med temaerne ‘intersubjektivitet’ og ‘selv’. To samhørige, men gensidigt irreducible 
temaer. Gennem en læsning af stadig upublicerede manuskrifter, argumenterer jeg, at Husserls 
teori om Selv-Anden relationen kun kan komme til sin fulde ret, hvis man tager højde for dennes 
implikationer i hans behandling af begreberne ‘empati’, ‘kropslighed’ og det ‘personlige liv’. I 
første kapitel introducerer jeg afhandlingen ved at fremlægge en præliminær udlægning af et af 
dennes centrale temaer; empatiens fænomenologi. Kapitel to danner fundamentet for min senere 
diskussion om ‘animate’ empati’ gennem en analyse af Husserls beskrivelse af naturen som 
sanselighedens domæne. I kapitel tre videreudvikler jeg Husserls påstand om, at ikke blot ens 
egen krop, men også andres perciperende kroppe er involverede i perceptionen af materialitet. 
Dette leder os til en form for empati som jeg denoterer ‘animate empati’. Begrebet dækker over 
vores perceptuelt baserede forståelse af dyr, menneskelige eller ikke-menneskelige, som kropslige 
væsner perceptuelt følsomme over for en fælles verden. Kapitel fire bryder tematisk med de 
foregående kapitler, idet det midlertidigt tilsidesætter ‘empati’ for i stedet at fokusere på 
‘selvbevidsthed’ og ‘personal self-acquiantance.’ I kapitel fem inddrages en undersøgelse af 
interpersonel empati og den intersubjektive karakter af det at være ‘person’. 
 
